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ABSTRACT
The War of Candia, 161*5-69, is one of the most important events 
-which occurred in the East during the seventeenth century. As a war 
between the Republic of Venice and the resurgent Ottoman em p ir e ,  the 
war provides an excellent opportunity to study the general history 
of the Mediterranean area, and also to examine one of the important 
factors involved in the seemingly inexorable decline of the once re­
nown Venetian state. The study attempts to analyze the war not merely 
frcm the perspective of military history, hut also tries to assess the 
economic, commercial, and social repercussions of the struggle.
Since the war itself oscillated between periods of extremely 
intensive fighting and those of general quiescence, an effort has been 
made to divide the twenty-four year conflict into its three major 
stages: 161*5-50, 1650-66, and 1667-69. Moreover, there is included 
an examination of the years immediately preceding the outbreak of 
war in an effort to analyze the state of the Venetian empire and its 
numerous imperial possessions prior to 1645.
Finally, in order to place the war in its proper perspective with 
respect to international relations in Europe, considerable time has 
been devoted to the effects of the conflict on seventeenth-
century European politics. In this way it is hoped that a broader and 
deeper understanding of French, Italian, Spanish, and Imperial diplomacy 
might be developed.
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XPREFACE
The Candian war i s  a  la rg e ly  fo rgo tten  episode in  European h is to ry . 
Like so much of th e  h isto ry  of seventeenth-century Venice, th e  struggle 
fo r  Crete e ith e r  has been lo s t  in  th e  shadow of th e  Venetian Renaissance 
or has been g lib ly  pushed aside as j u s t  another example o f the  la te r  
Republic 's decay. Recent h is to r ie s  concerning th e  war have generally  
focused on c e rta in  sp ec if ic  events o r years o f th e  war without making 
any e ffo r t  to  deal w ith th e  struggle  in  i t s  to ta l i t y .  Consequently th is  
work i s  designed to  do p rec isely  what has been attempted only in  p a rt .  
This study deals with the war in  i t s  e n tire ty , t re a tin g  i t  not only as 
one aspect of th e  general decline of Venice during th e  century but also 
try in g  to  fuse in to  a d iscern ib le  whole th e  many so c ia l ,  economic, and 
p o l i t ic a l  strands o f the c o n flic t.
In  a c e rta in  sense the  Candian war was l a te  in  coming. By I 6U5 
Venetian greatness in  the  easte rn  Mediterranean was a fading glory of 
the  p a s t. In terms Toynbee might use , the  stage was se t  fo r  a c lash 
between a s ta te  in  ascendancy and one in  a  condition of sp ira lin g  decay. 
As in  any such s tru g g le , the outcome remained only a question o f tim e.
The troub les which continued to  plague the  commercial and m ilita ry  
hegemony of the  Venetian s ta te  since the  f i r s t  voyages of Vasco da Gama 
in  the la te  f if te e n th  century are well-known to  h isto rian s  of early  
modern Europe. Economically, the  wealth Venice garnered by monopolizing 
the trade  of the  East dwindled over the  course o f a century in  the  wake 
of the  energetic competition of Portuguese, Dutch, and English tra d e rs . 
This commercial decline was accompanied by a l l  the  so c ia l repercussions
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2which inev itab ly  seem to  follow periods of economic con traction . With 
respect to  population, Venice found i t  increasing ly  d i f f ic u l t  to  a t t r a c t  
or r e ta in  the  numbers of people who had once made th e  Queen of the 
A driatic  one o f Europe's most populous c i t i e s .  In  terms o f lead ersh ip , 
the  energetic  and resourcefu l members o f  the  Venetian a ris to cracy  f led  
to  th e  mainland leaving  behind an enfeebled and enervated ru lin g  c la s s .  
Europe's most powerful s ta te  in  1500 had, w ith in  a century and a h a lf ,  
receded in  prominence and had rap id ly  assumed the  s ta tu s  o f  another one 
of I t a ly 's  re la tiv e ly  unimportant p e tty  kingdoms.
I t  was ju s t  such a Venice together with her empire o f  d is ta n t,  
tenuously-held islands and enclaves which was confronted in  th e  seven­
teen th  century by the  challenge of a resurgent and vigorous Ottoman 
s ta te .  During the ha lf-cen tu ry  a f te r  the  B a ttle  of Lepanto in  1571, the 
Ottoman empire remained la rg e ly  paralyzed by in te rn a l  d is in teg ra tio n . 
Corruption ta in te d  the  highest c irc le s  of government, and a  lack o f in ­
te l l ig e n t  and determined leadersh ip  caused th e  m ilita ry  and f in a n c ia l 
might of th e  Turkish empire to  flounder in  a s ta te  of perpetual confusion. 
The advent of Sultan Murad IV in  1623 and th e  r is e  of the K iu p rili family 
several decades la te r  tended to  reverse th is  dec line . As a re s u l t  a 
weakened Venetian s ta te  was forced in to  b a t t le  with a Turkish empire 
which was, by m id-century, stronger than i t  had been for nearly  s ix ty  
years.
To some observers in  I 6U5 , the  defeat of Venice might have seemed 
in ev itab le . That defeat did eventually  come, but i t  required nearly  
tw enty-five years of in te rm itten t warfare and was accomplished only a f te r
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many Venetians had met th e i r  fa te  with an overriding sense o f dignity  
and fo rtitu d e . In ev itab le  though th e  loss o f Candia may have seemed 
to  many then and must seem to  many now, th e  h isto ry  of Venetian r e s is ­
tance nevertheless r e f le c ts  in  numerous ways a genuine perseverance 
and n o b ility  of s p i r i t .
H istory i s  perhaps most fasc inating  and in s tru c tiv e  when i t  centers 
on a period of re la tiv e ly  extensive change. A study of th e  Candian war 
allows one to  view in  g rea te r depth the  response of a weakened s ta te  
to  a p e rs is te n t and generally  superior fo rce. But the  Candian war en­
compasses much more than the h is to ry  of Venice alone, fo r i t  provides, 
in  p a r t ,  a  comprehensive view of East-West re la tio n s  during th e  middle 
of th e  seventeenth century. The long and complex diplomatic v ic iss itu d es  
of th e  war present a  broader view of in te rn a tio n a l re la tio n s  than th a t 
which frequently  emerges when a tten tio n  i s  so lely  fixed  on th e  France 
of Louis XIV. Indeed, the  Candian war plays a v i ta l  h is to r ic a l  ro le  in  
the  gradual disentanglement of western Europe from th e  a f f a ir s  of the 
East. To a larg e  extent i t  was the f ru s tra t io n  and tragedy o f the  Can­
dian war as w ell as the co n flic t which followed in  the  Morea which d is ­
couraged a l l  Europe and France in  p a rt ic u la r  from remaining involved in  
the troub les of the  Ottoman empire. Consequently, i t  i s  hoped th a t  th is  
h isto ry  of the  Candian struggle w il l  provide not only a deeper glimpse 
in to  the  e n tire  problem of the  seventeenth-century c r is is  but also a 
broader understanding of seventeenth-century Europe as a whole.
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CHAPTER I  
OH TOE EVE OF WAR
By the seventeenth, century the Republic of Venice had ceased to  be 
a dominant power in  the Mediterranean. Although eclipsed  in  might and 
w ealth by the n a tio n -sta te s  of northern Europe, the  Republic neverthe­
less  re ta in ed  the vestiges of her former greatness. Moreover, th e  in­
s ti tu t io n s  and adm inistrative stru c tu re  by which Venice had regulated  
domestic and colonial a f f a ir s  fo r  several centuries remained e s se n tia lly  
in ta c t.  Of a l l  the  various councils w ithin the Venetian s ta te  th e  Sen­
a te  continued to  be the p rin c ip a l organ of government.* I t  was in  the 
Senate, a body of over th ree  hundred Venetian nobles, th a t  m atters of 
foreign policy and colonial adm inistration  were discussed and f in a l ly  
resolved. The vast m ultitude of m ag is tra tes , p ro w e d ito rs , and m ilita ry  
o ffic e rs  owed th e i r  f i r s t  alleg iance to  th e  Senate. I t  was th is  august 
body, w ith a l l  o f its- au x ilia ry  councils , which was soon to  he faced 
with the task  of preserving an empire against an aggressive and de te r­
mined Turkish challenge.
The empire of the Venetian Republic was s t i l l  a  re la tiv e ly  vast 
complex of diverse islands and co asta l enclaves. S tretch ing  from I s t r i a  
to  the  shores of Candia the  empire encompassed the Ionian islands of
*0f the  o ther important councils in  the  Venetian government there  
was the Collegio, a type of executive body which helped prepare m ateria l 
to  be discussed in  the Senate; the  Council of Ten, a  frequently  very 
powerful body mainly concerned with domestic a ff a ir s ;  the  Quarantia or 
ch ie f ju d ic ia ry  body; and the innumerable m agistracies which were the 
adm inistrative agencies through which governmental p o lic ies  and decrees 
were carried  through. The doge by the seventeenth century had become 
l i t t l e  more than the ceremonial head of s ta te .
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Corfu, Cephalonia, and Zante as w e ll  as th e c i ty - fo r t r e s s e s  sca tter ed  
along th e  e n tir e  len gth  o f  th e  Dalmatian c o a st . At th e  easterm ost 
l im it  o f  th e  em pire, Just sou theast o f  th e  Morea and n early  a thousand 
m iles  from V enice, la y  th e  is la n d  o f  Candia. This is la n d , known t o  
th e  modem world as C rete, was one o f  th e  most important co lo n ies  w ith­
in  th e  Venetian c o lo n ia l  system . Over 150 m iles  in  len gth  and tw enty  
to  fo r ty  in  w id th , Candia remained a geographic landmark in  th e  waters 
o f  th e  ea stern  M editerranean.
At the outbreak of the  war i t  seemed to  most Venetians th a t  the  
islan d  was an in te g ra l  p a rt of the  Venetian empire. Candia had "become 
a  possession of Venice over four centuries e a r l ie r  when i t  was purchased 
from the  Marquis o f Monferrato in  the  year 120U.1 Venetian co lonization 
had "begun almost immediately and had continued in to  th e  following cen­
tu ry . For a period  of over two hundred y ea rs , from th e  middle of the 
th ir te e n th  century to  the  end of th e  f if te e n th ,  no attempt was made to  
in i t i a t e  a policy  o f active im perial con tro l. During th is  period  the  
kingdom was plagued with considerable unrest and reb e llio n , Venetian 
contro l being e ffe c tiv e ly  lim ited  to  the  garrisoned urban cen te rs.^
I t  was not u n t i l  the  l a t t e r  p a rt of the  f if te e n th  century when 
Venetian commercial a c t iv i t ie s  began s ig n if ic a n tly  to  prosper th a t  any 
attempt was made to  subjugate the  islan d  and bring  i t  under complete 
domination."^ Nobles who p e rs is te d  in  conspiring against Venetian ru le  
were summarily stripped  of th e i r  patrim onies; arable  land on th e  islan d  
was divided in to  f ie f s  and those working i t  were reduced to  se rv ile  
s ta tu s . Venice re ta ined  d ire c t contro l over a l l  o f-th e  is la n d 's  major
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6urban centers t u t  a l l  o ther perip h era l areas were placed under th e  Ju­
r is d ic t io n  of indiv idual churches, m onasteries, or ind iv idual a r is to ­
c ra t ic  fam ilies.
This re la tiv e ly  s tr in g en t policy  had to  he considerably relaxed,
however, since i t  became increasing ly  necessary to  cede powers to  the
lo ca lly  entrenched feu d a lity . In such a d is ta n t  and tru cu len t kingdom
c o n c ilia tio n  and compromise understandably came to  rep lace a  policy o f 
It
open and determined coercion. The Venetian republic did attem pt, 
however, to  m aintain a t  le a s t  a modicum of ju d ic ia l  and adm inistrative 
con tro l. Two p row ed ito rs^  appointed every f iv e  years were sent to  the  
island  to  in v estig a te  complaints, punish th e  over-mighty, and, in 
g eneral, ac t as in q u is ito rs  and viceroys.
The a b il i ty  of these  p ro w ed ito rs  to  ac t against ru ra l  offenders 
or to  engage in  m ilita ry  movements was, however, considerably in h ib ited  
by the mountainous te r r a in  of the  is lan d . This geographic fa c to r ,  
combined w ith the g rea t d istance between th e  kingdom and Venice i t s e l f ,  
encouraged many Candian nobles to  ignore the  s tr ic tu re s  which the Vene­
tia n s  t r i e d  to  impose. Vast secto rs o f the  islan d  were consequently 
under the  e ffec tiv e  dominion of independent feudal ty ra n ts .  As a re s u lt  
the  oppressed peasantry not only su ffered  under the  in eq u itie s  o f feudal 
ju s t ic e  but a lso  found i t s e l f  laboring under tra d i tio n a l  feudal burdens 
which th e  unrestrained  n o b ility  commonly explo ited . The ' t e r t i a r i a '  or 
th ird  of the  harvest demanded by many lo rds impoverished large  numbers 
of peasants and forced many to  abandon th e  land. The 'an g aria ' or 
lo ca l form of corvee, although th e o re tic a lly  a nominal se rv ice , caused
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the  'A ngari' or s e rv i le  inhab itan ts of th e  is lan d  to  become l i t t l e  more 
than th e  m iserable pawns of th e  kingdom's p riv ileg ed  c la s s .^  To the  
average islan d er Venetian ru le  and ju s t ic e  had th ere fo re  became l i t t l e  
more than an inconsequential and ephemeral fo rm ality .
Venetian ru le  on th e  island  had become so in effec tiv e  by the 
seventeenth century th a t  public ac ts  of d isorder and violence were 
f a i r ly  common. E a r lie r  in  th e  century a Venetian in q u is ito r  had com­
plained  o f the  b i t t e r  feuding which had "held a l l  divided w ith such 
h a tred , and r a n c o r .. . ." ^ .  By l6UU the problem of blood feuds and ven­
de ttas  had come to  plague the peace of th e  kingdom l ik e  a menacing 
hydra. The Prow editor-G eneral reported  th a t  many nobles had demanded 
the r ig h t to  appear armed in  public places and th a t  the  members of a 
ce rta in  Zancaroli fam ily had even gathered in  the  c ity  square and had 
scorned publicly , a Venetian o f f ic ia l ,  not only refusing  to  sa lu te  him, 
"but even scandalously turn ing  th e i r  shoulder to  him.
E ffo rts  to  reform th e  island  were frequently  hindered by the  hos­
t i l i t y  of the  is la n d 's  entrenched n o b ility  and by th e  lethargy  of i t s  
bureaucracy. In the  1570's Jacopo Foscarin i had t r i e d  to  bring  order 
by reorganizing the  m il i t ia ,  elim inating th e  p rac tic e  of 'dead-pay' to  
inac tive  so ld ie rs , regu la ting  more equitab ly  the  ta x  s tru c tu re  and
reordering th e  treasu ry ; unfortunately h is  reforms were temporary since
g
h is  successors did not continue h is  reforming p o lic ie s .
P ie tro  Zane, a seventeenth-century eyewitness to  th e  conditions 
p revailing  on Candia,had l i t t l e  complimentary to  say. The cameras or 
t re a su rie s  were drained of funds, o f f ic ia ls  and m ilita ry  o ffic e rs
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8received exorbitan t s a la r ie s ,  corrupt judges commonly accepted b r ib e s ,
and even the higher clergy of the  islan d  d id l i t t l e  to  bring c re d it
and honor to  Venetian ru le .  One case noted by Zsne involved a  general,
a  p ro w ed ito r  of th e  cavalry , and a captain who together had received
more than twelve thousand ducats, a  sum fa r  in  excess o f what th e i r
ordinary remuneration should have been,10 Thus the  conditions which
preva iled  on Candia a t  the  time o f the  Turkish assau lt in  many ways
11
explain the Turkish successes during the  i n i t i a l  phase o f the  war.
Despite th is  f in an c ia l and m ilita ry  s tagnation , th e  islan d  contin­
ued to  be considered by both Venetians and Europeans a lik e  as a v i ta l  
and indispensable bulwark of secu rity  and economic s ta b i l i ty .  An 
anonymous author of the  early  seventeenth century re fe rred  to  the  king­
dom as the  very "defense, s e cu r ity , and greatness of the  R e p u b lic ..." ; 
other manuscripts of the  time frequently  allude to  Candia as th e  "sea
12w all of C h ristian ity  against the  dangers of m ilita n t Islam. Indeed, 
the  very in te n s ity  of the long war fo r possession o f the  islan d  stands 
as irre fu ta b le  evidence of th e  high esteem in  -which the  d is ta n t king­
dom was held.
In sp ite  of i t s  many l i a b i l i t i e s , th e  islan d  of Candia s t i l l  had 
ce rta in  notable advantages. Geographically i t  lay  c en tra l to  most of 
the  important trade  centers of th e  eastern  M editerranean; i t  was r e la ­
tiv e ly  close not only to  the  Cyclades- and Dodecanese islands, but was 
a lso  only a short s a ilin g  d istance from the Morea, Negroponte, and the 
Dardinelles. The Venetian ambassador a t  Constantinople, commonly 
re fe rred  to  as the  b a ilo ,1^ wrote in  l6Ul th a t  the  islan d  was an object
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of envy not merely fo r the  wealth i t  was presumed to  have hut a lso  "fo r 
the s i t e ,  which looks over the  mouth of th e  archipelago and extends 
..lHcommodiously.. .in to  the Mediterranean. Indeed, as an entrepot for 
the commercial t r a f f i c  of the  Aegean, A d ria tic , and Mediterranean,
Candia could hardly have "been more id ea lly  located .
Moreover, in  an age when the sea o ffered  th e  b est means o f tra n s ­
p o rta tio n , Candia was blessed with numerous large  p o r ts , harbors, and 
beaching areas. Many of these ports, moreover, could provide s h e lte r  for 
sizable  armadas ranging from th ir ty  to  f i f t y  ga lley s . Francesco 
B a s ilic a ta 's  accoun t^  o ffers a f a i r ly  extensive descrip tion  of the  
island  as i t  appeared to  a seventeenth-century observer. Among the  
many capacious ports  of which he takes note many, such as Porto d e lla  
Suda, Spinalonga, and Paleocastro di S i t t i a ,  were of considerable s t r a t ­
egic importance; others such as S i t t i a  and Grabusa, s itu a ted  respec­
tiv e ly  a t the  eastern  and western ex trem ities of the  islan d , could be 
easily  defended but were of more lim ited  commercial and m ilita ry  use.
In add ition , a l l  o f the  major c it ie s  of the  kingdom—Candia, Canea, and 
Rettimo—natu ra lly  were possessed of fin e  harbor f a c i l i t ie s  capable of 
serv icing  a s izab le  f le e t .  For the disembarking of reinforcements or 
emergency contingents there  were scattered  along the  is la n d 's  coasts 
countless beaches id ea l for in fantry  or cavalry maneuvers. F in a lly , 
fresh  water fo r man and beast was in  generally  p le n tifu l  supply fo r  a l l  
of the  kingdom's fo rtre sses  and p rin c ip a l c a s te l l i  or watch-towers.
Such n a tu ra l asse ts  had, however, won fo r Candia a reputation  in  
many ways undeserved. Bernardin Surius, a p ilgrim  who v is i te d  Candia
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in  th e  m id-l6^0 's, e n th u s ia s tica lly  c ite d  the  abundance which he found 
everywhere on the  is la n d ; he wrote of th e  sumptuousness o f Candia, o f 
i t s  f e r t i l i t y  in  a l l  th ings necessary fo r  l i f e ,  "espec ia lly  o f wines 
of Malvoisie and Muscadel which, fo r  th e i r  excellence, a re  tran sp o rted  
in  a l l  p a rts  of the  world. I t  i s  abundant in  wheat, buckwheats 
(b led s), o i l ,  wax, sugar, honey ,.. .o liv e  t r e e s ,  palm t r e e s ,  f ig  t r e e s ,  
and v ineyards.. . (as w ell as) q u an titie s  of b e a u tifu l woods...and medic­
in a l  herbs. Even the observant h is to r ia n  V aliero , w ritin g  several 
years a f te r  the  outbreak of the  Candian war, could w rite  of th e  pros­
p e rity  o f the  is la n d , a lb e i t  with some reserv a tio n . "This kingdom, 
s te r i l e  by n a tu re , had become, by the  a r ts  used so many years by the  
Republic, very f e r t i l e  and p o p u la te d .. .." 1^
The abundance and luxury of which these  men spoke unfortunately  
ex isted  more in  imagination than in  r e a l i ty .  There was on th e  islan d  
an abundance o f o liv e s , wines, f r u i t s ,  herbs, and cypress wood,^® but 
Candia suffered perennially  from a shortage of basic  g rain  s ta p le s .  In 
order to  supplement Candia’s lagging g rain  production, supplies o f  th is  
indispensable commodity often had to  be imported from various Turkish 
p o r ts . The b a ilo , Contarin i, wrote in  l6 4 l th a t  in  nego tia ting  w ith 
th e  Turk fo r grain shipments to  Candia i t  would be necessary "to  proceed 
with caution, in  order not to  show th a t  the  kingdom i s  no t, without such 
a id , able to  su sta in  i t s e l f . " 1^ Only th ree  years l a te r  the  P ro w ed ito r-  
General of Candia was confronted w ith a desperate s itu a tio n  when the 
b a ilo  a t  Constantinople informed him th a t ,  due to  increased a n ti -  
Christian  sentim ent, there  would be l i t t l e  hope of procuring any fu rth e r
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supplementary grain  shipments from Turkish p o r ts .20 Since Candian of­
f ic ia l s  frequently  reso rted  to  th e  purchase of g rain  in  Turkish ports  
to  ease poor harvests  on the  is la n d , any po licy  r e s t r ic t in g  such trade 
would have considerable e ffe c t in  Candia. The shortages which occurred 
in  l6hh, when combined with Turkish unwillingness to  s e l l  Venetian 
merchants g ra in , proved so severe th a t  th e  peasants were forced to  use 
as food th e  seed reserves custom arily se t  aside  fo r  the  f a l l  p lan ting .
To compensate fo r the  poor harvest th a t  year the  Prow editor-G eneral 
sent urgent requests to  Cephalonia and Zante, two islands which gener­
a lly  were b lessed  w ith abundant g rain  surpluses?1 A s te rn e r warning 
came from the  hard-pressed c ity  o f  Canea where the  P row ed ito r th ere  
warned th a t  without considerable assis tan ce  many in  h is  area  would 
perish  of famine; he furthermore noted th a t  th e  primary cause fo r the
continual g rain  shortages on the  islan d  re su lte d  from the  fa c t  th a t  "the
„22t e r r i to ry  does not y ie ld  but a th i r d  o f th e  need.
Another d if f ic u l ty  faced by Candian a u th o r i tie s ,  one almost as 
p red ic tab le  as the kingdom's recurring  famine, was th a t of p iracy . 
Throughout the  century the d estruc tive  ex p lo its  o f Mediterranean cor­
s a irs  had been dangerously on the increase ; those s ta te s  such as Venice
which continued to  re ly  on the sw ift bu t l ig h t ly  armed galley  were
23p a rticu la rly  a ffec ted  by th is  increased p i r a t ic a l  a c tiv ity . Attacks
by the Uscocch p ira te s  of the Dalmatian c o ast, the  Barbary c o rsa irs  o f
North A frica , and the  "pontentine" vessels  of Malta and Tuscany not
only d isrupted the regu lar flow of commerce but subsequently brought
2kabout a p recip itous r is e  in  Venetian insurance ra te s .  In d irectly  th is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12
r is e  in  insurance costs threatened  to  diminish s ig n if ic a n tly  the  a b il i ty  
of Venetian shipping to  remain competitive in  th e  Mediterranean tra n s ­
p o rta tio n  market.
The e ffe c ts  of th is  increased piracy  were f e l t  both d ire c tly  and 
in d ire c tly  on Candia. The dispatches of the  in q u is ito rs  in  the  e a r l ie r  
p a rt of the  century comment frequently  on the ’g reat p reju d ice ’ which 
had come to  the  commerce o f the  islan d  as a r e s u lt  o f  Barbary and Mal- 
25tese  a tta c k s . With an extensive shoreline to  p a tro l  and many conve­
n ient and secluded harbors to  guard, i t  was v i r tu a l ly  impossible for 
Venetian a u th o ritie s  to  prevent co rsa irs  e ith e r  from harassing  commer­
c ia l  ships which p lie d  Candian waters or from landing in  th e  is la n d 's  
anchorages to  careen th e i r  vessels  and rep len ish  th e i r  supplies. In 
th e  l6U0's the  Prow editor-G eneral had w ritten  th a t  Maltese and Barbary 
p ira te s  commonly in fes ted  Candian w aters, the  M altese themselves ravage
ing fellow  C hristian  merchantmen with almost complete re lig io u s  in d if -  
27ference. The problem of piracy  and i t s  many annoying and damaging 
ram ifications was one from which Venetian o f f ic ia ls  a t  Candia seldom 
enjoyed a re sp ite .
Famine and p iracy  were two problems not uncommon to  many European 
s ta te s  of the  seventeenth century, esp ec ia lly  those o f the Mediterranean 
area. But the f in a n c ia l and m ilita ry  d isorder which characterized  the  
Kingdom of Candia in  the  16^0's i s  more d i f f ic u l t  to  explain or excuse; 
i t s  orig ins were more d ire c tly  re la te d  to  "human fa ilin g "  than to  
"unavoidable na tu ra l d isa s te r s ."  Even a cursory examination of prov- 
v e d ito r 's  reports  reveals a p le thora  of f in a n c ia l i l l s ;  some of these
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were understandably generated by commercial fac to rs  beyond the  immediate
contro l of Venice, but others were a  re s u l t  o f simple malfeasance and
personal care lessness. Such mismanagement, when combined with famine,
p iracy , and general economic contraction  decreased even fu rther the
value of Candia as a co lonial a sse t. Subsidies from Venice to  boost the
Candian resources had become more or le s s  reg u lar p rac tic e . In  the
year 1638, fo r example, the Bilanci Generale reveals th a t  the  revenues
fo r Candia amounted to  some 196,610 ducats while expenses soared to
326,909 ducats, the  d e f ic i t  being hidden w ith in  a  combined budgetary
statement fo r  Candia and the e n tire  Ionian archipelago. Since Cepha-
lo n ia  and Zante both reg is te red  a considerable su rp lus, the f in a l  com-r
bined budget showed a 12,000 ducat excess. Yet in  r e a l i ty  Candia was
heavily  in  debt, burdening the  revenues o f the  islands o f the Levant by 
28a sum exceeding 130,000 ducats. Even allowing fo r  a p a rticu la rly  
poor y ea r, the  reduction of such a d e f ic i t  as th a t  of th e  island  o f 
Candia would have required  fundamental f in a n c ia l and adm inistrative 
changes.
Admittedly, much of the economic depression re f lec te d  in  these 
s ta t i s t ic s  must have been d ire c tly  re la te d  to  the  more general decline 
of the  e n tire  Mediterranean basin . N evertheless, i t  i s  impossible in  
the case of Candia to  dismiss completely the purely 'human' fac to r  of 
mismanagement and, to  some degree, f lag ran t corruption. For one reason 
or another, Candia was burdened more than w ith i t s  share of those seek­
ing to  circumvent the  law. Returning from Candia in  the  1620' s ,  Nicolo 
da Ponte complained openly of "frauds, rap a c ity , and proven ty ra n ts ,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
who remain t i l l  now unpunished.. . ." 2^ O ffic ia ls  frequently  found i t  
impossible to  co lle c t debts owed to  the  government. Clever manipulators 
successfu lly  eluded Venetian treasu ry  agents; o thers indebted to  the 
government had such depleted a sse ts  th a t there  remained e s se n tia lly  
nothing fo r the  agents to  c o n f is c a te .^  Other government losses were 
incurred with the public sa le  of the 'd a t i o , '^ 1 a custom duty lev ied  on 
numerous items leaving and entering  the islan d . The d a tio—Candia's 
ch ie f source of revenue—was auctioned by bids in  a fashion very sim ilar 
to  the  farming of taxes in  seventeenth-century France. U nfortunately, 
the  sale  of the tax  con tracts was often not supervised as r ig id ly  as 
the  f in an c ia l d is tre s s  of the  kingdom would have m erited and conse­
quently add itional needed money was lo s t  to  the  treasu ry .
By l61^ economic and f in a n c ia l conditions on the  is la n d  were noth­
ing less  than dismal. On h is  a r r iv a l  a t Candia th a t  year the  Prov- 
veditor-G eneral, Andrea Corner, found " a l l  the  provisions consumed, the 
camera without money, the  m il i t ia  g rea tly  indebted, and even the work­
men and fontegi Cfactory) e x h a u s te d .. .." ^  The shortage of as basic  a 
commodity as s a l t  on the islan d  was merely one example of poor manage­
ment. There apparently was no n ecessity  fo r th is  shortage since s a l t  
had been fo r many years p ast abundantly produced a t Porto d e lla  Suda; 
according to  one o f f ic ia l  the meager 20,000 measures then being pro­
duced could easily  have been increased eig h tfo ld  Cl66,000) by properly 
•sk
managing the operations a t Suda. I t  thus is  beyond doubt t h a t ,  in 
addition to  the general economic decline of the  e n tire  Mediterranean 
a rea , Candia was su ffe ring  from excessive adm inistrative la x ity ,  care-
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lessn ess, and malfeasance. The d isasterous e ffe c ts  of such laxness 
would "become even more obvious under th e  s tr a in  created  by the challenge 
of a newly rejuvenated and m ilita n t Ottoman s ta te .
During the  seventeenth century, when s ta te s  re l ie d  heavily  upon 
mercenaries, f in an c ia l i l l s  were often tantamount to  m ilita ry  weakness. 
Without a f u l l  treasu ry  there  was no money to  h ire  in fan try  or cavalry, 
nor to  arm and provision those already h ired . Consequently, the f is c a l  
weakness of Candia undermined the is la n d 's  capacity  to  r e s i s t  a ttack .
Not adm inistering what diminished f in a n c ia l resources the islan d  did 
possess consequently weakened the kingdom's e n tire  m ilita ry  posture.
Not even constant harassment by co rsa irs  and the  belligerence of 
the  Turks in  1638"^ proved su ff ic ie n t to  c reate  a sense of urgency and 
m ilita ry  a le rtn ess  on the island . The lo ca l m i l i t ia  was, fo r  example, 
plagued by ind ifference and d issension. Local laws requiring  the 
is la n d 's  n o b ility  to  levy fo r  defense prescribed  numbers of so ld ie rs  
were seldom ho n o red .^  The condescension of the  urban re c ru its  toward 
the  peasant re c ru its  of the  m il i t ia  tended to  undermine the  e sp ri t  de 
corps of the  regiments. To compensate fo r  the  weaknesses w ithin these 
lo ca l u n its ,th e  Venetian Senate did attempt to  m aintain sizab le  contin­
gents of European, Greek, and Dalmatian in fan try  and cavalry on the 
island . These'foreign ' u n its  were id ea lly  to  number four thousand in­
fan try  and th ree  hundred cavalry; as l a te  as the  l6U 0's, however, the  
p row ed ito r could account for only 1995 in fan try  and 217 horsemen.^® 
Even when the  ac tua l number of active rec ru its  approached sa tis fac to ry  
lev e ls , the re c ru its  often included men o f l i t t l e  experience and
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d is c ip l in e ,  " v ile  and inexpert p easan ts. . .  incapable o f  learn in g  d is c i -  
„39p lm e . . . .
For example, one o f  th e  major d efen siv e  p o s it io n s  on the is la n d ,  
th e  fo r tr e s s  o f  Canea, could muster in  161+1+ no more than s ix  hundred 
in fa n try , a number estim ated  to  be h a lf  th o se  n ecessary  to  mount a 
proper and sto u t d efense . The bombardiers s ta tio n ed  a t  Canea were fr e ­
quently no more than inexperienced  Greeks who "promised l i t t l e " ;  de­
p le te d  in fa n try  ranks were r o u tin e ly  supplemented w ith  s c o la r i  and 
ceraide ( lo c a l  r e c r u its )  drawn from th e peasantry o f  th e  c o u n tr y s id e .^  
Estim ates given  fo r  th e  e n tir e  is la n d  were no more prom ising. P ie tro
°  • c j lp 'f M r r  p jVaa v a d t t  -----
estim ated  th a t 25,000  p a id  in fantry  p lus m i l i t i a  and cavalry were nec­
essary  fo r  a proper defense o f  th e  kingdom; on th e  eve o f  th e Turkish
a ssa u lt in  161+5, however, no more than 13,81+3 fo o t -s o ld ie r s  could  be 
1+ 1
found on th e en tir e  is la n d .
The is la n d ’s d efenses by sea  were eq u a lly  d ep le ted . The naval
squadron o f l ig h t  g a lle y s  permanently sta tio n ed  a t Candia, th e  Guardia
di Candia, was inadequate even to  con tro l co r sa ir  a c t iv i t ie s ;  to  r e p e l l
a  major Turkish a ssa u lt i t  would obviously be o f  l i t t l e  s e r v ic e . Only
th ree  in  number, th e  g a lle y s  o f  the Guardia were a l lo t te d  l e s s  money
per ship than were th e  g a lle y s  o f  th e regu lar armada in  th e  budget o f  
1+2
161+1. In 161+1+, a f te r  a six-month tour o f  th e  i s la n d , P ro w ed ito r -  
General Corner ordered th e  number o f  armed g a lle y s  increased  by te n . 
U nfortunately, for  e ith e r  economic or d ip lom atic reasons th is  order was 
la te r  rescinded; i t  would not be r e in s t itu te d  u n t i l  th e  th reat o f  an
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li_3Ottoman invasion had "become imminent. Few in  number and lacking in  
men and su pp lies, the Guardia di Candia seldom proved of any e ffec tiv e  
use beyond th e  immediate periphery of th e  is la n d 's  major urban centers.
In  assessing  the defensive capacity  o f the  is la n d , one should not 
neglect what most s tr a te g is ts  of the  period  considered the  most impor­
ta n t  m ilita ry  fa c to r,  namely th e  fo rtre sse s  of th e  kingdom. By and 
la rg e ,th o se  of Candia offered  l i t t l e  reason fo r optimism. The kingdom's
cen tra l fo rtre s s  and c a p ita l  c ity ,  Candia, was perhaps in  b e tte r  con-
15d itio n  than most of the  o th ers , or so a t  le a s t  thought P ie tro  Zane.
By h is  account the  ca p ita l c ity  possessed s u ff ic ie n t a r t i l l e r y  (858 
p ieces); moreover, work was in  progress on severa l of Candia's main 
rav e lin s , e spec ia lly  the  bulwarks known as Baluardo V i t tu r i.  Zane him­
s e lf  had witnessed the  recent completion of th is  p a rt ic u la r  bulwark and
it 16deemed i t  one of the most b e a u tifu l piazzas one can s e e . . . .  But 
much more needed to  be done, and even during Zane's long tenure  of 
eight years the  fo rtre s s  had come nowhere near to  being p erfected . 
Sections of wall had continued to  f a l l  in to  ru in , housing remained lim­
ite d  and generally  of poor q u a lity , and th e  port of the  fo r tre s s  needed
17dredging and m odification.
The second p r in c ip a l fo r t re s s - c i ty ,  Canea, was in  f a r  poorer con­
d itio n . D itches, counterscarpments, and roadways were e ith e r  unfin­
ished or in  d isre p a ir . D ilapidated c iv i l ia n  housing crowded the  areas 
between c ity  w alls and the escarpments, in h ib itin g  the  free  movement of 
troops and provisions. So few watchtowers and parapets had been e rec t­
ed th a t  the p ro w ed ito r  of the fo rtre s s  complained he was unable to
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ilfts ta tio n  sen tine ls in  c r i t i c a l  areas. As the  th re a t  of a Turkish in ­
vasion mounted in  the  spring of 16U5 , he wrote th a t  h is  s p i r i t  was 
g rea tly  tormented "because of the lack  of p ro v is io n s .. . (and) of things 
very necessary fo r  a long, and v a lid  res is tan ce  against a very powerful 
. ,1*9invasion. Two companies o f reinforcements had recen tly  been sent to  
Canea, but s t i l l ,  the  p ro w ed ito r  noted, the  "p resid io  does not have 
five hundred so ld ie rs , where the  orders of Your Serenity  were thatj in  
time of peace, th ere  ought to  be maintained th ere  (a t Canea) 600 and .. . ,  
fo r the  fo rtre s s  to  r e s i s t  a powerful army, i t  must not be provided with 
,,50le ss  than four thousand combatants.
Beside the  is la n d ’s la rg e r c ity -fo r tre s se s  th ere  were a lso scat­
tered  throughout th e  kingdom many sm aller c ita d e ls  and e a s te l l i  (g a rr i­
soned watchtowers). Like the  more notable fo rtre sse s jth ese  le s se r  
strongholds d iffe re d  su b s ta n tia lly  in  qu a lity . Some were too iso la te d  
or undermaned to  be of any use,w hile o thers proved of v i ta l  importance. 
The fo r t  of Suda, fo r example, was of enormous s tra te g ic  importance. 
This was a r e la tiv e ly  small fo rtre s s  which commanded entrance to  the  
harbor o f the same name and to  sections of th e  coast bordering the 
harbor; fo rtunately  fo r the  defense of th is  v i ta l  port f a c i l i ty  and the 
t e r r i to ry  in  the  immediate v ic in i ty  of Canea which lay only five  miles 
to  the west, Suda remained one of the  le a s t  vulnerable of a l l  the 
fo rtre sses  of the islan d . Despite i t s  s tra te g ic  position , Suda urgently 
needed m odifications and improvements on a  j e t t y  extending from the 
fo rtre ss  which prevented th e  passage of enemy v e s s e l s .^  P row ed ito r- 
General Corner could fin d  complimentary words fo r Porto de lla  Suda; but
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the fo rtre s s  of Grabussa a t  the  western t ip  of the  islan d  evoked from 
the observant o ffic e r  nothing but c ritic ism . At Grabussa he found
52lacking everything from grain  and b isc u its  to  munitions and a r t i l l e ry .
At a watchtower ju s t  east of Grabussa known as Chissamo, Corner found 
the  garrison  depleted and the countryside seething with "violence, 
usury, homicide, oppression, e x to rtio n , and other e x c e s s e s . A c c o r d ­
ing to  h is  estim ate, the c a s te l l i  of the  kingdom were operating with 
garrisons a t le a s t  5-15 percent understaffed ; shortages of weaponry,
51*sho t, powder, and general provisions were to  be found everywhere.
The kingdom was thus generally  unprepared to  defend i t s e l f .  Part 
of the  fa i lu re  to  maintain adequate forces was perhaps in d ire c tly  re ­
la te d  to  the 'prolonged peace' which the island  had enjoyed, a peace 
which generated a clim ate of unconcern. But more d ire c tly  one could 
probably trace  the  m ilita ry  weakness which characterized  th e  kingdom to  
the general lack of funds both a t Candia and a t  home in  Venice. By the 
middle of the  century the Venetian Senate, faced with dangers on the 
European continent and with the r e a l i ty  of declining commercial reve­
nues, had every d if f ic u lty  in  maintaining an extensive and d istan t 
empire, one which had once been supported by much g rea te r economic might.
I I
The other in su la r  possessions of the  empire had not yet reached 
the d istress in g  s ta te  of Candia, but they too showed signs of the neglect
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which so often accompanies prolonged peace. F ortresses throughout the 
empire were in  need of a tte n tio n , and garrisons s u ff ic ie n t fo r  policing 
duties were unprepared to  meet the challenge of a p rofessional army. 
M ilitiamen, d iso rderly  as p a r t ia l ly  tra in ed  so ld ie rs  sometimes prove to  
he, disturbed the  tra n q u ili ty  of the towns almost as frequently  as ban­
d its  did the  peace of the  co u n try sid e .^  The f in a n c ia l s itu a tio n  on 
many of the  o ther Venetian is lan d s , while frequently  much sounder than 
which was found a t Candia, was seldom free  of g laring  i r r e g u la r i t ie s . 
In q u is ito rs  in  the  early  decades of the  century complained of the  " in f i­
n i te  disorders" which plagued the lo ca l t re a s u rie s ;  years l a te r  sim ilar 
complaints were voiced by the P row editor of Corfu who wrote th a t  owing 
to  the m u ltip lic ity  of needs, the treasu ry  of h is  is la n d  was "almost
..56always exhausted. Even where th ere  was reason to  he pleased as at 
Cephalonia, dangerous signs began to  appear by 16^0; a prosperous grain 
t ra d e , which the  f e r t i l i t y  of Cephalonia had e a r l ie r  made possib le , 
seemed in danger as a re s u lt  of increased competition from aggressive 
English wholesalers who t r i e d  to  "tyrannize the  s e lle r s  Cof grain) in  
order to  reduce ( i t )  to  a very low p r ic e —
Despite in te rm itten t complaints and lo ca l problems, the  islands of 
the  Ionian archipelago nevertheless proved more prosperous than the 
la rg e r and more famous kingdom of Candia. Like Candia, they offered the 
advantage of convenient and pro tected  harbors; c e rta in  fo rtre sses  l ik e ­
wise were of continued m ilita ry  value. As la te  as 16U1 the  Venetian 
b a ilo  a t Constantinople made reference to  the  fo rtre ss  a t Corfu as one 
of the reasons why the  island  was looked upon with envy by the Turks;
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th e  f o r t r e s s  was one, th e  h a i lo  commented, which could  "defend a g a in s t  
th e  s p i r i t s  which r i s e  up a g a in s t  C h r i s t i a n i t y . . . . " ^
One o f  th e  most im portan t a s s e ts  o f  th e s e  Io n ian  is la n d s  was t h e i r  
r e l a t i v e  w ealth  and f in a n c ia l  s t a b i l i t y .  For example, w h ile  th e  King­
dom o f  Candia was burdening  Venice w ith  a  deb t o f  over 133,000 d u ca ts ,
59Cephalonia a lone was c o n tr ib u tin g  a  su rp lu s  o f  alm ost as much revenue.
I t  was to  C ephalonia , Z an te , and Corfu t h a t  f r u s t r a t e d  Candian p ro v - 
v e d ito r s  g e n e ra l ly  addressed  t h e i r  ap p eals  f o r  g ra in  o r  emergency cash 
r e s e rv e s . Indeed , th e  g ra in  su rp lu s  custom ary in  th e  Io n ia n  a rc h ip e la g o  
was so s u b s ta n t ia l  t h a t  i t  i t s e l f  had g en e ra ted  c o n s id e rab le  jea lo u sy  
a t  C o n s ta n tin o p le .^ 0 U nderstandab ly , b e in g  fu r th e r  from th e  h e a rt la n d s  
o f  th e  Ottoman em pire, th e se  f e r t i l e  i s la n d s  were b e t t e r  a b le  t o  m ini­
mize th e  expenses invo lved  in  m il i t a r y  and d efen siv e  o p e ra t io n s . Never­
t h e l e s s ,  th e  r e l a t i v e  p ro s p e r i ty  w itn essed  in  th e s e  th re e  i s l a n d s ,  and 
e s p e c ia lly  a t  C ephalonia and Z an te , had no p a r a l l e l  in  any o th e r  s e c to r  
o f  th e  V enetian empire.
The l a s t  m ajor s t r e tc h  o f  V enetian  c o lo n ia l  t e r r i t o r y  was found 
a c ro ss  th e  A d r ia t ic  from Venice i t s e l f ,  a long th e  I s t r i a n  and Dalm atian 
c o a s ts .  From th e  I s t r i a n  p e n in su la  to  th e  a n c ie n t towns o f  Z ara and 
S p a la to , t h i s  fo rb id d in g  and b a rre n  c o a stlan d  reached fo u r  hundred m ile s  
from n o r th  to  so u th . A lan d  o f v i l l a g e s  and sm all tow ns, o f  nomadic 
herdsmen and c o a s ta l  t r a d e r s ,  D alm atia formed an ex te n s iv e  f r o n t ie r  
w ith  th e  w estern  l im it s  o f  th e  Ottoman em pire; only  V enetian m il i t a ry  
s tre n g th  and th e  d e so la t io n  o f  th e  D in a ric  Alps and Pindus mountain 
chain  lay  between th e  c o a s ta l  towns and th e  arm ies o f  th e  S u lta n . The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
one geographic a sse t o f the  reg ion , namely i t s  innumerable waterways 
and harbors, f a c i l i t a te d  the  use o f  Venice's superior naval power and 
thus made th e  region m il i ta r i ly  defensib le .
Considering the p rim itive  nature o f most Dalmatian fo rtre sses  i t  
was fo rtu n a te  th a t  Venice enjoyed these  topographical advantages. The 
m ajority  of the  fo rtre sse s  of the  region were, in  f a c t ,  more su ited  to  
the  warfare of an e a r l ie r  age, an age when a r t i l l e r y  had not yet become 
the ind ispu tab le  master of the  siege. Small, crude, and of rectangular 
design they lacked escarpments and the  s te l l a r  bulwarks usually  asso­
c ia ted  w ith seventeenth-century f o r t if ic a t io n s .  In ad d itio n , th e i r  
a r t i l l e r y  was lim ited  in  quantity  and c a lib e r. S palato , fo r in stance, 
was equipped w ith approximately two dozen small c a lib e r weapons— 
excluding muskets—and perhaps fiv e  or s ix  o f a somewhat la rg e r  bore. 
Zara, th e  c a p ita l  c ity  of the  province and a  town boasting a population 
la rg e r than any of the  p rin c ip a l towns of Candia, had had t h i r ty  to  
fo rty  larg e  ca lib e r a r t i l l e r y  with an equal number of sm aller ones. 
Compared to  such c i t i e s  as those on Candia (.Canea, Rettimo, Candia)
which numbered th e i r  a r t i l l e r y  in  the  hundreds, the  Dalmatian arsenals
6 lwere b e tte r  prepared fo r p o lice  action  than fo r open w arfare. These 
sm aller a rsenals in  Dalmatia were p a r t ia l ly  ju s t if i e d  by the  ease with 
which reinforcements and m aterie l could be sent by water from Venice, 
but any invasion by a determined enemy would c e rta in ly  have taxed the 
capacity  of these  la rg e ly  an tiquated  defenses.
Sim ilar to  Candia, th is  i n f e r t i le  land likewise labored under an 
almost continual f is c a l  d e f ic i t .  Dalmatian revenues, s t i f le d  by the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
commercial s ta g n a tio n  o f th e  M ed ite rran ean , were an nually  dwarfed by 
c o s t ly  m il i t a ry  ex p en d itu res . W hatever d e f i c i t s  th e re  were had neces­
s a r i l y  t o  be absorbed by V enice. Thus one can u nderstand  th e  t e r s e  
comment emended to  a  f in a n c ia l  document from D alm atia: "Of so  much r e ­
mains d e fe c t iv e  th e  prov ince t h a t  th e  o f f ic e  o f  th e  t re a s u ry  in  Venice 
w i l l  have to  account fo r  th e  above s a id  expenses and paym ents." In  
t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  case  th e  d e f ic ie n t  sum amounted to  n e a rly  850,000  l i r e ,
a  f ig u re  g re a te r  th an  th e  e n t i r e  revenue f o r  th e  i s la n d  o f  Candia in
621638 . This revenue d e f i c i t  was in d ic a t iv e  o f  th e  e n t i r e  V enetian  and 
M editerranean  economy, b u t in  D alm atia in c re a se d  Turkish  co m p etitio n  
aggrava ted  th e  s i tu a t io n  even more th an  u su a l.  For exam ple, th e  c o a s ta l  
town o f  S p a la to , th e  a n c ie n t s i t e  o f  D io c le t ia n 's  im p e r ia l r e s id e n c e , 
r e f l e c t e d  th e  impact o f  t h i s  re ju v e n a te d  T urkish  t ra d in g  a c t i v i t y ;  i t  
was h ere  in  th e  l a t e  1630 's t h a t  T urk ish  co m petition  a p p a re n tly  r e s u l te d  
in  a  30 p e rc e n t decrease  in  f u r  t ra d in g  and a 20 p e rc e n t d ec rease  in  
th e  export o f  wool. M oreover, w h ile  th e  ou tb reak  o f  h o s t i l i t i e s  in  
16U5 d id  not w itn ess  a  complete c e ss a t io n  o f  T urco-V enetian tra d in g  
a c t i v i t y ,  th e  war c e r ta in ly  in h ib i te d  and r e s t r i c t e d  commercial a c t iv ­
i t i e s  a long th e  Dalm atian c o a s t .  For a  lan d  which had n ev e r known 
g re a t  w ealth  o r  p ro s p e r i ty ,  dependence on Venice became an accep ted  
n e c e s s i ty  a f t e r  16U5 .
By l6k5 th e  V enetian empire had become something o f  an anachronism . 
This r e l a t i v e ly  v a s t  c o a s ta l  and in s u la r  em pire, once f irm ly  based  on 
a  p ro sp e rin g  M editerranean  commercial economy, had fo r  n e a rly  a  h a l f -  
cen tu ry  f a l l e n  in to  a  s ta t e  o f  in ex o rab le  d e c lin e . An o b jec t o f  envy
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more by reason o f hab it than by reason of any sound economic impulse, 
the empire had developed in to  e s se n tia lly  an economic alb a tro ss . There 
were iso la te d  exceptions to  th is  judgment, exceptions of which we have 
already taken note. But whenever th ere  were one or two encouraging 
fac to rs  to  c ite  in  some p laces , there  were elsewhere many others which 
only dimmed the p ic tu re .
Nowhere was th is  b i t t e r  paradox more evident than on the  island  
of Candia. Although the  most coveted of Venetian overseas domains, the 
Kingdom of Candia notwithstanding remained one of th e  most costly  and 
le a s t  defensible colonies of the  Republic. Far from th e  d irec t in te r ­
vention of Venice and burdened with a seemingly irre v e rs ib le  f is c a l  
d e f ic i t ,  th e  islan d  kingdom stood fo rth  as a p o te n tia lly  id ea l victim  
of a determined and re le n tle s s  aggressor. The war n a tu ra lly  involved 
the e n tire  empire,for the other islands and co asta l enclaves served as 
supply depots and p o in ts of rendezvous and refuge. But b as ica lly  i t
was a war which was concentrated on Candia i t s e l f .  Like most seven­
teenth-century  co n flic ts , the Candian war centered on sp ecif ic  and f a i r ­
ly  circumscribed goals; Turkish s tra tegy  might envision peripheral 
a ttacks in  other p a rts  of the empire, but the  primary aim of Constanti­
nople remained throughout the co n flic t the complete and irre v e rs ib le
seizure of the e n tire  Kingdom of Candia.
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I I I
P rio r to  th e  outbreak o f open h o s t i l i t ie s ,  the  primary concern of 
Venice was to  prevent completely(or a t  le a s t  to  fo re s ta l l  as long as 
possible)w ar w ith the  Turks by same means of diplomatic accommodation. 
For Venice, a s ta te  which r e l ie d  prim arily  upon commerce and tra d e , war 
was always to  be avoided; m ilita ry  expenditures drained the treasu ry , 
and war i t s e l f  reduced revenues by d isrupting  the  f ree  flow of commer­
c ia l  t r a f f i c  on the  A driatic  and th e  Mediterranean. Moreover, as an 
important I ta l ia n  s ta te  w ith possessions on the Terraferma to  guard, 
Venice had to  m aintain a constant watch on the  development of European 
p o l i t ic s  per se. Caught in  the  v ise  of declining economic s tren g th  and 
increasing  m ilita ry  dangers, the  Venetian republic had to  seek some 
compromise p o sitio n  between the  r e s t le s s  Turks to  the  east and th e  mad­
ness of the  Thirty  Years War to  the  west. The days o f the  League of 
Cambrai, when Venice alone could defy a l l  the  powers o f Europe, had 
passed forever. By the seventeenth century the Republic had to  make 
every e ffo r t  to  avoid s tra in in g  the s ta t e ’s a b il i ty  to  defend i t s e l f  
and i t s  domains. As a r e s u l t ,  the  Venetian s ta te  f e l t  ob ligated to  
remain as concilia to ry  as possib le  so as to  avoid any open and costly  
confrontation with a major power.
Up to  16U5 Venetian diplomacy had had considerable success in  
maintaining peace. In the West, Venice had managed to  elude m ilita ry  
involvement in  the T hirty  Years War. The n e u tra lity  she s tead fas tly  
m aintained during th is  general European conflagration won fo r her few
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close diplom atic friends on the  Continent*but likew ise saved her from 
gaining the  implacable hatred  of any o f Europe's major powers. In 
terms of Venetian t e r r i t o r i a l  secu rity  such a po licy  o f n e u tra lity  
proved a wise course of ac tion ; in  a c o n flic t which involved France, 
Spain, and the Qnpire no amount of p re s tig e  o r t e r r i t o r i a l  gain could 
possib ly  outweighed the  ce rta in ty  of incurring  the la s t in g  wrath o f any 
one of these  th ree  major powers. Likewise, involvement in  the  Mantuan 
c o n flic t of 1628 was avoided with equal f in e sse . Since the  war was 
e s se n tia lly  a dispute between Spain and France, Venice had l i t t l e  to  
p ro f i t  from becoming involved in  Mantuan a f f a ir s ;  w isely she played the 
ro le  o f a sympathetic but aloof sp ecta to r.
When m atters touched more d i re c tly  her own secu r ity  or well-being, 
Venice could not and n a tu ra lly  did not remain completely in d if fe re n t.
She reso rted  to  compromise when the  p ric e  of res is tan ce  or involvement 
proved too high. But when the  issue a t  hand involved her v i ta l  economic 
or p o l i t ic a l  in te r e s ts , she displayed considerable obstinancy and re ­
solve. For example, when Spain made an attempt to  contro l the  invalu­
able V a lte llin a  pass through the  Alps,Venice stood determined and ready, 
i f  necessary, to  re so r t  to  force. Since the  V a lte llin a  was the  only 
V enetian-controlled land route  to  the  markets of northern Europe, the  
republic could in  no way face the p o s s ib i li ty  of lo sing  i t .  Recogniz­
ing in  the case of the  V a lte llin a  pass her v i ta l  economic in te r e s ts ,  
Venice stood firm against Spanish coercion and won her po in t. In s t i l l  
another incident involving the I ta l ia n  peninsula i t s e l f ,  Venice proved 
a d i f f ic u l t  negotia tor with which to  dea l. Relations between two of
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the  pen in su la 's  most important s ta te s —th e  Venetian republic and the 
Papacy—understandably proved try in g  on occasion. In the  f i r s t  decade 
of the  century such had been th e  case when the  Pope, the  Republic, and 
th e  f ie ry  republican p r ie s t ,  Paolo S arp i, had met head-on. An in te r ­
d ic t  la s t in g  fiv e  years re su lte d  from th is  encounter, an in te rd ic t  
which l e f t  scars and unresolved tensions between Venice and the Holy 
See. Over th i r ty  years l a te r  another pope, Urban V III, sought—despite  
Venetian opposition—to  snatch the lands of the  Duchy of Castro; 
aligned w ith France and Tuscany, the  Venetians made a show of force and 
consequently preserved the  equilibrium  of the  I ta l ia n  peninsula. Al­
though th is  Venetian re fu sa l to  allow th e  pope to  absorb th e  duchy 
proved only tem porarily successfu l, i t  was another example of how firm  
the  Republic could be when i t  f e l t  i t s  d ire c t in te re s ts  were threatened .
In questions involving the balance of power in  I ta ly ,  Venetian 
diplomacy had scored several s ig n if ic a n t v ic to r ie s .  In  handling mat­
te r s  g rea tly  d is ta n t from I ta ly  i t s e l f  and ones which concerned the 
ira s c ib le  and often unpredictable Turk,Venetian diplomats found the  
s itu a tio n  considerably d iffe re n t. The c u ltu ra l and re lig io u s  t r a i t s  
which divided the East from the West as well as the  frequently  cap ri­
cious temperments o f the  Sultan and Grand V izier n ecessarily  demanded 
a more cautious and sen sitiv e  policy . Moreover, while carefu lly  manip­
u lated  diplomacy might have i t s  e ffe c ts  in  a Europe preoccupied with 
war, Venetian diplomats found in  the  East no other major powers to  
counterbalance against the Turks. Without the  capacity to  n eu tra lize  
Turkish th re a ts  by shuffling  diplomatic arrangements, Venice was
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compelled to  concede to  the  demands o f the  Porte more frequently  than 
she would have under b e tte r  circumstances.
Thus in  the  E ast, Venice was forced to  meet th e  Turkish th re a t 
from a p o s itio n  o f weakness. Experience had warned the  Republic th a t 
one could indeed expect l i t t l e  assis tan ce  from Europe's major Christian  
powers. Engaged in  an almost su ic id a l strugg le  w ith themselves, France 
and Spain had l i t t l e  time to  concern themselves w ith V enice's problems 
in  the  East; both powers, in  add ition , had devoted considerable energy 
toward cu ltiv a tin g  frien d ly  commercial and diplom atic re la tio n s  w ith 
Constantinople, re la tio n s  n e ith er power was in te n t upon abandoning in  
th e  in te re s t  of th e  Venetian s ta te .  A diplom atic s itu a tio n  such as 
th is  in  i t s e l f  required  a policy of cau tion , but th ere  was other reasons 
as w ell which seemed to  support a policy  o f co n c ilia tio n . Did not the 
long period of peace which had characterized  Turco-Venetian re la tio n s  
since the days of Lepanto in  the s ix teen th  century seem to  o ffe r  i r r e ­
fu tab le  evidence of the  peaceful in ten tio n s  o f the  Porte? So a t le a s t  
many thought, and, as long as a jud icious blend o f co n cilia tio n  and 
overt bribery—euphem istically re fe rred  to  as t r ib u te  or reparations— 
prevented open h o s t i l i t y ,  no one could convince Venice her action should 
be otherwise.
The might of the  S ultan , moreover, was something always to  be re ­
spected. War in  the  East frequently  demanded operations on a vast 
scale . Had not a l l  Europe witnessed in  horror the  hordes o f Islam be­
fore the gates of Vienna and had i t  not required  the combined naval 
might of Christendom to  win a v ictory  a t Lepanto? The b a ilo  noted in
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l 6Ul th a t  the  Sultan was, by feudal r ig h t ,  capable of ra is in g  without
any burden to  h is  treasu ry  several hundred thousand foot so ld ie rs  and 
65cavalry. With such a foe i t  was understandable why appeasement seem­
ed to  many Venetians as the  only sane a lte rn a tiv e  to  d isa s te r .
U nfortunately, th is  policy of co n c ilia tio n  fa i le d  p rec isely  because 
i t  generated a t Constantinople an a tti tu d e  of scorn. When once con­
fronted  by complaints th a t  the  peace with Venice should not be casually
broken, the  Grand V izier snapped back th a t  i t  was not necessary "to  use
,,66so much caution in  order to  awaken one who sleeps. Perhaps the  
peace would have been broken under any circumstances, a question no one 
can answer w ith c e rta in ty . But considering the frequent tendency fo r 
a m ilita n t power to  in te rp re t co n c ilia tio n  as a sign of weakness, one 
can not completely dismiss the  e ffe c t Venetian diplomacy must have had 
in  encouraging bolder and increasingly  reck less action  on th e  p a rt of 
the  Ottoman m in iste rs.
In  1638 the  war had indeed almost begun. In  th a t  year Algerian 
p i ra te s ,  for many decades elusive predators of Venetian commerce, 
f a i le d  in  an attempt to  sack the I ta l ia n  coasta l town of Loreto. The 
flee in g  co rsa irs  took refuge in  th e  Turkish p ort of Vallona where they 
were blockaded fo r  th ir ty -e ig h t  days by the  Venetian P row editor d e l l ' 
Armada, Antonio Cappello. For fear of repercussions in  Constantinople, 
Cappello had hoped to  avoid open b a tt le  by forcing the  p ira te  f le e t  
in to  c a p itu la tio n . As time passed, the  fea r  th a t  the Algerians would 
receive reinforcements forced Cappello to  move in  on the enemy. The 
ensuing b a tt le  l e f t  a l l  but one of the p ira te  vessels a t the  bottom of
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the  hay, th e  one hapless survivor being escorted  to  Venice as a  p rize  
67ship. This incident in fu ria te d  th e  S ultan , Murad IV, who immediately 
ordered th e  a rr e s t  of the  b a ilo , th e  blockade of Spalato, and an end 
to  a l l  commercial re la tio n s  with Venice. The S u ltan 's  i r e  soon cooled 
and h is  a tte n tio n  turned to  more p ressing  in te rn a l  m atters , but Venice 
had had a  sample of -what might happen should th ere  be a fu tu re  con­
fro n ta tio n . A peace agreement was eventually  concluded reso lv ing  the 
Vallona in c id e n t, but the  p rice  of peace was qu ite  high. Venice found 
h e rse lf  paying in  reparations 650,000 r e a l i s ,  150,000 of which had had 
to  be d is tr ib u te d  in  the  form of b ribes to  in f lu e n tia l  Turkish o f f i ­
c ia ls .  No mention was made by the Sultan of an e a r l ie r  t re a ty  signed 
between Venice and the  Porte which had e x p lic it ly  granted to  the
Republic th e  r ig h t  to  a ttack  the very same type o f marauders which had 
68attempted to  ra id  Loreto.
The ascension of th e  im becilic Ibrahim as Sultan in  1639 was view­
ed w ith optimism by many Venetian councilo rs, reasoning ra th e r  pre­
maturely th a t  such a weak-willed character would be less  inclined  to  
war than was h is  b e llico se  predecessor. These hopes were f ru s tra te d , 
fo r Ibrahim soon came to  be dominated by m in iste rs in te n t on casting  
Christians from the  eastern  reaches o f the  M editerranean .^  In Sep­
tember of l 6Mr, an event occurred which provided these m ilita n ts  with 
an id ea l p retex t fo r war. In th a t month, Zambul, a wealthy and very 
favored royal eunuch, sa ile d  from Alexandria in  possession of consider­
able treasu re  and accompanied by pilgrim s from Mecca. Among those in  
Zambul's convoy was the S u ltan 's  s is t e r  and one of h is  sons, whose name
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was Mohammed Effendi. Near th e  islan d  o f Scarpanto, 130 miles southwest 
of Rhodes, six  Maltese co rsa irs  attacked  th e  Turkish convoy; th e  a ttack  
l e f t  Zambul him self dead, as w ell as several agas and 150 Turkish de­
fenders. Mohammed was captured a liv e  and taken as hostage to  Malta.
The v ic to rious Maltese withdrew to  th e  safe ty  of th e  port of K alis- 
mene on the island  o f Candia and th ere  remained twenty days replenishing
th e ir  supplies and dealing in  s to len  merchandise with th e  lo ca l inhab- 
70i ta n ts .  The Prow editor-G eneral of Candia l a t e r  informed th e  Senate
th a t  he had learned of the  Maltese landing. According to  h is  testim ony,
they had landed a t some remote beach on the  is la n d , had disembarked
several Greeks held  by the  Turkish convoy as s la v e s , and had immediately
th e re a fte r  departed fo r home. A fter leaving Kalismene and subsequently
being turned away from several o ther Venetian po rts  th e  Maltese sought
refuge in  a remote bay a t Cephalonia; once contrary winds had subsided 
71they sa ile d  fo r Malta. Although the  Prow editor-G eneral made an 
honest e f fo r t  to  asce rta in  th e  tru e  fac ts  o f th e  in c id e n t, h is  report 
to  the  Senate n a tu ra lly  depended upon the  testimony of many v aried  
sources,some of which may have been u n reliab le .
The appearance of co rsa irs  on th e  islan d  of Candia or indeed on any 
islan d  in  the  Mediterranean which had secluded and navigable harbors 
was ce rta in ly  no reason fo r frenzied  alarm or p ro te s t. The c e n tra li ty  
of Candia as well as i t s  commodious harbor f a c i l i t i e s  made th e  kingdom 
a tempting lu re  fo r every m iscreant of the  seas. The only reasonable 
recourse the  p row ed ito rs of Candia had was to  disclaim  any responsi­
b i l i ty  for the  c o rs a ir 's  landing and to  issue decrees forbidding the
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inhab itan ts any contact with them; n a tu ra lly  had m ilita ry  ac tion  been 
feas ib le  or even p o ssib le ,s tep s  in  th is  d ire c tio n  would have been 
taken. Only a  few months p r io r  to  the  M altese a ttach  the  P ro w ed ito r- 
General had informed the Venetian Senate of another sim ila r  a ssau lt 
on Turkish shipping followed by a landing a t  a  rock is lan d  w ithin Can- 
dian w aters, an ac t which prompted the  issu in g  of orders not to  have 
72any contact w ith the p ira te s .  Despite such attempts to  discourage 
ac tion  o f th is  nature by the  M altese, th e re  was—as long as th e  Guardia 
d i Candia remained so lim ited  in  s iz e  and capacity—l i t t l e  any Venetian 
o f f ic ia l  could do to  prevent c landestine landings on remote beaches or 
to  r e s t r i c t  th e  sa le  o f p ira ted  goods to  islan d e rs  lu red  by the  g l i t t e r  
of a quick p r o f i t .  And since not only Turkish v essels but Venetian as 
well often f e l l  victim  to  these M editerranean c o rsa irs ,  Venice could 
h ardly be considered an accomplice of such ra id s .  To the Venetians the  
problem was a u n iversa l one and one which the  Republic i t s e l f  was t ry ­
ing to  con tro l to  the  best of i t s  a b il i ty .
Understandably, the  plunderous a c t iv i t ie s  of the  Maltese proved 
i r r i t a t i n g  to  Constantinople, esp ec ia lly  since the  Maltese were pro­
fessedly  C hristian . This fac t n a tu ra lly  complicated the d ispute adding 
to  i t  a p o te n tia l an ti-C h ris tian  crusading element as fa r  as the  Turks 
were concerned. The b a ilo , C ontarin i, res id en t a t  Constantinople and 
consequently somewhat more sen sitiv e  to  Turkish opinion, p rophetica lly  
observed what would be the  long-term e ffe c t  o f such attacks on Turco- 
Venetian re la tio n s . He reasoned th a t  th e  M altese, F lo ren tine , and 
papal p i ra te s ,  while not bringing any immediate damage or d isorder would,
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in  the  end, be "cause to  draw some ru in  on C h ris tia n ity . These cor­
s a ir s ,"  C ontarini continued,"many times in  my Bailaggio have come even 
to  th e  D ardanelles, and in  view o f them have made many prey and have
ca rried  away many Moslem slaves; m uch ...is  a t tr ib u te d  to  the  comfort
73they receive in  the  islan d s  of Candia and T ine, where although they 
know th a t  they have not been form ally rece ived , they  do not ignore how­
ever th a t  many open p o rts  and many unguarded i s l e t s  serve them to  make 
w ater, to  caulk, and s im ila r  t h in g s . . . . "  The b a ilo  made every attempt 
to  explain to  the Sultan and h is m inisters th a t  these  C hristian  ra id e rs  
received sim ila r s h e lte r  and supplies in  the  p o rts  o f th e  Ottoman em­
p ire ,  and, in  some cases, were t re a te d  b e tte r  since a t  le a s t  Venetian 
7kwaters were p a r t i a l ly  p a tro lle d . Such arguments had l i t t l e  e f f e c t , 
for those a t Constantinople in te n t on war had found what they consider­
ed an id ea l p re tex t fo r  ac tion . Even Venetian p ro te s ts  sent to  the  
Pope in  regard to  th e  ac tion  of h is  holy M altese knights and th e  subse­
quent confiscation  of a l l  Maltese p roperties w ith in  the  boundaries of
75the Venetian s ta te  did nothing to  a l t e r  th e  course of events.
The winter o f l 6*A and the spring o f th e  following year were char­
a c te rized  by a  p a th e tic  melange of hope, fe a r ,  and indecision . A 
p a ra ly tic  lethargy  seemed to  g rip  the  Republic. There were many who 
argued fo r  caution and pa tien ce, and not w ithout b a s is . Had not the  
S u ltan 's  f ie ry  harangues been quieted before by kind words and Venetian 
goldl Had not G rillo , th e  f a i th fu l  Venetian dragoman a t  Constantinople, 
heard from the  C adileschier him self th a t the  Sultan would never a ttack  
a friend  lik e  Venice! Perhaps, many could argue, the  furious t ira d e s
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of th e  Grand V izier were nothing more than a  c leverly  designed ruse
t 6by which to  bleed Venice of la rg e r and la rg e r  b ribes.
The sense of fa ls e  optimism was rein fo rced  by the  f a i lu re  of the  
Republic to  assess properly the f u l l  m ilita ry  preparedness o f the 
Turkish fo rces. Everyone respected th e  might of the  Sultan , but mis­
leading reports  concerning the  Jan issa rie s  and the Ottoman navy tended 
to  crea te  a sense of fa lse  confidence. In  l 6Ul the  b a ilo  had w ritten  
from Constantinople th a t  the  once dreaded Jan issary  e l i t e  was, in  f a c t ,  
no e l i t e  a t  a l l .  Although a t  one time the  Jan issa rie s  were a se le c t 
corps of twelve thousand armed and d isc ip lin ed  men, they now numbered 
close to  t h i r ty  or fo rty  thousand, but vere "decadent in  condition , no 
longer J a n is sa rie s , b u t . . . Jan issarized  Turks, no longer ferocious but 
almost a l l  domestic, not prepared fo r war but co rrup ted .. . . "  Such was
77the report sent to  Venice only a few years before th e  war. In 
add ition , the v ast naval resources of the  Sultan likew ise were more 
formidable in  numbers than in  qu a lity . Besides being scattered  through­
out many ports in  the Mediterranean and the Black Sea the  indiv idual
u n its  were often of a poor quality  and "qu ite  weak" as the  b a ilo  termed 
78them; even th e  Ottoman m inisters themselves seemed convinced th a t ,  
from a naval viewpoint, Venice enjoyed a s ig n if ic a n t advantage. So 
hampered were the Turkish naval contingents by a shortage of sk il le d  
mariners and navigators th a t fu lly  equipped galleys had been forced to  
remain a t anchor fo r the  lack of tra in ed  personnel.^0 Furthermore, as 
la te  as the  summer of l 6Uh the Prow editor-G eneral of Candia had re ­
ported to  the senate th a t  no -unusual m ilita ry  preparations had been
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observed a t  Constantinople; so confident was the  Prow editor-G eneral 
a t th is  time th a t  he ordered a cut back in  th e  galleys attached to  the 
Guardia d i Candia and ordered disbanded a company o f foot so ld ie rs  re ­
cently  rec ru ite d  to  re in fo rce  the defenses o f Zara on the  Dalmatian 
co ast . 81
Yet by the  spring of 16^5 m atters had become more c r i t i c a l ,  indef­
in i te  and nebulous. E ffo rts  to  assuage the  anger o f the  Grand V izier 
had met w ith no success. In January of l61»5 the b a ilo , Soranzo, had 
met with V izier Jussu f in  the hope o f providing the  b asis  fo r  a d ip lo­
matic accommodation in  regard to  the  M altese in cid en t. But the  v iz ie r  
remained unshakeable, and i t  became by then  more and more obvious th a t 
he was seeking to  reso lve the  difference by means o f war. He cu rtly  
informed Soranzo th a t  the  time fo r  diplom atic parleys had passed, espe­
c ia l ly  since he had recen tly  learned th a t  th e  Maltese p ira te s  had 
landed a t  Candia fo r  some twenty days and had disposed of much o f th e i r  
sto len  treasu re  by s e ll in g  i t  to  th e  is la n d 's  in h ab itan ts .^2 In  addi­
t io n ,  he presented Soranzo with another charge th a t  Venice had refused 
to  lend assis tan ce  to  a Moslem vessel l i s t i n g  in  the  waters o f Cape 
Salamone on the  southwestern t ip  of Candia; th e  islan d e rs , so the  Turk­
ish  claimed, not only refused to  help but subjected the  d istressed  
vessel to  considerable i ll- trea tm e n t. This charge was undoubtedly 
without substance, but i t  served the immediate purpose of lending fu r­
th e r  support to  Turkish c rie s  of righteous indignation.
Ey th e  spring of I 6U5 the  atmosphere o f optimism a t Venice began 
to  pass and sp ecific  steps were taken to  prepare the  empire fo r a
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s p ir i te d  defense. Following an unprovoked a ttack  on a  Venetian convoy- 
e a rly  in  16U5 , the  Senate had appointed severa l new m ilita ry  command­
e rs  to  key p o sitio n s . In the  spring an order was issued to  augment "by 
twenty galleys the  Guardia d i Candia; preparations fo r  the  construction
of th i r ty  galleys and two galeasses a t  the  a rsenal in  Venice were also 
83undertaken. The twenty galleys ordered fo r the  Guardia did eventually 
reach Candian w aters, hu t,p rim arily  as a r e s u l t  of in e f f ic ie n t  manage­
ment a t the  Venetian arsenals the g alleys and galeasses to  he construc t-
81;ed th ere  never were completed. Despite these  he la ted  e ffo r ts  the
size  o f the  Venetian f le e t  remained dangerously sm all, s ca tte red  as i t
was in to  small in effec tiv e  u n its  throughout th e  Mediterranean and 
85Aegean. As fo r the  defenses of Candia i t s e l f ,  p reparations continued
in  a desultory  and fa l te r in g  manner. Some e ffo r ts  were made in  the  way
86of adding several contingents of Oltremontani and O ltrem arini foot 
so ld ie rs  as rap id ly  as supplies and funds would perm it; m odifications 
and rep a irs  on the  respective  fo rtre s se s  o f the  islan d  likew ise moved 
87apace.
What the  in ten tions of th e  Sultan and the Grand V izier were with 
respect to  the  peace no one ye t c le a rly  understood. In March the Porte 
had o f f ic ia l ly  declared war on the  M altese Knights of S t. John hut one 
could not he ce rta in  whether a s im ila r d ec la ration  against the  Eepuhlic 
would likew ise follow. Rumors and conjecture continued to  c ircu la te  
among the diplomats and statesmen of Europe. In  April a Turkish armada 
l e f t  Constantinople, sa iled  to  Scio, and from th ere  to  Negroponte for 
provisions. From Negroponte the armada moved southward to  the  port of
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Malvasia on the  southeastern t i p  of the  Morea, f in a l ly  re s tin g  anchor
to  th e  west a t  Navarino in  order to  await fu rth e r  Barbary re in fo rce -
89ments. Although a  powerful Turkish armada now lay  anchored only a
short distance from th e  shores of Candia, many continued to  believe
th a t  i t s  ta rg e t  was Malta and not th e  Venetian islan d .
The stops a t  Malvasia and then a t  Navarino, both o f which were to
the  west of Candia, seemed a favorable in d ica tio n  th a t  perhaps Venice
would escape from war. The p ro w ed ito r  o f Canea wrote the  Senate th a t
since the  Turkish armada had passed westward of the  kingdom th e  island
would in  a l l  p ro b ab ility  be spared from a tta c k .^0 M atters a t  Malta
were s im ila rly  confused by th is  recent ac tion  o f th e  enemy armada. The
papal in q u is ito r  a t  M alta, G iovanbattista Gori P annelin i, f e l t  ce rta in
th a t  th e  Moslem f le e t  would soon be heading h is  way. "And here CMalta)
i t  is  held fo r  c e rta in ,"  Pannelini w rote, " th a t the  sa id  arms (of the
Turks) are destined  against th is  is lan d  because of th e  new l e t t e r s  come
from Constantinople, even from the  French ambassador, and because o f
the  reports  of sp ies who have been sent from t h e r e . . . . "  There were
those such as the  M altese Grand Master him self who disagreed w ith Pan-
n e l in i 's  apprehension, but i t  must have seemed to  many throughout
Europe th a t  the  Sultan did indeed mean to  have h is  revenge aga inst th is  
91t in y  islan d  of C hristian  p riv a tee rs . Turkish commanders n a tu ra lly  
did everything possib le  to  confuse and deceive the  C hristian  world.
A Greek spy aboard th e  enemy armada reported  se c re tly  th a t an aga, when 
asked the  destin a tio n  of the f le e t ,  answered p o sitiv e ly  th a t  i t  was 
headed toward Malta. Moreover, wherever the  Turkish f le e t  passed a
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Venetian port of c a l l  a l l  due courtesy and circumspection was shown the
92Venetian o f f ic ia ls  hy the  Moslem o f fic e rs .
The rumored s ize  o f the  enemy armada in sp ired  fea r  and awe among 
even th e  most v a lia n t.  U nfortunately, estim ates of the  s ize  o f the  
Turkish f le e t  varied  enormously. W riting from the  tense  atmosphere of 
Malta the  papal in q u is ito r  reported  th a t  the  Turkish f le e t  had grown 
to  as many as seven hundred s a i l ,  a fig u re  undoubtedly exaggerated by 
93rumors and fea r . Most o ther rep o rts  were more conservative. The 
e n tire  armada probably numbered about th ree  hundred ships in  a l l ,  near­
ly  two hundred of which were small cargo and troop c a rr ie r s  known as 
gli
saiches and caramussels. On the  23rd o f May, one day p r io r  to  the
a ssau lt on Canea, a Greek spy had reported  th a t  the  armada consisted  of
seventy g a lley s , two maone, eight Barbary g a lley s , one su ltan e , th i r ty
v essels  of between f if te e n  and twenty cannon each, 120 saiches and
numerous smaller provision and munition ships. The informant estim ated
95the number of men aboard to  be approximately s ix ty  thousand.
These figu res fo r both the  number of ships and men involved pro­
vide us with a f a i r ly  accurate d escrip tion  o f th e  force which now 
menaced Candia. N aturally , the  mere s ize  of t h is  awe-inspiring f l o t i l l a  
deserved resp e c t, but numbers alone were not a  completely sa tis fa c to ry  
c r i te r io n  by which to  estim ate the capacity  of the  Sultan to  wage war. 
There were reports  th a t  large portions of th is  armada were in  poor 
condition. Several weeks before the  i n i t i a l  Turkish a ssau lt on the  
Candian i s l e t  of San Teodoro,the Prow editor-G eneral wrote to  the  Senate 
describing much of the  Ottoman armada in  an "imperfect co n d itio n .. .the
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men demoralized and d esp a ir in g .. . . ” Many of the  Turkish vessels were 
apparently poorly armed and several were no more than B ritish  and 
Flemish merchantmen impressed in to  se rv ice; many o f th e  other u n its ,  
according to  the  Prow editor-G eneral*s re p o r t, vere  "vessels o f l i t t l e
.,96e s te e m .... Such weaknesses, perhaps to  he expected in  an armada so 
h a s ti ly  assembled, gave the endangered Venetians some guarded reason 
fo r hope.
On the  20th of June the  Turkish f le e t  l e f t  Navarino and had, with­
in  th ree  days, landed on th e  Candian beach of Gogna, a beach ju s t  f i f ­
teen  miles from the  fo rtre s s  of Canea. The following day th e  Turks led 
an assau lt against the t in y  islan d  and fo rtre s s  o f San Teodoro which 
lay  only a few m iles v est of Canea. The fo rtre s s  commander, an I s tr ia n
by the name o f Biagio G uiliana, rea lized  th ere  was no chance o f escape
or defense fo r  h is  garrison  of several dozen men; ra th e r  than  f a l l  
captive to  th e  in f id e l  he ordered the  fo rtre s s  mined, th e  subsequent
explosion destroying the  fo rtre s s  i t s e l f ,  nearly  a l l  the  Venetian gar-
97r iso n , and approximately 150 of the  enemy. The clouds o f mystery had 
suddenly vanished in  th is  ra th e r  tra g ic  scenario of heroism. The war 
of Candia had indeed begun, a war long and b i t t e r  in  which th ere  would 
be many other heroic deeds and many o ther mounds o f rubble as the  p rize  
of v ictory .
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must t a l e  in to  account th e  g re a ter  m ilita r y  burden th a t Candia had to  
absorb in  defense o f  th e  e n t ir e  M editerranean area , th e  budgetary sh o rt­
ages o f  th e  vingriiMn could n ot be e a s i ly  d ism issed . For in s ta n c e , th e  
t o t a l  expenditures o f  Candia represented  alm ost as much a s  th e  combined 
revenues o f  two o f  th e  Terraferma’ s most important c i t i e s ,  Padova and 
Verona. Indeed, th e  326,909 ducats l i s t e d  as  expenditures fo r  Candia 
represented  approxim ately 1 2 .4  percent o f  th e  t o t a l  expenditures l i s t e d  
fo r  th e  e n tir e  Venetian s ta t e  in  1638 (2,635,901 d u c a ts). For th e  
t o t a l  expenditures l i s t e d  in  l6 4 l,  a  sum o f  2,770^551 d u cats , th e  
expenses fo r  Candia represented  about 12 p ercen t. The fo llo w in g  f ig u r e s  
were found in  th e  Reale Commissione d e i document! f in a n z ia r i i  d e l la  
Repubblica d i V enezia, B ila n c i g en er a l! d e l la  Repubblica d i V enezia 
(V enice, 1903-12), V ol. I l l ,  ppT 538-540.
REVENUE (ENTRADA) EXPENSES (SPESA)
89,439 ducats Candia .............. 70 ,684  ducats
C a n ea .................  70,583 " C a n ea ....................25,9^5
R e tt im o ............. 32,961 " R e tt im o ............. 6,992
S i t t i a ............... 3,201 " S i t t i a ................  2,524 "
C e r ig o .............. 426 ” C e r ig o ................  2,777 ”
TOTAL • .  • . 196,610 ducats TOTAL   108,922 ducats
REVENUE SUPPLEMENTS* ADDITIONAL EXPENSES
Cephalonia ...108 ,000 ducats Captain o f:
Z a n t e   16,000 ” G uard .................  23,517 ducats
In te r e s t    19,289 " M il i t ia ...............  187,415 "
I n t e r e s t   7,055
TOTAL REVENUE 339,899 ducats TOTAL EXPENSES 326,909 ducats
■X-
N .B .: Without th ese  supplementary revenues contributed  by th e  is la n d s  
o f  Cephalonia and Zante th e  expense o f  Candia would have fa r  exceeded th e  
y ea r ly  revenues.
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Z a n te............ 59,561 "
Corfu  30,083 "
TOTAL............  222,918 ducats
EXPENSES (SPESA)
Cephalonia  25,053 ducats
Zante........... 18,1*65 "
Corfu   53.085 M
TOTAL..........  96,603 ducats
With the exception of Corfu, -which had a deficit of slightly over 
23,000 ducats, the other two islands of the Ionian archipelago showed 
a surplus of revenues over expenditures. Cephalonia had a revenue 
surplus of 108,221 ducats and Zante had one of 1*1,096 ducats. When 
all the revenues of the Ionian islands and those of Candia were com­
bined we achieve an accounting as follows:
REVENUE (ENTRADA)
Candia 196,610 ducats
Cephalonia  133,271* "
Zante.........  59,561 ”
Corfu  30,08^ "
TOTAL.........  1*19,528 ducats
EXPENSES (SPESA)
Candia  326,909 ducats
Cephalonia  25,053 "
Zante..........  18,1*65 "
Corfu..........  53.085 ”
TOTAL........... 1*23,512 ducats
When all other revenues or expenses (e.g., interest charges, etc.) 
are added to or subtracted from these total one arrives at the 
following figures for the three islands of Ionia and the Kingdom 
of Candia:
TOTAL ACCOUNTING
Revenues.......  365,861 ducats
Expenses.......  352.Q27 "
Surplus  12,751* ducats
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2 9 .  B.N.M ., V H  (3 3 2 ), R elazione d i  N ico lo  da Boate dqpo i l  
suo r i to m o  da Candia.
3 0 . A .S .V ., P.T.M. (7 9 5 ) , Senato, Andrea Corner, P ro w ed ito r -  
G eneraledi Candia, November 10 , l61A . See a l s o ,  A .S .V ., P.T.M. (8 7 3 ), 
D isp a cci in q u is i to r i  in  Candia, Marco Loredan, Giovanni P asqualigo ,
e t  a l . ,  I 6 l l - l 6 l 5 .  A l e t t e r  o f  l 6 l2  -written by th e  in q u is i to r i  noted  
th a t  th e  fin an ces o f  th e  is la n d  -were in  poor co n d it io n , one reason  
b ein g  th a t th e  camera or trea su ry  in  many o f  th e  is la n d  was " cred ito r  
o f  a  considerab le sum o f  money."
31 . The *d a tio ' (p lu r a l, d a t i i )  i s  a  form o f  th e  modern I t a l ia n  
word which means a t e l l  or  customs duty . The d a tio  (d a z io , in  modem 
I t a l ia n )  was th e  primary source o f  revenue fo r  both  th e  im p eria l 
domains o f  Venice as w e ll  as th e  Terraferma. A l l  goods en terin g  or  
departing  from Venetian p o rts  were requ ired  to  pay a  ta x  eq u iva len t
t o  a  c e r ta in  perc n tage o f  th e  va lu e  o f  th e  goods. The duty le v ie d  on 
goods en tering  was known as th e  d a tio  d 'en trad a, and th a t which was 
l e v ie d  on goods lea v in g  a Venetian p o rt was c a lle d  th e  d a tio  d 'u s c i ta .  
Numerous heated debates revolved  around th e  is s u e  o f  th e se  custom t o l l s  
concerning whether or n ot th ey  should be e i th e r  e lim in ated  com pletely  
or se r io u s ly  m od ified . Yet i t  was fo r  o n ly  a  sh ort p eriod  during th e  
seventeenth  century th a t th e  d a t i i  were ever r e v ise d  o r  a lte r e d . See 
A .S .V ., Cinque s a v i i  a l i a  m ercanzia, Old & New s e r ie s ,  passim . ; 
da Mosto, L'A rchivio d i  S ta to  d i  V enesia (V en ice, 1957), I  & I I ,
32 . A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R e laz ione , Busta 83 , Marco 
G iu stin ia n , P ro w ed ito r  d i  Canea ,  May 2 7 , l6kh, G iustin ian  wrote  
th a t " in th e  sa le  o f  th e  d a t i o , . . .  I  have increased  by fo u rteen  
thousand two hundred and se v e n ty -s ix  ducats th e  p u b lic  s a l e , . . .
in  a l l ( t h e  d a tio ) r a is in g  th e  sum o f  seventy-tw o thousand two hundred 
and n inety-tw o d u c a t s . . . ."
3 3 . A .S .V ., P.T.M. (7 9 5 ) , Senato, Andrea Com er, P ro w ed ito r -  
GeneraLe d i Candia, February 2 8 , l6Uh.
34 . A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R elaz ione , B usta 83 ,  Marco 
G iu stin ia n , P ro w ed ito r  d i Canea, May 27 , 16UU.
35 . B.N.M., VH (3 0 2 ), R elazione d e l  S ignor N ico lo  Suriano, 
P ro w ed ito r  dell*A im ata, 1583 .
36 .  See below , th e  V allona in c id e n t, p .  29-30.
37 .  Rosnanln, S to r ia , V H , pp. 356-57 .
38 .  B osch etto , "Come fu  aperto,"  Part I ,  pp. **6-14-7.
39 . A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e e r e ta ) , R e lazione, Busta 8 l ,  Prow ed- 
i t o r  d e l la  c a v a l le r ia  in  Candia, P isa n i. The f ig u r e s  g iven  by P isa n i,
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th e  P ro w ed ito r  o f  th e  Cavalry, were somewhat h igh er than th o se  
noted by th e  P row ed itor-G enerale, Cornaro. P isa n i claim ed th a t  
th e  is la n d  could muster 120 Venetian cava lry , 221 C retenese, 27** 
feu d a l con tin gen ts, and 1*75 ’ s c u d ie r i';  th e s e  's c u d ie r i'  were 
th e  v i l e  peasants incapab le o f  d is c ip l in e  t o  which P isa n i r e fe r s ,  but 
he noted  th a t "even from th e  oth ers one can hope fo r  l i t t l e . "
t o .  A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V ( Seer e t a ) ,  R elazione, Busta 83,
P row ed !tor  d i Canea, Marco G iu stin ian , May 27 , l 6t o .  From th e  
f ig u r e s  quoted by G iustin ian  over erne thousand c iv i l ia n s  could be 
m ustered in to  th e  ranks o f  th e  m i l i t i a  thus making, in  ab so lu te  
numbers, a  f a i r ly  la r g e  fa r ce; unfortu nately  th e se  ’ cern ide' or 
' s c o lh r i'  were o ften  ju s t  as inexperienced  as G iu stin ia n 's  sarcasm 
im plied  and o ften  had e ith e r  poor or in s u f f ic ie n t  equipment.
1*1. B.N.M., VII (211*), P ietro  Zane, R elazione d e l l ' i s o l a  
d i Candia. Zane g iv e s  th e  fo llow ing  f ig u r e s :  900 s o ld ie r s  a t Canea,
3 ,527  a t Rettim o, and 3 ,895  a t  Candia.
1*2. Approximately 9,12l* ducats were a l lo t t e d  fo r  each o f  
th e  s o t t i l e  g a lle y s  in  operation  in  th e  year 161*1 ; more, o f  course, 
was spent on th e  g a lle a s s e s  and th e  r e sp e c tiv e  v e s s e ls  o f  th e  P row ed- 
i t o r  dell'A rm ata, th e  Capitano in  G olfo, e t c .  For th e  th re e  g a lle y s  
o f  th e  Guardia d i Candia in  th e  same y ea r , a  t o t a l  o f  23,517 ducats  
was a l lo t te d , exclud ing th e  in t e r e s t  charges. This f ig u r e  would 
average out t o  7 ,839  ducats per v e s s e l ,  or 1 ,2 8 5  ducats l e s s  per  
average Candian g a l le y .  Of th e  t o t a l  n aval budget th e  expenditures 
fo r  th e  Guardia d i Candia represented  ju s t  s l ig h t ly  more than  
6 .1  percen t. See R eale Ccomissione, B ila n c i gen er a l! (V enice,
1903-12), I I I ,  PP. 570-71.
1*3. A .S .V ., P.T.M. (7 9 5 ), Senato, Andrea Corner, P ro w ed ito r-  
G eneraledi Candia, March 29, 16V*.
1*1*. S .N .M ., VII (211*), R elazione d e l l ' i s o l a  d i  Candia, P ietro  
Zane. Zane v en t a s  fa r  as to  claim  th a t  th e  is la n d 's  d efen ses , e s p e c ia lly  
i t s  f o r t i f i c a t io n s ,  were probably in  s a t is fa c to r y  con d ition  t o  w ithstand  
an a tta ck  i f  on ly  m unitions and p ro v is io n s were sen t t o  th e  is la n d .
1*5. Ib id . Zane g iv e s  th e  fig u re  o f  858 cannon, but many o f  th e se  
were undoubtedly u n serv iceab le .
1*6. Ib id .
1*7. Ib id .
1*8. A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V ( Seer e t a ) ,  R e lazione, Busta 83 , P row ed itor  
d i Canea, Marco G iustin ian , May 27, 16W*.
1*9. A .S .V ., P.I.M . (8 2 0 ), P ro w ed ito r  d i Canea, Antonio Navagiero, 
March 18 , 161*5.
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50. Ibid.
51. A .S .V ., C o lleg io  7  ( Seer e t a ) ,  R elaz ione , Busta 8 3 , P row ed- 
i t o r  d i Canea, Marco G iu stin ian , May 27 , l6*th; A .S .V ., P.T.M. (7 9 5 ), 
Senator, Andrea Cornaro, P row ed itor-G eneral d i  Candia, January 20 ,
16U5 .
52. A .S .V ., P.T.M. (7 9 5 ), Senato, Andrea Corner, P ro w ed ito r -  
Generale d i  Candia, November 20 , 16UU.
53. A .S .V ., P.T.M. (7 9 5 ), Senato, Andrea Corner, P ro w ed ito r -  
Generale d i Candia, December 1 0 , l 6*ik.
5*f. A .S .V ., P.T.M. (7 9 5 ), Senato, Andrea Corner, P ro w ed ito r -  
Generale d i Candia, n .d . The Prow editor-G enera requested  6 ,000  
m uskets, 600,000  musket b a l l s ,  500,000  pounds ( l ib b r e s )  o f  powder, 
and 20 ,000  a ssorted  c a lib e r  a r t i l l e r y  sh ot.
55. A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R elazione, Busta 8 5 , Vendramin, 
Corfu, August 7 , 16*10.
56 . A .S .V ., P.T.M. (8 7 3 ), D ispacci in q u is i to r i  in  Candia, Marco 
Loredan, Giovanni P asqualigo, e t  a l . ,  I 6 l l - l 6 l 5 .  L e tte r  o f  Giovanni 
P a sq u ilig o , Cephalonia, December 3 , l6 lh ;  A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ), 
R elazione, Busta 85 ,  P ie tro  N avagiero, P ro w ed ito r  e t  Capitano d i  Corfu,
161A.
57. A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S ec reta ), R elazione, Busta 83 ,  Giacomo 
Donado, P row ed itor  d i Cephalonia, September 1 7 , l6*»0.
58 . B arozzi and B erchet, R e laz ion i A m basciatori, I ,  S er ie s  I ,
p . bl2.
59 . Cephalonia, an is la n d  not n ea rly  so la r g e  a s  Candia but r e la ­
t iv e ly  r ic h  and populous, was approxim ately 170 m iles  (m ig lia ) in  c i r ­
cumference and had a  popu lation  o f  approxim ately s ix ty  thousand p erson s. 
I t s  entrada or revenues were second in  th e  empire on ly  t o  Candia, but 
w ith  much fewer expenses; as a  r e s u l t ,  th e  is la n d  provided V enice w ith
a com fortable revenue su rp lu s. According to  a report o f  Giacomo Donado, 
P ro w ed ito r  o f  Cephalonia, we lea r n  something about th e  s ta t e  o f  th e  
is la n d  in  th e  year 16U0 . That year th e  re n t from th e  d a tio  dell*en trad a  
and th e  d a tio  d 'u sc ita  amounted to  about 33,000 d ucats, although much 
o f  t h is  sum was apparently s t i l l  a c tu a lly  u n c o lle c te d . Nearly tw enty  
thousand ducats annually went fo r  ordinary expenses, o f f i c i a l ’ s  s a la r ie s ,  
and th e  c o sts  o f  th e  m i l i t i a .  T his a lone would have provided a sm all but 
s a t is fa c to r y  su rp lu s, but other revenue was derived  from th e d a tio  on 
new im ports. The amount c o lle c te d  from t h is  custom charge was 7*1,090 
d ucats. Moreover, Donado added, th ere  were 3^,671 ducats l e f t  in  th e  
treasu ry by h is  predecessor. In sh o rt, revenues fo r  th a t  year exceeded  
expenses by a sum o f approxim ately 87,000 d ucats. A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V 
(S ec reta ), R elazione, Busta 83 , Giacomo Donado, P row ed itor  d i Cephalonia,
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September 17, 1640. See a ls o ,  Reale Conmissione, B ila n c i g en er a l!  
(V en ice, 1 9 03-12), I U ,  chap. i ,  n . 2 8 . From th e se  f ig u r e s  we 
a rr iv e  a t  a  surplus fo r  th e  year o f  1638  o f  approxim ately 108,000 
ducats fo r  th e  revenues c o lle c te d  a t  Cephalonia.
6 0 . B arozzi and B erchet, R e la z io n i flm haseiatori, I ,  S er ie s  I ,
p . 412.
6 1 . A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R e laz ion e , Busta 66 , Rrov- 
v e d ito r  d i Spa la to , 1642. I  have u sed  th e  somewhat arb itrary  standard  
o f  con sidering  on ly  th o se  c a lib e r  a r t i l l e r y  between fou rteen  and f i f t y  
c a lib e r  ' la r g e  a r t i l l e r y ' . Any weapon w ith  a sm aller c a lib e r  than t h i s  
range has been considered  ' sm aller a r t i l l e r y ' . Most Dalmatian towns 
had no la r g e  a r t i l l e r y  p ie c e  and many m erely r e l ie d  on musket shot or  
th e  support o f  sm all a r t i l l e r y  in  th e  range o f  one t o  th re e  ca lib e r  
(th e se  were freq u en tly  known as ' s a c r i '  or ' f a l c o n i ' ) .
62 . A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R e laz ion e , Busta 66 , Dalmatia 
e t  A lbania, 1642. The revenues and expenses fo r  th e  variou s towns and 
c i t i e s  o f  th e  p rovince in  1642 were a l  fo llo w s:
REVEHUBS AMD EXPENSES
Town Revenue (Entrada) Expenses (Spese)
Sudua 9 ,840  L ire 4 ,638  L ire
Cattaro 38,955 39,534





Pago 4 ,4 l6 5,13*1
Arbe 1,170 6 ,178
V eglia 15 ,116 14,513
Cherso & Ossero 6,642 6,274
u n lis te d 602 1,000
TOTAL...................................... . 282,857 L ire 280,097 L ire
MILITARY EXPENSES




S iben ico 8 ,101 4 2 ,6 o4
Zara (and towns in  i t s
ju r is d ic t io n ) 31,011 . 171,938
TOTAL............................................  110,398 L ire 407 ,0 6 l L ire
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CAVALRY
T otal Revenue se t aside  fo r  cavalry  19,819 L ire
T otal Expenses fo r  th e  ca v a lry .    571,836 L ire
Sum o f a l l  the  expenses o f the  province: 1,258,994 l i r e
Sum of a l l  th e  revenues o f the  province: 413,074
Total D e f ic i t ...........................  845,920 L ire
See A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R e la z io n e ,'B u sta  6 6 , Dalmatia e t  
A lbania, 1642.
Note on th e  numbers o f  men, women,and ch ildren  as w e ll  as th e  t o t a l  
numbers o f  h o rses , c a t t l e ,  and oth er sm aller anim als in  th e  Province 
o f  Dalmatia and A lbania, Busta 66.
POPULATION FIGURES (1642)
Women & Other Ceraide *
Town Men Children Children A v a ila b le
Budua 154 321 132 ----
Cattaro 1,837 3,078 1,260 1,067
Spalato 1,315 2,756 796 480
Trau 1,839 3,576 1,409 800
Sibenico 2,895 3,309 1,563 1,456
Zara 3,866 7,360 2,736 1,462
Novegrad 205 236 294
TOTALS 12,111 20,636 8,190 4,269
T o ta ls  g iven  fo r  th e  e n t ir e  province:
21,607 36,436 16,837 9,249
See A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R elazione, Busta 66 , Dalmatia e t  
A lbania, 1642.
*  The ceraide were th o se  upon whom th e c i t y  or fo r tr e s s  could c a l l  
in  order t o  supplement th e  ranks o f  th e  regu lar m i l i t i a  or reg im en ts.
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6 3 . A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R e laz ion e , Busta 72,
Bassadonna, S palato , 1638 .
64 . See Roberto C e ssi, S to ria  d e l la  Repubblica d i Venezia 
(r ev . e d . ,  M ilan-M essina, 1968) ,  I I ,  chaps, v i  and v i i ,  pp. 141-228.
65 . Barozzi and B erchet, R e la z io n i A m basciatori, I ,  S eries  I ,
p . 390.
66. Quoted in  B osch etto , "Cane fu  a p e r to ,” Part I ,  p . 30.
67 . B.N.M ., VII (2 0 0 ), Mossa dell'A rm i, Eresa d e lla  g a le o tte  
a l ia  V allona, August 7 , 1638 ; Romania, S to r ia , V II, p . 344; B osch etto , 
"Come fu  aperto ,"  Part I ,  p . l 4 .
68 . B osch etto , "Come fu  aperto ,"  Part I ,  p . 15.
6 9 . Ib id . ,  p . 5-
70. Ib id . ,  pp. 18-19 .
71. Romania, S to r ia , V II, pp. 3k7-3kS.
72. A .S .V ., P.T.M. (795)> Senato, Andrea Corner, P ro w ed ito r -
Generale d i Candia, June 1 6 , 1644.
73. Tine was a V enetian is la n d  s itu a te d  north o f  Candia in  
th e  Aegean Sea.
74 . B arozzi and Berchet, R e la z io n i A m basciatori, I ,  S er ie s  I ,
p . 396.
75 . Mario Nani Mocenigo, Le marina Veneziana da Lepanto a l i a  
caduto d e lla  Repubblica (Rome, 19351, p . 133" (H erein after re fer re d  
t o  as Marina Veneziana. )
7 6 . B osch etto , "Came fu  aperto ,"  Part I ,p p . 25-26 .
77. Barozzi and Berchet, R e laz ion i A m basciatori, I ,  S er ie s  I ,
p . 343.
78. The Turkish navy, although g e n e r a lly  l e s s  renown than th e  
V enetian, had not been com pletely n eg lec ted  by Sultan  Murad IV; he had 
elim i nated many abuses and had a ttr a c te d  in to  Turkish se r v ic e  - s k i l l e d  
Greeks, Genoese, and, on occasion , even V enetians. Turkish arsen a ls  
d otted  th e  banks o f  th e  Black Sea, w h ile r a id in g  p a r t ie s  in to  neighbor­
in g  Tartar t e r r i t o r ie s  furn ished  an abundant supply o f  g a lle y  s la v e s . 
B osch etto , "Come fu  aperto ,"  Part I ,  p . 6 . B ie  In q u isito r  o f  Malta 
a lso  noted  th e  enormous productive cap acity  o f  th e  Turkish a rsena ls  
but questioned  th e  q u a lity  o f  th e  Turkish f l e e t .  "Correspondenza Malta 
1645-69," A rch ivio S torico  I ta lia n o , XLI, p . 122.
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79- B arozzi and B erchet, R e la z io n i Am basciatori, I ,  S er ie s  
I ,  p . 362.
80. Ib id . ,  p . 356.
81 . A .S .V ., P.T.M. (7 9 5 ) , Senato, Andrea Corner, P r o w e d ito r -  
Generale d i  Candia, May 7 , 1644 and May 1 8 , 1644.
82 . Romanin, S to r ia , V II, p . 353 . The Grand V iz ie r  a ls o  
accused th e  Venetians o f  having re fu sed  t o  a s s i s t  a  Turkish v e s s e l  
l i s t i n g  in  th e  w aters o f  Candia near Cape Salomone. The is la n d e r s  were 
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CHAPTER XI 
THE WAR BEGINS, 1& 6
The se iz u r e  o f  th e  t in y  fo r tr e s s  o f  San Teodore narked th e  begin­
n ing o f  th e  war o f  Candia. This Turkish ch a llen ge p resen ted  th e  
i s la n d 's  defenders w ith  enormous problems. The Provedit or-G eneral,
Andrea Corner, and o ther o f f ic e r s  on Candia had fo r  months warned th e  
Senate o f th e  need fo r  greater  preparation , but t h e ir  advice had had 
l i t t l e  e f f e c t .  With th e  outbreak o f  open h o s t i l i t i e s  e x is t in g  d e f i ­
c ie n c ie s  were aggravated even fu rth e r . The very appearance o f  such a  
form idable armada a s  th a t o f  th e  Sultan c a s t  a  shadow o f  fe a r  over th e  
is la n d . Many o f  th e  is la n d ers  sought re fu ge in  th e  mountainous te r r a in  
o f  th e  in t e r io r  thereby exacerbating th e  e x is t in g  manpower sh o rta g e s.1  
With such a c r i t i c a l  la c k  o f  men and v i t a l  su p p lie s , th e  p rosp ects fo r  a 
su c c e ss fu l defense were exceedingly  dim.
By August th e  s itu a t io n  had become c r i t i c a l .  As th e  Turks were 
b esieg in g  th e  c i t y  o f  Canea, warnings were sen t by th e  V enetian commander 
o f  Canea th a t w ithout fu rther a s s is ta n c e  he would be unable to  r e p e l a  
major enemy a s s a u lt .2 Although Corner promised th e  beleaguered  c i t y  
immediate a s s is ta n c e , he soon d iscovered  th a t i t  was n ea rly  im possib le  
t o  break through th e  Turkish cordon which surrounded i t ;  g a lle y s  reported  
th a t th ey  alm ost always found th e  c i t y  "en circled  by th e  T u rk s...
With th e  excep tion  o f  a sm all r e l i e f  column o f in fa n try  and th ree  g a lle y s  
which s lip p ed  in  by cover o f  darkness, th e  c i t y  o f  Canea was l e f t  to  i t s  
own resou rces .
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Corner informed th e  Senate o f  th e  d esperate co n d it io n  o f  th e  
b esieg ed  fo r tr e s s ;  incapab le o f  being  reached by e ith e r  land or sea , 
th e  doomed c i t y  la y  "tormented and broken in  a l l  p a r ts . . ." .'*  Die 
determined enemy continued i t s  r e le n t le s s  a s sa u lt ;  Turkish m ines, to o  
numerous t o  count, widened th e  breaches blown in  th e  c i t y ' s  w a lls .
Morale a t Canea touched a new low when th e  defenders learned  th a t no 
attem pt was b eing  made by th e  g a lle y s  o f  Porto d e l la  Suda t o  r e l ie v e  
th e  exhausted g a rr iso n . As August came t o  a  c lo s e ,  even th e  o f f ic e r s  
a t  Canea began t o  p r o te s t  th a t  fu rther r e s is ta n c e  was f u t i l e ,  c ir c u la ­
t in g  among them selves a s igned  p e t i t io n  t o  th a t e f f e c t .^
The fa i lu r e  t o  d ev ise  a  u n if ie d  command a ls o  hampered th e  
Venetian d efe n siv e  e f f o r t .  E ff ic ie n t  op eration s were thwarted on 
variou s occasions by masked insubord ination  and genuine cow ardice. One
p lan  t o  send a r e l i e f  column o f  tw elve hundred s o ld ie r s  t o  Canea ended
7
in  fa i lu r e  when o f f ic e r s  le d  th e  contingent t o  th e  wrong rendezvous.
A more ser io u s problem r e su lte d  from th e  t im id ity  and in e p titu d e  o f  
Antonio Cappello, Captain o f  th e  Navi and commander o f  th e  Guard o f  Candia. 
For one reason or another Cappello, who had a t  h is  command a s ig n if ic a n t  
f l o t i l l a  o f  over tw enty g a l le y s ,  d id  everyth ing in  h is  power t o  avoid  
contact w ith  th e  enemy. During th e  s ie g e  o f  Canea he anchored h is  v e s ­
s e l s  a t  Porto d e lla  Suda, o s te n s ib ly  t o  p r o te c t t h is  v i t a l  fo r tr e s s  and 
port f a c i l i t y .  With th e  p ro te c tio n  o f  Suda as an excuse , he adamantly 
refu sed  to  r is k  engagement w ith  th e  enemy. Yet when Canea f e l l  and th e  
Turkish f l e e t  gained th e  opportunity t o  move aga in st Suda, Cappello again  
withdrew in  h aste  and sought refuge in  th e  p ort a t S i t t i a  a t  th e  eastern
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end o f th e  is la n d . H is a c tio n  during th e se  f i r s t  c r u c ia l  days o f  th e  
war negated th e  va lue  o f  th e  g a lle y s  under h is  command and hastened th e  
f a l l  o f  th e  c i t y  o f  Canea. In  ra ther  strong language th e  R e tto r i o f  
Canea expressed  th e  hope th a t Signor Cappello would soon come to  "recog-
g
n iz e  h is  duty fo r  th e  se r v ic e  o f  h is  c o u n tr y ..." .
A fter n ea rly  two months o f  desperate d efense th e  p r o w e d ito r  o f  
Canea was fo r ced  t o  sue fo r  terms o f  surrender. On th e  tw en tieth  o f  
August a l l  f i r in g  ceased , and w ith in  two days th e  d e ta i l s  o f  th e  cap itu ­
la t io n  had been agreed upon. The terms proved generous, fo r  th e  Turkish 
commander undoubtedly hoped to  encourage th e  oth er fo r tr e s s e s  o f  th e  
kingdom to  surrender w ithout a s tr u g g le . He perm itted  a l l  person s, 
goods, and r e l ig io u s  treasu re  to  lea v e  th e  f a l l e n  c i t y  w ith  th e ir  banners 
in  f u l l  d isp la y ; furtherm ore, he f u l ly  guaranteed th e  r ig h ts  and p r iv i ­
le g e s  o f  a l l  th o se  c i t iz e n s  who decided  t o  s ta y  and l i v e  under th e  new 
Turkish regim e. The wisdom o f  th is  p o lic y  was proven' when on ly  th e  f iv e  
hundred su rv iv in g  so ld ie r s  chose to  depart; alm ost to  a man th e  c iv i l ia n  
populace e le c te d  t o  remain in  th e  c i t y  and chance th e ir  f a t e  under th e  
new Turkish r u le . Almost im m ediately workers and engineers were d is ­
patched by th e  pasha t o  begin  re p a ir  and ex ten sio n  o f  th e  c i t y ' s  defen- 
9
s iv e  network. Canea was now, w ithout a doubt, a Turkish c i t y  and an 
enemy stronghold  in  th e  m idst o f  th e  Candians.
The p r ice  o f  Venetian neg ligen ce  came h ig h , fo r  th e  capture o f  
Canea provided th e  Sultan w ith  a secure f o r tr e s s  which could serve as a  
base o f  fu tu re op eration s. Follow ing a str a te g y  s im ila r  t o  th a t in  th e  
war o f  1570, th e  Turkish commanders had d ir e c te d  th e ir  i n i t i a l  a s sa u lt
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aga inst a le s s e r  ta r g e t  in  th e  hope th a t a la t e r  and broader o ffen s iv e  
could be d ir ec ted  from a secure and w e ll-p ro v is io n ed  b a se .10 During 
th e  w inter months when turbu lent seas d isrupted  communications w ith  
C onstantinople and when ra in  and cold  combined to  make th e  l i f e  o f  the  
fo o t  s o ld ie r  an en d less  m isery, th e Turkish army could now seek  refuge  
and sh e lte r  w ith in  th e  w a lls  o f  a secure fo r tr e s s .
The f a l l  o f  Canea a lso  com plicated s tr a te g y  and o p eration s. Any 
attempt to  recover th e  l o s t  fo r tr e s s  would n e c e s sa r ily  invo lve  severing  
th e  l i f e - l i n e  o f  su p p lie s  and reinforcem ent which str e tc h e d  from 
C onstantinople t o  Canea. With Turkish commanders s to c k p ilin g  reserves  
a t Canea a b lockade, to  be su c c e s s fu l, would have to  be maintained fo r  
months on end. What had once been e s s e n t ia l ly  a d efen siv e  war fo r  
Venice now had t o  be expanded in to  a war in v o lv in g  a com plicated o ffen ­
s iv e  str a teg y .
The capture o f  Canea stunned Venice and intim idated  th e  e n tir e  
archipelago w ith  th e  might o f  th e  Turkish m ilita r y . But th e  shock was 
apparently not so great as t o  in sp ire  fe v e r ish  a c t iv i t y  on the p art o f  
th e  V enetians. A month a f t e r  the f a l l  o f  Canea Corner h im se lf , e ith e r  
from personal p reference or n e c e s s ity , urged th e  Senate not to  hazard  
any seriou s engagements w ith  the enemy fo r  fe a r  o f  lo s in g  th e  few  
remaining Venetian f o r c e s .13. An i n i t i a t iv e  taken by th e  defenders a t  
th is  tim e, b efore th e  enemy could become f irm ly  entrenched, might w e ll  
have proved worthy o f  th e  r isk s  involved; cau tion , however, ru led  th e  
day. Certain ly  th e  s i tu a t io n  on th e  is la n d  was indeed unpromising; con­
fu s io n , d isorder, and death had undermined th e  readiness o f  th e  other
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fo r tr e s s e s  o f  th e  kingdom. Sanitary c o n d it io n s , undoubtedly aggravated  
by fam ine, threatened  th e  is la n d  and generated  a gen eral panic; so  
l i t t l e  organ ization  e x is te d  in  many p a rts  th a t not even th e  most ru d i­
mentary precautions had been taken to  separate th e  d iseased  cadavers 
from th e  h ea lth y  su rv ivors , and decaying corpses d e f i le d  th e  s tr e e t s  o f  
th e  c i t i e s . 12
The ta sk  o f  m aintaining a  blockade a t  th e  port o f  Canea made th e
ex is te n c e  o f  an armed and ready f l e e t  e s s e n t ia l .  U nfortunately, th e
once renowned Venetian navy had f a l le n  in to  a s ta t e  o f  advanced decay.
Action  taken p r io r  t o  th e  war had done l i t t l e  t o  improve appreciably th e
con d ition  o f  th e  naval defenses o f  th e  archipelago and th e  is la n d  o f
Candia. By September o f  16^5 th e  V enetians had in  se r v ic e  approxim ately
tw en ty -fiv e  s o t t i l e  g a l le y s ,  th e  standard l i g h t  g a lle y  so w idely  
13employed in  th e  Mediterranean. D esp ite p e r io d ic  f l i r t a t io n s  w ith  
other d es ig n s , i t  was b a s ic a lly  t h is  l i g h t  g a l le y  which remained th e  
m ainstay o f  th e  V enetian as w e ll  as th e  Turkish f l e e t s .  The Venetian  
f l e e t  in  l6k5 was in  s iz e  and strength  m erely a  shadow o f  th e  form idable  
armadas th e  Republic had launched in  th e  century b efore .
Considering th e  nature o f  th e  Turkish f l e e t ,  however, th e  g a lle y  
a c tu a lly  proved an a s s e t  t o  th e  R epublic, e s p e c ia l ly  considering  th e  type  
o f  o ffe n s iv e  warfare which now had to  be undertaken a g a in st Turkish supply  
convoys. Such operations n e c e s s ita te d  p u r su it , and a v e s s e l  o f  b erton i  
construction  would have found i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  have m aintained th e  speed  
and m anueverability demanded to  hunt th e  e lu s iv e  Turk. As long as th e  
Venetian v e s s e ls  d id  not have to  confront v e s s e ls  enjoying superior f i r e ­
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power, th ey  could u se to  marked advantage th e  maneuverable g a l le y  and 
th e  h er ita g e  o f  Venetian seamanship.
Undoubtedly th e  V enetian navy l im ite d  i t s  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  a s  an 
instrument o f  d estr u c tio n  by not proving more f l e x ib l e  and r e ce p tiv e  
t o  th e  newer b erto n i d esig n s. Even a supplementary squadron o f  such 
warships would have proved invalu ab le in  conjunction  w ith  th e  ma-tp 
f l e e t  o f  nimbler g a l le y s .  The g a lle y s  could  have been used  t o  chase 
th e  enemy's g a lle y s  and to  delay  them u n t i l  a  contingent o f  h ea v ily  
armed b erton i would have had tim e t o  have jo in ed  th e  fr a y . In  a d d itio n , 
th e  b erton i could have been used to  advantage during th e  harsh w inter 
months when rough seas forced  th e  more f r a g i l e  g a l le y s  t o  seek  s h e lte r  
in  p o rt. But whatever th e  arguments a g a in st th e  b e r to n i, whether they  
were founded on f in a n c ia l  con sideration s or th o se  o f  p ride  and tr a d i­
t io n ,  th e  V enetian f l e e t  remained e s s e n t ia l ly  a  f l o t t a  o f  g a l le y s .  I t  
was th e  Candian war which proved t o  be th e  l a s t  major c o n f l ic t  in  th e  
western world which in volved  alm ost e x c lu s iv e ly  th e  tr a d it io n a l  
M editerranean g a lle y .
To in crea se  th e  d estr u c tiv e  cap acity  o f  th e  f l e e t  th e  Venetians 
d id  mainta in  se v e r a l la rg e r  and more h e a v ily  armed g a lle y s  known as  
g a le a sse s . T a lle r , lo n g e r , and p ossessed  o f  more form idable armament, 
th ese  g a lea sses  were n ev er th eless  c o s t ly  to  con struct and c o s t ly  t o  
maint a in; as a r e s u lt  th ey  seldom were on duty more than th ree  or four  
months o f  every year . P sy ch o lo g ica lly  th e  g a le a sse s  were a ls o  an advan­
ta g e , th e ir  considerab le s iz e  in sp ir in g  fe a r  and re sp e ct; a seventeen th - 
century w r iter  observed th a t th e  Venetian g a le a sse s  "are o f  prod ig ious
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co n str u c tio n .. .one alone capable o f  r e s is t in g  and scorning tw enty  
g a l l e y s . . ." .  Our author concludes, th a t th e  V enetians alm ost always 
have th e  advantage a t sea  s in c e  th ey  are th e  "only ones who have t h is
„Tli
type o f  g a lea sse  on th e  M editerranean.
The on ly Venetian v e s s e ls  l e f t  unmentioned so  fa r  were th e  cargo 
or supply sh ip s, known sim ply as 'n a v i', which in v a r ia b ly  accompanied 
th e  f l e e t  o f  g a l le y s .  The navi were indeed very  s im ila r  in  con struction  
t o  th e  northern b erto n i, but th e ir  u se  was alm ost e x c lu s iv e ly  reserved  
fo r  tra n sp o rta tio n  o f  goods and men, e ith e r  t o  th e  fo r tr e s s e s  on Candia 
or t o  th e  g a l le y s  a t  sea . The navi remained a mobile quartermaster 
corps and g en er a lly  remained a lo o f from th e  h ea t o f  b a t t l e .1 ^
The con d ition  o f  t h i s  mixed f l e e t  was g e n e r a lly  p oor, in  a s ta t e  
o f  "misery" as Francesco Molin termed i t .  M istreatm ent o f  crews and th e  
m isuse o f  funds undermined th e  e s p r it  de corps o f  th e  f l e e t ' s  personnel; 
few experienced  and r e l ia b le  m ariners were to  be found t o  man th e  a v a i l ­
ab le sh ip s . To make m atters worse, what g a l le y s  th ere  were were u su a lly  
sca tter ed  to o  fa r  apart in  th e  archipelago and th e  Dalmatian co a st to  be 
o f  any e f fe c t iv e n e s s .  Molin a ttr ib u te d  t h i s  decadence t o  th e  prolonged  
peace between Venice and th e  Turks; complacency c e r ta in ly  was p art o f  
th e  e n t ir e  scenar io  o f  Venetian decadence in  a l l  spheres during th e  
seventeenth  c e n tu r y .^
But th er e  were r e a l  problems fa c in g  th e  Republic in  m id-century  
which had undoubtedly become more acute as she continued t o  r e tr e a t  frcm  
th e c ir c le s  o f  th e  great powers. The u se  o f  fr e e  men a t  th e  oars o f  th e  
g a l le y s ,  fo r  in sta n c e , had become im possib le due to  the in a b i l i t y  o f  th e
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Republic t o  a t tr a c t  men to  such arduous and now poor-paying la b o r . By-
mi d-century i t  was d i f f i c u l t  to  r e c r u it  even a  handful o f  s k i l l e d  fr e e
men to  serve aboard th e  g a lle y s  in  order t o  in s tr u c t  th e  o th ers in  th e
a r ts  o f  th e  sea . To f i l l  t h i s  v o id , th e  R epublic hastened to  is s u e
17decrees pardoning cr im inals in  retu rn  fo r  s e r v ic e  in  th e  g a l le y s ; ' men 
o f  such c a lib e r , however, f a i le d  t o  d isp la y  in  se r v ic e  th e  d ed ica tion  
and seamanship fo r  which fr e e  V enetian c i t iz e n s  had once been renowned.
The p r o d u c tiv ity  o f  th e  arsena l in  Venice a lso  proved d isap p o in tin g . 
As ea r ly  as th e  turn  o f  the century th e  a rse n a l had f a l l e n  fa r  short o f  
p rojected  l e v e ls  o f  production; purchase o f  v e s s e ls  made in  th e  shipyards 
o f  northern Europe cou ld  have compensated for th e  la g  y e t  a  combination 
o f  p ride and l im ite d  fin a n ces le d  th e  V enetians to  shun such measures.
The p r in c ip a l cause o f  th e  dim inished p ro d u c tiv ity  a t  th e  arsen a l was th e  
d ec lin e  in  s k i l l e d  labor needed fo r  co n stru ctio n . F u t i le  d ecrees were 
is su e d  requ ir in g  a l l  sons and nephews o f  sh ipw rights t o  work in  th e  
a rsena l; such f i a t s  seldcm had any s ig n if ic a n t  e f f e c t  in  in c re a sin g  th e  
labor supply. When workers could be h ir ed  fo r  th e  a r se n a l, r a te s  o f  
absenteeism  were h ig h  even though th e  law requ ired  on ly  one hundred and 
f i f t y  days o f  s e r v ic e  a y e a r .1®
This dism al co n d it io n , t h is  "misery" in  which th e  once indom itable 
Venetian navy found i t s e l f  was understandably th e  r e s u lt  o f  many fa c to r s ;  
th e  "length o f  th e  peace" and consequent complacency which in v a r ia b ly  
accompanies good tim e s , th e  movement o f  c a p ita l  and investm ent t o  th e  
Terraferma, th e  general la ck  o f  p u b lic  funds fo r  construction  c o s ts  and 
com petitive s a la r ie s  to  th e  oarsmen o f  th e  g a l le y s ,  and th e  i n f l e x i b i l i t y
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and la c k  o f  inn ovative p lanning a l l  contributed  in  s ig n if ic a n t  ways t o  
th e  V enetian problem. I t  was upon such a  f l e e t ,  sca tter ed  a s  i t  was 
throughout th e  archipelago and th e  Mediterranean and d ir ec ted  by in d e c i­
s iv e  and over ly  cautious o f f ic e r s ,  th a t th ere  f e l l  th e  burden o f  defending  
th e  v a s t  im peria l in t e r e s t s  o f  th e  Venetian R epublic.
I I
Venice was aware o f  th e  fa c t  th a t a lone she could never in  her  
p resent circum stances defend h er empire a ga inst th e  onslaught o f  an 
in v ig o r a ted  Turkish s ta te ;  t h i s  very  r e a l i s t i c  ap pra isa l n a tu ra lly  le d  
th e  Republic to  seek  support from other p arts o f  Christendom. The war fo r  
Candia was c e r ta in ly  in  the main her war; but s in c e  th e  str u g g le  p it t e d  
a C hristian  power aga inst a Turkish i n f id e l ,  th e  war became, by th e  
standards o f  th a t m artia l century, something o f  a  h oly  war fo r  th e  f a i th .  
There e x is te d  s u f f ic ie n t  precedent fo r  concerted C hristian  e f fo r t s ;  had 
not th e  Pope and other C hristian  powers hastened t o  send r e l i e f  to  th e  
M altese when i t  had f i r s t  seemed th a t  th e  Turkish armada was in  fa c t  
heading toward Malta in  l6k5. I t  was on ly  natural t o  expect s im ila r  d is ­
p la y s o f  common concern when i t  was now th e  Venetian Republic which was 
threatened . For Venetian diplom ats th e  d i f f i c u l t  ta sk  la y  ahead o f  con­
ver tin g  w e ll- in te n tio n e d  prom ises in to  m ateria l contributions and o f  
exhorting su b sta n tia l commitments from economy-minded m in is ters . To 
accomplish th e se  ends in  a Europe p ro str a te  under the demands o f  th e
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T hirty  Years War would ta x  th e  s k i l l s  o f  even Venetian d ip lom ats. Ifce 
n e u tr a lity  m aintained by Venice during th e  d a s h  between Habsburg and 
Bourbon merely com plicated m atters; a once r ig id ly  n eu tra l Republic now 
had th e  d i f f i c u l t  ta sk  o f  convincing th e  m in is ters  o f  Spain and France 
th a t n e u tr a lity  in  T urco-C hristian  con fronta tions was akin to  im m orality.
Id e o lo g ic a lly  and s t r a te g ic a l ly  th e  European power most d ir e c t ly  
concerned w ith  th e  Venetian problem was th e  Papacy. As head o f  an 
I ta l ia n  s ta t e  d o s e  t o  th e  Mediterranean th e a te r  o f  war, th e  Pope had t o  
consider th e  imminent p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t a  v ic to r io u s  Sultan might la y  eyes  
upon th e  I ta l ia n  p en in su la  i t s e l f .  One papal nuncio could r e c a l l  th a t  
when he was r e s id e n t in  Constantinople "the Turk hoped t o  dominate a l l  
I t a ly ,  a n d .. .s in c e  th e  tr u e  Emperor o f  C h r is t ia n ity  was th e  P o n t if f ,  
found i t  n ecessary  to  go t o  Rome. A s im ila r  l e t t e r  from Constantinople  
warned th a t i f  th e  Kingdom o f  Candia f e l l ,  I ta ly  i t s e l f  would soon be
20
"inundated by Turkish b a rb a ria n s.. .even  to  th e  very  ga te s  o f  Rome.. . . "  
I d e o lo g ic a lly  th er e  lik e w ise  always remained th e  overrid in g  moral argu­
ment th a t th e  Pope, as th e  shepherd o f  Christendom, had always to  be 
se r io u s ly  concerned whenever one o f  h is  f lo c k  was attacked  by th e  Moslem 
in f id e l .
Such were seme o f  th e  general arguments which would urge Rome to  
become d ir e c t ly  invo lved; th e  p ressin g  r e a l i t i e s  o f  th e  European war then  
raging on th e  Continent supported a more cautious approach. Although 
th e  new pope, Innocent X, seemed sym pathetic toward th e  V enetians, th e  
septuagenarian p o n t if f  u nfortu nately  in h e r ite d  th e  d isa stro u s problems 
o f th e T hirty  Years War. He was forced  by circum stances as w e ll  as
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p e r so n a lity  to  o s c i l l a t e  between th e  h o s t i le  camps o f  Bourbon and
Habsburg; in  such a s itu a tio n  th e  p ressin g  needs o f  th e  Papal S ta te s
had t o  re c e iv e  f i r s t  consideration
Moreover, in  th e  eyes o f  the Holy See, C atholic Venice had been
something o f  a ch u rlish  and p rod iga l so n . In  Venice d isobed ience to
the d ic ta te s  o f  Rome was not uncommon. In  th e  opinion o f  th e  papal
nuncio t o  th e  R epublic, Monsignor Francesco Bannocehiesehe, th e
V enetians were c e r ta in ly  a  p iou s people but one which viewed th e  papal
a u th ority  w ith  resentment and su sp ic io n . T his ambivalance toward Rome
Pannocchiesche a ttr ib u te d  to  th e  In te r d ic t  is su e d  ag a in st th e  c i t y  in
21
1605 in  th e  d isp u te raging between Paolo Sarpi and Paul V. Another 
source o f  f r ic t io n  was th e  q uestion  o f  th e  Santo O ff i t io  or I n q u is it io n ;  
th e  Venetians o f f i c i a l l y  recogn ized  i t  w ith in  th e borders o f  th e  
Republic but re leg a te d  i t  to  a p o s it io n  o f  in s ig n if ic a n c e . The Mon­
signor complained th a t h e r e t ic s  o f  very  breed found Venice accom­
modating; many even gained  b u r ia l in  th e  C atholic cem eteries o f  the  
22
c i t y ' s  churches w ithout d if f i c u l t y .  Whatever th e  tru th  o f  such
charges, th ere  remained th e  more recent s tr a in s  between Venice and Rome
23
generated by th e  squabbles over th e  t e r r i t o r ie s  o f  th e  Duchy o f  C astro.
D espite th e  b it te r n e ss  a r is in g  from such te n s io n s ,th e r e  was a l ­
ways hope th a t th e  memory o f  p a st con frontations would be b lurred  in  
th e  ex ig e n c ie s  o f  th e  immediate c r i s i s  over Candia. I t  was t h i s  mood 
which caused Venice to  r e ce iv e  th e  news o f  Innocent's e le c t io n  w ith  marked 
optimism; Venice and perhaps th e  greater part o f  I t a ly  were hardly d is ­
p lea sed  to  see th e  tru cu len t Urban pass on to  h is  heavenly reward.
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U nlike Urban, Innocent was a cautious and reserved  man whose l i f e  
was dominated by th e  p r in c ip le  o f  m oderation. U nfortunately , th e  
r e serv a tio n  so  c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f  th e  new p o n t if f  o fte n  m anifested  i t s e l f  
in  th e extrem e; w ariness freq u en tly  d ete r io ra ted  in t o  ir r e so lu t io n  and 
f r u g a lity  in to  mean parsimony. Character t r a i t s  such as th e se , which 
might have su ff ic e d  in  a more p ea ce fu l century , proved u t te r ly  inadequate 
t o  create a s p ir i t  o f  u n ity  and determ ination  w ith in  a  d iv id ed  C hristen- 
to n .21*
I f  Innocent f a i l e d  t o  provide th e  c a t a ly s t  n ecessary  fo r  th e  s i tu a ­
t io n ,  he was n ot com pletely  d e r e l ic t  in  h is  r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  as 
s p ir it u a l  head o f  th e  C atholic world. By March o f  I 6U5 he had a lready  
sen t sev e ra l thousand in fa n try  to  M alta and D alm atia and in  May ordered  
th e  papal squadron prepared fo r  a c t io n  under th e  command o f  h is  nephew, 
N iccolo  L u d o v is i.2  ^ The Pope even suggested  th e  form ation o f  an I ta l ia n  
league fo r  th e  defense o f  I ta ly  and th e  M editerranean, but Venetian sk e p ti­
cism concerning th e  m otives o f  th e  p o n t if f  le d  th e  Republic t o  r e je c t  th e  
p ro p o sa l.2^
D irect m ilita r y  a id  t o  Venice from th e Pope amounted to  th e  f iv e  
papal g a l le y s ,  a contingent o f  two thousand tr o o p s , and perm ission  to  le v y  
another e ig h t thousand men w ith in  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  th e  papal s t a t e s .  
Although th e se  a d d itio n a l l e v ie s  were t o  be h ir e d  and p aid  by th e  V enetians 
th em selves, th e  con cession  was o f  va lue s in c e  th e  manpower demands o f  th e  
T hirty  Years. War had made i t  in c r e a sin g ly  d i f f i c u l t  to  f in d  ab le-b odied  
re c r u its  anywhere in  Europe. The Pope l e n t  t o  th e  Venetian e f fo r t  what 
in flu en ce he had by c a l l in g  upon a l l  th e  p rin c es  o f  Europe fo r  a s s is ta n c e
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in  th e  war; he appealed p a r tic u la r ly  to  th e  P o lish  k ing , -who, i t  was 
hoped, might mount a d iversionary  a tta ck  an th e  northern fla n k s  o f  th e  
Ottoman em pire.2^
The a l l i e d  fo r ce  whioh ev e n tu a lly  gathered  assumed th e  appearance 
o f  a  C h ristian  f l e e t  en rou te t o  a  crusade; among th e  sh ip s were th e  
f i v e  g a lle y s  o f  th e  Pope, f i v e  from Tuscany, f i v e  from th e  Kingdom o f  
N aples, and s i x  from M alta, a t o t a l  o f  on ly  tw enty-one v e s s e ls .  Although 
o f f i c i a l l y  u n ite d  in  common cause, th e  a l l i e d  fo r c e  was c o n tin u a lly  re n t  
w ith  d isse n s io n  and d iso r g a n iza tio n . Loan o f  th e  v e s s e ls  was s t r i c t l y  
contingent upon th e  p o l i c ie s  o f  t h e ir  r e sp e c tiv e  co n tr ib u to rs , and a s  a 
r e s u lt  on ly  th e  papal and M altese squadrons c o n s is te n t ly  p a r tic ip a te d  in  
naval maneuvers throughout th e  duration  o f  th e  war.
The Tuscan g a l le y s ,  w h ile u se fu l during th e  f i r s t  years o f  th e  war, 
f e l l  v ic tim  t o  th e  economizing moves o f  Grand Duke Ferdinand I I ;  by l6h7  
t h e ir  se r v ic e  w ith  th e  a l l i e d  f l e e t  was term inated . Venice p ro te s ted  
t h is  withdrawal from a c t iv e  se r v ic e  but had no su ccess  in  fo r e s t a l l in g  
th e  sa le  o f  th re e  o f  th e  v e s s e ls  and th e  permanent r e c a l l  o f  th e  other  
tw o .2® E ventually  th e  g a lle y s  from Naples and S ic i ly  were a ls o  r e c a lle d  
as th e  r e s u lt  o f  p r in c e ly  p o l i t i c s .  The r e la t iv e ly  numerous warships 
s ta tio n ed  in  th e  p o rts  o f  t h i s  kingdom were je a lo u s ly  reserved  fo r  th e  
defense o f  southern I t a ly .  When not so  engaged, th ey  were r e q u is it io n e d  
in  order t o  convoy troops and su p p lie s  t o  Spanish p o r ts . In 16U5, fo r  
in s ta n c e , th e  nuncio reported  t o  Venice th a t many v e s s e ls  stood  ready  
fo r  se r v ic e  in  Naples and S ic i ly  b utih at th ey  had been ordered t o  Spain  
fo r  other m ilita r y  d u t ie s .29
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In  a b so lu te numbers th e a u x ilia r y  f l e e t  represen ted  an increase
in  th e  t o t a l  s iz e  o f  th e  a l l i e d  f l o t i l l a  o f  about 30 percen t.^ 0
Although t h is  was a s ig n if ic a n t  in crease  in  s i z e ,  th e  a r r iv a l o f  th e se
a d d itio n a l u n its  had numerous d isadvantages. The d iv is iv e n e ss  and
petu lance which ch aracterized  th e se  a u x il ia r ie s  freq u en tly  prevented
u n ity  o f  command. Disputes concerning p r o to c o l, departure d a tes , and
maneuvers brought on ly  confusion; p e tty  rancor was o fte n  th e only
reason ly in g  behind c r i t i c a l  delays and m istaken courses o f  a c t io n .
B ickering between th e  M altese and th e  F lo re n tin es  in  th e  spring  o f
1645 delayed  th e  departure o f  th e a u x il ia r y  f l e e t  and in d ir e c t ly  con-
31tr ib u ted  to  th e  subsequent f a l l  o f  Canea. E ffo r ts  to  re c o n c ile  
d if fer en ce s  between quarreling fa c tio n s  u su a lly  proved f u t i l e .  Even 
more ser iou s was th e  e x c essiv e  deference which Venetian commanders 
p aid  t o  th e  w ishes and demands o f  th e  a l l i e d  fo r c e s , th e  r e s u lt  being  
an even g reater  la c k  o f  coordination  and more in d e c is iv e n e ss  w ith in  th e  
h igh  command.
B esides damaging th e  u n ity  o f  command, th e  a u x il ia r ie s  a ls o  disrup­
te d  naval operations by re fu sin g  t o  remain in  Candian waters longer  
than f iv e  or s ix  months a year . During th e  f a l l  and w in ter months, th e  
papal and M altese squadrons re g u la r ly  returned t o  th e ir  r e sp e ctiv e  
home p o rts . S ince th e  m ilita r y  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f  th e  fr a g ile  g a lle y s  
was se r io u s ly  im paired by th e  turbu lent sea s  o f  f a l l  and w in ter , i t  was 
thought b e st  t o  r e c a l l  them in  order t o  p ro te c t them from shipwreck and 
in  order to  reduce th e  co sts  o f  operation  and maintenance. Although the  
a u x ilia r y  u n its  u su a lly  returned th e  fo llo w in g  sp ring , th e ir  s e r v ic e s  
were m issed far n early  h a lf  th e  year .
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To spare th e  galleymen th e  r ig o r s  o f  a  w in ter campaign and t o  
operate w ith in  str in g en t naval b udgets, th e  V enetians a ls o  operated  
on a  r e s tr ic te d  schedule during th e  th re e  or four months o f  w in ter .
But Venetian g a lle y s  d id  m aintain p a tr o ls  throughout th e  b e tte r  p art  
o f  th e  f a l l ,  n ot in freq u en tly  on a  regu lar schedule in t o  th e  month 
o f  November. The departure o f  th e  a u x il ia r ie s ,  sometimes as e a r ly  as 
l a t e  August or ea r ly  September, tended to  hamper V enetian e f fo r t s  t o  
m aintain such p a tr o ls  s u c c e s s fu lly . For se v e r a l c r u c ia l months th e  
Venetians were farced  t o  operate w ith  considerab ly  dim inished fo r c e s .
I t  was not unusual fo r  th e  a u x il ia r y  commanders t o  r e so r t  t o  an e a r ly  
withdrawal not so much fo r  sound m ilita r y  reasons but in  order to  
avoid  prolonging th e  p eriod  o f  open con tact w ith  th e  enemy. With th e  
booty c o lle c te d  from a summers p a tr o l, th e  a l l i e d  f l e e t  was under­
standably anxious to  hurry homeward rather than r is k  b a t t le  fo r  no 
d is t in c t  ga in . Venice consequently found h e r s e lf  in  leagu e w ith  fa r ces  
upon whom she became more and more p sy c h o lo g ic a lly  and m i l i t a r i ly  
dependent but upon idiom she fr eq u e n tly  could not r e ly .
No su b sta n tia l m ilita r y  or f in a n c ia l  a s s is ta n c e  could be expected  
from th e  Genoese. As th e  commercial r iv a ls  o f  V enice, th e  Genoese had 
everyth ing to  gain  from a  prolonged str u g g le  between th e  V enetians and 
th e  Ottoman empire. Moreover, a s fa r  as European p o l i t i c s  were con­
cerned, th e  Genoese found them selves in  a h ig h ly  vu lnerable p o s it io n ;  
squeezed between th e  French t o  th e  north and th e  Spanish to  th e  sou th , 
Genoa was compelled to  a ct in  in tern a tio n a l m atters w ith  considerab le  
caution .
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In  16U5 th e  Venetian diplom at, A lv ise  M olin, was d ispatched to  
Genoa in  order t o  d isc u ss  her p o s it io n  in  th e  war. The re p ly  was 
generous in  in te n tio n  but h ig h ly  q u a lif ie d . The Genoese Republic  
promised tw elve  f u l ly  equipped g a l le y s  and se v e r a l contingents o f  
so ld ie r s  fo r  th e  Candian war i f ,  in  re tu rn , V enice would encourage 
th e  Pope t o  grant Genoa entrance in to  th e  Sala R egia and th e  ex a lte d  
t i t l e  o f  "Seren issim a," a t i t l e  which th e  papacy had already granted  
to  V e n ic e .32  Reasoning th a t th e Genoese were tr y in g  to  ex to rt as 
much as p o ss ib le  from tem pting but u n f u l f i l l e d  prem ises, n eith er  
Venice nor th e  Pope would concede on th e s e  two is s u e s  o f  honor and 
p r o t o c o l .^  L ud d visi, th e  papal commander, s a r c a s t ic a l ly  remarked th a t  
th e  p reten tio u s Genoese were a ctin g  more l i k e  merchants than l ik e
•ah
p r in c e s .-3 On th e  other hand, th e  Genoese argued th a t o n ly  th e  o b s t i ­
nacy o f  th e  V enetians and Pope stood  in  th e  way o f  re c e iv in g  the  
d esired  p r iv i le g e s  and honors. In th e  m idst o f  charges and recrim ina­
tio n s  Genoese support o f  Venice n a tu ra lly  f a i l e d  t o  m a te r ia liz e .
Venice a ls o  looked to  Piedmont a s  a p o s s ib le  source o f  support 
on ly  to  encounter th e  same type o f  problem as had developed w ith  Genoa. 
In  t h is  in sta n c e th e  d isp u te about honor centered  on th e  Moslem-held 
is la n d  o f  Cyprus. Venice had granted th e  Piedmontese dynasty th e  
in h e r ita b le  t i t l e  o f  "Altezza" and "Serenissim a" fo r  i t s  a s s is ta n c e  
a t  th e  b a tt le  o f  Lepanto. Apparently not s a t i s f i e d  w ith  th ese  ex a lte d  
honors th e  Piedmont p rinces o f th e  seventeenth  century sought to  extend  
to  them selves a ls o  th e  t i t l e  o f "Kings o f  Cyprus"; insane as i t  seems, 
th e  t i t l e  o f  "king" to  an is la n d  lo s t  to  th e  Sultan  seme th ree quarters
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o f  a century e a r lie r  became a p o in t o f  contention  between th e  V enetians 
and th e  Savoyards. For nearly  f i f t e e n  years th e  Piedmontese p rin ces  
o b stin a te ly  refused  a s s is ta n c e  t o  Venice because o f  t h i s  d isp u te . 
Undoubtedly th e  Savoyards used  th e  Cyprian q uestion  as a p r e te x t  to  
avoid  entanglement in  a ser io u s Mediterranean war. As in  th e  case o f  
Genoa, th e  r e a l  reasons behind th e  Savoyard a ctio n  la y  elsew here. Bound 
t o  Spain through t i e s  o f  commerce and fin ance and forced  t o  weigh care­
f u l ly  th e  a tt itu d e s  o f  th e ir  French neighbor, th e  Piedmontese n e c e s sa r ily  
found i t  expedient t o  fo llo w  a cautious fo reig n  p o lic y . In  no way d id  
Savoy wish to  become en tangled  in  an eastern  war which might d isrupt
commercial t i e s  w ith  th e  Turks or weaken th e  m ilita r y  p o s it io n  o f  Savoy 
35
v is  a v i s  France.
As u s e fu l as th e se  sm all I ta l ia n  s ta t e s  might have been , i t  was 
natural th a t fo r  su b sta n tia l and su sta in ed  m ilita r y  support Venice would 
have to  turn t o  th e  French and to  th e  Spanish. P leas  to  France h eld  
more promise s in c e  th e  Republic had u su a lly  m aintained a c o r d ia l r e la t io n ­
sh ip  w ith th e  French, a r e la tio n sh ip  which, on sane o ccasion s such as 
th e  Mantuan war o f  1628 , blossom ed in to  a f u l l - s c a l e  a l l ia n c e .
With th e  I ta l ia n  Mazarin p rese n t ly  in  power a t  P a r is , prosp ects fo r  
su b sta n tia l a ss is ta n c e  seemed b r ig h ter . I t  was c e r ta in ly  inconceivab le  
th a t an I ta l ia n  cardin al could  p a ss iv e ly  w itn ess th e  inundation  o f  Rome 
and perhaps th e  e n tir e  p en in su la  by a heathen Moslem horde. In a d d ition , 
France in  1645 had good reason  fo r  w ish ing to  strengthen  h er d ip lom atic  
t i e s  w ith  Venice; in  l i g h t  o f  th e  French quarrels w ith  th e  Pope over th e  
extravagancies o f  th e  B arberin i fa m ily , th e  support o f  I t a ly ' s  s in g le  most 
important s ta te  might prove a valuab le a s s e t  to  P a r is .3^
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D espite fa c to r s  favor in g  d ir e c t  French in te r v e n t io n , th ere  were 
other eq u a lly  com pelling ones which demanded a more cautious approach.
Open support o f  Venice would r is k  an open rupture o f  r e la t io n s  between 
France and th e  Porte and would consequently p la c e  in  jeopardy French 
conmercial in t e r e s t s  in  th e  Levant. No m atter how sym pathetic th e  
French might be toward th e  Venetian cause, d ir e c t  a id  might cancel in  
one move sev e ra l decades o f  c a r e fu lly  nurtured r e la t io n s  w ith th e  Turks; 
co r d ia l o f f i c i a l  r e la t io n s  w ith  th e  Porte remained o f  th e  utmost 
importance t o  th e  continued development o f  French in t e r e s t  in  th e  ea stern  
M editerranean.
In order to  avoid  com pletely a lie n a tin g  th e  V enetians, French 
diplom ats were fo rced  t o  camouflage th e ir  crown's tr u e  in te n tio n s  behind  
a barrage o f  k in d ly  but h ig h ly  q u a lif ie d  r h e to r ic . Apparently such  
methods had some immediate su cce ss . In October o f  16^5 B a tt is ta  Nani, 
th e  Venetian re p r esen ta tiv e  a t  P aris, wrote th a t th e  war was " to ta lly  
a lie n  from th e r e so lu tio n s  o f  t h is  (French) g o v er n m en t....”^  Yet on ly  
two weeks la t e r  Nani had apparently been convinced by sev e ra l P aris ian  
o f f ic i a l s  o f  France’s  good in te n tio n s;  he wrote w ith  optimism th a t fo r  th e  
f i r s t  tim e th e m in is t e r ia l  cou n cil in  P aris had expressed  a c le a r  and 
d e f in it e  re so lv e  n ot t o  abandon th e  Venetian R epu blic.3® Mazarin h im se lf  
had apparently assured th e  ambassador th a t French a s s is ta n c e  would be  
forthcoming as soon a s  th e  Spanish e f fo r t  t o  dominate th e  I t a l ia n  penin­
su la  could be s u c c e ss fu lly  thwarted; Nani was fu rther  consoled  by th e  
thought th a t once French naval p a tro ls  in  th e  Mediterranean could thereby  
be cu rta ile d  th a t France would be in  a p o s it io n  to  lend  both men and
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armaments t o  th e  Venetian c a u s e .^  N an i's hopes were consequently  
rev iv ed  by s k i l l f u l  French d ip lom ats.
French m ilita r y  a s s is ta n c e  during t h is  f i r s t  year o f  th e  war was 
in  a c tu a lity  in co n seq u en tia l, most o f  th e  French support b eing  in  th e  
form o f  moral and d ip lom atic sympathy. For in sta n c e , th e  French 
ambassador a t C onstantinople, M. de l a  Haye, jo in ed  in  p ro te s t a g a in st  
th e  S u lta n 's  a r r e st  o f  th e  Venetian B a ilo  and g e n e r a lly  le n t  h is  
s e r v ic e s  f r e e ly  as an u n o f f ic ia l  m ediator between V enice and th e  P orte. 
L ion, th e  French F oreign  M in ister , assured  Nani a t  P a ris  th a t th e  French 
ambassador to  th e  Forte would be renal le d  should th e  Turks prove r e s i s t ­
an t t o  d ip lom atic p ressu re s . P aris even d ispatched  a sp e c ia l  envoy 
whose ta sk  i t  was t o  express d ir e c t ly  t o  th e  Sultan F ran ce's d is t r e s s  
over th e  recen t eruption  o f  war, exp la in in g  t o  th e  P orte th a t Louis
was Europe's Most C h ristian  King and th er efo r e  o b liged  t o  sh e lte r  a l l
hoChristendom from a ttack .
Of th e  g r e a te s t  concern fo r  Venice was th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t w ith in  
th e  near fu tu re  peace between France and Spain might be resto red  and 
th a t C hristian  Europe’s  most powerful nations might then  d ir e c t  th e ir  
en erg ies  aga in st th e  Turkish menace. Nani c e a s e le s s ly  pressured  Paris  
to  move in  th e  d ir e c tio n  o f  an accord w ith  Spain; Mazarin and Lion in  
turn  nurtured V enetian hopes by a llu d in g  t o  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  a  peace  
settlem ent t h i s  w in ter .
The French proposed a naval tru ce  in  th e  Mediterranean fo r  th e  
course o f  one year; th e  truce would fr e e  th e  g a lle y s  o f  both major powers 
to  devote th e ir  a tte n tio n  t o  Candia. This p rop osal, considered as e a r ly
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as th e  summer o f  l6 h 5 , encountered th e  determined op p osition  o f  Madrid, 
an op position  which was in  many ways reasonably j u s t i f i e d .  The Spanish  
argued th a t w ith  such a naval truce  th e  French would m erely "disarm th e  
v e s s e ls  and g a lle y s  and make use o f  th e  men on th e  ground.. . th ey  
fu rth er  contended th a t disarming th e  superior Spanish navy would o ff e r  
th e  French a decided  m ilita r y  advantage. Moreover, to  dem obilize th e  
Spanish Armada would have understandably proved c o s t ly  and w a ste fu l.
Under such circum stances, th e  French p rop osal, a s th e  Venetian ambassador 
t o  Spain r ig h t ly  p red ic te d , came t o  noth in g .**2
There was s l ig h t  hope th a t  Venice might b e n e f i t  by e x p lo it in g  as 
f u l ly  as p o ss ib le  French in flu en ce  in  Poland? th e  ob jec t under consider­
a tio n  was th e  "Polish  d iv e rsio n ”, a P o lish  a tta ck  a long th e  northern  
fr o n t ie r s  o f  th e  Ottoman empire. In a century o f  in te n se  r e l ig io u s  fervor  
i t  was n ot unreasonable to  expect such a c t io n  from th e fe r v e n tly  C atholic  
King o f  Poland and h is  Cossack v a ssa ls  in  th e  south . Nani was thus  
c e r ta in ly  not alone in  h is  b e l i e f  th a t Poland m ight "render to  a l l  
C h ris tia n ity  a s e r v ic e  so g r e a t . . . B u t  a s  in  s im ila r  s itu a tio n s  on 
th e  war-torn European continent dom estic concerns demanded f i r s t  a tte n ­
t io n  and troub led  King Casimir found h im se lf in  no p o s it io n  to  hazard  
a rupture in  r e la t io n s  w ith  th e  P orte. The e lu s iv e  "Polish  d iversion"  
consequently remained one o f  the many schemes which f ir e d  th e  minds o f  
Venetian p a tr io ts  but which remained in  r e a l i t y  l i t t l e  more than a 
diplom atic chimera.
The t o t a l  m ateria l contribution  o f  France during th e  f i r s t  year o f  
th e  war remained r e la t iv e ly  l im ite d .1*1* The one concession  o f  any
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s ig n if ic a n c e  was th e  r ig h t  granted Venice t o  le v y  s o ld ie r s  w ith in  the  
boundaries o f  France. S ince th e  Venetians r e l ie d  alm ost e x c lu s iv e ly  
on m ercenaries, i t  was a b so lu te ly  im perative th a t sane source o f  man­
power be found. The drain  o f  the Thirty Years War made fin d in g  such 
a supply o f  ab le-b od ied  men in c re a sin g ly  d i f f i c u l t .  The r e a l or 
threatened s tr a in  which such concessions p laced  upon F rance's own 
manpower r e se r v o ir  generated  h o s t i le  re a ctio n  w ith in  th e  French m inis -  
t e r i a l  co u n c ils . In  a d d itio n , i t  was argued by sane French m in isters  
h o s t i le  to  th e  war th a t l e v i e s  granted t o  th e V enetians would hazard in  
a  very  d ir e c t  way r e la t io n s  between the Porte and P a r i s .^  prom P aris  
Nani reported  increased  op position  t o  th e  Venetian le v i e s ;  among th e
French m in is te r s , Nani w rote, a  cloud was "being formed by th e  quarrel
U6o f  a l l  a g a in st th e  l e v i e s  o f  Your S erenity  (V e n ic e ) .. ."
D espite th e  o p p o sitio n , th e  le v ie s  were sanctioned  throughout 16^5. 
I t  was, however, th e  growing c o st involved  in  such l e v i e s  th a t proved 
most annoying. Nani r u e fu lly  noted  th a t he was s t i l l  a b le  t o  h ir e  a  
thousand s o ld ie r s  as w e ll  as two sh ips but a t  a  p r ic e  se v e r a l tim es  
higher than what he had expected . Moreover, th ere  were en d less  numbers 
o f  con tracts which were n egotia ted  but which never were f u l f i l l e d ,  a 
disappoin ting  and fr u s tr a tin g  s itu a tio n  fo r  th e  V enetian r e p u b lic .^
Beyond France, th er e  la y  hope in  fin d in g  support fo r  th e  Republic 
in  Spain. But fo r  numerous economic and p o l i t i c a l  reasons Venetian p le a s  
were received  w ith  in d iffe r e n c e  by th e court a t  Madrid. Rather than  
f in d in g  h e r s e lf  a l l i e d  w ith  Spain as she had on occasion  w ith  France, 
Venice had during th e  p a st decades freq uently  found h e r s e lf  attem pting
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t o  thwart Spanish and Habsburg d esigns in  th e  I t a l ia n  p en in su la . S t i l l ,  
Spain was very much o f  a  C atholic nation  and one which h e ld  v i t a l  
in t e r e s t s  in  S ic i ly  and Naples and consequently had good reason  t o  be 
d e f in it e ly  concerned w ith  th e  p rogress o f  th e  Candian war. The 
i n i t i a l  f lu r r y  o f  a c t iv i t y  w itn essed  in  Naples and S ic i ly  seemed c e r ta in ly  
t o  suggest a  paramount concern on th e  p art o f  Spanish a u th o r it ie s .
The Venetian ambassador t o  Madrid q uick ly  c la r if ie d  th e  s itu a t io n . 
Ambassador G iustin ian  informed th e  Signory th a t S pa in 's f i r s t  concern in  
th e  Candian c r i s i s  would be to  her own in t e r e s t s  and d efenses; a s fo r  
S pain 's fo r ces  in  I t a ly ,  th e  Venetians "would no longer  be a b le  to  ob ta in  
a id  o f  g a lle y s  nor o f  m i l i t i a  from Naples because o f  th e  Jealousy  and 
su sp ic ion  o f  invasion  by th e  Turks, (fo r )  th ey  (th e  g a l le y s )  would be 
every year ob lig a te d  t o  a s s i s t  t o  th e  defense o f  th a t same kingdom.. .  
Venetian requ ests fo r  u se  o f  th e  g a lle y s  in  Naples and S ic i ly  were 
con stan tly  evaded in  a c le v er  game o f  cat and mouse; whatever th e  Spanish  
m in isters  prem ised th e  Spanish v ice ro y s o f  I t a ly  r e q u is it io n e d  fo r  seme 
other im perative u se . In  the summer o f  16U5 G u istin ian  won a promise fo r  
as much a ss is ta n c e  as th e  defenses o f  Spain would a llo w , perhaps as many 
as n in e  warships acquired from th e  arsen a ls  o f  S ic i ly ,  Naples and Sard in ia; 
alm ost as soon as th e  promise had been made, however, th ose  same g a lle y s  
were re q u is it io n e d  by th e  Viceroy o f  Naples for other d u t ie s . 1*9
Since th e  dangers o f  th e  Thirty Years War and th e  challenge o f  
France on th e  European continent were o f  paramount importance, th e  Spanish  
diplom ats is su e d  sev era l proposals o f  th e ir  cwn which might h elp  t o  bring  
peace t o  Christendom's two major powers.. As an a lte r n a t iv e  t o  th e  French
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50a rm istic e  proposal th e  Spanish suggested  a tr u c e  o f  th r e e  t o  four  
years on both land  and se a . In  l i g h t  o f  th e  setbacks su ffe red  by th e  
Spanish in  C atalonia, P ortuga l, and a t  th e  B a tt le  o f  R ocroi, a  f u l l  
m ilita r y  a ll ia n c e  would undoubtedly have been welcomed by th e  Spanish  
crown. But in  th e  eyes o f  th e  French such a prolonged c e s sa tio n  o f  
h o s t i l i t i e s  would be eq u iva len t t o  re lin q u ish in g  th e ir  advantage, a  
f a c t  not com pletely untrue by 16U5 . The French r e je c t io n  in  turn  was 
n a tu ra lly  in terp re te d  as su b sta n tia l proof th a t France had no p ea ce fu l 
in te n tio n s  and th a t th e ir  own proposal fo r  a Mediterranean naval tr u c e  
had been o ffere d  in  bad f a i t h .  ^  By August th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  e f fe c t in g  
a temporary suspension  o f  arms by th e  France-Spanish fo r c e s  was ra p id ly  
fad ing; G iustin ian  ominously informed th e  Signory th a t  th e  Spanish k ing  
had not so much as mentioned an a rm istic e . 52
From th e  two major European powers Venice re ce iv e d  l i t t l e  more 
than f in e  words and u n f u l f i l l e d  prom ises. The Senate,m oreover,had t o  
remain a le r t  fo r  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  d ip lom atic treach ery . There always 
remained th e  fe a r  th a t th e r e  was substance behind th e  rumors purporting  
c lan destine  n eg o tia tio n s  between th e  Turkish m in is ters  and th e  represen­
t a t iv e s  o f  France and Spain. One rumor fo ste r e d  by th e  Spanish court 
suggested  th a t France and th e  Turks had planned a  jo in t  p in cer  a tta ck  on 
I ta ly  i t s e l f ,  French troops moving a g a in st Spanish Milan w h ile Turkish 
g a lle y s  and in fa n try  inundated th e  southern c o a sts  o f  th e  p en in su la . 53
Other rumors c ir c u la te d  concerning Spain p o ss ib ly  n eg o tia tin g  a separate
5k
tr e a ty  w ith  th e  Porte so as t o  p ro te c t S ic i ly  and Naples from a tta ck .
There was, in  f a c t ,  no substance t o  e ith e r  rumor. The inescap ab le problem
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remained, however, th a t Venice la y  dependent upon Europe’ s two super­
powers, one which was tr a d it io n a l ly  fr ie n d ly  t o  Constantinople and 
which had ex ten siv e  commercial ho ld ings to  p r o te c t  and th e  oth er , w ith  
ve ste d  in t e r e s t s  in  M ilan, Naples, and S ic i ly  and th er efo r e  n a tu ra lly  
cautious about to o  str o n g ly  supporting th e  im p eria l hold ings o f  th e  
Venetian rep u b lic .
From ' a  m ilita r y  p ersp ectiv e , events during I 6U5 proved as  
unprom ising as th o se  in  th e  d ip lom atic realm . The ca p itu la tio n  o f  Canea 
in  August d id  much t o  shock th e  a l l i e d  commanders but concerted and 
determined e f fo r t  on th e  p art o f  th e  C h ristian  fo r c e s  was s t i l l  slow  
in  develop ing. Over th e  o b jec tio n s o f  th e  papal commander lu d o v is i, i t  
was f in a l ly  decided in  c o n s u l ta ^ ^  to  move th e  a l l i e d  f l e e t  from th e  
sh e lte r  o f  Zante to  th e  p o rt o f  Candia. As th e  f l e e t  sa ile d  toward Candia, 
no attem pt was made t o  a tta ck  the Turkish f l e e t  sta t io n ed  at Canea. When 
th e  f l e e t  had secured p ort a t  Candia, L udovisi again  complained th a t th e  
a l l i e s  should not embark on any p e r ilo u s  m issions b efore th ey  had awaited  
th e  a r r iv a l o f  th e  tw enty g a lle y s  o f  th e  Guardia d i Candia; even when 
th e se  g a lle y s  had f in a l ly  arr ived , L udovisi found other p retex ts  fo r  
in a c tio n . A pparently, th e  orders o f  th e  papal commander s p e c i f ic a l ly  
im plied  th a t th e  g a lle y s  o f  th e  Pope should avoid  engagement w ith  th e  enemy 
f l e e t  as long as p o s s ib l e .^
D e fin ite  p lan s fo r  a c t io n  were f i n a l l y  agreed upon by th e a l l i e d  
co n su lta . A f l e e t  o f  n early  s ix ty  g a l le y s ,  four g a le a sse s , and t h ir t y -  
s ix  asso rted  v e s s e ls  departed from Port d e l la  Suda on th e  s ix tee n th  o f  
September w ith th e  in ten tio n  o f  a ssa u lt in g  th e  Turkish armada then
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sh e lter ed  in  th e  captured p ort o f  Canea; an adverse wind, however, 
thwarted t h i s  operation  and th e a l l i e s  were forced  t o  withdraw once 
again  t o  Suda. A second attem pt was made n early  tw elve days l a t e r ,  
but t h is  was l ik e w ise  f o i l e d  by adverse w inds. A th ir d  and f in a l  
a ssa u lt  met th e  combined fu ry  o f  rough sea s and determined Turkish 
shore b a tte r ie s  and was g iven  up as a  fa i lu r e .  Two days a f t e r  t h is  
f in a l  attempt a ga in st th e  p ort o f  Canea th e  d isgru n tled  a u x il ia r y  
commanders agreed t o  return  to  th e ir  r e sp e c tiv e  home p o r t s .^
The opportunity provided by th e  withdrawal o f  th e  a l l i e d  fo r ces  
was immediately se iz e d  by th e  Turkish commander, Pasha J u ssu f. 
Approximately f i f t y - f i v e  v e s s e ls  togeth er w ith  seven  thousand men were 
conveyed from M alvasia t o  Canea, an operation  which encountered no 
op position  w h a tso ev e r .^  By th e  f a l l  o f  1645 th e  Turkish comaanders 
had accomplished e s s e n t ia l ly  th e  b a s ic  aims o f  th e ir  s t r a t e g y .^  By 
avoiding d ir e c t  naval con fronta tion , by strengthen ing th e  d efenses o f  
Canea, and by tak ing advantage o f  th e  in d e c is iv e n e ss  o f  th e  a l l i e d  
command, th e  Turkish fo r c e s  had es ta b lish e d  fo r  them selves a formid­
ab le  and r e la t iv e ly  secure base o f  op eration s.
The subsequent m ilita r y  developments on land  f o r  th e  remainder o f  
1645 achieved l i t t l e  o f  importance. Toward th e  end o f  1645 an embarras­
s in g ly  inept attem pt to  recapture Canea ended in  a general f ia s c o .  
General d e lla  V a lle tta  w ith  seven thousand men marched a g a in st Canea 
but a t  th e  f i r s t  appearance o f  th e  enemy h is  troop s broke and f le d .
Many o f  th ese  unseasoned and u n d isc ip lin ed  troops were mercenaries 
unfam iliar w ith  th e  te r r a in  o f  th e  is la n d  and consequently f le d
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d ir e c t ly  toward th e  sea ; as a  r e s u lt  many o f  them drowned, ignom iniously  
weighed down by t h e ir  b a t t le  armor.
The Senate moved h e s ita n t ly  toward re in fo r c in g  th e  mercenary con­
tin g e n t on th e  is la n d ; sev e ra l new commanders were appointed t o  a s s i s t  
in  th e  d efense o f  th e  kingdom, among them Camillo Gonzaga, th e  i s la n d 's  
new Governor -G eneral. ^  G alleys were b eing  armed w h ile proposals to  
construct s t i l l  others were hurried  through th e  Senate. A id , 
r e la t iv e ly  su b sta n tia l fo r  th e ir  re sp e c tiv e  s i z e ,  tr ic k le d  in  from Parma, 
Tuscany, and M o d e n a ; ^  th er e  was even hope th a t f in a n c ia l  con trib u tions  
might prove o f  some s ig n if ic a n c e . And i f  th e  f l e e t  remained in  a s ta te  
o f  'm isery' as Molino had noted , th e same Molino reported  to  th e  
C olleg io  in  September o f  16^5 th a t th ere was enough money in  th e  naval 
trea su ry  to  keep th e  f l e e t  'fo r  some tim e w ell-enough provided' The 
o v e r a ll  p ic tu re  remained d epressing  but a t  l e a s t  fo r  th e  o p tim is tic  th er e  
were glimmers o f  hope th a t th e  Republic would do i t s  b e s t  to  meet th e  
Turkish ch a llen g e, i f  needs b e , a lone . And indeed th er e  was room fo r  
optimism, a guarded optimism which would have t o  tak e in to  con sideration  
th e  d isa stro u s d e f ic ie n c ie s  and fa i lu r e s  which had marred th e  adm inistra­
t io n  o f  th e  V enetian armada and empire fo r  over a h a lf -c e n tu r y . There 
would be a  f ig h t  but one not untouched by a  sense o f  desp eration .
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CHAPTER H :  FOOOTOTES
1 . A .S .V ., P.T.M. (7 9 6 ) , Senato, Andrea C om er, P ro w ed ito r -  
GeneraLe d i Candia, June 27 , 161*5; BJTJ4., V U  ( 9158) ,  P ro w ed ito r  d i  
Canea, Ju ly  8 ,  16^5 .
2 .  B.N.M., VH  (2 1 1 ) , R e tto r i, Andrea C om er, 16U5 .
3 . B.N.M., V U  (2 1 1 ), R isp osta  d i  S ig . G eneral a l i a  R ettore  
d i  Canea, August 10 , 16U5, Suda.
1+. In  Ju ly  o f  161*5 seme th ree  hundred p a id  in fa n try  and f iv e  
hundred ce m id e  ( lo c a l  r e c r u its )  p lu s  a  sm all cache o f  money *as smug­
g led  in to  th e f o r tr e s s ;  on th e  i t h  a  contingent o f  cava lry  and th ree  
hundred ce m id e  a lso  a rr iv ed . These c e m id e  were lo c a l  r e c r u its  -who, 
u nfortu nately , "demonstrated good w i l l ,  b u t . . .  (cou ld ) n ot b e  reduced 
to  m ilita r y  d is c ip l in e ."  B.N.M ., VH (9 138), R elazione d i quanto fu  
operato n e l  Regno d i Candia dopo l 'a t ta c c o  d e l la  Canea s in o  » re sa .  
Although th e  est im a tes  concerning th e  number o f  a c t iv e  s o ld ie r s  a t  
Canea vary con siderab ly , th e  f ig u r e s  g iven  by th e  p r o w e d ito r  o f  th e  
c i t y  seem r e l ia b le .  He noted th a t in  a l l  th e  tim e o f  i t s  s ie g e ,  th e  
c i t y  had never had more than e ig h t hundred paid  in fa n tr y , two hundred 
gu astadores, seventeen  bombardiers, and th re e  g a l le y s  i n  th e  p o r t .
A .S .V ., P.T.M. (8 2 0 ), Antonio N avagiero, P ro w ed ito r  d i  Canea, August 
1^, l6k3 (J u lia n  ca le n d a r).
5 . A .S .V ., P.T.M. (7 9 6 ) , Senato, Andrea C o m er ,-P ro w e d ito r -  
GeneraLe d i Candia, August 1 2 , 161*5.
6 .  A .S .V ., P.T.M. (8 2 0 ) , Antonio N avagiero, P ro w ed ito r  d i  
Canea, August l 4 ,  161*5 (J u lia n  ca le n d a r). The o f f ic e r s  o f  th e  garrison  
complained th a t fu rth er  r e s is ta n c e  was u s e le s s ,  and "adhered t o  th e  
re so lu tio n ...sw e a r in g  to  i t  w ith  th e ir  own sig n a tu r es ."  A .S .V .,
P.TJ4. (796), Senato, Andrea Corner, P ro w ed ito r - Generate d i Candia, 
August 2 1 , 161*5.
7 .  Andrea V a liero , H isto r ia  d e l la  gnerra d i Candia (V en ice,
1679), P . 139* (H erein after re ferred  to  as H is to r ia . )
8 .  Although C appello 's action s may not have been 'cow ardly', th ey  
c e r ta in ly  were ir r e s o lu te  and o v er ly  ca u tio u s . For h is  fa i lu r e  to  act 
during th ese  f i r s t  c r u c ia l  days o f  th e  war he was r e c a lle d  to  Venice; 
th ere  he was censured fo r  s o t  having used th e  g a l le y s  under h is  comoand 
to  b e tt e r  u se . Whatever th e  p a rticu la r  d e t a i l s  o f  t h is  c a se , th e  exchange 
o f  l e t t e r s  between Cappello and the p ro w e d ito r  o f  Canea, Antonio Nava- 
g ie r o , provide us w ith in te r e s t in g  in s ig h t  in to  the squabbles and d is ­
putes which hampered th e  Venetian e f fo r t  in  th e  f i r s t  days o f  th e  war. 
Cappello informed Navagiero th a t i f  he (C appello) were to  le a v e  Suda
in  order to  defend Canea, th e  e n tir e  port would be endangeredJ i f  the  
port f e l l  to  th e  enemy, Cappello reasoned, "the r e s t  o f  th e Kingdom 
would f a n . . . . "  Navagiero responded to  Cappello exp ressin g  th e  hope
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th a t th e  Captain o f  the Havi (C appello) would reach " better r e f le c t io n " ,  
and p r o p h e tic a lly  noted th a t i f  "one lo s e s  Canea never more w i l l  i t  
be p o s s ib le  t o  recuperate (th e  c i t y )  even when one d efeated  and d estroy­
ed th e  enemy armada." D esp ite h is  o r ig in a l  arguments about th e need to  
defend-Porto d e l la  Suda a t  a l l  c o s t s ,  th e  moment Cappello learned  o f  
th e  f a l l  o f  Canea he departed w ith  M s  g a lle y s  t o  th e s a fe ty  o f  a  more 
d is ta n t  p o r t;  t h is  a ction  th u s l e f t  Porto d e l la  Suda and i t s  fo r tr e s s  
open to  d ir e c t  a ttach  by th e  enemy armada. See V a lier o , H is to r ia , p .  ^7;
B.N.M., V U  ( 2 l l ) ;  A .S .V ., P.T.M. (796) ,  Senato, Andrea Com er, Prow ed­
i t o r -  Generals d i  Candia, August 30 , l6 h 5 .
9 .  L uig i Boschetto,"Come fu  aperto l a  guerra d i Candia,” Ateneo 
V eneto, Part U ,  XLH (1912), pp. l l f f -W . Included in  th e  terms o f  su r-' 
render was th e  r ig h t to  withdraw unharmed th e  fou r Venetian g a l le y s  se ­
q uestered  in  th e p ort o f  Canea. For th o se  V enetian su b je cts  who chose  
to  remain under th e ir  new Moslem r u le r s ,  th ere  would be e le c te d  by  
them t h e ir  own m agistrate whose d e c is io n s  concerning them would b e , in  
most c a s e s , b in d in g . Although Turkish troops may have engaged in  some 
vandalism  and d estr u c tio n , i t  seems th a t  th e  c i t y  was spared th e  
horrors o f  f u l l - s c a l e  p i l l a g e .  A .S .V ., P.T.M. (7 9 6 ), Senato, Andrea 
Corner, Prow editor-G enerale d i  Candia, August 30, l6 h 5 .
1 0 . -Alberto G u g lie la o tt i)  S to r ia  d e l la  marina p o n t if ic ia .  La 
squadra a u s il ia n a  d e l la  marina Bcmana a  Candia e a l i a  Morea. S to r ia  
d e l  a l  1699. (Seme, 1BB3 ) ,  T i n ,  Passim .
1 1 . A .S .V ., P.TJd. (7 9 6 ) , Senato, Andrea Corner, P r o w e d ito r -  
Generale d i  Candia, September 21 , l6 h 5 , Suda.
12 . B.N.M., V U  (1232), Camillo Gonzaga, In fom azion e a l  p r in -  
cip e  c ir c a  l a  condizione m il i t a ir e  d i  Candia n e l  l6 h 5 , allorquando v i  
fu  e l l e t t o  Generale d e l le  Armi.
13 . The Mediterranean f l e e t s  n a tu r a lly  varied  con siderab ly  in  
com position but th ose  o f  th e I t a l ia n  s ta t e s  and th e  Turkish empire 
were alm ost e x c lu s iv e ly  comprised o f  l i g h t  g a l le y s .  The northern  
n a tio n s , namely the E nglish  and th e  Dutch, needed stu rd ier  v e s s e ls  
in  order to  p ly  th e  trade rou tes o f  th e  A t la n tic  ocean; con seq u en tly , 
th ese  n a tio n s had almost a l l  converted  to  th e  square-r igger v e s s e l  
w ith  rounded h u l l s ,  commonly known in  seventeenth-century I t a ly  as  
’b e r to n i* . Hot o n ly  were th e se  b e r to n i b e tte r  ab le t o  w ithstand rougher 
s e a s , but th ey  a lso  were capable o f  carrying h eav ier armament and thus  
were l e s s  vu lnerable to  th e  a ttack s o f  Mediterranean p ir a te s .  As fa r  as 
th e  Candia war was concerned, th e  b e r to n i con struction  p layed  alm ost 
no r o le  a t  a l l  in  naval s tr a teg y ; th e  on ly  sh ip s o f  t h is  d esign  in  
e ith e r  th e  Venetian or Turkish n a v ie s  were th e  so -c a lle d  navi which 
were, in  esse n c e , on ly  supply v e s s e l s .  The sea  b a t t le s  fought during  
th e  war were alm ost in v a r ia b ly  b a t t le s  between opposing f l e e t s  o f  
g a lle y s  and g a lle a s se s . For an in t e r e s t in g  and inform ative study o f
th e  variou s sM ps which s a i le d  th e  Mediterranean during the e a r ly  
seventeenth  century, see A lberto T en en ti, P iracy and the D eclin e  o f  
V enice , 1580- 1615 , tr a n s . by Janet and Brian P u ll an (Berkeley-Los 
A n geles, 1967) ,  passim .
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l h .  Jean B a p tis te  de B oco les,  Arbege methodique de l 'M s t o i r e  
de l a  Republique de V enise (Geneva, 1673), p .  7 7 .
1 5 . The ’navi* o c c a s io n a lly  became invo lved  in  aimed c la sh e s  
w ith  th e  enemy, hut th ey  were never sy s te m a tic a lly  used as an o ffe n s iv e  
weapon by Venetian consnanders.
16 .  According to  M olin, th ere  were in  s e r v ic e  approxim ately 
tw en ty -fiv e  s o t t i l e  g a l le y s ,  but th ese  were sc a tte r e d  throughout th e  
arch ip elago . He noted  th a t th e  " length  o f  th e  peace" was r e sp o n sib le  
fo r  th e  poor con d it io n  o f  th e  f l e e t ;  everywhere th ere  was a gen era l 
shortage o f  vo lu n teers  fo r  duty on the g a lle y s  and th e  treatm ent o f  
crews was freq u en tly  below  standard. In  comparison to  th e  f l e e t s  o f  
the a u x il ia r ie s ,  th e  Venetian f l e e t  was, according to  M olin, in  many 
ways in f e r io r ;  "our g a l le y s  in  comparison t o  th e  a u x i l i a r i e s , . . .  w i l l  
perhaps be judgedin many re sp e c ts  in f e r io r ."  A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V 
(S e c r e ta ) , R elazione, Busta 75 , Francesco M olino, Prow ed itor-G enerale  
da Mar, September 21 , l 6 tyj.
1 7 . During th e  war years th er e  were numerous decrees issu e d  
concerning th e  pardoning o f  cr im ina ls in  return  fo r  se r v ic e  a t  th e  
o a rs on th e  g a l le y s .  For an example o f  such a  d ecr ee , s ee  A .S .V ., 
C apitolax H ,  R eg istro  I ,  P ro w ed ito r  a ll 'A r a a r . Later one can read  
fu rth er  decrees concerning t h i s  m atter r e la t in g  to  th e  ex ten sio n  o f  
th e  maximum, age fo r  th o se  w ish ing  to  serv e  a t  s e a ;  in  1655 th e  
maximum age was extended f i v e  y e a r s , from fo r ty  to  f o r t y - f iv e .  See 
v ariou s D e cre ti Arsen a l i  contained in  th e  Q uerini Stamp a l l  a . The 
problem o f  re c r u it in g  men fo r  se r v ic e  a t s e a  on th e  g a lle y s  i s  an 
in t e r e s t in g  problem o f  th e  Candian war. According t o  th e  h is to r ia n  
V a lier o , th e e a r l ie r  p r a c t ic e  o f  regim enting th e  e n t ir e  c i t y  o f  V enice 
in t o  variou s se c tio n s  fo r  th e  purpose o f  m ustering c e r ta in  required  
numbers o f  men from each se c to r , had f a l le n  in t o  desuetude and n e g le c t .  
V a liero  noted th a t th e  movement to  th e  mainland (S erra fem a ) was 
la r g e ly  resp o n sib le  fo r  th e  s ta t e  o f  a f f a ir s ;  th e  a r is to c r a t ic  landowners 
had no d e s ir e  to  see  th e ir  workers and peasantry  drawn away fo r  se r v ic e  
a t s e a  ("benche s i  puo a c q u is t i  d i  terrafexm a, non vedendo v o lo n t ie r i
i  l o r  vi l l i c i  o b lig a t i  ad un'aggrovio p e r sa a a le , che p otea  p regu id icare  
a l l e  lo r o  p o s s e s s io n ! .N) Moreover, th e  Senate, perhaps unable to  do 
oth erw ise , allow ed th o se  who wished to  purchase freedom from t h e ir  
o b lig a tio n  t o  serv e; th e  fig u r e  quoted by V a liero  was some 130 d u cats .
See Andrea V a lier o , H is to r ia  d e l la  guerra d i  Candia (V en ice, 1679), 
p .  1 37 . T his -problem o f  r e c r u ita e n t fo s te r e d .s o a *  in te r e s t in g  arguments. 
In  1639 i t  was debated whether or not i t  would b e  b e tte r  to  le v y  a  ta x  
on th e  c i t y  and th e  Terrafexma in  order t o  h ir e  oarsmen ra ther than  
co n scr ip t than d ir e c t ly  from th e p opu lace. Many argued th a t d ir e c t  
c o n scr ip tio n  would m erely cause a m assive f l i g h t  from th e c i t y  or  
would cause a hardship on th o se  drawn away fran  th e ir  shops; moreover, 
every c lo sed  shop would mean a d ecrease in  th e  revenues o f  th e  c i t y .
In  a d d itio n , th e  o r ig in a l law s which had es ta b lish e d  a d e p o s it  o f  
tw en ty -fiv e  ducats t o  be s e t  a side  in  order to  h ir e  oarsmen, was by 
th e  1630*8 and l61*0*s com pletely ant equated; in f la t io n  had made tw enty- 
f i v e  ducats by th a t tim e a very  sm all sum indeed ("pochissim o so lie v o " )  
in  l i g h t  o f  th e  f a c t  th a t i t  would now requ ire 150 ducats per man. I t
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was proposed th a t a  y ea r ly  ta x  be in s t it u t e d  and a fund es ta b lish e d  
■which -would enable th e  Republic t o  man f i f t y  g a l le y s .  The fig u r e  
demanded fo r  such a  p ro je c t would be approxim ately 1 , 300,000  d u c a ts , 
a scan which could  be a tta in ed  w ith in  tw enty years ( 52,190  ducats t o  
b e c o lle c te d  each y e a r ) . T his proposal was apparently voted  on and 
accepted , but what a c tu a l inp act i t  had on th e  war which errupted ju s t  
s i x  years l a t e r  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  e s t im a te . See R eale C onaissione, B iia n c i  
g en er a li d e l la  Repubblica d i  V enezia (V en ice, 1903-12J,' m ,  p p . 5k2-5k7. 
(H erein after referred  t o  as B iia n c i g e n e r a l! . )  In  th e  meantime, however, 
l e s s  scrupulous methods were apparently sometimes used , and much v io ­
le n c e  seems t o  have re su lte d  from variou s ty p es  o f  impressment. V a liero  
t e r s e ly  n o tes  th a t " in t h is  merchandising in  human f l e s h ,  th e  d ece p tio n s ,  
th e  v io le n c e , and a l l  th e  e v i l  a r t s  have been i n f i n i t e . . . . "  V a lier o ,  
H isto r ia . p .  138.
18 . The problems encountered at th e  arsena l o f  Venice were 
numerous in c lu d in g  th e  la c k  o f  s k i l l e d  and even u n sk ille d  workers, the  
departure o f  g a lle y s  improperly manned, and th e  f a i lu r e  o f  arsena l 
workers t o  report re g u la r ly  fo r  d uty . Many o f  th ese  problems may w e ll  
have been so lved  had th ere  been more money a v a ila b le  fo r  th e  a rse n a l.  
Qmerini Stam palia, D ecreto(A rsenala),  Bernardo L odo li, Cod. CXXX, C lasse  
OA, PP. 309-313.
19 . A .S .V ., C o lleg io , E sposizion e Roma, 16U5 .
20 . "Correspondenza M alta, 16^5- 69 ,"  A rch ivio S to r lco  I ta l ia n o ,
XLJ (1 908), pp . 120-21 .
21 . Fcmpeo Molmenti, "Venezia a-Ha meta se c o lo  XVU. R elazione  
in e d it  a  d i  Mons. 7 .  Fannocchiesche, ” R endiconti d e l la  Reale Accademla 
d e i Id n c e i, S e r ie s  5 , XXV (1916) ,  p .
2 2 . I b id . ,  p .  219 . These charges m ight r e f l e c t  o n ly  th e  rumors 
and p reju d ices  o f  th e  tim e . V enice, however, had had fo r  some tim e a 
rep u ta tio n  fo r  to ler a n c e and ♦m erchant-like * a tt itu d e s  towards th ose  
elsew here in  Europe considered p a r ia h s . As fo r  the b u r ia l  p o l ic ie s  o f  
th e  c i t y ,  th ere  e x is te d  a  Hebrew cemetery on th e  Lido where Jews had 
been in terr ed  fo r  c e n tu r ie s .
2 3 . Urban VEU had so coveted  th e  Duchy o f  Castro th a t he aroused  
th e  fe a r  and anger o f  the Republic o f  V en ice . The Republic a l l ie d  i t s e l f  
w ith  th e  threatened Duke o f  Modena as w e ll  a s w ith  th e  F lo re n tin es; t h is  
a l l ia n c e  tem porarily  prevented th e  Fope from se iz in g  th e  duchy, although  
th e  coveted  land was even tu a lly  absorbed in to  papal t e r r i t o r ie s  in  16W  
when th e  V enetians were more than occupied w ith  th e  war fo r  Candia.
2k. Even as sympathetic an author as Pastor has w r itten  th a t  
Innocent X was " ir reso lu te  and exceed in g ly  p a rs im o n io u s ...."  Ludwig 
von P astor , H istory  o f  th e Popes, trana . by Dorn E rnest Graf (London, 
1 9 to ) , XXX, p . 356. "*
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25. A lb e r to  G u g l i e lm o t t i ,  S t o r i a  d e l l a  m a r in a  p o n t i f i c i a . l a  
s q u a d ra  m m -tn m m  d e l l a  m a r in a  Rcmana a  C a n d ia  e  a l i a  M orea .  S t o r i a  
d e l 1644 a l  1699. (Rome", 1883) ,  V III, pp. 12-137 S ee  a l s o ,  B o s c h e t to ,
■"Come fu  ap erto ," Part I ,  p .33. B esides th e  contingent o f  troops sen t 
t o  M alta, th e  Pope a ls o  forwarded sane 28 ,000  scu d i.
26. Eugenio Bacchione, "Venezia e  Genova durante l a  guerra d i  
Candia," Deputazlone d i S to ria  P atr ia  per l e  V enezia, VI (19^3), 16. 
GremonvLlle, th e  French ambassador t o  V enice, informed h is  government 
th a t th er e  had been some n eg o tia tio n s concerning th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  
th e  form ation o f  a  d efe n siv e  league o f  I t a l i an s ta t e s  ag a in st th e  
Turkish a ggression . The Venetian ambassador t o  Rome, C ontarin i, was 
c lo se r  t o  th e  s itu a t io n  and he reported  t o  V enice th a t th e  Pope was 
proposing such a leagu e o n ly  t o  save appearances and would use such
a league t o  fu rth er  h is  own in t e r e s t s .  C ontarin i consequently d id  not 
encourage th e  Pope in  t h i s  m atter. Moreover, i t  was f e l t  th at th e  
form ation o f  such a  leagu e would m erely tend  t o  confuse th e  is s u e  and 
would r e s u lt  in  a d elay  o f  a ss is ta n c e  t o  th e  R epublic.
27. P astor , H istory  o f  th e  Popes, XXX, p p .355-356, 359-
At f i r s t  th e  Pope h e s ita te d  to  a llow  more than e ig h t thousand troops  
t o  be re cr u ite d  w ith in  h is  t e r r i t o r ie s  fo r  fe a r  th a t such la rg e  l e v ie s  
would d ep le te  th e  p opu lation  o f  th e  Papal S ta te s ; la t e r  he p a r t ia l ly  
l i f t e d  t h i s  ban.
2 8 . Giovanni Z ulian , "Le prime r e la z io n e  t r a  i l  Cardinal e  G iulo  
M azzarini e  V enezia,"  Noovo Archivio Veneto, XXV (1909), PP- 11 5 -H 6 .
See a ls o ,  Mocenigo, Mario Nani, La marina Venezlana da Lepanto a l ia  
cadnto d e l la  Repubblica (Rome, 1935), p . lW I (H ereinafter referred
t o  as Marina Veneziana. )
29 . A .S .V ., E sposizione Roma, C o lle g io , R eg istro  37, Ju ly  1 8 , l6 h 5 .
30. F igures concerning th e  a c tu a l number o f  ser v ic ea b le  g a lle y s  
a v a ila b le  t o  th e  V enetian Republic vary con siderab ly , but according t o  
G uglielm ottl, th er e  were tw en ty -fiv e  g a lle y s  a t  Zante, tw enty-three a t  
Suda, and four g a lle a s s e s  in  a l l ;  in  a d d itio n  th er e  were eigh teen  v e s s e ls  
( v a s c e l l i )  a t  Suda and another eigh teen  a t  Zante. Using th ese  f ig u r e s ,  
th e  a d d itio n a l tw enty-one g a lle y s  o f  th e  a u x il ia r y  fo r ces  would repre­
sen t an o v e r a ll  in c re a se  in  t o t a l  sh ip s o f  approxim ately 2b percent; i f  
one considers o n ly  th e  g a lle y s  and g a lle a sse s , then  th e  a u x ilia ry , fo r ces  
represented  an in crea se  o f  nearly  bO p ercen t.
31. The g a l le y s  o f  th e  Pope were apparently prepared t o  depart 
fo r  Candia in  e a r ly  summer, but th e  squabbles over m atters o f  p ro to c o l 
by th e  other u n its  o f  th e  a u x il ia r ie s  delayed  th e  f in a l  departure u n t i l  
l a t e  summer. T his delay o f  nearly  two months was o f  c r u c ia l importance 
in  th e  f a l l  o f  Canea. G uglie lm otti, Marina P o n t i f ic ia . V III, p . 1 9 . 
Reference i s  made t o  th e  incessan t b ickerin g  which undermined th e  r e la ­
t io n s  o f  th e  a u x il ia r y  u n its  in  th e  R eg istro  o f  th e  C o lleg io: "The 
Genoese have competed for  precedence w ith  th e  Grand IXike (o f  Tuscany) 
and he a ls o  does n ot w ish to  concede, w h ile  even th e  M altese have s im ila r  
th o u g h ts . . . ,  but s t i l l  i t  i s  b elieved  th a t one can fin d  seme compromise 
as has been made other tim es."  A .S .V ., E sposizione Rcma, C o lleg io , Reg-
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i s t r o  37 ,  J u ly  18 ,  161*5. The a u x il ia r ie s  f in a l ly  jo in ed  th e  V enetian  
f l e e t  a t  Corfu on th e  29th  o f  August. P astor , H istory  o f  th e  Bppes.
XXX, p . 355.
32* Bacchione, 'V en ezia  e  Genova,” p . 2 5 .
33 . In  an age when h o n o r if ic  t i t l e s  were o f  th e  g r e a te s t  im­
p ortan ce , th e  gran tin g  o f  th e  Genoese requ ests  b y  V enice and th e  papacy 
would have perhaps encouraged th e  o th er  a l l ie d  powers to  demand th e  
same. On th e  o th er hand, Spain, England, and Poland had a l l  agreed to  
th e  Genoese demands and th e  r e fu s a l o f  V enice t o  do so could  e a s i ly  
have been in terp re te d  as noth ing l e s s  than ob stinan t arrogance. The 
f a l l  o f  Canea com pelled th e  V enetians to  "accom odate them selves to  
reasonable th in g s” hut renewed d isc u ss io n  on th e  m atter s t i l l  f a i le d  
t o  produce any p o s it iv e  r e s u l t s .  Most c e r ta in ly  th e  d isp u te  hinged , 
as Bacchione c le a r ly  su g g ests , n o t on th e  sim ple m atter o f  h o n o r if ic  
t i t l e s ,  hut ra ther on q uestions o f  European p o l i t i c s ;  as long as th e  
Genoese Republic remained trapped between th e  French to  th e  north and 
th e  Spanish in  I t a ly  no d e f in it e  a s s is ta n c e  cou ld  be promised t o  V enice . 
See Bacchione, "Venezia e  Genova," pp . 20 -22; 0 .  P a stin e , "La p o l i t i c s  
d i  Genova n e l la  l o t t a  Veneto-Turca d e l la  guerra d i Candia a l ia  pace  
d i  Passarow itz,"  A t t i  d e l la  Deputazione d i  S to r ia  P a tr ia  p er l a  L igura,
lxvh (1938-39), 3£5i.
3U. B acchione, "Venezia e  Geneva," p . 2 0 .
35. Ibid., passim.
36 .  Shielded by th e  power o f  th e French crown, the Barber i n i  
fam ily  proved a  se r io u s  ir r i t a t io n  to  th e  p o n t if f .  The fa m ily  served  
a s a  nucleus about which gathered a  pro-French p arty  in  Rome. The 
B arberin i were ev e n tu a lly  ex p e lled  from Rome and were perm itted  t o  
return  on ly  a f t e r  con siderab le pressure had been exerted  in  th e ir  
b e h a lf  by French r e p r e se n ta t iv e s .
3 7 . A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, F ran cia , F i lz a  103, B a t t is ta  
R ani, October-February, 16U5 .  Nani wrote concerning French in te n tio n s  
in  Candia "that th e  rupture o f  th is  crown (France) w ith  th e  T u r k ... i s  
t o t a l ly  a lie n  to  th e  re so lu tio n s  o f  t h is  government, and s in c e  Signor  
Cardinal<(Kazarin) has so expressed h im se lf , I  know i t  from good source."  
W ritten in  a  l e t t e r  dated October 3 , 161*5.
38 .  A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, F i lz a  103, B a t t is ta  N ani, 
O ctober-February, l6 h 5 , October 17, 161*5.
39 . Ib id . ,  November 2 1 , 161*5. Nani wrote th a t "Signor Cardinal 
(Mazarin) has n ot g iven  me form al r e p ly , but Brlenne and l io n  have 
t o ld  me th a t th e  King, ceasin g  th e  need o f  naval fo r c e s ,  would b e  ab le  
. . . t o  g iv e  (sh ip s )  t o  V .V.E.E. (V en ice), or i f  n ot arming (more French  
v e s s e ls )  to  send new aid  to  V enice w ith  th e  saving  o f  th a t m o n e y ... .”
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1*0. A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, F ran cia , F i lz a  103 , B a t t is ta  
N a s i, October-February, 1645, L etter  o f  January 7 ,  1646. The French 
suggested  to  th e  somewhat n a ive  Nani th a t  should form al French p r o te s ts  
f a i l  th a t France would tak e extreme measures and withdraw "the ambassar- 
dors and m in is ters  in  order to  break openly w ith  th e  Ottoman F o r te .”
4 l .  Nani reported  th a t Cardinal Mazarin had spoken t o  him con­
cerning th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  a  rapid  peace se ttlem e n t between Spain and 
France; Nani noted th a t  ”he (Mazarin} has sa id  t o  m e ...th a t  t h i s  w in ter  
peace would be m a d e .. . .” A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, F rancia , F i lz a  
103, B a t t is ta  N ani, October-February, 1645, L etter  o f  November 2 1 , 1645.
1*2. M. Lion read t o  Nani a  report from Mazarin concerning th e  
proposal o f  a  n aval tr u c e  between France and Spain in  th e  M editerranean. 
The o s te n s ib le  purpose o f  such a tr u c e  was to  enable th ese  two powers 
to  lend  g re a ter  a s s is ta n c e  to  th e  Venetian R epublic. Moreover, i t  would 
perm it a  more secure d efense o f  Spanish p o sse ss io n s  in  th e  Kingdom o f  
S ic i ly .  A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, F ran cia , F i lz a  103, B a t t is ta  N ani, 
October-Fenruary, 1645, n .d . From th e  Spanish v iew p oin t, th e  proposed 
naval truce  was l i t t l e  more than a  c le v e r  ruse by which France hoped to  
im m obilize th e  Spanish armada and thus deprive th e  Spanish crown o f  th e  
advantage which th e  Spanish f l e e t  enjoyed over th e  weaker French navy.
The V enetian ambassador to  Spain, undoubtedly sym pathetic t o  th e  in t e r ­
e s t s  o f  Spain, wrote th a t  "the ob jec t o f  th e  F rench ...w as very  obvious:
I t  i s  to  p reserve t h e ir  (French) maritim e armada, fo r  a  lon g  tim e in f e r ­
io r  to  th e  Spanish, and t o  deprive th e  C atholic  King (Spanish) th e  use  
o f  th ose fo r c e s  in  which he p rev a iled ."  G iu stin ia n  added th a t s in c e  th e  
French warships had already r e t ir e d  t o  p ort the se a  was open t o  th e  a c t­
io n  o f  th e  Spanish f l e e t ,  a  f l e e t  which had a lread  c o s t  th e  Spanish crown 
a m ill io n  and a  h a lf  in  gold  (presumably d u c a ts ) . A .S .V ., Am basciatori 
D isp a cc i, Spagna, F i lz a  80 , 1644-46, L e tte r  57, n .d .  G iustin ian  urged 
th e  V enetian S ig n o ria  t o  encourage th e  French "to th e  gen era l suspen­
s i o n . . . .  " which would end warfare on land  as  w e ll  as'.at s e a . A .S .V ., 
Am basciatori D isp a cc i, Spagna, F i lz a  80 , 1644-46, October 11, 1645.
Z ulian  argues th a t  th e  French proposal fo r  a  n aval truce was probably  
o ffere d  in  e a r n e st . He n o tes  th e  gen era l d isc o n ten t in  France generated  
as a  r e s u lt  o f  th e  T h irty  Years War and th e  r e su lt in g  in c re a se s  in  
ta x a t io n . See Z ulian , "Le prime re la z io n e ,"  pp . 85- 87 .
4 3 . N a n i's  optimism tended to  exaggerate th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  a  
fu tu re  P o lish  d iversionary  a ttack  along th e  northern borders o f  th e  
Ottoman em pire. As e a r ly  as February 2 0 , 1646, Nani was speaking o f
how "Poland i s  ab le t o  render to  a l l  C h r is t ia n ity  a s e r v ic e  so  g r e a t . . . . "  
A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, F rancia, F i lz a  103 , B a tt is ta  N ani, 
October-February, 1645, L etter  o f  February 20 , 1646.
4 4 . Mazarin o ffere d  400,000 scu d i fo r  th e  a cq u is it io n  o f  tw elve  
v e s s e ls  t o  be purchased in  th e  N etherlands; he a lso  perm itted  th e le v y  
o f  fou r thousand men w ith in  th e  borders o f  France Including mariners and 
such s p e c ia l i s t s  as bombardiers and en g in e er s. Four ' f i r e - s h ip s '  were 
apparently contributed  t o  a s s i s t  in  th e  d efense o f  Candia. Such ' f i r e -  
sh ip s' or  b r u lo t t i  were used in  th e  armada to  s e t  a f ir e  th e  v e s s e ls  o f  
th e  enemy. See Z ulian , "Le prime r e la z io n e ,"  p .  77; Mbcenigo, Marina 
Veneziana, p . 137.
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4 5 . A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, F rancia, F i lz a  103 , B a t t i s t a  
N ani, October-February, 1645, l e t t e r  283 ,  n .d .  Nani wrote t o  th e  S ig n o ria  
concerning th e  com plaints in  th e  French co u n c il th a t th e  arm ies o f  France 
in  C atalon ia and I t a ly  were b ein g  d ep leted  by th e  l e v i e s  made by V enice  
w ith in  th e  borders o f  France.
k6. Ib id .-N ani made re feren ce to  a  'c lou d ' which was forming in  
th e  French m in is t e r ia l  co u n c ils  concerning th e  l e v i e s  and th e  fe a r  th a t  
fu tu re  l e v ie s  might be l im ite d . He noted , however, th a t m atters had 
b een  stra igh tened  o u t. "The shadow (nembo) which was forming about th e  
q uarrel o f  a l l  aga in st th e  le v i e s  o f  Tour Serenissim a in  t h i s  kingdom, 
f i n a l l y  f la r e d  up (sc o c c a to ) , and a l l  had been on th e  p o in t o f  remaining 
w ithout e f f e c t ,  and confused*. when God granted me (th e  power) to  s tr a ig h t­
en m atters ou t fo r  th e  most p a r t ."
4 7 . Nani complains fr eq u e n tly  o f  th e  h igh  co s t  o f  r a is in g  troops  
and m ariners. One in sta n c e  occurred when he ra ised  a contingent o f  approx­
im a te ly  one thousand s o ld ie r s  to  be shipped o f f  to  Corfu along w ith  two 
s h ip s . These men were h ired  a t M a r se ille s  fo r  a p r ic e  "exceeding by two 
and th re efo ld  per h e a d .. . ."  th e  customary charge. A .S .V ., Am basciatori 
D isp a cc i, F ran cia , F i lz a  103, B a t t is ta  N an i, October-February, 161*5,
L e tte r  234, October 2 4 , 1645. Ny h ir in g  French m ercenaries th e  V enetians 
d id  gain  th e  experience which many o f  th ese  men had from years and years  
o f  w arfare. Foreign  m ercenaries (a s  opposed t o  th o se  men h ir ed  w ith in  
th e  t e r r i t o r ie s  o f  th e  Terrafeim a) were a ls o  paid  sm aller s a la r ie s  than  
Venetian c i t i z e n s ,  thus saving  s iz a b le  sums o f  money fo r  th e  R epublic.
For example, th e s a la r ie s  l i s t e d  fo r  th e  h ir in g  o f  French m ercenaries 
was as fo llo w s: fo r  a cap tain  in  th e  In fa n try , 60  d ucats; a  l ie u te n a n t ,
32 d ucats. The r e sp e c tiv e  s a la r ie s  fo r  a  cap ta in  and lieu ten a n t h ired  
w ith in  th e borders o f  th e  Terrafexma or  in  Venice p er se  were 100 ducats  
and 50 ducats p er month r e s p e c t iv e ly . S im ilar  d is p a r it ie s  e x is te d  in  th e  
pay fo r  oth er  ranks. See A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, F rancia , F i lz a  
1 03, B a tt is ta  N ani, October-February, l6 4 5 ,C a p ito li  a cco rd a ti, e t  c o n d u s i  
t r a . . .B a t t i s t a  N a n i . . .e t  U  Signor C o llo n e llo  Sidney A tk in s, January 10 , 
1645. T his d isp a r ity  may have re su lte d  from th e  reasoning th a t V enetian  
m ercenaries weald be more l ik e ly  t o  spend t h e ir  pay w ith in  th e borders 
o f  th e  R epublic.
1»8. A ,S ,V ,, Am basciatori D isp a cc i, Spagna, F i lz a  8 0 , G iu stin ia n , 
L etter  67 ,  August 30, 1645.
49 . The n in e v e s s e ls  included  f i v e  from N ap les ,,tw o  from S ic i ly ,  
and two from Sard in ia; th e  prom ise o f  th e se  v e s s e ls  o fte n  never m a ter ia l­
iz e d  s in c e  l o c a l  a u th o r it ie s  freq u en tly  re q u is it io n e d  th e  sh ip s fo r  
s p e c i f ic  l o c a l  d u t ie s .  In  t h is  case  th e  V iceroy complained th a t th e  
v e s s e ls  from N aples could not be spared due to  th e French th re a t in  th e  
M editerranean. A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, Spagna, F i lz a  80 , G iu stin ia n , 
L etter  69 ,  n .d .
50. For th e  French p rop osa l, see  above, p . 69-70 .
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51. A .S .V ., Ambasciatori D isp acci, Spagna, F ilz a  80, G iu stin ia n ,
L etters  69 and 82 , n .d . G iustin ian  wrote th a t th e  Spanish were wil l i ng  
t o  agree t o  a general th re e  or four year suspension  o f  a l l  arms. The 
ambassador a ls o  informed th e  S ignoria th a t th e  Spanish monarch, as soon 
as he had h is  hands fr e e  o f  France, would len d  th e  greater part o f  h is  
armada.
52. A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Spagna, F ilz a  80, G iustin ian , 
L e tte r  68, August 30, lSk3-
53. In re feren ce t o  th is  rumored p in cer a ttack  by jo in t  Franco-  
Turkish fo r c e s , th e  Spanish Secretary o f  S ta te  noted to  G iustin ian  th a t  
France was probably p leased  by th e  Turkish a tta ck  on Candia; w ith  such
a d iv e rsio n  France would be in  a much b e tte r  p o s it io n  "to d iv id e  th e  
world w ith  th e  Turk." A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp acci, Spagna, F ilz a  80, 
l6kk-k6, L etter  88 , November 8 , l6k3.
3k. Because o f  th e  th re a t o f  a Turkish attack  on southern I ta ly  
i t  was rumored th a t Spain might make.* separate accord w ith  th e Ottoman 
em pire. There seems t o  have been no substance whatsoever in  such rumors.
See A.S.V., Ambasciatori Dispacci, Spagna, F ilz a  80 , G iustinian, l6kk-k6, 
passim.
55. The ’ consu lta ' was th e  Venetian term fo r  a  meeting o f  a l l  
th e  a l l i e d  commanders; a t th ese  m eetings gen eral stra teg y  and other  
m ilita r y  m atters were d iscussed .
56 . Ludovisi t r ie d  everyth ing p o ss ib le  to  delay tak ing d e c is iv e  
s te p s . On th e  30th o f  August news reached Zante th a t Canea had f a l le n ;  
d esp ite  th e  o b jec tion s o f L udovisi, th e  con su lta  decided th at d e f in it e  
a ct io n  had to  be taken im m ediately. On th e  voyage to  th e  port o f  Candia, 
th e  Venetian commander, Antonio Bernardo (Capitano d el G olfo) and th e  
Tuscan commander, Lodovico Verazzano, urged th a t  th e  a l l i e s  a tta ck  th e  
enemy f l e e t  then  anchored a t  Canea. T his p lan  came to  nothing when
th e papal commander refu sed  to  p a r tic ip a te  and withdrew to  th e  sa fe ty  
o f th e  Port o f  Suda, th ere  to  await th e  a r r iv a l o f  reinforcem ents under 
Cappello. Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, p . lhO -lU l. I t  might be noted  
th a t even before th e  a l l ie d  f l e e t  had arr ived  a t Zante, Morosini had 
suggested  th a t th e  Venetian f l e e t  already th er e  be sen t to  a ttack  th e  
enemy a t  Canea. Even though th ere  were tw en ty -fiv e  g a lle y s  and four  
g a lle a s s e s  a t Zante a t  th a t tim e, no a c t io n  was taken on th is  su ggestion .
As a r e s u lt  another f iv e  days passed before the  a l l i e s  arrived  a t  Zante.
By th a t d a te , th e  25th o f  August, any element o f  su rp rise was obviously  
l o s t .  See Samuele Remanin, S toria  documentata d i Venezia (V enice, 1853-61), 
VII, pp. 362-363. (H ereinafter re ferred  t o  as S to r ia . )
57- Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, p . lh 2 .
58. Ib id . ,  p . IU3 .
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59. Ib id , ,  pp . ll»6-lU 7. The V enetians n a tu ra lly  hoped to  
concentrate on th e  war a t  s e a , w h ile th e  Turkish commander s  sought 
to  turn  th e  war in to  a s tr u g g le  on la n d .
6 0 . V a lier o , H is to r ia , p .  50
61 .  Cappello was f in a l ly  replaced  by th e  Senate as Capitano d e l la  
N avi; he was succeeded by Giovanni B a t t is ta  Easadonna who was h im se lf to o  
o ld  and in firm  to  asstane such arduous d u t ie s .  Basadonna was thus sh o r tly  
th e r e a fte r  replaced  h^wBAif by Tomaso M orosin i. Camillo Gonzaga was
sen t to  Candia in  th e  w in ter as Governor-General o f  th e is la n d . See Mocen­
ig o , Marina Veneziana, p .  lh h .
6 2 . G irolaaa Cavazza, then in  M alta, was ordered to  procure new 
warships as w e ll  as numerous f ir e - s h ip s .  A lv ise  C ontarin i, th e  Venetian  
ambassador extraordinary to  th e  Congress o f  Munster, was l ik e w ise  ordered  
to  h ir e  seme tw elve v e s s e ls  and four thousand in fa n tr y . Giovanni T iepolo  
was sen t on a s im ila r  m ission  t o  th e  Kingdom o f  Poland. See V a lier o , 
H isto r ia , pp . 38-39 .
63 .  The Duke o f  Parma sen t two thousand aimed in fa n try , a l l  o f  
whom accompanied th e  duke h im se lf . The Duke o f  Modena ordered th e  
Marquis T assoni to  len d  h is  m ilita r y  e x p e r tise  to  th e Venetian cau se .
The Republic o f  Lucca r a ised  one thousand in fa n tr y . See V a lier o , H is to r ia ,  
P . U2.
6k, Although Molin had termed th e  V enetian f l e e t  in  a  s ta t e  o f  
•m iseria* , he seems t o  have had s u f f ic ie n t  funds fo r  the immediate needs  
o f  th e  f l e e t ;  seme 136,958 ducats were d is tr ib u te d  to  General M orosini 
and Commissioner Mocenigo, Molin concluded th a t th e  armada would be  
Mfo r  seme tim e w ell-enough provided." A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S ec reta ), 
R elazione, Busta 75, Francesco M olin, P row ed itor-G enerale da Mar, 
September 21 , 16^5.
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CHAPTER III 
THE WAR BECOMES GENERAL, 1&J6-1650
A lthough  t h e  f i r s t  y ea r  o f  th e  war had  b een  f i l l e d  w ith  d is a p ­
p o in tm e n t  and f r u s t r a t io n ,  th e  s i t u a t io n  was s t i l l  f a r  from  h ope­
l e s s .  Canea was l o s t  b u t th e  r e s t  o f  t h e  i s la n d  and i t s  f o r t r e s s e s  
rem ained i n  th e  c o n tr o l  o f  th e  R e p u b lic . The a c t io n s  o f  t h e  a l l i e d  
armada p roved  u n in s p ir in g  and l e t h a r g i c ,  bu t th e  T urkish  f l e e t  i t ­
s e l f  had sc o r e d  no s p e c ta c u la r  v i c t o r i e s .  I f  t h e  arm ies o f  th e  
S u lta n  had won t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  on C andia, i t  was t h e  g a l l e y s  o f  V en ice  
w hich  now w ere on th e  o f f e n s iv e  a t  s e a .  C e r ta in ly  in  th e  w in te r  o f  
161+5-1+6 t h e  f a t e  o f  Candia rem ained s t i l l  v e r y  much in  q u e s t io n .
The n e x t t h r e e  y e a rs  o f  w arfa re  p roved th e  most in te n s iv e  and 
w idespread  o f  th e  e n t i r e  c o n f l i c t .  During t h i s  p e r io d  th e  war was 
expanded on a l l  f ro n ts  and th e  c a p ac ity  o f  i t s  b e l l i g e r e n ts  t e s t e d  
in  th e  extrem e. When t h i s  th re e -y e a r  p e r io d  came to  an end th e  war 
evolved slow ly  in to  a  c o n f l i c t  which more and more c e n te red  on th e  
p r in c ip le  o f  sim ple a t t r i t i o n .  In  t h i s  sense  th e  f i r s t  few y e a rs  
s e t  th e  p a t t e r n  o f  th e  e n t i r e  tw en ty -fo u r y e a r- lo n g  s tru g g le .
The c o l la p s e  o f  R ettim o i n  16H6 i n  many ways sym b olized  th e  
new in t e n s i t y  and s e r io u s n e s s  w h ich  had  come t o  c h a r a c te r iz e  th e  
w ar. A lthough  R ettim o  was th e  i s la n d 's  t h i r d  m ost im p ortan t c i t a ­
d e l ,  i t s  d e fe n s e s  w ere in ad eq u ate  t o  w ith s ta n d  a  lo n g  and in t e n s iv e  
s i e g e .  The c i t y  la c k e d  s a t i s f a c t o r y  p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s  by w hich  r e in ­
fo rcem en ts  m igh t b e  s e n t  t o  r e l i e v e  a  s i e g e .  The w a l l s  w ere in  n eed  
o f  c o n s id e r a b le  r e p a ir  and r e n o v a t io n , and t h e  e n t i r e  c i t y  was
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dangerously surrounded by c l i f f s  and mountains from which an enemy 
1
a tta c k  might be launched. To fu rth er  com plicate m atters , th e  b u l­
warks had become e n c ir c le d  by a  n e s t  o f  ramshackle d w ellings which 
provided  th e  c i t y ' s  inh ab itants w ith  housing but which a ls o  o ffe r e d  
an enemy a ssa u lt  fo r c e  e x c e lle n t  p r o te c tiv e  cover. Saved from de­
m o litio n  by th e  o u tc r ie s  o f  i t s  r e s id e n ts , t h i s  'burg' ev e n tu a lly
d id  serve  as sh e lte r  fo r  a ttack in g  Turkish troops and thereby f a c i l -  
2
i ta te d  th e  capture o f  th e  c i t y .  Even th e  garrison  a t  Rettimo was 
so weakened th a t as l a t e  as August o f  16H6 i t  was recommended th a t
no s o r t ie s  in to  th e  countryside be made fo r  want o f  men t o  defend th e
3
fo r tr e s s  i t s e l f .
The Turkish a s sa u lt  came in  September. On th e  20th  a  Turkish f l e e t  
o f t h ir t y  g a lle y s  and four thousand in fa n try  s a fe ly  arr ived  a t  Canea, 
and w ith in  n in e days a form idable Turkish army, estim ated  by one ob­
server t o  be e ig h t thousand in fa n try  and two thousand sappers, appeared 
k
b efo re  th e  w a lls  o f  R ettim o. Reinforcem ents were sen t to  th e  b esieged  
c i t y ,  but w ith in  on ly  te n  days c e r ta in  se c tio n s  o f  th e  fo r tr e s s  had
already f a l le n  in to  enemy hands, and th e  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  g arr ison  to
5
r e p e l fu tu re a ttack s seemed very much in  doubt. On th e  20th  o f  October
Rettimo was subjected  to  a fu riou s a s s a u lt . During t h is  a s s a u lt  a
b a rre l o f  powder a c c id e n ta lly  exploded causing th e  defenders t o  panic
and f l e e  in  a gen era l rou t; a l l  attem pts to  r a l ly  th e  defending fo r ces
f a i l e d ,  and th e  survivors were fo rced  to  withdraw t o  th e  s a fe ty  o f  th e
inner b a stio n . A ll  th a t remained to  th e  Venetians was t h is  tow er and i t s  
6
tw elve hundred d efenders. D espite such a re v er se , i t  was thought th a t th e  
f o r tr e s s  was s t i l l  capable o f  fu rth er  r e s is ta n c e , e s p e c ia l ly  when minor
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reinforcem ents reached th e  defenders in  e a rly  November. But fea r  and
fa tig u e  vere too g reat to  be overcome, and on th e  13th of November the
7
fo r t re s s  was surrendered to  th e  Turkish commander.
The lo ss  o f  Rettimo was a serious m ilita ry  and psychological blow. 
With Rettimo in  th e i r  hands, th e  Turkish armies could now move against 
th e  c a p ita l  c ity  of Candia w ithout fe a r  of Venetian a ttacks from the 
re a r .  The possession of Rettimo a lso  insured the sa fe ty  o f th e  lin e s  
o f communication and supply running from Canea to  th e  Turkish armies 
encamped a t  th e  w alls of Candia. Psychologically , th e  surrender of 
Rettimo stunned th e  Republic because, un like  Canea, th is  defeat could 
not in  any way be ra tio n a lize d  by arguing th a t  the assau lt came as a 
su rp rise . Moreover, with exception o f th e  c a p ita l o f Candia and h a lf  
a dozen small c a s te l l i  sca tte red  throughout th e  kingdom, Turkish troops 
could la y  claim to  almost t o t a l  possession of the  islan d . Now only the 
fo r tre s s  o f Candia stood between th e  inexorable march of th e  Ottoman 
armies and a complete surrender of the  islan d .
I t  th ere fo re  came as no su rp rise  th a t  th e  enemy now began to  concen­
t r a t e  h is  forces a t  Candia and began to  tig h te n  s ig n ific a n tly  the  siege 
of the  c ity .  The Venetians, however, were a lso  able to  concentrate 
th e i r  e f fo r ts  on the defense o f the  ca p ita l now th a t  they had no need 
to  d isperse  th e i r  forces in  an attempt to  defend several p o s itio n s . 
Although th e  number of ac tiv e  so ld ie rs  av a ilab le  a t  Candia varied  with
each new assau lt and each new outbreak of the  plague, there  u sua lly  were
8
during these  f i r s t  years about ten  thousand men in  th e  garrison . The 
fo r t if ic a t io n s  o f the  c ity  were a lso  in  b e tte r  condition than those of 
the o ther fo rtre s s e s .  In  May of l 6U6 Captain of the Gulf Bernardo
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had kind words fo r  th e  a b il i ty  of th e  Eroveditor-General o f the  c ity
to  organize i t s  defenses; Bernardo noted how the  Proveditor-General
had "made th e  fo r t if ic a t io n s  o f th e  c i ty  so marvelously provided fo r  
9
with a l l  necessary th in g s .• . . "
Obviously not everything a t  Candia gave reason fo r  such optimism.
Of the  ten  thousand or more so ld ie rs  s ta tioned  a t  Candia many were 
10
barely  provided fo r .  Plague, always the seventeenth-century s o ld ie r 's  
worst enemy,,continued reg u la rly  to  deplete th e  ranks. Control o f th is  
dread disease proved p a r t ic u la r ly  d i f f ic u l t  under wartime conditions.
The t r a n s i t  of so many m ilita ry  ships to  and from the c ity  made spread 
of the  contagion an ever-present danger. Houses had to  be sequestered, 
suspected goods confiscated  and destroyed, and th e  in fec ted  removed 
from the c ity .  Such measures understandably created  much b itte rn e s s  
among those involved and heightened tensions in  th e  c ity .  With 
Turkish troops surrounding th e  c i ty  i t  proved even hazardous and d i f f i ­
c u lt to  remove th e  diseased to  the  h o sp ita ls  which were loca ted  on an 
islan d  some d istance from th e  c ity  i t s e l f .  By August of 161*6 many
o ffic e rs  and over f iv e  hundred infantrymen had f a l le n  victim  to  th e  
11
d isease .
Dissensions among the  commanding o ffic e rs  a lso  continued to  hamper 
the defensive e f fo r t .  Such bickering  was, in  p a r t ,  encouraged by the 
Venetian Senate which hoped thereby to  elim inate the  p o s s ib i li ty  o f too 
much power being concentrated in to  the  hands of any one m ilita ry  admin­
i s t r a to r .  Hot only did subordinate o ffic e rs  appeal d ire c tly  to  th e  
government a t Venice, but the  Senate i t s e l f  seemed in  no g rea t hurry  to  
c reate  an unmistakably d is t in c t  l in e  of command which might have served
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t o  e lim in a te  confusion  in  th e  Tipper ranks. During tim es o f  peace such
a 'p o lic y '  might very  w e ll  have strengthened th e  co n tr o l o f  th e  Senate,
but during tim es o f  war i t  could  only th rea ten  to  weaken the e n t ir e
m ilita r y  e f f o r t .  As one gen eral observed a t  Candia in  l6k6, th e  r e a l
enemy la y  in  th e  "pernicious d isputes"  which marred th e  Venetian command;
i t  was ju s t  such d isp u tes which 'con tinu ou sly  d ivided  th e  s p ir i t  o f  th e
12
arm y...(an d) made sim ple endeavors in p o s s ib le  " S p e c if ic  o f f ic e r s ,
o ften  as h igh  as th e  rank o f c o lo n e l, were c i te d  by name for n e g le c t  or 
incom petence, and requ ests fo r  th e ir  removal had to  be sen t t o  V enice. 
S ta ff  o f f ic e r s  who f e l t  them selves undeservedly s l ig h te d ,f ir e d  o f f  t o  th e  
Signoria  l e t t e r s  f i l l e d  w ith  ca u s tic  a l lu s io n s  and b it t e r  c r it ic ism s
13
o f  t h e ir  fe llo w  o f f ic e r s .  The freq u en tly  v o la t i l e  temperament o f  
th ese  noble o f f ic e r s  was thus honed to  an even- sharper edge.
At Candia m ilita r y  operations during th e  f i r s t  few  years o f  th e  
war fo llow ed  a f a i r ly  p red ic ta b le  p a tte rn . The main l in e  o f  Turkish 
atta ck  was d ir ec ted  aga inst various 'baluardo' or bulwarks with c e r ta in  
ones re c e iv in g  sev e ra l major a ssa u lts  repeated ly . These a s sa u lt  waves 
came a t  a l l  tim es o f  th e  year , although l e s s  freq uently  during th e  ra in y  
w inter months when l i f e  in  th e  trenches became almost im p ossib le. The 
rep u lsio n  o f  th ese  a s sa u lts  demanded th e  utmost in  courage and p erse ­
verance on th e  part o f  in d iv id u a l u n its  and in d iv id u a l commanders.
By June o f  164-7 th e  c i t y  o f  Candia was com pletely invested  by Turkish
fo r c e s . Thousands o f  Turkish troops were amassed in  th e  h i l l s  which la y  
Ik
only a few m iles  d is ta n t from th e  c i t y .  The r e le n t le s s  s ie g e  continued  
In 1646, perhaps encouraged by news o f  a d isa stro u s Venetian shipwreck
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on th e  coasts o f Asia Minor, new assa u lt waves b a tte red  th e  c i ty  •while
enemy engineers continued to  se t underground mines in  a  vain  attempt
to  collapse th e  walls o f th e  fo r t re s s .  Attacks in  th a t  year came along
th e  e n tire  section  of th e  fo r t if ic a t io n s  s tre tch in g  from southeast to
southwest, from the  f o r t  of San D im itri to  the  bulwarks of Gesu, Santa 
15
Maria and Martinengo.
By 16U9 the  continuous and unrelen ting  a tta c k  of th e  enemy had
begun to  show e ffe c t.  To th e  south th e  Turks had e rected  several
b a tte r ie s  which tra in ed  th e i r  f i r e  on the  whole southern periphery while
s t i l l  another c loser to  the  coast harassed movement w ithin the  p o rt of
the  c ity .  Because of shortages in  Venetian cavalry enemy so ld ie rs  had
been able to  advance dangerously close to  th e  main bastions with th e  a id
of only l ig h t  a r t i l l e r y .  Grain was lacking fo r the  Venetian cavalry,
sickness had cut in to  th e  ranks of the  g arrison , and th e  number of
functioning cannon had been reduced to  l i t t l e  over one hundred. The
fiv e  galleys contained w ith in  th e  c i ty ’s p o rt were in  need of rep a ir
and were of no m ilita ry  use. Even when sizab le  sums of money reached
the  fo rtre s s  from Venice th e re  never seemed to  be enough s ilv e r  fo r a l l
the  needs. When in  one instance 70,000 ducats a rr iv ed  a t  Candia, one of
the  o ffic e rs  sadly noted th a t  i t  required  a t  le a s t  50,000 ducats every
month alone to  pay sa la r ie s  and to  acquire th e  necessary supplies of war;
the  cost o f rep a irs  i t s e l f  involved s t i l l  thousands o f add itio n al ducats 
16
every month of th e  year.
Although most of the  m ilita ry  a c tiv ity  focused on Candia, Turkish 
a ttacks a lso  increased against the is la n d -fo r tre ss  s itu a te d  in  Porto d e lla  
Suda. Numerous attempts to  force the cap itu la tio n  of th is  t in y  c ita d e l
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a l l  ended in  f a i lu re .  Nevertheless, the  a ttack s  continued, and with 
Turkish troops in  command o f almost a l l  o f th e  co asta l t e r r i t o r y  en­
c irc lin g  th e  bay of Suda bombardment o f  th e  fo r t re s s  became v i r tu a l ly  
a  d a ily  event. The fo r t re s s  of Suda was of p a r t ic u la r  in te r e s t  to  th e  
Turks because o f th e  c e n tra l p o s itio n  i t  h e ld  w ith in  th e  bay and be­
cause i t  o ffered  a  place o f refuge fo r  Venetian ga lley s  r e la tiv e ly  c lose 
to  enemy l in e s .  In  ad d ition , con tro l o f  th e  fo r t re s s  f a c i l i t a te d  contro l 
of th e  co asta l fo rtre s se s  which, in  tu rn , might th re a te n  the  Turkish 
l in e  o f  communications from Canea to  Candia.
As a  r e s u l t  o f th e  s tra te g ic  lo ca tio n  of th ese  re la tiv e ly  minor 
coasta l fo r tre s s e s , th ere  occurred during th e  l a t e  l 6!+0 , s constant 
skirmishes and b a tt le s  fo r  th e i r  possession . Since many of th ese  f o r t ­
resses  and entrenched b a tte r ie s  were s itu a te d  on mountain to p s, th e i r  
value as p o te n tia l  outposts and depots became even g rea te r . Such places 
as Bicorno, C u la tta , Porto Huovo, and th e  church and b a tte r ie s  o f Cal- 
o i r i  drew sp ec ia l a tte n tio n  from both Venetians and Turks a lik e . Unfort­
una te ly , as long as Canea remained in  th e  hands o f th e  Turks, Venetian 
commanders could never hope to  hold th ese  la rg e ly  iso la te d  outposts fo r 
any length  of tim e. Venetian forces succeeded in  capturing sev era l of 
these p o sitio n s  fo r  short periods o f time but th e  major s i t e s  remained 
f irm ly  in  Turkish con tro l. With r e la tiv e ly  lim ited  land fo rces and 
frequen tly  inadequate naval support, th e  Venetian armies could hope fo r 
l i t t l e  more. On th e  o ther hand, as long as V enetian  naval su p e rio rity  
could dominate th e  seas, the  fea r  of lo sing  Suda to  a Turkish a tta c k  
likew ise remained extremely remote. There thus developed in  th is
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perip hera l th ea ter  o f  th e  war a v ir t u a l  m ilita r y  sta lem a te ,a  sta lem ate
so  firm ly  based on th e  r e a l i t i e s  o f  Venetian n aval s tr en g th  and Turkish
land  su p e r io r ity  th a t i t  would remain throughout th e  e n t ir e  tw enty- 
17
four years o f  th e  war.
N atura lly , m ilita r y  a c t iv i t y  was la r g e ly  r e s t r ic t e d  t o  th e  areas
o f  Candia, Rettim o, and Porto d e l la  Suda. O perations d ir ec ted  a g a in st
th e  sm aller fo r tr e s s e s  were g e n e r a lly  o f  minor m ilita r y  s ig n if ic a n c e .
Chissamo, a b a stio n  lo c a te d  t o  th e  w est near Garabusa, was a ssa u lted
by f i f t e e n  hundred Turkish in fa n try  and, p a r t ia l ly  a s  a  r e s u lt  o f  treach ery
18
from w ith in , f e l l  to  th e  enemy in  th e  ea r ly  p a rt o f  1646. A year la t e r
th e  Venetians scored  a  minor triumph when th ey  s u c c e s s fu lly  captured
19
and destroyed  th e  fo r tr e s s  o f  M illqpotam i ju s t  e a s t  o f  Rettim o.
With n early  a l l  o f  th e ir  en erg ies  d ir ec ted  toward e ith e r  th e  capture  
or defense o f  th e  c a p ita l  o f  Candia, n e ith er  adversary showed much
concern fo r  minor fo r tr e s s e s  o f  t h i s  nature. Both s id e s  f u l ly  recog­
n ized  th a t i t  was p o sse ss io n  o f  Candia which would in e v ita b ly  determ ine who
who would con tro l th e  kingdom.
Hope remained, however, th a t perhaps th e  Republic would be ab le  
t o  recapture Canea and th u s deny th e  enemy th e  advantages o f  th a t  
city*  s p ert f a c i l i t i e s . Canea was e s p e c ia l ly  important s in c e  i t  was 
e s s e n t ia l ly  through t h i s  fo r tr e s s  and port th a t  th e  Turkish s ie g e  
fo r ces  a t  Candia remained su pp lied . Moreover, th er e  were rumors th a t  
th e  Turks had f a i le d  to  u t i l i z e  th e  fo r tr e s s  t o  i t s  f u l l e s t  cap acity  
and had f a i le d  t o  m aintain i t s  f o r t i f ic a t io n s  in  optimum con d ition .
News reported  from C onstantinople claim ed th a t th e  fo r tr e s s  was in  
d ire need o f  a s s is ta n c e  w ithout which i t  might f a l l  t o  th e  V enetians.
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Such d is t r e s s  •when combined w ith  th e  tr o u b le  th e  Sultan was having in
Babylonia found " a ll  th e enemy.. .  employed, continuously in  praying to  
20
Mohamet fo r  a i d . . . ."
Whatever substance th er e  was to  such rumors, Canea remained firm ly  
in  Turkish hands; so  in e p t were se v e r a l attem pts t o  recapture th e  f o r t ­
r e s s  th a t th ey  proved more em barrassing t o  th e  V enetians than th reaten ­
ing  to  th e Turks. S im ila r ly , Turkish co n tro l o f  Rettimo and th e  v a st  
m ajority  o f  th e  i s la n d 's  other fo r tr e s s e s  remained unchanged. For 
Venice th e b e s t  th a t could be sa id  was th a t  Candia continued to  w ith ­
stand th e  s ie g e .  Each year th e  demanding ta sk  o f  r a is in g  men and money
seemed to  grow more d i f f i c u l t  w ithout any r e a l i s t i c  hope th a t m atters  
21
would ease in  th e  fu tu re . In  alm ost every  important r e sp e ct th e  
land  war belonged t o  th e enemy. At b e s t  Venetian armies had won a  
tenu ou sly  h e ld  sta lem ate.
As a maritime and commercial power th e  tr u e  stren gth  o f  Venice 
la y  a t  sea . Moreover, i t  was a t  sea  th a t th e  V enetians scored  th e ir  
g r e a te s t  su ccesses  and proved them selves th e  most daring and courageous. 
But t h is  was not always th e  case fo r  apathy and la x i t y  sometimes seemed 
to  enshroud th e  movements o f  th e  armada. I f  th e  navy freq u en tly  remained 
th e  on ly  glimmer o f  hope and v ic to r y , i t  a lso  a t tim es proved a source  
o f  disappointm ent and fa i lu r e .
Much was ce r ta in ly  expected  from th e new command and th e  re in fo r c e ­
ments gathered togeth er fo r  th e  campaign o f  l 6U6 . U nfortunately, th e  
new Venetian commander, Giovanni Cappello*, was a man advanced in  years
*T h is  was Giovanni Cappello, not t o  be confused w ith  Antonio Maria 
Cappello who was r e c a lle d  to  Venice fo r  h is  fa i lu r e  to  support Canea 
in  l6h5.
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and more in c lin e d  toward v a c i l la t io n  than a g g re ssiv e  a c t io n . The 
armada he brought, when jo in ed  w ith  th e  a u x ilia r y  f l e e t s  o f  Malta and 
th e  papacy, co n s is ted  o f  62  g a l le y s ,  6  g a l le a s s e s ,  1*0 v e s s e ls  o f  variou s  
ty p e s , and 20 barques; th er e  were aboard 12 ,000  oarsmen, 1 0 ,000  m ariners, 
and 15,000  s o ld ie r s .  The a l l ie d  co n su lts  *  was d iv id ed  in  i t s  op in ion  
whether t o  i n i t i a t e  a  d iversionary  a ttack  or to  keep th e  armada in t a c t ,  
and move to  blockade th e  D ardanelles. C appello, i t  seemed, h e s ita te d  
t o  undertake any b old  maneuvers, so the f l e e t  d iv id ed  in  two w ith  part 
remaining a t  Suda and th e  other moving t o  Cape Spada near th e  w estern­
most t ip  o f  th e  is la n d . This in d ec is iv e n e ss  and subsequent delay was 
c o st ly , fo r  i t  perm itted  th e  Turkish armada tim e t o  conduct t o  s a fe ty
more reinforcem ents and su p p lie s  from C onstantinople t o  th e  port o f  
22
Canea. Such was th e  obliquy and p u b lic  outrage over t h is  poor
performance th a t Cappello was replaced  by Giovanni  B a t t is ta  Grimani 
23
as Captain General da Mar. D espite th e  newly strengthened armada o f  
the a l l i e s ,  th e  Turkish f l e e t  was not once encountered throughout th is  
year; a l l  th e  e f f o r t  t o  r e in v ig o ra te  th e  f l e e t  seemed by e a r ly  f a l l  
to  have been in  vain. The departure o f  th e  a u x il ia r ie s  in  September
made ce r ta in  th a t  no d e c is iv e  campaign aga inst th e  enemy would be
2k
undertaken in  l6kS.
The only naval a c t iv i t ie s  o f  any m erit in  l6k6 took  p la c e  a long  
d istance from Candia and were concerned prim arily  w ith  an attempt 
to  blockade th e  D ardan elles. I t  was here a t  th e  D ardanelles th a t  
V enetian g a lle y s  g en er a lly  remained on th e  o f fe n s iv e  making every
*The Venetian Giovanni Cappello, th e  M altese V i l la r o e l ,  and th e  
papal commander Zambeccari.
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e f fo r t  to  sever th e  l in e  o f  cojnnuni ca tio n  between Constantinople and 
Candia. The Dardanelles a lso  remained a ce n tra l rendezvous where 
Venetian armadas would meet and from which p a tr o ll in g  squadrons would 
be sen t to  scour th e  Aegean fo r  Turkish merchantmen and sh ip s-o f-w ar.
In  th e  shadow o f th e  D ardanelles many n ob les continued t o  d isp la y  
th e  seamanship and daring which had been fo r  so  long a part o f  th e  
tr a d it io n  o f  th e V enetian n o b i l i ty .  I t  was h ere th a t  one member o f  th e  
i l lu s t r io u s  M orosini fam ily  d isp layed  th e  kind o f  courage and a g g re ss iv e ­
n ess which s t ir r e d  th e  w aters o f  th e  Aegean in  th e  la t e  l6 h 0 's .  through­
out 16k6 Tonmaso M orosini as Capitano d e l le  Navi harassed  Turkish sh ipping  
and enemy convoys in  th e  seas adjacent t o  or im m ediately south o f  Con­
s ta n tin o p le . He even le d  a daring but f u t i l e  a s sa u lt  a g a in st th e  Turkish 
i s la n d  o f  Tenedo in  16U6 ,  an attempt w h ic h ,if  su ccessfu l,w ou ld  have 
g iven  Venice con tro l o f  a  p o s it io n  lo c a te d  on ly  a few m iles from th e  
entrance t o  th e  D ardanelles.
D esp ite minor setb ack s, th e  Venetian f l e e t  under M orosini continued  
t o  p a tro l th e  northern Aegean during th e  w in ter o f  I6k6-b7. An event 
occurred in  January 16^7 which d ram atically  r e f le c te d  th e  kind o f  courage 
and p luck  o f  which Venetian naval commanders were freq uently  capable. I t  
was in  th a t month th a t M orosin i’s  own g a l le y  was driven  by northeastern  
winds toward th e  is la n d  o f  Negroponte. Here he encountered a f l e e t  o f  
fo r ty - f iv e  Turkish g a l le y s .  With courage bordering on th e  re c k le s s  
he ordered h is  sh ip  to  a tta ck  in  s p ite  o f  th e  num erical su p e r io r ity  o f  
th e enemy. The ensuing b a t t le  claimed th e  l i f e  o f  M orosini, and h is  
g a lle y  was only b arely  saved by the tim e ly  a r r iv a l o f  reinforcem ents 
under Proveditor-G eneral Grimani. Although th e  f u t i l i t y  o f  M orosin i's
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a c t io n  was obvious, i t  showed th e  ag g re ssiv e  daring which o fte n
25
characterized  Venetian seamanship.
This second w in ter o f  th e  war thus ended on a  n ote o f  tr a g ic
heroism . In terms o f  m ilita r y  accomplishment th e  war remained s t i l l
deadlocked in  a d iscouraging sta lem ate. Notwithstanding o c c a sio n a l
moments o f  g lo r y , th e  V enetians s t i l l  lack ed  th e  determ ination  and
26
•unity needed t o  d is lo d g e  th e  Turkish fo r c e s  a t  Candia.
B esides th e  v e s s e ls  under M orosini, th ere  was another f l e e t  
under a new commander, G. B. Grimani. Grimani had been appointed t o  
rep la ce  th e  s p ir i t l e s s  Giovanni Cappello and h is  a r r iv a l brought th e  
hope th a t a  more fo r c e f u l  campaign would now be waged. This change o f  
command d id  bring  t o  th e  armada new and v igorous l eadersh ip  but th er e  
were s t i l l  few events o f  any n ote in  l6 h 7 . Scattered  bombardments 
such as th a t which took  p la c e  a t  th e is la n d  o f  S cio  (C hios) and b lock ­
ades m aintained a t  Turkish p o rts  such as th a t  a t  N auplia d id  l i t t l e  t o  
r e s t r i c t  th e  enemy's m ilita r y  cap acity . Thousands o f  Turkish troops  
continued to  land  s a fe ly  at Canea w ith  th e  Venetian p a tr o ls  seldom
capable o f  doing more than delaying  th e  a r r iv a l o f  th e se  r e in fo r c e -
27
ments or in terc ep tin g  one or two i s o la t e d  enemy convoy v e s s e ls .
The fo llo w in g  year w itn essed  th e  same s e r ie s  o f  p a tr o ls , b lockad es, 
and harassment maneuvers. The only event o f  any n ote  occurred in  March 
o f  l 6h8 . On th e  l 8th  o f  th a t month Grimani*s f l e e t  o f  2k g a l le y s ,  5 
g a l le a s s e s ,  and 27 v e s s e ls  encountered a  fu r io u s storm near th e  is la n d  
o f  Psara c lo s e  to  Scio; many sh ips were b a ttered  in t o  a " m illion  p ieces"  
and th e  more for tu nate were thrown upon th e  beach. Others were sh a ttered  
on th e  rocky crags o f  th e  c o a st . F ortun ate ly , th e  wind blew most o f
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th e  sh ip s toward land which enabled many o f  th e  men aboard t o  escape  
t o  th e  s a fe ty  o f  th e  beach. One g a l le y ,  th a t o f  Grimani, was "the 
most maltreated" and sank w ith  th e  lo s s  o f  e ig h t hundred men; in  add­
i t i o n ,  2k,000 ducats went down w ith  th e  Captain-General*s f la g s h ip . The 
t o t a l  l o s s  r e su lt in g  from th e  storm was estim ated  to  be eigh teen  t o  
nin eteen  g a lle y s  and n in e v e s s e ls .
Undaunted by t h i s  l o s s ,  th e  Venetian squadron, now reduced t o  a
handful o f  g a lle y s  and th e  f i v e  o r ig in a l g a le a s s e s , assembled i t s e l f
and s a i le d  northward in  order t o  re in fo r c e  th e  blockade o f  th e  D ardanelles.
When news reached Constantinople o f  th e  d isa stro u s  shipwreck o f  th e  Venetian
f l e e t ,  th e  Turkish commander decided  to  attem pt t o  fo r ce  h is  way p a st th e
cr ip p led  a l l i e s .  H is optimism proved unfounded, and he and h is  g a lle y s
were fo rced  back in to  th e  s a fe ty  o f  th e  D ardanelles. The in a b i l i t y  o f
th e  Turkish f l e e t  t o  escape th e  blockade in fu r ia te d  th e  Sultan  a s  such
a s i t  encouraged th e  V enetians. The March tragedy n a tu ra lly  p laced
an a d d itio n a l burden on th e  resources o f  th e  Republic but i t  a ls o
served  to  show th e  enemy th a t no m atter what m isfortunes might b e f a l l
V enice ,her g a lle y s  would s t i l l  remain m asters o f  th e  sea s; in  t h i s  sen se
th e  March shipwreck could  be viewed as a  p sy ch o lo g ica l v ic to r y  fo r  th e  
28
V enetians.
The remainder o f  16U8 saw a minimum o f  naval a c t iv i t y  and i t  was 
not u n t i l  May o f  16U9  th a t Venice could f in a l ly  claim  a tr u e  m ilita r y  
v ic to r y  a t  sea . The b a t t le  came when Turkish sh ip s blockaded in  th e  
D ardanelles tr ie d  to  escape w ith  h elp  from a  favorable wind; t h i s  
Turkish f l e e t  managed t o  reach th e  s a fe ty  o f  th e  p ort o f  Focchies where 
th e  pursuing Venetians under Giacomo Riva e s ta b lish e d  another blockade.
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Although outnumbered, Riva decided to  a tta c k  th e  Turkish convoy 
d esp ite  the  dangers of cannon f i r e  from the  Turkish fo rtre s s e s  w ith­
in  th e  p o r t.  The subsequent engagement was an unreserved triumph fo r  
Venice; a t  a  minimal s a c r if ic e  Riva’s g a lleys sunk or destroyed th ree  
o f those of th e  enemy as w ell as th ree  maone and nine tra n sp o rt vesse ls .
Venice was ju s t ly  proud of R iva 's  success and thus granted him 
the  h o n o rific  t i t l e  of Cavalier of San Marco. Unfortunately, th e  
v ic to ry  was somewhat hollow, fo r  desp ite  the  damage which Riva had 
in f l ic te d  on th e  enemy, the  Turkish convoy a t  Focchies remained la rg e ly  
in ta c t  and l a t e r  managed to  escape from, th e  harbor and s a i l  sa fe ly  to  
Candia. A v ic to ry  had been won, but the  main s tr a te g ic  aim of the  
a l l i e s  had not been achieved. In  f a c t ,  a f te r  depositing  i t s  re in fo rce ­
ments and supplies a t  Canea, th is  same convoy o f Turkish ships manpged 
to  re tu rn  unscathed to  the  safe ty  o f the  Dardanelles. Once again th e  
v icto ry  would prove more damaging to  the  enemy psychologically  than i t  
would m il i t a r i ly .  Perhaps with t h is  in  mind sev era l senators a t  Venice 
proposed th a t  th e  Ventian f le e t  not only m aintain a  passive blockade 
a t  the  Dardanelles but th a t  i t  should a lso  pursue and harass enemy 
ships even to  th e  w alls of Constantinople i t s e l f ;  t h is  suggestion was 
considered a t  th e  time too rad ic a l and th e  passive blockade continued.
And d esp ite  iso la te d  v ic to r ie s  such asFtocchies, th e  Venetians were 
unable to  s tr ik e  a  f a t a l  or cripp ling  blow against th e  enemy shipping
capacity  and remained unable to  sever th e  Turkish l in e  of supply to  
29
Candia.
The b a tt le  a t  Focchies was unfortunately  ty p ic a l o f the type of 
naval v ic to ry  won by th e  galleys of th e  Republic, not only during the
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i n i t i a l  period  but throughout the  e n tire  war. Whenever p o ssib le  Turkish 
admirals p refe rred  to  avoid open confrontation  with th e  superio r Vene­
t ia n  navy, and whenever po ssib le  a l l i e d  commanders attempted to  fo rce 
th e  enemy to  accept th e i r  challenge. These two naval s tra te g ie s ,  th e  
one offensive and other defensive, were both t ie d  to  the  land operations 
a t  Candia. V ictory was not to  be weighed in  terms o f th e  number o f 
enemy galleys destroyed but ra th e r  in  th e  men and m ateria l which d id  or 
did not reach the  Turkish armies encamped on the islan d . Consequently, 
from a s t r a te g i s t 's  viewpoint, th e  f i r s t  years of th e  war were f i l l e d  
with b i t t e r  f a i lu re  fo r th e  Republic. Galley fo r g a lley  the Venetian 
navy was undoubtedly superior to  th a t  of the  Turks, bu t e ith e r  fo r  lack  
of la rg e  enough f le e ts  or s u ff ic ie n tly  aggressive commanders, the  block­
ades and p a tro ls  were not achieving th e  desired  r e s u l ts .  By 16^9 the
tempo of the  war had without auestion  increased, but th e  p o s itio n  of the
30
respec tive  armies re main ed e s se n tia l ly  unchanged.
I I
The war in  Dalmatia came as a r e s u l t  of widening th e  c o n flic t which 
had begun in  Candia. Although the  warfare waged in  t h is  desolate  region 
always remained secondary to  the  main th ea te r  of operations, the  triumphs 
and defeats witnessed here nevertheless had considerable impact on the  
e n tire  war e ffo r t.  Because of i t s  con tigu ity  with th e  t e r r i to ry  o f  the  
Ottoman empire and i t s  r e la tiv e  proxim ity to  the mainland o f Venice, th is  
mountainous w&steLand assumed a s tra te g ic  importance f a r  g rea te r  than  i t s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
in t r in s ic  economic or demographic value. Consequently, fo r  a  b r ie f  
p eriod  of th ree  years s tre tch in g  from l 6k5 u n t i l  l 6h8, the  en tire  
Dalmatian s t r ip  became the focus of a  serious m ilita ry  e f fo r t  by both 
adversaries.
Venetian contro l of the  coasts of Dalmatia o rig ina ted  as f a r  bach 
as th e  Fourth Crusade (1202-I20k) when crusading knights were persuaded 
to  a tta c k  Zara and Durazzo in  re tu rn  fo r  passage to  the  Holy Lands. From 
th is  time forward th e  Republic gradually  extended i t s  ru le  along four 
hundred miles of co asta l domains. By th e  seventeenth century the  Vene­
t ia n  empire included in  th is  a rea  th e  c a p ita l,  Zara, as well as the  
towns of Spalato, Trau, Sebenico, Scardona, Novegradi and Pago. In ­
cluded in  th is  empire were a lso  th e  coasta l is lan d s  and th e  I s t r ia n  
peninsula to  the n orth . P rotected as i t  was by b leak  and forbidding 
mountains separating  th e  co asta l areas from th e  Turkish-held in te r io r  
and surrounded by navigable waterways and channels, Dalmatia remain ed 
one of Venice's most e a s ily  pro tec ted  overseas t e r r i t o r i e s .
Besides being geographically close to  Venice, th is  region a lso  
presented few 's o c ia l ' problems. The towns and ru ra l  secto rs were in  
no way troubled  by an unruly n o b ility  as Candia had been, and most of 
■ the  in h ab itan ts were peasant tribesmen and small town merchants who had 
strong bonds of lo y a lty  to  Venice. Many of th e  tribesm en who l iv e d  in  
the  mountain regions bordering Ottoman lands were C hristian  by f a i th  
and thus had n a tu ra l sympathies with th e  Venetian s ta te .  These Morlacchi, 
as they were known in  Venice, proved invaluable as monitors of Turkish 
troop movements and as a source of numberless reserves needed to  f i l l  the  
ranks o f the Venetian armies. Francesco Molino wrote with confidence of
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t h e ir  lo y a lty  and sen se o f  d ed ica tion : "In a l l  th e  c i t i e s  o f  Dalm atia,"
Molino w rote, "I have heard est im a tes  o f  t h e ir  d e v o tio n .. .  (and d e s ir e )
to  expend th e ir  b lood  in  th e  defense and se r v ic e  o f  t h i s  Very Serene 
31
R e p u b lic ."
Since many o f  th e se  tribesm en were ncnadic, th ey  sometimes s h if te d
t h e ir  a lle g ia n c e  t o  one s id e  or th e  o th er  in  an e f f o r t  t o  choose th e
vinndr. In  c e r ta in  areas, such as in  th e  south near modern-day A lbania
and Montenegro, th e re  was reason to  suspect even open co llusion  w ith
th e  Turks. At Ragusa, fo r  example, fo r e ig n  m erchants, e s p e c ia l ly  th e
Spanish, t r ie d  to  cause u n rest among th e  m aritime p eop les  o f  th e  co a sts
in  order t o  exacerbate Turco-Venetian ccmmerical r e la t io n s ;  th e ir  g oa l
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was n a tu ra lly  t o  in c re a se  Spanish commercial in f lu en ce  in  th e  re g io n . 
F ortunately  fo r  V enice, attem pts o f t h i s  nature g en er a lly  f a i l e d  and a 
harmonious rapport between th e  Republic and th e se  nomadic and maritime 
peop les was p reserved . Many o f  th e  M orlacchi and t h e ir  su bsid iary  
tr ib e s  a c t iv e ly  sought a lle g ia n c e  to  Venice by sending s p e c ia l  ambassadors
33
t o  th e  Venetian commanders requ estin g  t o  be made su b je c ts  o f  th e  R epublic. 
Throughout th e  long Candian war peace and fr ie n d sh ip  between th ese  D al­
matian t r ib e s  and th e  Venetian s ta t e  was seldom broken by any in te r n a l  
d iscord  or treach ery .
The th re a t o f  war erupting  in  Dalmatia as w e ll  as Candia increased  
in  l6k5 when a s e r ie s  o f  minor in c id e n ts  erupted along th e  Turco-Venetian  
border. Minor p o lic e  a c tio n s  were in i t ia t e d  by th e  Turks a g a in st variou s  
tr ib e s  lo y a l t o  Venice which inh ab ited  th e  mountains o f  Montenegro. In  
A pril,caravans were forbidden by orders from C onstantinople t o  continue  
tradin g a t  th e  Venetian p ort o f  Spalato; t h i s  e f f e c t iv e ly  cut o f f  th e  
supply o f  ’P o g lis sa n e ', w arriors who norm ally accompanied th e  caravans
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and who ware re g u la r ly  re cr u ite d  by Venetian o f f i c i a l s  t o  serve as
guards and sen tr y s . Turkish troops were a ls o  b eing  concentrated  a t  Buda
by order o f  th e  Grand V iz ie r . By A p ril th e  E row editor-G eneral o f
Dalm atia, Andrea Vendramin, c le a r ly  foresaw  an imminent Turkish a tta ck  
3^
d ir ec ted  a g a in st h i s  p rov ince. H is fe a r s  were confirm ed, fo r  in  June 
th e  Venetian b a ilo  learned  a t C onstantinople th a t an order had been
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g iven  "to th e  Pasha o f  Buda t o  invade Dalmatia in  th e  area o f  S palato ."
Dalmatia was a p rovince p rized  by th e  V enetian government but one
where m atters were fr eq u e n tly  approached w ith  a sen se  o f  in sou cian ce.
In  th e  spring o f  l6U5>with a major invasion  th re a ten in g , th er e  could
be found in  a l l  Dalmatia no more than 1 ,9 5 8  a c t iv e  so lid e r s ;  even by
August, sev e ra l months a f t e r  war had o f f i c i a l l y  been declared , th ese
fo r ces  s t i l l  on ly  numbered 3 ,688  in fa n try  and k26 cava lry . The naval
fo r ce  a v a ila b le  in  Dalmatia remained l im ite d  to  numerous s w ift  and
l ig h t ly  armed barques u s e fu l  in  p a tr o ll in g  th e  serpentin e  c o a s t lin e
36
but obviously  o f  questionab le va lue in  terms o f  f i r e  power.
F ortunately , th e se  fo r c e s  were grad u ally  in c re a se d  so  th a t by January 
o f  l 6U6  over f i v e  thousand in fa n try  and cava lry  were a v a ila b le  fo r  th e  
e n tir e  p rovince. Zara, th e  c a p ita l ,  became th e  p ro v in c e 's  main strong­
h old  from which su p p lie s  and reinforcem ents cou ld  be d ispatched to  th e
37
oth er fo r tr e s s e s  s c a tte r e d  throughout th e  in t e r io r  and along th e  co a st .
The funds a llo c a te d  fo r  th e  defense o f  th e  reg ion  l i kew ise grew; in  
September and November o f  l6h5 over 36,000 and 28 ,000  ducats r e s p e c t iv e ly  
were sen t to  Dalm atia, both  fig u r e s  o f which represen t as much as 50 t o  
60 percen t o f  th a t which was sen t to  Candia i t s e l f .  Over 25,000 ducats 
per month were s e t  a s id e  fo r  th e  province throughout th e  fo llow in g  year ,
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and in  I 6U7 , during a  four-month long period  o f unusally  in ten se  f ig h t­
ing th ere  were dispensed from the Venetian tre a su ry  almost 760,000 ducats.
To supplement her own resources, Venice received from th e  Pope 100,000 
gold scudi to  be ra ise d  by the  clergy of Dalmatia and 2,000 p a id  in ­
fa n try  fo r  a period  o f s ix  months. These r is in g  costs r e f le c t  to  a large  
ex tent the  expansion of th e  Dalmatian war; un fo rtunately , they  a lso  re ­
f le c t  the  ruinous influence which in f la t io n  and speculation , two e v ils  
inv ariab ly  present in  a war-time s itu a tio n , had had on th e  Dalmatian 
economy. Without question th e  f i r s t  th ree  years o f th e  Candian war
demanded extraordinary f in a n c ia l s a c r if ic e s  in  a l l  p a rts  o f th e  empire,
38
including Dalmatia.
Hie Turkish invasion d id  not b eg in ,in  f a c t ,u n t i l  September o f 16U5 
when several Venetian outposts near Spalato were subjected  to  bombard­
ment and musket f i r e .  These re la tiv e ly  harmless probes were apparently  
designed to  t e s t  the  perim eters of th e  Venetian defenses since no major 
a ssa u lt  followed u n t i l  December, many months a f te r  th e  advantages o f
39
su rp rise  had forever been lo s t .
Although Turkish movement in  the  province had been cautious and
reserved , two of the  le s s e r  fo rtre s se s  under Venetian contro l f e l l
before the  end of l 6hp. Novegradi, a  fo r tre s s  of no p a r t ic u la r  m ilita ry
importance beyond the  f a c t  th a t  i t  was s itu a te d  only twenty to  th i r ty
m iles d is ta n t from Zara, f e l l  in  the  summer to  a s izab le  Turkish army;
th e  surrender of Novegradi was a b i t t e r  psychological defeat fo r  th e  
hO
armies of the  Republic. I t s  lo ss  a lso  re f lec te d  the  c h a ra c te r is t ic a l ly  
sluggish s ta r t  which marred the defensive e ffo r t  o f Venice in  l6h-5. Be­
fo re  the  fo rtre s s  had fa l le n ,  many advisors including the lo ca l commander
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had urged i t s  abondonment and d estruc tion  since i t  -was judged too d i f f i ­
c u lt  to  do-ppnri under any circumstances; no such ac tion  was ever taken , 
thus p resenting  the  Turkish general w ith a ready-made bastio n  dangerously 
close to  Venetians supply l in e s . In  add ition , th e re  were munitions and 
reinforcem ents av a ilab le  w ithin the  general v ic in i ty  of Novegradi none of 
which were, fo r  one reason or another, sent to  th e  besieged fo r tre s s .  
Considering the  acknowledged v u ln e ra b ility  of t h i s  fo r t re s s ,  i t  seems 
lo g ic a l  th a t  Novegradi should have e ith e r  been re in fo rced  o r, as the  
experts had urged, demolished.
To the  south about f iv e  to  ten  m iles from Sebenico and nearly  midway 
between Spalato and Zara was th e  Venetian r iv e r - fo r tr e s s  of Scardonia.
This likew ise was l o s t  during th e  f i r s t  Turkish campaign in  Dalmatia and 
f u t i le  attem pts to  recapture  i t  only enboldened th e  enemy. Consequently 
th e  successfu l s tr ik e  against Scardonia was followed by a Turkish a ssa u lt 
against Sebenico, an a ssau lt which f a i le d  because o f th e  g rea te r  streng th  
o f th is  p a rtic u la r  fo r tre s s  and Venetian mastery o f the  waterways leading
b2
t o  i t .  By th e  end of th is  fa ll-w in te r  campaign Turkish forces con tro lled  
an a rea  comprising several thousand square m iles between Novegradi and the  
Canal o f Sebenico.
Despite th e  seizu re  of Novegradi and Scardonia the  Turkish drive had 
f a l le n  fa r  short of i t s  m ilita ry  p o ten tia l. Excessive caution and poor 
s tra te g ic  planning caused the  Turkish commanders t o  leave men in  reserve 
fo r  fu tu re  a ttacks ra th e r  than concentrating th e i r  v as tly  superior 
forces against a few se le c t bastions o f v i ta l  importance. Had Zara or 
Sebenico been captured, the Venetians would have been deprived of bases 
absolu te ly  necessary fo r a successfu l defense of the  e n tire  province.
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The Turkish armies had a lso  f a i le d  to  secure v i ta l  l in e s  of communication
and thus l e f t  themselves vulnerable to  serious coun terattacks.
The tim e in a d v erten tly  gained  by th e  Venetian defenders a fford ed
them invaluable opportunity to  re in fo rce  th e  defensive network of th e
province and to  coordinate the  upper lev e ls  of command. By th e  end of
the  summer of l6k6} Venetian troop s treng th  had reached nine thousand
reg u la rs  and s ix  hundred cavalry in  add ition  to  th e  lo ca l u n its  of
Morlacchi and Erim oriani. Moreover, w ith the  appointment o f Leonardo
Foscolo as Erow editor-G eneral of Dalmatia, the  Venetian fo rces  were
u n if ie d  under a determined and a s tu te  commander; fu rther  u n ity  was
accomplished by p lacing th e  naval forces a ttached to  Dalmatia under
Gabriel Zorzi who was, in  tu rn , subordinate to  th e  Erow editor-G eneral.
Much squabbling and u n certa in ty  was thus elim inated by th is  simple 
b5
adm in istrative decision. During th e  remainder o f  the  s trugg le  in  
Dalmatia, every e ffo r t  was made in  Venice to  keep to  a minimum any
H6
d if f i c u l t y  which might r e s u lt  from f r ic t io n  w ith in  th e  m ilita r y  h ierarch y. 
Much o f  th e new s p ir i t  c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f  l6k6, l6 h 7 , and l 6h8  was spon­
tan eou sly  generated by th e  h ig h ly  su c c e s s fu l d efe n siv e  and o ffe n s iv e  
campaigns in i t ia t e d  under F o sco lo 's  b r i l l ia n t  lea d er sh ip . By th e  end 
o f  l6H6 th e Venetian p o lic y  in  Dalmatia had dram atica lly  s h if te d  from 
one b a s ic a lly  d efensive  in  nature t o  one which carried  th e  war t o  th e  
enemy and which sought t o  r e ta in  th e  advantage by fo r c in g  th e  enemy o f f -  
balance.
Beyond sp e c if ic a lly  m ilita ry  problems, th ere  were a lso  serious economic 
and demographic troubles which th reatened  to  weaken Venetian contro l of 
the  province. The population had begun to  decline as a r e s u l t  of the
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t r a g e d ie s  o f  w a r fa re  and t h e  n eed  t o  r e l o c a t e  many o f  t h e  p e a s a n tr y .
An in t e r r u p t io n  i n  th e  sm ooth f lo w  o f  com m ercia l t r a f f i c  in c r e a s e d  th e  
s c a r c i t y  o f  c e r t a in  com m odities and d e p r iv e d  t h e  governm ent o f  d e sp e r ­
a t e l y  n eed ed  custom  r e v e n u e s . In  o rd er  t o  a l i e v a t e  t h i s  f i s c a l  c r i s i s ,  
p u b l i c  good s and s e c t io n s  o f  p u b l ic  la n d s  w ere s o ld  t o  r a i s e  money.
D a is  p o l i c y  a f fo r d e d  im m ediate g a in s  b u t a l s o  d e p le t e d  th e  b a se  f o r  
f u t u r e  governm ent r e v e n u e s . Even in c r e a s in g  th e  money s e n t  t o  th e
47
p r o v in c e  from  V en ice  f a i l e d  t o  narrow  th e  d e f i c i t y  i n  any s i g n i f i c a n t  w ay.
To t h e  g ood  fo r tu n e  o f  V e n ic e , 1646 p ro v ed  t o  b e  a n o th er  y e a r  o f  
r e l a t i v e  q u ie t  i n  D a lm a tia . D uring t h i s  y e a r  m i l i t a r y  p r e p a r a t io n s  con­
t in u e d  w ith o u t  s e r io u s  in te r r u p t io n .  T here w ere  th e  t y p i c a l  sh o r ta g e s  o f  
money and s u p p l i e s ,  b u t g e n e r a l ly  b y  t h e  f a l l  o f  1646 s e v e r a l  o f  th e  
f o r t r e s s e s  i n  D a lm atia  c o u ld  b e  term ed  i n  s a t i s f a c t o r y  c o n d i t io n .  S p a la to  
was i n  n eed  o f  more e x t e n s iv e  bu lw arks and tr e n c h e s  b u t S e b e n ic o , Z ara , 
A lm issa , and Trau seem ed p rep a red  t o  r e p e l  ev en  a  m ajor a s s a u l t .  F u r th e r ­
m ore, th e  h o rsem a n sh ip , co u ra g e , and l o y a l t y  o f  t h e  l o c a l  A lb a n ia n  and  
C ro a tia n  r e c r u i t s  was p r o v in g  a  g r e a te r  m i l i t a r y  a s s e t  th a n  o r i g i n a l l y  had
kS
b een  e x p e c te d .
M il i t a r y  a c t io n  in  1646 was la r g e ly  l i m i t e d  t o  f e i n t s ,  m aneuvers, 
and o c c a s io n a l  s i e g e s .  N ovegrad i changed hands tw ic e  i n  16U6, and b o th  
Z a ra v ecch ia  and S eb e n ic o  w ere  s u c c e s s f u l l y  d e fen d ed  b y  r e in f o r c e d  V e n e tia n  
g a r r is o n s  in  c o n ju n c t io n  w ith  V en etia n  g a l l e y s  w h ich  p r o v id e d  in v a lu a b le  
su p p ort b y  way o f  l o g i s t i c s  and f ir e -p o w e r .  A f te r  a  seco n d  y e a r  o f  
f i g h t i n g  th e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  D alm atia  had h a r d ly  changed; V en ice  rem ain ed  
m a ster  o f  th e  c o a s t a l  r e g io n s ,  th e  r i v e r s ,  and t h e  fo u r  o r  f i v e  m ajor  
c i t i e s  o f  th e  p r o v in c e  w h ile  T urk ish  t r o o p s  co n tin u e d  t o  c o n tr o l  a
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q u a d rila ter a l se c tio n  running from Novegradi and Zemonico in  th e  north
49
to  Scardonia and D em is in  th e  sou th . From t h e ir  r e sp e c tiv e  p o s it io n s  
each s id e  endeavored t o  h arass and p sy c h o lo g ic a lly  unnerve as much as  
p o s s ib le .th e  op p osition . The war would have to  w ait another year before  
th e  aggressive  gen eralsh ip  o f  F osco lo  brought to  an end t h i s  u n o f f ic ia l  
sta lem ate.
For th e  next two years th e  Dalmatian campaigns under Leonardo
F oscolo  assumed an e n t ir e ly  new appearance. During t h i s  r e la t iv e ly
short p eriod  F osco lo ’s  armies managed t o  exp el th e  Turks from N ovegradi,
Zemonico, C lissa , Scardona, Vrana, D e m is , and Chnin. In l e s s  than two
y ears not a s in g le  fo r tr e s s  w ith in  a d istance  o f  tw enty to  t h ir t y  m iles
d ista n c e  from th e  coast remained in  th e  hands o f  Turkish fo r c e s .
Favored by a r e la t iv e ly  harsh  w inter in  Dalmatia which hindered
th e  sw ift  movement o f  Turkish su p p lie s  overland, General F osco lo  moved
e a r ly  in  161*7 toward Novegradi where he hoped to  tak e t h i s  fo r tr e s s  from
th e  enemy. U t il iz in g  Venetian naval su p e r io r ity  w ith  considerab le
e x p e r tise , Foscolo  had an army o f  th ree  thousand, in fa n try  and one
hundred cavalry transported  t o  th e  w a lls  o f  Novegradi w ith  r e la t iv e  ease
and speed; sim ultaneously another Venetian fo r ce  l e f t  Zara and tr a v e le d
by land  to  th e  an cien t Turkish fo r tr e s s  o f  Zemonico. Zemonico surrendered
on th e  19th o f  March and Novegradi on th e  3 1 s t . This s k i l l f u l ly  executed
p in cer  prevented th e  Turkish commander from s h if t in g  h is  fo r c e s  t o  h elp
n e u tr a liz e  th e Venetian a tta ck . The se izu re  o f  th e se  two fo r tr e s s e s
reversed  th e  Turkish momentum o f  161*5-1*6 and se r io u s ly  endangered and
50
weakened th e  enemy p o s it io n  in  th e  north . Two oth er su bsid iary  Turkish  
fo r tr e s s e s ,  Vrana and Nadin, were captured by F o sc o lo 's  v ic to r io u s  armies
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maWng com plete th e  R epu blic's v ic to r y  in  th e  north; by A p ril enemy
l in e s  o f  communication to  th e  northernmost areas had been t o t a l l y  d is -  
51
r u p te d .
These su ccesses  encouraged F osco lo  to  d ir e c t  h is  a tte n tio n  to  
th e  south and th e  T urkish-held  fo r tr e s s e s  o f  Scardona and D erais along  
th e  Canal o f  Sebenico. The subsequent a tta ck  on Scardona brought immed­
ia t e  triumph and w ith in  a few days th e  fo r tr e s s  was once more a Venetian  
52
p o sse ss io n . Only Dernis and C lis sa , t o  th e  southeast and southw est 
r e s p e c itv e ly ,  were s t i l l  Turkish. The Turkish fo r ces  now concentrated  
in  th e  south w ere, however, t o  be respected  end a ser io u s counterattack  
came a g a in st Sebenico. In a tta ck in g  Sebenico th e  Turkish commanders 
undertook a d i f f i c u l t  ta sk  but one which, i f  su c c e s s fu l, would have 
ruptured Venetian communications from th e  co a st a l l  th e  way to  Scardona.
Loss o f  Sebenico would have e n ta ile d  lo s s  o f  con tro l o f  th e  Canal o f  
Sebenico and would have denied V enetian g a lle y s  a cc ess  t o  th e  in te r io r  
by way o f  th a t same canal. In a d d itio n , th e  apparently e x c e lle n t  defen­
s iv e  p o s it io n  o f  Sebenico tended to  encourage in  Foscolo  and other
53
Venetian gen erals a sense o f  complacency and overconfidence.
The a n tic ip a ted  a tta ck  was expected  t o  come from th e  e a s t ,  where 
th e  Turks s t i l l  h e ld  th e  fo r tr e s s e s  o f  Dernis and Chnin (Khin) and through  
which a constant supply o f  goods and reinforcem ents might be m aintained.
As fo r  preparing th e  fo r tr e s s  and i t s  d e fe n se s , m atters had com pletely  
changed s in c e  16^5 ; triumphant in  th e  north and having a t h is  command 
an army considerably la rg e r  than th a t which had been garrisoned in  the  
province two years p r io r , F oscolo  was now ab le  to  s h if t  by sea many o f  
th e  troops s ta tio n ed  in  th e north. In t h is  fash ion  nearly 3>500
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in fa n try  and cavalry were amassed a t  Sebenico by August o f  I 6U7 .
In  th e  event th a t th is  garrison  should prove in s u f f ic ie n t ,  even more
reinforcem ents could be transported  t o  Sebenico by th e  g a lle y s  and navi
55
o f  th e  B epub lic.
Tensions mounted as money ran short and the fe a r  o f  an imminent
Turkish a ttack  increased . U n its o f  ’ oltrem ontani’ and French troops
r e b e lle d  in  August w h ile d isse n s io n  between th e  Venetian and papal 
56
commanders endangered morale. The a s sa u lt  f in a l ly  came in  August, 
and d esp ite  previous prep aration s, th e  a tta ck  proved d i f f i c u l t  to  r e ­
p u lse . Turkish trenches approached th e  w a lls  o f th e  fo r tr e s s  and 
Turkish b a tte r ie s  b attered  i t s  w a lls . As se c tio n s  o f  th e  ou ter d efen sive  
perim eter were being breached, a d d itio n a l Turkish reinforcem ents arr ived  
from th e e a s t . The s itu a t io n  seemed grim u n t i l  F oscolo managed to  
assem ble reinforcem ents h im g p lf  and have them transported  a long the  
co a sts  o f th e  A d ria tic  and disembarked a t  Sebenico. This a b i l i t y  to  
s h i f t  fo rces  from one p o in t to  another w ithout expense o f  delay  once 
again  brought v ic to r y  and, in  t h is  case ,saved  Sebenico.
The a r r iv a l o f a d d itio n a l Venetian u n its  forced  th e  enemy t o  l i f t  
th e  s ie g e  of Sebenico and f l e e  eastward in  th e  d ir e c tio n  o f  Dernis and 
Chnin. These re tre a tin g  Turkish troops were harassed fo r  th e  next two 
months by M orlacchi, Albanian, and Croatian cavalry , who destroyed  sev ­
e r a l outposts and pursued th e  enemy to  th e perim eters o f  Dernis and 
Chnin. Although n early  6 ,000  Turkish troops were h a s t i ly  assembled 
a t th ese  two eastern  strongh o lds,th ey  were apparently exhausted and
demoralized; a Venetian a ttack  came in  February o f  16U8  and both Dernis
57
and Chnin f e l l  a short tim e la t e r .  R etention o f  Chnin would have
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been o f  u se  t o  th e  Venetian armies in  b e tte r  p ro te c tin g  th e  n a tiv e
M olacchi tribesm en o f  th a t area , but i t s  v u ln e r a b ility  to  Turkish
58
a tta ck  and i t s  d ista n ce  from Sebenico le d  t o  i t s  d em olition .
By th e  spring o f  1618 th er e  remained o n ly  one fo r tr e s s  o f  any major
importance which remained co n tr o lle d  by th e  Turkish arm ies. Important
because o f  i t s  proxim ity to  th e  co a st and t o  th e  commercial town o f
S palato , th e  fo r tr e s s  o f C lissa  now found i t s e l f  an is o la te d  Turkish
outpost along th e  Venetian dominated co a st . The Turkish garrison  th ere
was r e la t iv e ly  sm all, numbering on ly  about 170 men, but because C lissa
was lo ca te d  on top  o f  a steep  mountain to p  i t  was considered  by nearly
59
a l l  m ilita r y  exp erts o f  th e  day to  be 'in v u ln e ra b le ’ . The Venetians
began th e ir  s ie g e  o f  t h is  'in v u ln era b le’ c ita d e l  on th e  l 6th  o f  March,
and d esp ite  th e  sm all Turkish ga rr iso n , i t  requ ired  over two weeks to
bring  about i t s  surrender. Even th en , i t  could  have taken longer  had
not harsh weather and th e  d i f f i c u l t  p o s it io n  o f  th e  fo r tr e s s  prevented
Turkish r e l i e f  columns from reaching th e  defenders. One bloody tragedy
marred t h is  l a s t  great Venetian v ic to r y  in  Dalmatia. The tr o u b le  came
when many o f  th e  Morlacchi and F o lis sa n i tribesm en who had taken p art
in  th e  s ie g e  broke out in to  an h y s te r ic a l d isp la y  o f  b r u ta lity  and
cr u e lty  ag a in st th e  survivors o f  th e  Turkish g a rr iso n . The b it te r n e s s
generated  by th re e  years o f  warfare w ith  th e  Turks erupted in to  an
u n con tro llab le  massacre o f  many h ap less  v ic tim s who came in to  th e  way
o f  th e  v ic to r s .  Regardless o f  attem pts t o  end th e  carnage, th ey  continued
t o  ra v ish  and murder w ith  concern n eith er  "for se x , nor fo r  a g e . . .(T urks)
seme in  order t o  escape such a fury  threw th em selves from th e  windows 
60
and from th e  w a l ls ."
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Because C lissa  had been considered  invu lnerab le even by th e  Turks,
th e  booty and p ro v is io n s found th er e  were con siderab le , e s p e c ia l ly  in  
6l
terms o f  money, muskets, and a r t i l l e r y .  In terms o f  m orale and p res­
t ig e  th e  capture o f  th e  ’ invu lnerab le' C lissa  a lso  proved a worthy 
clim ax t o  F o sco lo 's  b r i l l i a n t  and triumphant campaigning in  Dalmatia.
Whether or not t o  r e ta in  and r e f o r t i f y  t h is  fo r tr e s s  was a  q uestion  
subm itted to  th e  Senate in  V enice. Although some advocates o f  i t s  des­
tr u c tio n  argued th a t C lissa  was to o  c o s t ly  and to o  d i f f i c u l t  t o  m aintain,
i t  was decided th a t th e  c i t i d e l  should be garrisoned  and added t o  th e
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growing arsenal o f  Venetian fo r tr e s s e s  in  Dalmatia. By summer o f  1648 
th a t arsena l  was w ithout question  im pressive and com plete, incorporating  
a m ilita r y  empire s tr e tc h in g  from C lissa  and Spalato in  th e  south t o  
Zara and Novegradi in  th e  north .
Hie f a l l  o f  C lissa  s ig n a led  th e  end o f t h i s  Dalmatian ep iso d e .
With not a s in g le  fo r tr e s s  w ith in  fo r ty  or f i f t y  m iles  o f  th e  co a st  
in  Turkish hands, th e  Senate could r e s t  assured  th a t th e  Dalmatian 
empire had been s a fe ly  secured . Deprived even o f  b a stio n s  such as  
Zemonico and D e m is , which were Turkish long b efore 1645, i t  would be 
considerably more d i f f i c u l t  fo r  th e  armies o f  th e  Sultan  t o  mount a  mas­
s iv e  drive in to  t h is  a r id  and mountainous te r r a in . And d e sp ite  minor 
reverses  such as th e  Turkish recapture o f  Chnin, t h is  Dalmatian empire 
would remain firm ly  co n tr o lle d  by th e  Venetians even to  th e  c lo s e  o f  th e
63
war. With i t s  newly organized army and th e  d e c is iv e  and unquestioned  
lead ersh ip  provided by F o sco lo ,th e  Venetian Republic had swept th e  enemy 
from th e f i e l d  and had scored  a triumph perhaps unequalled  in  th e
64
en tir e  war.
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I n  r e t r o s p e c t  i t  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  e a s y  t o  u n d ersta n d  t h e  f a c t o r s  
u n d e r ly in g  t h e  V e n e tia n  v i c t o r i e s  i n  D a lm a tia . B e s id e s  t h e  dynam ic 
g e n e r a ls h ip  o f  F o s c o lo  and h i s  a s s i s t a n t s ,  t h e  p r in c ip a l  ca u se  o f  th e  
v i c t o r i e s  w as t h e  V e n e tia n  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  s e a .  T h is  s u p e r io r i t y  p r o v id e d  
t h e  V e n e tia n  a rm ies w ith  a  f l e x i b i l i t y  n o t  en jo y e d  b y  t h e i r  a d v e r sa r y .
I t  a l s o  p r o v id e d  in v a lu a b le  f ir e p o w e r ,  f o r  t h e  g a l l e y s  w ere  f r e q u e n t ly  
a b le  t o  su p p o r t t h e  in f a n t r y  b y  r a k in g  enemy p o s i t i o n s  w ith  t h e i r  m us-
65
k e t s  and cannon. In  a d d i t io n ,  t h e  r e a d y  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  n a t iv e  D a l­
m a tia n  r e c r u i t s  e n a b le d  V e n e tia n  commanders t o  r e p le n is h  t h e i r  d e p le t e d  
c a v a lr y  and in f a n t r y  ran k s w ith  co m p a ra tiv e  e a s e .  M oreover, t h e s e  
f i e r c e  n a t iv e  tr ib e sm e n  b rou gh t t o  th e  cam paigns an  unm atched h a tr e d  
f o r  th e  T u rk s. I t  w as n o t  uncommon f o r  t h e s e  M o r la cch i and A lb a n ia n  
r e c r u i t s  t o  c e l e b r a t e  t h e i r  v i c t o r i e s  b y  d a n c in g  "on t h e  rem ain s o f  
th e  T u rk s, th ro w in g  i n t o  t h e  a i r  v a r io u s  l im b s . . . a n d  c u t t in g  up  
o t h e r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h e i r  h ea d s w h ich  t h e y  c a r r y  i n  trium ph on t h e i r
56
sw o rd s " But p erh ap s e q u a l i n  im p o rta n ce  t o  th e  s k i l l  and c o u r ­
a g e  o f  t h e  V e n e tia n  a rm ies w ere th e  d is a d v a n ta g e s  w ith  w hich  t h e  T u rk ish  
f o r c e s  had  t o  s t r u g g le .  N ot o n ly  d id  t h e  D alm atian  o p e r a t io n  r e c e iv e  
seco n d a ry  c o n s id e r a t io n  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  demands o f  C andia , b u t  t h e  
t r a n s p o r t a t io n  o f  s u p p l ie s  and m u n it io n s  i n t o  t h i s  m ountainous and b a rren  
r e g io n  b y  t h e  Ottoman arm ies r e q u ir e d  a lm o s t  superhuman e f f o r t .  One 
c a s e ,  f o r  exam p le , in v o lv e d  t h e  sh ipm ent o f  one la r g e  a r t i l l e r y  p i e c e  
from  B e lg r a d e  t o  t h e  D alm atian  c o a s t ;  t o  move t h i s  s i n g l e  cannon a c r o s s
th e  m ou n ta in s, t h e  u s e  o f  n e a r ly  s i x t y  b u f f a lo e s  and f o r t y  oxen  was 
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n e c e s s a r y .  Such l o g i s t i c a l  p rob lem s o b v io u s ly  l im i t e d  t h e  number o f  
a r t i l l e r y  p i e c e s  w hich  c o u ld  b e  u se d  i n  D alm atia  and a l s o  hampered
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m ilita r y  maneuvers because o f  th e  interm inable d elays in vo lved .
Without th e  advantage o f  naval support, Turkish maneuvers became 
cumbrous and in f le x ib le .
As we have noted , Dalmatia was g en er a lly  considered  p erip heral 
t o  th e  concerns o f  Candia. During th e  th re e-y e a r p eriod  from l6h5  
to  l 6h8 ,  p r io r i t ie s  sh if te d  somewhat) e s p e c ia l ly  as th e  campaigns in  
th i s  reg ion  began t o  assume th e  sta tu r e  o f  something greater than  
mere d iv e rs io n s . For th ese  few b r ie f  years th e  war in  Dalmatia in  
terms o f  men and m ateria l developed in to  a ser io u s  m ilita r y  c o n te st .
The proxim ity o f  th e  Dalmatian empire t o  th e  Venetian mainland demanded 
th a t t h is  reg ion  be kept fr e e  from Turkish in f lu e n c e . The v ic t o r ie s  o f  
F o sco lo ’ s armies insured  th a t t h i s  would indeed  be th e  ca se . Further­
more, th ey  sim ultaneously served  t o  b righ ten  th o se  f i r s t  few y e a r s ,  
which otherw ise would have proved so d ism al. Although th e  m ilita r y  
h is to r y  o f  th e  province ended e s s e n t ia l ly  w ith  th e  f a l l  o f  C lis sa , th e  
g lo ry  o f  Dalmatia would p rovide a l l  Venetians w ith  a memory whose 
aura would l a s t  long a fte r  th e  campaign o f  l 6h8  had concluded.
I l l
Winning th e  war in  Dalmatia was one t h i n g ,  e x p e ll in g  th e  Turks 
from Candia s t i l l  another. The v ic to r y  in  Dalmatia belonged alm ost 
t o t a l l y  to  V enice, but i t  seemed th a t b efore Candia could be freed  
th e  C h ristian  powers o f  Europe would f i r s t  have t o  become involved .
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Although Europe's concern continued t o  cen ter  on th e  f r a t r ic id a l  
madness o f  th e  Thirty Years War, th er e  seemed hope th a t peace would 
once again  f in d  Christendom u n ite d  a g a in st th e  ch a llen ges o f  th e  in ­
f i d e l .  D espite th e  p au c ity  o f  th e  i n i t i a l  co n tr ib u tio n s, many in  
V eniee continued to  hope fo r  m assive a s s is ta n c e  more in  conform ity  
w ith  th e  great w ealth and power o f  France and Spain.
The decade o f  the l61*0's was a tim e during which th e  fr ie n d sh ip  
o f  France and Venice seemed more t han ever t o  o ffe r  prom ise. As 
th e  hegemony o f  Europe continued to  s h i f t  to  th e  Bourbons o f  France, 
th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  and th e  hope th a t V enice might b e n e fit  frcm t h i s  r i s e  
in  French power a lso  increased . To many th e  defense o f  Candia would 
have seemed a sim ple m atter had th e  Republic enjoyed th e  unreserved  
support o f  so great a power a s  France. But French support was r e ­
served and French a ss is ta n c e  slow  in  coming. She French m in is ters  
inc lud ing  Mazarin were com pletely aware o f  th e  desperate s itu a t io n
fa c in g  V enice, but s t i l l  th e ir  r e p l ie s  concerning fu tu re  a id  were
68
" cu s to m a r ily  am biguous, and r e s t r a i n e d . . . . ” D e s p ite  th e  g r a d u a l  
e c l i p s e  o f  S p a in , t h e  demands o f  war in  F ran ce  w ere s t i l l  t o o  p r e s s ­
in g  t o  a l lo w  F rench  m in is t e r s  t o  co n te m p la te  s e v e r in g  t i e s  w i th  
C o n sta n t in o p le . A lth ou gh  th e r e  w as a  f a c t i o n  w ith in  th e  governm ent  
w hich  a d v o ca ted  more d i r e c t  in v o lv em en t i n  t h e  Candian w ar, t h e  m ajor­
i t y  o p in io n  u rg ed  c a u t io n  and r e s t r a i n t .  The governm ent o f  F ran ce  
c o n tin u e d  t o  h on or i n  form  i t s  e x i s t i n g  t r e a t i e s  w ith  th e  P o r te  and
69
a g reed  t o  a s s i s t  V en ice  and P o lan d  o n ly  i n  an u n o f f i c i a l  m anner.
Even th e  a s s i s t a n c e  w hich  was o f f e r e d  seem ed t o  in v o lv e  on e  
prob lem  o r  a n o th e r . For exam ple, th e  F rench  s h ip s  p la c e d  a t  th e
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se r v ic e  o f  Venice in  th e  summer o f  l 6h6  had t o  be r e c a lle d  in  th e
f a l l  b e c a u se  th e y  h a d  b een  h ir e d  f o r  o n ly  s i x  m onths; p l e a s  by N ani
70
in  P aris t o  r e ta in  th e  se r v ic e s  o f  th ese  v e s s e ls  vas t o  no a v a i l .
In  a d d itio n , many o f  th e  l e v i e s  re cr u ite d  on French s o i l  proved l e s s  
71
than r e l ia b le .  Nani and th e  Senate would have p referred  in stea d  
d ir e c t  lo a n s or grants o f  money which could then  have been used  
w ithout such com plication s. But when s p e c i f ic  grants were prom ised, 
even th o se  encountered d i f f i c u l t i e s .  One case  involved  a loan  o f  
200,000 scud i au thorized  by Mazarin. The money was au thorized , how­
ev er , in  th e  form o f  l e v i e s  on fu tu re  revenues s in c e  th er e  were not 
s u f f ic ie n t  funds then  in  th e  s ta t e  tr ea su ry . This meant th a t no funds 
would be d isbursed  u n t i l  th ey  were c o lle c te d  sometime in  th e  fu tu re  
or u n t i l  someone purchased in  advance ownership o f  th e  s p e c if ie d  
revenues. Nani observed how th e  French trea su ry  was ’’indebted  t o  th e  
e x tr e m e ...."  and how th e  government spent in  l6k7 th e  revenues in ­
tended fo r  16U8. The so lven cy o f  th e  crown was so in  doubt th a t o n ly
s p e c if ic  c o l la te r a l  and th e  word o f  th e  k ing would s u f f ic e  t o  encour-
72
age in d iv id u a ls  t o  loan  th e  government money.
In tim ate ly  connected w ith  th e  a b i l i t y  o f  France t o  len d  a s s i s ­
tance t o  Venice was th e  q uestion  o f  th e  war raging in  Europe. The 
defeated  cond ition  o f  Spain and th e  weakening p o s it io n  o f  th e  Bnperor 
encouraged many t o  look  fo r  a rapid  settlem en t o f  th e  T h irty  Years War.
I t  vas hoped th a t France and th e  Bspire might be ab le t o  n e g o tia te  a 
separate peace agreement. I f  such an arrangment could come about, then  
France would be fr e e  t o  fo r ce  a tr e a ty  on Spain thus ending th e  war 
in  Europe. Even i f  war continued between France and Spain, peace in
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Germany w ou ld  r e l i e v e  t h e  F ren ch  t r e a s u r y  o f  a  m ajor burden and w ou ld
73
p e r m it  M azarin  t o  r e l e a s e  more money f o r  u s e  a t  C andia. But t h e
h o p es o f  V en ice  and o f  N a n i, i n  p a r t i c u la r ,  f o r  a  r a p id  s e t t le m e n t  o f
th e  war i n  Europe w ere w ith o u t  su b s ta n c e  and r e a l i t y .  N ani a d m itte d
t o  t h e  S ig n o r ia  i n  November o f  l6 h 6  t h a t  F ra n ce  w ould  o n ly  f o l lo w
t h e  p e a c e  o f f e r s  made b y  o th e r s  b u t w ou ld  i n i t i a t e  none o f  h e r  own.
A lth ou gh  ev ery o n e  spoke c o n f id e n t ly  o f  p e a c e ,  h e  n o te d  b i t t e r l y ,  " in
th e  c a b in e t  among t h e  more t r u s t e d  one sp e a k s  o f  arm s, and o f  th e  
7*f
fu t u r e  cam paign i n  I t a l y . . . . "  The q u e s t io n  o f  p ea ce  w ould  h a v e  t o
w a it .  F ran ce  w ould  c o n tin u e  t o  p reo ccu p y  h e r s e l f  w ith  European m a tte r s
and t h e  co n cern s o f  h e r  own R e a lp o l i t ik .  No p e a c e  w ould  b e  made w ith
th e  Bnperor u n t i l  16U8 and none w ith  S p a in  u n t i l  e le v e n  y e a r s  a f t e r
th a t , i n  1659- W ith in c r e a s e d  t e n s io n  i n  I t a l y ,  th e  in te r m in a b le
war w ith  S p a in , a  f i s c a l  c r i s i s  i n  t h e  t r e a s u r y ,  and th r e a te n e d  c i v i l
u p h ea v a l a t  home, F rench  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  th e  V e n e tia n  r e p u b l ic  w ou ld
75
n e c e s s a r i ly  b e  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  few  c o n c e s s io n s  and many k in d  w ords.
A t M adrid V e n e tia n  d ip lo m a ts  l ik e w is e  m et w ith  c o n t in u a l  v a c i l ­
l a t i o n  and v a g u e n e ss . The f i s c a l  c r i s i s  i n  S p a in  was e v e r y  b i t  a s  
d e sp e r a te  a s  t h a t  m et w ith  in  F ra n ce . "These m in is t e r s ,"  w ro te  t h e  
V e n e tia n  am bassador G iu s t in ia n  from  M adrid , "have e x p r e s se d  i t  t o  b e  
a b s o lu t e ly  im p o s s ib le  t o  do m ore. S p a in  i s  s o  ex h a u sted  o f  e v e r y th in g  
t h a t  i t  can n o t su p p ly  i t s  own e s s e n t i a l s .  The p r e s id e n t  o f  th e  C o u n c il
o f  th e  I n d ie s  and th o s e  o f  th e  ag en cy  f o r  t h e  p r o v is io n  o f  money m eet  
76
w ith  in s u p e r a b le  d i f f i c u l t i e s . "  Rumors co n cern in g  S p an ish  money 
b e in g  s e n t  t o  P oland  i n  ord er  t o  i n s t i g a t e  a  'P o l i s h  d iv e r s io n '  
p roved  u nfounded . A l l  t h e  im p ortan t m in is t e r s  spoke o n ly  in  v e r y
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gen eral terms and th e  c h ie f  m in ister  o f  s t a t e ,  Don L uigi d 'A ros, r e ­
minded G uistin ian  th a t th e  f i s c a l  c r i s i s  was so pervasive th a t the
Spanish armada i t s e l f  "remained im m obilized .. . s o l e ly  fo r  th e  la ck  o f  
77
money.” Furthermore, everyth ing seemed to  bog down in  en d less de­
la y s  a t  th e  Spanish court; "at tim es I  lo s e  p a t ie n c e ,” G uistin ian  w rote,
78
"for I  am not a b le  t o  stomach th e  tedium o f th e se  d ela y s."  The only  
a ss is ta n c e  forthcom ing from Spain was in  th e  form o f concessions to  
r a is e  r e c r u its  and t o  con tract th e manufacture o f  b is c u i t s  and other
79
war m a ter ie l.
So im poverished was th e  Spanish crown th a t  by 161+9 th e  Queen o f
Spain was forced  t o  d elay  her journey from H ilan  due t o  th e  sim ple 
80
la c k  o f  s u f f ic ie n t  funds fo r  tr a v e l .  O ccasion ally  th e  treasu ry
would be boosted  by th e  a r r iv a l o f  th e  f l o t t a  from th e New World
and th e  quinto o f  s i lv e r  which i t  carried  t o  th e  k in g , but alm ost
81
in v a r ia b ly  t h is  r o y a l ' f i f t h '  had a lready been spent in  advance.
I t  was understandable then  th a t a l l  Venetian requ ests to  have th e
Spanish armada sen t to  Candia were p o l i t e ly  re fu sed ; G u is tin ia n 's
argument th a t th e  Spanish sh ip s could s a fe ly  be sen t i n  l a t e  summer
or ea r ly  f a l l  a f t e r  th e ir  campaigns in  Europe,were eq u a lly  d ism issed  
82
by th e crown. Even when peace came to  th e  Qnpire in  161+8, i t  was 
im perative th a t Spain so lv e  f i r s t  her own problems b efore becoming 
entangled  w ith  a war a ga in st th e  S ultan . And i f  an agreement could  
be reached between Spain and France th e  Spanish sim ila rly  would have 
to  turn t h e ir  a tte n tio n  toward th e  u p r is in g  in  Portugal.
S ince l i t t l e  p o s it iv e  a s s is ta n c e  could be reasonably expected  
from Madrid, th e  paramount o b jec tiv e  o f  Venetian diplom ats to  the
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court o f  Spain remained e s s e n t ia l ly  n e g a tiv e . What Venetian repre­
se n ta t iv e s  in  Spain hoped above a l l  t o  prevent was th e  s ig n in g  o f  any 
agreement between Madrid and C onstantinople which might prove d is ­
advantageous- t o  th e  in t e r e s t s  o f  th e  B epublic and th e  p rogress o f  
th e  war. Venice was aware o f  th e  fr ie n d ly  r e la t io n s  which th e  Spanish  
nourished w ith  th e  Turks, but in  l 6h8  sev e ra l events occurred which 
generated  even g reater  fe a r s , one o f  th e se  'in c id e n ts ' concerned th e  
p roposal o f  c e r ta in  Spanish m in isters  t o  extend t o  Turkish sh ip s th e  
p r iv i le g e  o f  trad in g  and anchoring a t th e  p o rts  o f  Messina and N ap les. 
F earing th a t Venice would soon s ig n  a peace agreement w ith  th e  S ultan , 
sev e ra l 'p r in c ip a l m in is te r s ' f e l t  i t  w iser  fo r  th e  s a fe ty  o f  S pain 's  
I ta l ia n  p o sse ss io n s  t o  make such fr ie n d ly  g estu r es  to  Turkish commer­
c i a l  t r a f f i c ;  because o f  th e  k in g 's  r e l ig io u s  in t e g r it y  and ' z e a l ' ,
8h
however, th e  m atter was l e f t  u nresolved  and thus tem porarily  suspended.
Another 'shock' was caused on ly  one year la te r , in  16^9,when 
th er e  was sen t from Constantinople to  Madrid a c e r ta in  Acmet Aga 
who carried  w ith  him warm w ishes from th e  Sultan and sev e ra l ser io u s  
p rop osals. B esides proposing th e  m arriage o f  Don Juan o f  A u str ia  to  
a Turkish p r in c e ss , Acmet suggested  th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t a  jo in t  oper­
a tio n  o f  Turkish and Spanish fo r c e s  might be undertaken a g a in st th e  
I ta l ia n  t e r r i t o r ie s  o f  V enice. The p lan  was supposed to  in v o lv e  
amassing a s iz a b le  Turkish armada in  th e  A d r ia tic  w h ile Spanish troops  
launched an a tta ck  from M ilan. Nothing developed from t h is  su g g estio n , 
but contem plation o f i t s  im p lica tio n s fo r  th e  sa fe ty  o f  th e  Venetian  
Terraferma must have busied  many members o f  th e  Senate. Moreover, 
th e  warm welcome accorded Acmet on h is  a r r iv a l a t  Madrid,and th e  
a r r iv a l o f  a  sp e c ia l  Spanish em issary la t e r  in  C onstantinople must
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h ave  b e e n  c o n s id e r e d  b y  many V e n e tia n s  a s  f a r  beyond t h e  r e q u ir e -
85
m ents o f  d ip lo m a t ic  c o u r te s y .
As fa r  a s  r e s o lv in g  t h e  war b y  means o f  d i r e c t  d ip lo m a t ic
n e g o t ia t io n s  w ith  C o n s ta n t in o p le , t h e r e  w ere  few  s ig n s  t h a t  o f f e r e d
any r e a so n  a b o u t w hich  t o  b e  o p t im is t i c .  M ost o f  t h e  r e p o r t s  from
C o n sta n tin o p le  w ere  s im i la r  t o  t h a t  s e n t  b y  b a i l o  Soranzo i n  t h e
sp r in g  o f  l6h6 i n  w hich  h e  warned t h e  S e n a te  t h a t  t h e r e  was l i t t l e
chance f o r  p e a c e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  s in c e  th e  S u lta n  and h i s  m in is t e r s  w ere
86
s o  s w o lle n  w ith  p r id e  and c o n c e i t  o v e r  t h e i r  c o n t in u a l  v i c t o r i e s .
The French  m in is t e r  l ik e w is e  con firm ed  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  S u lta n  and
h i s  m in is t e r s  w ere i n  no way i n t e r e s t e d  i n  d is c u s s in g  th e  q u e s t io n  
87
o f  p e a c e .  G r i l l o ,  t h e  V e n e tia n  dragoman a t  C o n s ta n t in o p le ,
w arned Soranzo t h a t  i t  w ou ld  p ro b a b ly  b e  im p o s s ib le  t o  b e g in  p e a c e
n e g o t ia t io n s  a s  lo n g  a s  V en ice  i n s i s t e d  on  t h e  r e s t i t u t i o n  o f  Canea.
I n  a  c o n v e r s a t io n  w ith  G r i l l o ,  th e  Grand V iz ie r  had  ev en  demanded
th e  im m ediate c e s s io n  o f  th e  e n t i r e  kingdom and a s  w e l l  t h e  payment
o f  t r ib u t e !  Such was t h e  in tr a n s ig e n c e  w h ich  V e n e tia n  d ip lo m a t ic  
88
e f f o r t s  en co u n tered  a t  C o n s ta n tin o p le .
Beyond h i s  im m ediate  c a p a c ity  a s  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t iv e  o f  V e n ic e ,
Soranzo a l s o  t r i e d  t o  k eep  in form ed  o f  th e  d ip lo m a t ic  s i t u a t i o n  in  
th e  E a st e s p e c i a l l y  c o n cern in g  T u rk ish  r e l a t i o n s  w ith  P o lan d  and t h e  
Em pire. O c c a s io n a lly  i t  seem ed a s  i f  th e r e  was a  r e a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  
th a t  P oland  o r  M uscovy m igh t d e c la r e  war on t h e  e a s te r n  f r o n t i e r ,  b u t  
th e  S u lta n  rem ain ed  in t e n t  on p r e s e r v in g  t h e  f r ie n d s h ip  o f  t h e  P o le s  
and th e  T a r ta r s . I t  seem ed even  l e s s  l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  C ossack s u nder  
Bogdan K hm eln itsky  w ould  b reak  w ith  th e  S u lta n  s in c e  th e  C ossack
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lea d er  planned t o  sever  com pletely h is  r e la t io n s  w ith  Poland. -
Soranzo had l e s s  reason  t o  be concerned w ith  th e  a f f a ir s  o f
Poland than he d id  w ith  th e  n eg o tia tio n s  which had been undertaken
between Constantinople and th e  Holy Roman Emperor. Reason fo r  h is
concern la y  w ith  th e  tr a d it io n a l tr ib u te  which th e  Emperor paid
annually t o  th e  Sultan in  return  fo r  Suzerainty over th e  lands o f
Hungary. The n eg o tia tio n s  underway were in  connection  w ith  th e  S u lta n 's
demand th a t h is  tr ib u te  be increased . S ince th e  wars in  Europe had
drained  th e  Superior1 s  tr ea su ry , i t  was rumored th a t th e  Sultan  had
offe r e d  to  modify h is  demands fo r  increased  tr ib u te  in  retu rn  fo r
im peria l perm ission  fo r  Turkish troops to  pass through Hungary and
th e  Duchy o f  C am iola . I f  Turkish troops were perm itted  t o  pass through
th e se  a re a s , a l l  V enetian te r r it o r y  in  th e  I s tr ia n  pen in su la  and in  th e
Terraferma north o f  th e  Piave might be subjected  to  th e  ravages o f
w arfare. Although i t  was unthinkable fo r  th e  German finperor to
sig n  such a p act w ith  th e  S ultan , th ere  was reason fo r  concern, as
lo n g  as th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  e x is te d . Ho one on th e  Terraferma wanted a
r e la t iv e ly  ' comfortable* c o lo n ia l  war turned in to  a str u g g le  fo r  l i f e
and death. The Emperor h im se lf made very  attempt to  avoid  such an
agreement, b u t, as Soranzo ominously warned, th er e  were s t i l l  th o se  a t
court who "would have embraced th e  p r o p o s it io n .. . . "  F ortun ately ,
Soranzo observed, th e  German n o b i l i t y  remained u n a lterab ly  opposed to  
90
th e  d esigns o f  th e  Moslem in f id e l .
Throughout th e  l a t e  l6 h 0 's  Venice a ls o  continued to  importune th e  
la rg e r  I ta l ia n  s ta t e s  fo r  a s s is ta n c e  in  th e  war. Although th e  Papacy
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represented  th e  most important o f  th e se  s t a t e s ,  Innocent X had h is
own problems. The pro-Spanish posture o f  Innocent and th e  f r ic t io n s
r e s u lt in g  frcm th e  d isp u te  w ith  France over th e  m achinations o f  th e
91
B arberin is ca st an ominous Bourbon shadow over Rome. Hie Pope was 
consequently h e s ita n t t o  p art w ith  h is  f l e e t  and h is  treasu ry  in  th e  
in t e r e s t s  o f  a  d is ta n t war in  th e  Levant. In a d d itio n  t o  th e  dangers 
posed by French r e s t le s s n e s s ,  th e  p o n t if f  found h im self fu rth e r  con­
s tr a in ed  by th e  d ep le ted  con d ition  o f  h is  treasu ry; Innocent inher­
i t e d  not on ly  th e  debts o f  th e  am bitious Urban V III but acquired some 
o f  h is  own in  th e  se izu re  o f  Castro and th e  r e v o lt  o f  M asaniello in  
Naples in  th e  l a t e  l61*0’ s .
Venice f e l t  d isp lea sed  w ith  th e  performance o f  the Pope and esp e­
c ia l l y  w ith  th e  f a i lu r e  o f  th e  p o n t if ic a l  g a lle y s  t o  appear a t  Candia 
during th re e  o f  th e  f i r s t  s i x  years o f  th e  w ar.*  Many Venetians 
undoubtedly argued th a t th e  few papal g a l le y s  would be o f  no u se in  
preventing a French invasion  o f  th e  p en in su la  but could serve a
worthy purpose by jo in in g  th e  other a u x il ia r y  u n it s  in  th e  waters o f  
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Candia. To fu rther  com plicate m atters, th ere  were re sid u es o f  
d is tr u s t  connected w ith  such questions a s  e c c l e s ia s t i c a l  patronage, 
le g a l  ju r is d ic t io n , and censorship  which tended to  exacerbate Papal- 
Venetian r e la t io n s .  This re s id u a l antagonism was rooted  in  many de­
cades o f  mutual an tipathy and m isunderstanding. The papal nuncio in  
Venice during th e  war, Archbishop S cip io  Pannochieschi, p o in ted  out 
sev e ra l areas in  which th e  Venetian s ta t e  had encroached on th e
*The p o n t if ic a l  f l e e t  remained in  I ta l ia n  w aters in  l 6U6  and 161*9 as a 
r e s u lt  o f  th e  French th rea t to  th e  p en insu la; in  1650 i t  again  f a i le d  
to  jo in  th e  a u x il ia r ie s  in  order to  p r o te c t the C hristian  p ilgr im s  
tr a v e lin g  t o  Rome fo r  th e  J u b ilee .
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p rero g a tiv es  o f  H is H o lin ess . Undoubtedly th er e  were many a t  Rome who
shared t h i s  view . When th e  t a c t l e s s  Venetian ambassador t o  Rome,
Giovanni G uistin ian , d ep ic ted  t o  th e  Pope th e  m isfortunes o f  th e
R epublic, Innocent r e p lie d  th a t  perhaps God was m erely punishing
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Venice fo r  having d isregarded th e  r i g i t s  o f  His church. An atmos­
phere o f  th is  nature was hard ly  conducive t o  a s p ir i t  o f  com plete 
cooperation.
Venice s im ila r ly  p e r s is te d  in  i t s  e f f o r t  t o  e lim in a te  th e  
d if fer en ce s  which continued to  a lie n a te  h er from her s i s t e r  rep u b lic  
o f  Genoa. But th e  Genoese found i t  in c r e a sin g ly  necessary  t o  preserve
9h
in  Europe a d e l ic a te  balance between r iv a l  French and Spanish fa c t io n s .
As a r e s u l t ,  Genoa made every e f f o r t  to  remain a lo o f  from th e  problems 
o f  Venice and d id  so  by fe ig n in g  in d ig n a tio n  over r e la t iv e ly  in s ig ­
n if ic a n t  m atters o f  p ro to co l and diplomacy. In l6 k 7 , fo r  example, th e  
Genoese r e s id en t a t  Vicenza presented  h im se lf  b efo re  th e  S ign oria  
where he swore th a t h is  government had is su e d  orders to  equip te n  
g a lle y s  and two g a lleo n s  fo r  se r v ic e  a t  Candia. To r e c e iv e  t h i s  gen­
erous o f f e r ,  th e  Venetian Senate had only to  requ est th e  a id  and to  
grant Genoa th e  o f f i c i a l  t i t l e  o f *Serenissima" o r  "Most Serene” , an 
honorary t i t l e  which had a lready been awarded t o  V enice. On March 9 , 
l6 k 7 ,th e  Senate complied w ith  t h i s  request by a f f ix in g  on a formal note  
to  th e  Genoese Doge and dukes th e  t i t l e  o f  ’Serenissim a1. in stea d  o f  
f u l f i l l i n g  th e  terms o f  th e ir  o ffe r , th e  Genoese demanded in  ad d itio n  
to  ’Serenissim a' th e  t i t l e  o f ’E ccellanza' and a ls o  precedence over th e  
M altese g a lle y s  in  th e  form ation o f  th e  a l l i e d  armada; every attem pt 
to  r e so lv e  t h is  question  o f  precedence between th e  M altese and Genoese
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f a i l e d .  F ea r fu l th a t in  an e f fo r t  to  p le a se  th e  Genoese V enice might
lo s e  th e  very  ta n g ib le  support o f  th e  M altese, Venetian diplom ats
l e f t  th e  m atter unresolved . And angered by what seemed to  be ob-
vous d u p lic i ty , th e  Venetian Senate decided  to  erase  th e  re fer en ce s
i t  made in  i t s  March l e t t e r  t o  'Serenissim a' when ad dressing th e  
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Genoese R epublic.
A ssista n ce  frcm other sources remained extrem ely l im ite d . The 
b e l l ig e r e n t  a t t itu d e  assumed by France in  th e  l a t e  l6 h 0 's  tended t o  
c rea te  an atmosphere o f  w ariness e s p e c ia l ly  in  th e  sm aller pro-Habsburg 
I ta l ia n  s ta t e s  o f  Parma, Tuscany, and Modena. Beyond minor c o n tr i­
bution s such as th e  Duke o f  Modena's g i f t  o f  th ir te e n  condemned men 
fo r  use in  th e  g a lle y s  and perm ission  t o  le v y  troops or purchase sacks 
o f  g ra in , th e se  s ta t e s  had to  preoccupy them selves f i r s t  and forem ost 
w ith  th e ir  own d efen se . These g estu r es  had no r e a l  m ilita r y  s ig n i ­
fic a n c e  as fa r  as th e  war was concerned and are b e s t  seen  as k in d ly
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a c ts  designed  t o  r e ta in  th e  d ip lom atic goodw ill o f  th e  Venetian s t a t e .
During t h i s  p eriod  th ere  was one d ip lom atic development concerning  
a peace o f f e r  made by Venice which i s  worthy o f  a tte n t io n . A fter  
more than two years o f  war and co u n tless  u n su ccessfu l attem pts to  
gain  th e  u n ite d  support o f  Christendom, in  the w in ter o f  16U7  s ev e ra l  
senators proposed a peace o ffe r  to  be presented  t o  C onstantinople fo r  
con sideration . The f i r s t  v o tes  on th e  peace o f fe r  were d efea ted , but 
th e  proposal f in a l ly  passed  on th e  3 1 st o f  January, l6 h 8 . With th e  
v ic to r ie s  in  Dalmatia to  use as pawns and with increased  c i v i l  tu r ­
m oil rumored w ith in  th e  Ottoman em pire, many senators f e l t  i t  a 
p ro p it io u s tim e to  begin  bargaining w ith  th e  enemy. The Venetian
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o f f e r  in c lu d e d  t h e  r e tu r n  o f  a l l  T u rk ish  t e r r i t o r i e s  won b y  F o s c o lo
i n  D a lm a tia  and t h e  t r a n s f e r  t o  T u rk ish  c o n tr o l  o f  t h e  tw o A d r ia t ic
i s la n d s  o f  T in e  and P arga. I f  n e c e s s a r y ,V e n ic e  w ou ld  a l s o  a g r e e  t o
r a z e  t h e  Candian f o r t r e s s e s  o f  R ettim o  and Canea, and w ould  make a
r e p a r a t io n  paym ent o f  5 0 0 ,0 0 0  r e a l i e s .  I n  r e tu r n  V en ice  demanded
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t h e  r e s t o r a t io n  o f  th e  e n t i r e  i s l a n d  o f  C andia . N oth in g  came from
t h i s  p r o p o s a l ,  f o r  t h e  Grand V iz ie r  seem ed more in t r a n s ig e n t  and
d e t e r m i n e d  th a n  e v e r .  O nly one y e a r  a f t e r  t h i s  agreem ent h ad  b een
p ro p o sed  th e  v i z i e r ,  i n  a  f i t  o f  r a g e ,  had  s t r a n g le d  th e  V e n e tia n
dragoman, G r i l l o ,  and im p r iso n ed  and h u m il ia t e d  t h e  R e p u b lic 's  
98
am bassador, S oranzo.
The m id -c e n tu r y  was ap p roach ed  w ith o u t any n o t i  c a b le  change i n  
th e  d ip lo m a t ic  s i t u a t i o n .  The C andian war w as s t i l l  v e r y  much a  
V e n e tia n  war and what e x te r n a l  a s s i s t a n c e  th e  R e p u b lic  r e c e iv e d  
w as n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  n e u t r a l i z e  t h e  S u l t a n 's  m i l i t a r y  s u p e r io r i t y .  
The p r o s p e c t  f o r  f u tu r e  r e l i e f  from  th e  pow ers o f  Europe seem ed  
e q u a lly  dim . D e s p ite  th e  s e t t le m e n t  a t  W e stp h a lia , F ran ce and Sp a in  
rem ained  lo c k e d  i n  w ar, w h ile  c i v i l  r e b e l l i o n s  r a n g in g  from  t h e  
F rench  Fronde t o  t h e  r e v o l t  i n  C a ta lo n ia  tu r n e d  Europe’ s  a t t e n t i o n  
inw ard . And w ith  a lm o st no re a so n  a t  a l l  t o  hope t h a t  th e  S u lta n  
w ould a c c e p t  a n y th in g  s h o r t  o f  t o t a l  su rren d er  o f  C andia, th e  b e ­
le a g u e r e d  V en etia n  R ep u b lic  ad ap ted  i t s e l f  t o  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  many 
more y e a r s  o f  w a r fa r e .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER I I I :  FOOTNOTES
1 . Andrea V a liero , H lsto ria  d e l la  guerra d i Candia (V en ice,
1 679), P- 19- (H ereinafter referred  to  as H is t o r ia .)
2 . Ib id . ,  pp. 94-95-
3 . A .S .V . ,  P.T.M. (797), C a m illo  G onzaga, A ugust 3 , l6I*6. I t
i s  extrem ely d i f f i c u l t  to  estim ate ex a c tly  th e  number o f  troops s ta t io n ed  
a t  Rettimo b efore th e  Turkish a s sa u lt  in  September. The P ro w ed ito r-  
GenerstLe l i s t e d  fo r  Ju ly , 1646, 349 in fa n try  p lu s  200 reinforcem ents  
making a t o t a l  o f  5^9- This p a rticu la r  number must have been augmented 
considerab ly by September or during th e  s ie g e  i t s e l f  s in ce  i t  was r e ­
ported  la te r  th a t th er e  were 1,200 men alone who remained hold' up in  
th e  inner b astion  a fte r  th e  rout o f  October 20th . There may have been 
sev e ra l thousand men in  th e  garrison  a t  th e  tim e o f  th e  i n i t i a l  a tta ck .
See A .S .V ., P.T.M. (7 9 7 ) , Corner to  S enate, L etter  215, Ju ly 19 , 1646.
If. B.N.M ., VII (9158), R elazione d e l le  operazione de Turchi 
s o tto  Rettimo l ’anno 1646 in  le t t e r e  d e ll'Z a cc a r ia  Balbo, Sopra P row ed- 
i t o r  de R ettim o, October 18 , 1646, p p .236-41 .
5. A .S .V ., P.T.M. (797), L etter  238,  September 30, 1646, Corner 
t o  Senate, (R ettim o). Corner wrote from Rettimo th a t he found th ere
"a f o r t r e s s . . . f u l l  o f  fr igh tened  inh a b ita n ts  and fu g i t iv e s ,  and. . . I  can 
not p rom ise.. . t o  be a b le w ith  b e n e fit  o f  th e  ex te r io r  fo r t i f ic a t io n s  to  
make s im ila r  r e s is ta n c e  ( to  another Turkish a s s a u lt ) ."  See a lso  A .S .V ., 
C olleg io  V (S e c r e ta ), R elazione, Busta 8l ,  Camillo Gonzaga, Rettimo.
An e a r lie r  attempt to  prevent the a r r iv a l o f  Turkish reinforcem ents a t  
Rettimo f a i le d  when th e  troops under Gonzaga encountered no enemy so ld ie r s  
a t th e  pass a t  Almiro.
6 .A .S .V . ,  C o lleg io  V (S ec reta ), R elaz ione , Busta 8l ,  Camillo 
Gonzaga, Rettim o. Once panic s e t  in  even th e  cavalry refu sed  to  en ter  
combat, many p referr in g  t o  sc a tte r  th e ir  h orses rather than have to  jo in  
th e  f ig h t .  "Having seen every remedy in  v a in ,” Gonzaga w rote, "and th e  
so ld ie r s  rather in c lin e d  to  throw them selves in to  th e sea than t o  show 
them selves t o  th e  enemy again , I  ordered th e  g a te s  (o f  th e inner b a stio n )  
opened and allow ed th e  men t o  enter in to  th e  fo r tr e s s  in  order to  end so  
unfortunate a th in g ."
7- V a liero , H isto r ia , p . 99 .
8 . B.N.M., VII (9158), p . 300. This source estim ated th e  number 
o f paid  s o ld ie r s  a t  Candia in  A p ril 1646 a t  over 9 ,000  men.
9 . B.N.M., VII (9158) ,  May 1646, pp. 193-194. L ettere d i  
Capitano d i G olfo, Bamardo, May 6 ,  1646.
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1 0 .  I b i d .
H . A .S .V ., P.T.M. (7 9 7 ), L etter  229 , August 30 , l 6h6 , (Comer to  
S en a te ) , Rettimo; B.N.M ., VII (9 158), pp. 301-302. Camillo Gonzaga r e ­
corded M s observations o f  Candia: "I en tered  th e  c i t y ,  w here.. .  ( I
passed ) over cadavers, th e  s tr e e t s  and p u b lic  squares and even th e  Port 
o f  th e  Arsenal being  f u l l  o f  them. I  saw a t  th e  same tim e a continuous 
transp ort o f  goods t o  th e  j e t t y ,  as i f  th ey  had w ished t o  abandon th e  
c i t y . . .  (and) I  stepped t h i s  exodus not w ithout ser io u s com plaint by seme 
p u b lic  r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s . . . ."  A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S ec reta ),R e la z io n e ,
Busta 8l ,  Camillo Gonzaga.
1 2 . A .S .V . ,  C o l le g io  V ( S e c r e t a ) ,R e la z io n e ,  B u s ta  8 l .  R e la z io n e  
d e l l ’ S ig n o r  d a l la  V a l l e t t a ,  G en era le  d e l l o  S b a rco , November 2 9 ,  l6 h 6 .
1 3 .  I b id . ,  S e e  a l s o  A .S .V . ,  C o lle g io  V (S e c r e t a ) ,R e la z io n e ,  B u sta  
8 l ,  R e la z io n e  d e l l e  c o s e  d i  Candia f a t t o  i n  S en a to  da l 1 * Don C am illo  
G onzaga, l6h6.
lh .  B .N .M ., VII (2 0 0 ) , M ossa d e l l ’Armi, p . 39 , nap 18.
15. V a lier o , H is to r ia , pp. 178-181.
16. A .S .V ., P.T.M. (7 1 5 ), Rubrica d i l e t t e r e  d a lle  P ro w ed ito r -  
Generale d e l le  Arma in  Regno, Candia: D o lfin , Mocenigo, Lipcmana,
M orosin i, l6 h 7 - l6 5 2 , L etter  o f  M orosini, P row ed itor-G enerale d e l l ’Armi, 
L etter  3 , January 26 , l6h9 .
17. For some o f  th e  operations during l 6h6  a t  Porto d e l la  Suda 
and th e  fo r t i f ic a t io n s  wMch marked th e  co a st o f  th e  bay, s ee  A .S .V ., 
C o lleg io  V (Secreta), R elazione, Busta 8l ,  Camillo Gonzaga; R elazione d i  
S ig . D alla  V a l le t t a ,  l 6h6 : B.N.M ., VII (2 0 0 ), Mossa d ell'A rm i, p . 89 , 
map h i.
18. A .S .V . ,  P .T .M . (7 9 7 ), March l h ,  16L 6, C o m er  t o  S e n a te ,  C andia.
19. B.N.M ., VII (2 0 0 ), Mossa d e l l ’Anni, l6h7-
20 . B .H .M ., V H  ( 2 1 1 ) ,  F o g l i e t t o  d ' a v i s i  v e n u to  da C o n s ta n t in q p li ,  
A p r il , l6 h 7 , p p . 1 0 1 -1 0 2 ;  A .S .V ., P.T .M . (797) Septem ber 1 1 ,  l 6h6 , su p p o se -  
e d ly  from a c o n f id a n t  a t  Canea.
2 1 . Many V e n e tia n s  h ad  h oped  t h a t  th e  end  o f  t h e  T h ir ty  Y ears  
War i n  Europe w ou ld  mnV-P i t  e a s i e r  t o  h i r e  new in f a n t r y  r e c r u i t s ;  i n ­
s t e a d ,u n f o r tu n a t e ly ,  t h e  l a c k  o f  fu n d s g r e a t ly  d is a p p o in te d  t h e s e  h o p e s . 
M oreover, t h e r e  w ere o c c a s io n a l ly  r e s t r i c t i o n s  p la c e d  on t h e  u s e  o f  
tr o o p s  h ir e d  i n  v a r io u s  c o u n tr ie s  such  a s  S w itz e r la n d . H ere t h e  g o v e r n ­
m ents o f  Z u rich  and B ern  r e fu s e d  p e r m is s io n  t o  a l lo w  t h e i r  men t o  be  
em ployed o u t s id e  o f  I t a l y .  S ee  V a l ie r o ,  H i s t o r ia  ,  p p . 17h-177.
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22. A n to n io  G u g l ie lm o t t i ,  S t o r ia  d e l l a  m arina  p o n t i f i e i a . La 
sq uadra a u s i l i a n a  d e l l a  m arin a  Romana a  C andia e  a l ia .  M orea. S t o r ia  d e l  
lo 4 4  a l  1669 (Rome, 1&83), V IH , PP. 45-48 . (H e r e in a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  
M arina P o n t i f i e i a . )
23. Samuele Rcmanin, S to r ia  docnmentata d i Venezia (V en ice, 
1 8 5 3 -6 1 ), V II, p . 375- (H erein after r e fer re d  t o  as S to r ia . )
24. G u g l ie lm o t t i ,  M arina P o n t i f i e i a ,  pp. 6O-6 3 .
2 5 . B.N.M ., VII (2 0 0 ) , Mossa d ell'A rm i, p . 2 6 , map 11 and 12; 
V a lier o , H is to r ia , pp. 57-58; 106: Rcmanin, S to r ia , pp. 377-378.
2 6 . A sym pathetic author o f  th e  h is t o r y  o f  th e  Venetian navy 
has w r itten : "Even t h i s  second year o f  war had not been put to  good 
a se  by th e  Venetian Armada and . . . i t  i s  n ecessary  t o  agree th a t in  th e  
Armada th er e  was s t i l l  n o t formed th e  combative s p ir i t  necessary  and
t h e r e  w as n o t  g e n e r a l iz e d  r e c ip r o c a l  t r u s t  " M ario N ani M ocen igo ,
La marina Veneziana da Lepanto a l i a  cadnto d e l la  Bepubblica (Rome,1 9 3 0 ), 
pp. 151-152T (H ereinafter re fer re d  t o  a s  Marina Veneziana. )
27 . Grimani m aintained a  b r ie f  blockade o f  Turkish v e s s e ls  a t  
N auplia, but was forced  t o  withdraw from t h i s  port by th e  approaching 
w inter and th e  departure o f  th e  a u x lla r ie s .  Mocenigo a ls o  had sane 
su ccess  in  b lockading S cio  and in  sin k in g  two enemy g a lle y s ;  M ocenigo's 
blockade was ended -when he wsls ordered t o  jo in  in  th e  blockade a t  
N auplia. In both in s ta n c e s , however, th e  Turks managed t o  escape  
r e la t iv e ly  unharmed and l a t e r  were a b le  t o  jo in  a  convoy which s a fe ly  
a rr iv ed  a t  Canea w ith  9 ,0 0 0  troops and many p ro v is io n s . See Mocenigo, 
Marina V eneziana, pp. 153-155.
28. For sev e ra l o f  th e  numerous accounts o f  t h i s  shipwreck
o f  1648, see  B.N.M ., VII (2 1 1 ) ,L etter  o f  A p r il 8 , 1648; V a lier o , H is to r ia ,  
pp. 147-152; Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, pp. 156- 158; B.N.M ., VII (2 0 0 ) ,  
Mossa d e l l ’Armi, p . 75 , map 34.
29 . See B.N.M., VII (2 1 1 ) , pp. 142-145, L etter  o f  May 1 2 , 1649; 
B.N.M ., M iscellanea  169 ,  R e la tion e d e l la  v i t t o r ia  o tten u ta  d a lle  armi 
d e l la  Serenissim a Repubblica d i V enetia s o tt o  i l  commando d i . . . S i g .
Giacomo da R iva , Capitano d e l le  N avi, Contro l'Armata Turchesca in  A sia  
n e l  Porto d i Focchie: B.N.M., VII (2 0 0 ), Mossa d ell'A rm i, p . 8l ,  map 
37; V a lier o , H is to r ia , pp. 205-207; Romanin, S to r ia , pp. 414-415.
30 . Ohe Venetians were g en er a lly  outnumbered a t  sea  though  
n ot n ea rly  in  so great d isp rop ortion  as some w r iters  would l i k e  t o  have 
thought. For example, in  1646 th e  Turkish f l e e t  which l e f t  th e  D ardanelles 
c o n s is te d  o f  seventy  g a l le y s ,  f iv e  maone, and t h ir t y - f iv e  v e s s e ls  w ith
two hundred sm aller sa ic h e s . B ie V enetians had a t Suda a  fo r ce  c o n s is t in g  
o f  f i f t y - tw o  g a l le y s ,  s i x  g a l le a s s e s ,  and tw enty armed barques. See B.N.M ., 
VII (9158 ) ,  p . 298 . G enerally , however, th e  d if fe r e n c e  in  f l e e t  s iz e s  
was g rea ter  than t h i s ,  and th e  Venetian and a l l i e d  commanders had to  
r e ly  more h e a v ily  on superior seamanship or fir e -p o v e r  to  counterbalance  
th e  num erical d isadvantages. Moreover, th e  Venetians were not always 
a b le  t o  count on the support o f  th e  a u x il ia r ie s  who, as in  th e  years
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161*9 and 1650 , found m atters a t  home more p ress in g  than th e  war a g a in st  
th e  in f id e l ;  i t  va s  in  th e s e  two years th a t  th e  papal squadron remained 
in  I ta l ia n  w aters because o f  th e  tr o u b les  w ith  th e  F am ese and th e  
Duchy o f  Castro and a ls o  because o f  th e  J u b ilee  p ilgr im s o f  1650 . See 
Nani-Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, pp. 161-162, n . 1; V a liero , H is to r ia ,
pp. 208- 210 .
31. A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R e lazione, Busta 75> R elazione  
de Francesco M olino, P row ed itor-G enerale da Mar, September 21 , 161*5.
One contemporary h is to r ia n  noted  th a t th e  M orlacchi and Albanians were 
th e  "Iroquois" o f  th a t region; moreover, th ey  knew th e  te r r a in  e x p l i c i t l y  
and showed them selves brave in  b a t t le .  They a ls o  proved much more durable 
in  th e  harsh clim ate o f  Dalm atia, much more so than th e  European tr o o p s. 
Sometimes, however, th e ir  ardor le d  them t o  fo llo w  th e ir  own em otions, 
thus l im it in g  th e  o rd er lin ess  th ey  had in  b a t t le .  Antoine de l a  Haye,
La p o lit iq u e  c i v i l e  e t  m i l i ta ir e  des V en itien s (Cologne, 1669) ,  pp. 103- 
lol*, 135 , 138.
32. Frederico S a s s i , ”Le campagne d i Dalmazia durante l a  guerra
d i Candia, I61f5-l61j8," A xchivio Veneto, XX (1937), 5th S e r ie s , pp. 212-213.
Ragusa was considered  by many contem poraries o f  th e war as a "true center  
o f  in t r ig u e . . . ."
33. B.N.M., M iscellanea  269 , R elazione de f e l i c i  p r o g r e s i . . .
n e l le  Dalm atia, pp. 31-32; V a lier o , H is to r ia , p . 12k.
3k. S a s s i , "Le campagne d i Dalmazia," XX, pp. 219-221.
35. A .S .V ., Senato, F i lz a  127, D ispacci d i C ostan tin opo li,
Soranzo, June 6 , l6 h 5 .
36 . S a s s i , "Le campagne d i Dalmazia," XX, p . 222.
37- Ib id . ,  pp. 230-231.
38 . Ib id . , pp. 61-62; Sertonaco A nticano, Frajnmenti i s t o r i c i
in  Dalmazia (V enice, 16^9), pp. 13-15.
39. S a s s i ,  "Le campagne d i Dalmazia," XX, pp. 225-229.
to .  For a  design  o f  Novegradi and alm ost a l l  th e  oth er fo r tr e s s e s  
o f Dalmatia see  B.N.M., VII (2 0 0 ), Mossa d ell'A rm i, passim .
111. For th e  complete account o f  th e  p reparations a t  Novegradi 
and i t s  eventual f a l l  in  161*5 see  A nticano, Fragment! i s t o r i c i  in  
Dalmazia, pp. 1*9 - 59-
1*2. Ib id . ,  pp. 75-79-
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43 . S a s s i , "Le campagne d i Dalm azia,” XX, p . 242.
44 . Venetian troop stren gth  in  Dalmatia by th e  end o f  th e  summer 
o f  1646 was as fo llo w s: Zara -  4 ,786  in fa n try , 546 cavalry; Sebenico -
1 ,0 6 0  in fa n tr y , 30 cavalry; Spalato -  1,0 8 3  in fa n tr y , 12 cavalry; Cattaro -  
838 in fa n try . In t o t a l  th er e  were some 8 ,9 3 6  in fa n try  and 606 cavalry  
sca tter ed  throughout th e  p rovince. Turkish troops numbered approxim ately  
tw enty thousand in fa n try  and cavalry  combined and th e se  were accompanied 
by e ig h t la r g e  a r t i l l e r y  p ie c e s  from B elgrade. This a r t i l l e r y  was 
apparently o ften  antiqu ated , one o f  th e  p ie c e s  tr a c in g  i t s  h is to r y  back
t o  th e  era  o f  Charles V. S a s s i , "Le campagne d i Dalm azia," XX, pp. 232, 
242-244.
45. Ib id . ,  pp. 239-240
46. Ib id . ,  pp. 236-238.
47. A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R elazione, Busta 66 , Dalmatia 
1646, R elazione d i Andrea Vendraoin, May 23, 1646. As th e  P ro w ed ito r  
E straordinario  o f  Spalato n oted , during tim es o f  p eace , wine and o i l  were 
in  abundance, but now th a t war had erupted, th e se  commodities (which had 
been o r ig in a lly  acquired  from th e  Turks) were in  great demand and had t o
be brought in  by se a . Moreover, th e  treasu ry  i t s e l f  was com pletely drained.
A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S ec reta ), R elazione, Busta 72 , S palato , A lv ise  Cocco, 
P ro w ed ito re  E straordinario d i Spalato , December 30, 1648. The in t e r ­
ruption  o f  commerce and trade was obviously  not t o t a l ,  but revenues d id
d ec lin e  and th e  n eu tra l Ragusians tended t o  p r o f i t  from th e d isorders o f
war. N atura lly , merchants who hoped t o  avoid  se izu re s  and p e n a lt ie s  were 
in c lin e d  to  trade a t  Ragusa and Ancona ra ther than r is k  th e  hazards o f  war 
by trad in g  w ith  Venetian p o rts  and sh ip s . In  a d d itio n , th e  Ragusians 
them selves su pp lied  th e  Turks w ith  g a l le y s  and other sm all v e s s e ls  and 
p r o fite d  by t h is  trade as w e ll .  See A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) ,
R elaz ione , Busta 66 , Vendramin, Dalmatia, May 23 , 1646.
48. A .S .V ., P.T.M. (373)> Rubrica d i l e t t e r e  d e l P ro w ed ito re -  
Generale in  Dalmatia e t  A lbania, 1646-51, Sebenico, L etter  o f  October,
1646 and L etter  o f  October 30, 1646, Alm issa; A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) ,  
R elazione, Busta 72 , Antonio Lippomano, E row ed itore  E straordinario  d i  
Spalato e t  Trau, L etter  o f  November 9 , 1646; A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , 
R elazione, Busta 6 6 , R elazione d i Andrea Vendramin r ito r n o  d i P ro w ed ito re -  
Generale in  Dalmatia, L etter  o f  May 23, 1646. Many o f  th e  l e s s e r  fo r tr e s s e s  
such as Trau and Spalato had a t  th e ir  conanand th ir t y  t o  fo r ty  la r g e  and 
sma l l  a r t i l l e r y  p ie c e s ,  a  number g en er a lly  in  excess  o f  what th e  Turkish  
armies had t o  u se . The c o sts  o f  th e  war, though l e s s  than th a t in  Candia, 
n ev er th e less  d id represen t a  s iz a b le  burden to  th e  p u b lic  treasu ry . For 
example, a t  S palato , Lippomano reported  a p u b lic  revenue o f  6 ,093  d ucats, 
but an o u tla y  fo r  in fa n try  and cavalry fo r  Spalato and Alm issa o f  45,000  
ducats; a t  Trau, th e  Captain reported  an income o f  21,384 ducats fo r  1645, 
but expenditure amounting to  49 ,447 ducats.
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1*9- V a lier o , H is to r ia , p . 66; B.N.M., VII (2 0 0 ) , Mossa d e l l ’
Armi, pp. 1 4 , 22 and maps 4 ,9  r e sp e c tiv e ly . A fter  th e ab o rtiv e  attempt 
t o  capture Sebenico in  August o f  1646, th e  Turkish fo r c e s  were turned  
a g a in st th e  southern p a rts  o f  Bosnia in  th e  hope th a t th e  tribesm en o f  
t h i s  area, th e  E rim ariani, might be swayed from th e ir  a lle g ia n c e  to  
V enice. S a s s i , "Le campagne d i Dalmazia," XX, pp. 248-49.
50. A .S .V ., P.T.M. (373), Prow ed itore-G enerale in  Dalmatia e t  
A lbania, F osco lo , 1647-51 , L etter  o f  January 21 , 1647, Rubrica 365;
Angelo de Benvenuti, " II c a s t e l lo  d i  Zemonico e l a  to r r e  d i Vercevo,"
La R iv is ta  Dalmatica, Part I ,  XVI (D ec ., 1937), pp. 27-28 , 46-47;
V a liero , H isto r ia , pp. 101-104; B.N.M., M iscellanea 169 , R elazione
d i f e l i c i  p ro g re ssi d e l l ’a m i  d e lla  Serenissim a Repubblica d i Venezia 
n e l la  Dalmatia, pp. 3 -2 3 . I t  i s  in te r e s t in g  t o  note th a t Turkish s o ld ie r s  
freq uently  d isp layed  extraordinary courage such as th o se  so ld ie r s  who 
defended Zemonico a g a in st th e  Venetian a s s a u lt . When th e  fo r tr e s s  was 
f in a l ly  taken over , two hundred Turkish defenders re fu sed  t o  surrender 
from th e ir  underground h id in g  p la ce  and preferred  in stea d  t o  d ie  f ig h t in g .
51. Vrana, a  fo r tr e s s  approxim ately two days d is ta n t from 
Novegradi, was "ringed by w a lls  with four sm all strong tow ers but not 
very  w e ll  p rov ision ed  w ith  munitions and s o ld ie r s ."  When th e  Venetians 
began to  b es ieg e  Vrana, th e  Turks sen t reinforcem ents from d i s s a .
The s ie g e  la s te d  e lev en  days and n ig h ts , but when news arrived  th at th e  
Venetians had taken Nadin, a l l  hope fo r  a s u c c e s s fu l defense vanished and 
th e  Turkish survivors a t  Vrana surrendered. See B.N.M ., VII (211),
L ettera  che a v isa  l a  v i t t o r ia  d i Novi Gradi, L etter  o f  A p ril 2 8 , 1647 from 
Vrana, pp. 103-107. See a ls o  B.N.M., VII (2 0 0 ), Mossa d e l l ’Armi, p . 51? 
map 23 and p . 53,  map 24.
52. S a s s i , "Le campagne d i Dalmazia," XXI, pp. 71-72; B.N.M.,
VII (2 00), Mossa d ell'A rm i, p . 55, map 25.
53. One o f  th e  b a s ic  reasons why Sebenico was considered r e la ­
t i v e l y  sa fe  was th e  poor cond ition  o f  th e  roads lea d in g  to  i t .  With roads 
in  such a co n d ition , th er e  was l i t t l e  chance fo r  a su rp rise  attack  to  
occur. Moreover, th e  fo r t i f ic a t io n s  a t Sebenico were considered  by
F oscolo  h im self to  be "near p erfec t io n ."  A .S .V ., P .T.M ., (3 7 3 ) , P ro w ed ito re -  
Generale in  Dalmatia e t  A lbania, F osco lo , 1646-51, L etter  280, Ju ly 29,
1647, Zara. A lso  see  S a s s i ,  "Le campagne d i Dalm azia,” XX, passim . S a ssi 
considered  F osco lo ’ s m isca lc u la tio n  concerning Turkish in te n tio n s  t o  a tta ck  
Sebenico th e on ly  ser io u s  m istake th e  general made w h ile in  command in  
Dalmatia.
54. A .S .V ., P.T.M. (373), Prow ed itore-G enerale in  Dalmatia e t  
A lbania, F osco lo , L etter  o f  August 24 , 1647, Zara, Rubrica 297.
55- The Pasha o f  B osnia had reputedly  about s ix te e n  thousand men, 
but many o f  th ese  were only poorly armed; only th ree  thousand o f  th e se  
were J a n is sa r ie s . F oscolo  had a t h is  command approxim ately n ine thousand 
men in  ad d ition  to  sev e ra l hundred M orlacchi and lo c a l  r e c r u its . S a s s i ,
"Le campagne d i Dalmazia," XXI, pp. 76-77.
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56. S a s s i ,  "Le campagne d i Dalmazia," XXI, pp. 74-75-
57- B.N.M., VII (2 0 0 ), Mossa d e l l ’Armi, p . 6l ,  map 28; V a liero ,
H isto r ia . pp. 118-122; S a s s i , "Le campagne d i Dalmazia," XXI, pp. 84-85.
58. A nticano, Frammenti i s t o r i c i  d i Dalmatia, pp. 244-245;
B.N.M ., VII (2 0 0 ), Mossa d e l l ’Armi, p . 6 3 , map 29 , and p . 65  and map 30. 
D em is f e l l  to  Venetian arm ies on February 25 , 1648, and Cfanin (a ls o  
Khin or  Chinin) nearly  fo r ty  m ile s  from Sebenico, f e l l  two days la t e r  
on th e 27th .
59. A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R e lazione, Busta 72 , Lippomano 
E row ed itore E straordinario d i Spalato e  Trau, L etter  o f  November 23, 1646.
60. A nticano, Frammenti i s t o r i c i  d i Dalmatia, pp. 274-75. 
Apparently the Venetians d id  not h e s i ta te  to  o f f e r  th e  n a tiv e  tribesm en  
b oun ties fo r  every Turkish head th ey  acquired . These tribesm en had so  
many heads w ith  them th a t th ey  were l ik e  "sequins o f  beads." See De La 
Haye, l a  p o lit iq u e  c i v i l e  e t  m il i t a ir e  des V e n itie n s , pp. 136-137.
61. A nticano, Frammenti i s t o r i c i  d i Dalmatia, p . 280.
62. Ib id . , pp. 282-288. For fu rther  inform ation  on th e  s ie g e
o f  C lissa  and th e  slaugh ter ifcich  fo llow ed  th e  surrender, see  B.N.M., 
M iscellanea  169 ,  Eresa d i C lis sa , C ontinuatione de f e l i c i  p rogress!  
dell'A rm i d e l la  Serenissim a Repubblica d i Venezia n e l la  Dalmatia, 1648, 
pp. 2-16; B.N.M., VII (2 1 1 ), R elazione d e l la  p ressa  d i C lis sa , L etter  
A p ril 5 , 1648, Zara, pp. 125-132; Alessandro Veraino, D e lla  h is t o r ia  
d e lla  guerra d i Dalmatia so tto  i l  gen era la to  d i Leonardo F oscolo  (V enice, 
1648), pp. 152-154; B.N.M., VIl"T200), Mossa d e l l ’Armi, pp. 67- 69 , 7 1 , 73 
and maps 31-34 r e sp e c tiv e ly ;  V a lier o , H is to r ia , pp. 159-160; S a s s i , "Le 
campagne d i Dalmazia," XXI, p . 8 5 .
6 3 . S a s s i ,  "Le campagne d i Dalmazia," XXI, pp. 93-94.
64. The Venetian armies were reorganized  so  th a t s p e c ia liz e d  
u n its  came t o  p la y  a more important r o le .  There were sp e c ia l  in fa n try  
and cavalry u n it s ,  reorganized  so  th a t th ey  would fu n ctio n  more smoothly 
in  a c tio n . Moreover, th ere  was considerab le m ixing o f  n a t io n a l i t ie s  
w ith in  u n its  in  order t o  minimize r iv a lr ie s  and com petition which some­
tim es developed among is o la t e d  n a t io n a l i t ie s . Ib id . , pp. 98-99-
65 . The Venetian g a lle y s  s ta tio n ed  on th e  Dalmatian coast gen­
e r a l ly  accomplished t h e ir  task s w ith r e la t iv e  ea se . Even though th ere  
were on ly s ix  g a lle y s  and one g a l le a s s ,  a l l  w ith  d ep le ted  crews and a 
chronic shortage o f  money, th ese  s ix  proved s u f f ic ie n t  t o  p a tr o l th e  
e s s e n t ia l ly  compact area o f  Dalmatia. When winds were favorab le , th e  
area th ey  had t o  p a tr o l could u su a lly  be covered e n t ir e ly  in  a m atter o f  
a few days. When Dalmatia was considered  "secure" in  1648, th e  g a lle y s
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o f  Dalmatia were alm ost a l l  ordered to  th e  Levant fo r  s e r v ic e  a t  Candia 
and th e  eastern  M editerranean Sea. A .S .V ., P.T.M. (3 7 3 ) , P ro w ed ito re -  
Generale in  Dalmatia e t  A lbania, 1647-51, F o sco lo , L etter  o f  A p r il 30,
1648, Zara, Rubrica 4o4; S a s s i ,  "Le campagne d i Dalmazia, 11 XXI, pp. 85 - 86 .
6 6 . I t  o f te n  proved a  d i f f i c u l t  ta sk  m aintaining th e  permanent 
lo y a lty  o f  seme independent tr ib e s .  One case in vo lved  th e  Ia c in iz z a
who had been promised th e  p ro te c tio n  o f  Venice and -who were la t e r  a ttacked  
by sev e ra l members o f  th e  P o ssid a r ia n i; th e  I a c in iz z a  then  looked  t o  th e  
Turks fo r  p r o te c tio n . But d e sp ite  such is o la t e d  in c id e n ts , th ese  n a tiv e s  
proved Invaluable t o  th e  V enetian cau se, so much so  th a t c e r ta in  tr ib e s  
l ik e  th e  M orlacchi were form ally  outlawed by th e  S ultan . Sometimes 
th e  fe ro c io u s vehemence o f  th e se  M orlacchi was so  in te n se  th a t th ey  
p referred  t o  cut t o  p ie c e s  th e ir  Turkish ca p tiv es  rather than take  
p rison ers; F oscolo  ir o n ic a l ly  once complained th a t t h is  p r a c t ic e  was 
causing a ser io u s shortage o f  g a l le y  s la v e s . See A .S .V ., P.T.M. (3 7 3 ),  
P row ed itore-G enerale in  Dalmatia e t  A lbania, F o sco lo , L etter  o f  May 27 , 
1648, Rubrica 4 l6  and L etter  o f  January 10 , 1648, Rubrica 360; A nticano, 
Frammenti i s t o r i c i  d i  Dalmatia, pp. 35-36 , 66- 68 , 282; S a ss i , "Le campagne 
d i Dalmazia," XXI, pp. 74 , 89 -90 . To insu re th e  continued lo y a lty  and 
support o f  th ese  l o c a l  t r ib e s ,  th e  Venetian government and army freq u en tly  
went to  great p a in s t o  p r o te c t  t h e ir  s a fe ty .  When in d iv id u a l t r ib e s  were 
s itu a te d  in  dangerous a re a s , th e  members would be tra n sferred  to  a 
r e la t iv e ly  secure re g io n  or t o  an area such a s  th e  I s tr ia n  pen insu la  or 
th e  is la n d  o f  Pago where th e  tr ib e s  would h elp  t o  popu late a d e so la te  area  
and strengthen th e  reg ion  a s  a  "buffer zone" fo r  th e  fu tu re . These r e lo ­
ca tion  operations fr eq u e n tly  involved  many thousands o f  men, women, 
ch ildren , and an im als. See A .S .V ., P.T.M. (3 7 3 ) , P row ed itore-G enerale  
in  Dalmatia e t  A lbania , F osco lo , L etter  o f  J u ly  25 , 1647, Rubrica 277 and 
L etter o f  August 6 , 1647, Rubrica 283 .
6 7 . S a s s i ,  "Le campagne d i Dalmazia," XXI, p . 77.
68 . A .S .V ., Dip. R e l. ,  Francia, F i lz a  104 , L etter  387, August 1 4 ,
1646, B a tt is ta  Rani; A .S .V ., Dip. R e l . ,  F rancia , F i lz a  105 , L etter  433, 
November 13 , 1646, B a t t is ta  Nani. Nani noted  how w e ll  informed th e  French 
m in isters  and Mazzarin w ere, fin d in g  th e se  m in is ters  "with p a rticu la rs  
more d is t in c t ,  and much f u l l e r . . .than I  was ab le t o  say m yself."
6 9 . A .S .V ., Dip. R e l. ,  F rancia, F i lz a  105 , L etter  433, November 13 , 
1646; L etter  445, December U ,  l6 4 6 , B a tt is ta  N ani, P a r is .
70 . A .S .V ., Dip. R e l. ,  Francia, F i lz a  105 , L etter  426, October
30, 1646, B a t t is ta  Nani, P a r is .
71 . A .S .V ., Dip. R e l. ,  F rancia, F i lz a  105 , L etter  458 , January 1 ,
1647, B a tt is ta  Nani, P a r is . Nani reported  th at many o f  th e  men re cr u ite d
in  France fo r  se r v ic e  a t  Candia were men who had o fte n  f le d  from duty
in  th e  Spanish armies and were thus u n r e lia b le  as s o ld ie r s .
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7 2 . A .S .V ., Dip. R e l. ,  Erancia, F i lz a  105, L etter  464 , January 
1 5 , 1647, B a tt is ta  Nani, P a r is .
73 . A .S .V ., Dip. R e l. ,  F ran cia , F i lz a  104 , L etter  325, A p r il  17 , 
1646, L etter  359, June 2 6 , 1646, B a t t is ta  N ani, P a ris . Rani noted  th a t  
even i f  war continued between France and Spain, peace in  th e  Inspire would 
bring much money to  V enice, perhaps a s  much a year as "nine m il l io n s  o f  
f r a n c h i . . . . "
74. A.S.V., Dip. Rel.,Erancia, F ilza  105, Letter 439, November 
2 7 , 1646, B attista  Nani, Paris.
75. The Venetians were perm itted  t o  continue r a is in g  l e v i e s  on 
French s o i l  and a ls o  to  purchase gra in  and m unitions fo r  le v i e s  on
th e  war. See A .S .V ., E sp osiz ion i R r in c ip i, C o lleg io , 1648, R e g is tr i  57, 
passim .
76 . A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, Spagna, F i lz a  8 0 , L etter  110, 
February 7 , 1646, G. G u istin ian , Madrid.
77 . A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, Spagna, F i lz a  8 0 , L etter  168, 
October 4 , 1646, G. .G uistin ian, Saragosa.
73 . A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, Spagna, F i lz a  8 0 , L etter  168, 
October 4 , 1646, G. G u istin ian , Saragosa.
79- A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, Spagna, F i lz a  8 0 , L etter  
tr a n s la te d  frcm th e Spanish sen t by d'Haros to  th e  V iceroy o f  Naples 
about December, 1646. These le v i e s  and m ateria l acquired in  Spanish  
t e r r i t o r ie s  were purchased by V enice.
80 . A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, Spagna, F i lz a  8 2 , L etter  38 , 
August 3 , 1649, Basadonna, Madrid, (deciphered  s e c t io n ) .
81 . A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, Spagna, F i lz a  8 l ,  L etter  214, 
May 4 , 1647 , G. G uistin ian , Madrid.
8 2 . A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, Spagna, F ilz a  8 l ,  L etter  229, 
August 7 , 1647, G. G uistin ian , Madrid.
8 3 . A. S. V ., Am basciatori D isp a cci, Spagna,F ilza 8 2 , L etter  9 , 
January 1 2 , 1649, Basadonna, Madrid, (deciphered s e c t io n ) .
8 4 . A .S .V ., Dip. R e l. ,  Spagna, F i lz a  8 l ,  L etter  303, Ohne 1 0 ,
1643, G u istin ia n , Madrid, and L etter  313, Ju ly  1 8 , 1648, G u istin ia n , Madrid, 
(coded), and L etter  9 , November 4 , 1648, Francesco B ianch i, Madrid, (coded). 
Perhaps th e  Spanish, l ik e  th e  Im perial ambassadors, were s t i l l  ir r it a t e d  
over th e  Venetian r e fu sa l t o  perm it th e  passage o f  a  Spanish convoy from 
T r ie ste  to  N aples in  1648. Venice o ffere d  to  esc o rt a sh ip  carrying the
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<Jtieen, but would n o t, a s  was t r a d it io n a l ly  bar claim ed p rer o g a tiv e , 
perm it th e  passage o f  sh ip s o f  any major power through th e  w aters o f  
h er "gulf" , namely, th e  "Venetian Gulf" or upper A d r ia tic . See A .S .V ., 
Dip. H e l . ,  Spagna, F i lz a  8 l ,  L etter  273, (coded), February 6 ,  1648, 
G u istin ia n , Madrid.
85 . A .S .V ., Dip. R e l . ,  Spagna, F ilz a  8 2 , L etter  51 , (coded), 
September 29 ,  1649, L etter  52, October 6 ,  1649 and L etter  6l ,  161*9,
P iero  Basadonna, Madrid. V a lier o , H is to r ia , pp. 199-203.
86 . Ihe v a n ity  and p rid e  o f  th e  Turkish m in isters  seemed in  no 
way dim inished by V enetian  m ilita r y  e f f o r t s .  In th e  summer o f  1646, 
Soranzo learned  th a t th e  Grand V iz ie r  had m arvelled a t  th e  sm all numbers 
o f  g a lle y s  attached  t o  th e  Venetian armada, in terp re tin g  so  few  as an 
in d ic a tio n  o f  th e  weakness o f  th e  Republic and o f  a l l  C h r is t ia n ity .
Rumors c ir c u la t in g  in  C onstantinople a ls o  m isled  th e  Turks; one rumor 
suggested  th a t th e  Venetians were having t o  spend n early  600,000 r e a l ie s  
a  month on th e  war and th a t  a t  such a r a te  th e  Republic could  not hope 
to :h o ld  out very  lo n g . A .S .V ., Dip. R e l. ,  C onstantinop li, F i lz a  129, 
L etter  246, August 26 , 1646, Giovanni Soranzo.
87 . A .S .V ., D ip. R e l . ,  C on stan tinop li, L etter  227 , (coded),
March 1 0 , 1646, Giovanni. Soranzo. Soranzo d id  h is  b e s t  t o  avoid  com plete 
dependence on th e  French ambassador fo r  h is  contact w ith  th e  Sultan  and 
th e  Grand V iz ie r , but h is  e f fo r t s  had l im ite d  e f f e c t .
88 . A .S .V ., Dip. R e l . ,  C on stan tinop li, F i lz a  129, L etter  234,
May 1 5 , 1646, Soranzo, Vigne d i Pera. Soranzo attem pted t o  make con­
ta c t s  through th e  so n -in -la w  o f  th e  Sultan  and th e  Captain o f  th e  Sea, 
Mussa B assa, in  order t o  ach ieve seme d ip lom atic lev e ra g e.
89 . A .S .V ., Dip. R e l . ,  C on stan tinop li, F i lz a  129 , L etter  230, 
March 2 5 , 1646, Soranzo; A .S .V ., Dip. R e l . ,  C on stan tinop li, F i lz a  130, 
L etter  256 ,  October, 1646; V a lier o , H isto r ia , pp. 108-110.
90 . A .S .V ., Dip. R e l . ,  C onstantinop li, L etter  con ta in in g  th e
contents o f  another l e t t e r  dated November 30, 1646, and L etter  262, 
January 4 , 164-7 (1646), Soranzo, Vigne d i Pera. The Sultan  demanded 
th a t th e  3 0 ,000  r e a l is  t r ib u te  p aid  by th e  Bnperor be ra id ed  t o  as much 
as 200,000 r e a l is ;  in  t h i s  way th e  Sultan could m aintain p ressu re on
th e  Qnpire by a masked th re a t o f  having a war on two fr o n t s ,  one w ith  th e  
Turks and th e  one in  Europe.
91. A .S .V ., Dip. R e l. ,  F rancia , F i lz a  104, L etter  359» June 26, 
1646, and L etter  323, A p ril 1 0 , 1646, B a tt is ta  N ani, P a r is . A .S .V .,  
Am basciatori D isp a cci, Spagna, F ilz a  80 , L etter  115, February 21 , 1646, 
G u istin ian , Madrid. On th e  character o f  Innocent X, Giovanni G uistin ian  
th e  Venetian ambassador t o  Rome wrote: "There i s  cu rren tly  th e  o p in io n ...
not on ly  among th e  French but fo r  a good part o f  th e  oth er n a tio n s , th a t  
th e  Pope i s  o f  Spanish gen ius ( s i c )  and th er efo r e  much in c lin e d  to  favor  
th e  in t e r e s t s  o f  th a t crown. I  do not deny th a t th e  temperment o f  His 
H olin ess i s  more Spanish in  manner, being in  h is  nature very  slow  in
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movement, grave in  sp ea k in g ,. .  .b ut a s  fo r  th e  r e s t  he does not do more 
fo r  them (th e  Spanish) than fa r  another n a t io n .. . . "  G uistin ian  a lso  
noted  how th e  "Trench lament o f  having a  Pop. badly in c lin e d  toward  
another n ation  and another*s i n t e r e s t s . . . . ” N icolo  Barozzi and 
Gugliolmo Berchet ( e d s .) ,  Le B ela zio n i d e g li  s t a t i  Suropei l e t t e  a l  
Senato dafeli am basciatori Yenezianl n e l  s e c o lo  decim osettim o (V en ice, 
1^ 56-7 8 1 7 1 1 , S er ie s  I I I ,  Roma, pp. 131-131*. (H erein after“referred  
to  as Barozzi and Berchet, B e la z io n i Am basciatori. )
92. As B a tt is ta  Rani, th e  Venetian ambassador in  P aris fa c e -  
tio u S y  remarked, i f  Prance w ished to  invade I t a ly  she would not be 
stopped from doing so  by "the r id icu lo u s  armament o f  th e  Pope, nor th e  
s ix  g a l l e y s . . . ( o f )  th e  Grand Duke o f  T u sc a n y ...." ;  ra th e r , Nani, 
concludes, th e  Pope "does not w ish t o  spend money." See A .S .V ., Dip.
R e l. ,  Francia, F ilz a  104, L etter  304, March 8 ,  1646, B a tt is ta  Nani, P a r is .
93 . Ludwig von P astor , H istory  o f  th e  Popes, tr a n s. by Dam 
Ernest Graf (London, 19 4^0) ,  XXX, pp. 360^366 . The Pope d id  grant to  
Venice 100,000 scud i in  th e  form o f e c c l e s ia s t i c a l  reva lues in  J u ly ,
1649, and th e  f l e e t  o f  th e  p o n t if f  served  in  th e  war in  1645, 1647, and
. 1648.
94. Eugenio Bacchione, "Venezia e  Genova durante l a  guerra 
d i C andia," Deputazione d i s to r ia  p a tr ia  per l e  V enezia, VI (1943), 
pp. 28- 2 9 .
95 . I b id . ,  pp. 31-37* Venice even t r ie d  r e so lv in g  th e  d isp u te  
about precedence in  th e  armada by o ffe r in g  t o  p la c e  th e  e n t ir e  f l e e t  
under th e  command o f  th e  Pope; th is  p lo y  d id  not work however. A lso , 
many peop le were o f  th e  opin ion  th a t Spanish p ressure and in flu en ce
in  Genoa helped  bring about th e  sta lem ate in  t h is  d isp u te  s in c e  Spain d id  
not want a strong Venice in  th e  t e r r i t o r ie s  o f  th e  Terraferma. A weakened 
Venice in  th e  peninsu la  gave Spain more lev era g e in  th e  Duchy o f  Milan.
96 . See fo r  example th e  E sposiz ion i P r in c ip i, C o lleg io , 1648, 
R e g is tr i 57, passim .
97- Romanin, S to r ia , pp. bOk-kOJ. The f i r s t  b a llo t  on th e  
proposal t o  e le c t  24 nobles to  tr e a t  fo r  peace w ith  th e  Turkish repre­
s e n ta t iv e s  f a i le d  on November 1 9 , 1647 by a v o te  o f  37 t o  74 w ith  24 
a b sta in in g . (Romanin, S to r ia , p . *405,  n . l ) .  There was on ly  one extrem ely  
"dovish" proposal made which advocated peace a t  any p r ic e , includ ing  
th e  surrender o f  th e  is la n d ; t h i s  was made by two S a v ii o f the C ouncil, 
Giovanni Bno and N icolo  D e ls in o . This proposal re ce iv e d  few v o te s ,  
many o f  th e  senators f e e l in g  th a t D elsino  had proposed i t  only because 
h is  son remain ed a prisoner o f  th e  Turks. V a lier o , H isto r ia , pp. 145-146.
98 . Romanin, S to r ia , p . 4D8; V a lier o , H isto r ia , pp. 211-213, 217-219. 
The tro u b les  which apparently paralyzed  much o f  th e  Ottoman srpire in  1648- 
1649 seem to  have been re so lv e d  by th e  f a l l  o f  1649, fo r  a t  t h is  tim e th e  
Turks renewed w ith  v igor  t h e ir  a ssa u lt on Candia. Part o f  the Turkish 
tro u b le  had stemmed from a pay demand by th e  J a n issa r ie s  which was f in a l ly  
s e t t le d .
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CHAPTER IV 
YEARS OF QUIET, 165O-I666
From approxim ately 1650 u n t il  1667 th e  war a t  Candia en tered  a 
semi-dormant s ta g e . By mid-century th e to n e , in t e n s it y ,  and general 
scope o f  th e  war had become fa ir ly  w e ll  d e lin e a ted . With on ly  a few 
excep tions th e war dragged on in to  a s ta te  o f  c o s t ly  and exhausting  
a t t r i t i o n ,  a war where "basic s tr a te g ie s  changed l i t t l e  and where th e  
"battles won and l o s t  seemed to  have only ephemeral impact. The war 
seemed more a t e s t  o f  perseverance and te n a c ity  rather than a t r i a l  o f  
courage or cunning.
Symbolic o f  the enemy's in ten tio n  to  remain entrenched on Candia 
was th e con struction  in  1650 o f  th e fo r tr e s s  o f  Nuova Candia or Hew 
Candia. From a m ilita r y  viewpoint Nuova Candia p resented  no s ig n i f i ­
cant th r e a t. Though b u i l t  only a m ile or so  from Candia i t s e l f ,  th e  
Turkish fo r tr e s s  had no adequate water supp ly , i t s  w a lls  were h igh ly  
vulnerable to  su rp rise a tta ck , and i t  was cut o f f  from th e sea . S t i l l  
th ere were garrisoned behind i t s  w a lls  four thousand in fan try  and e ig h t  
hundred cavalry which could  be used to  prevent any Venetian attempt to  
r e lie v e  Candia, and no m atter how fe e b le  th e  new fo r tr e s s '  defenses i t  
was a much b e tte r  p lace to  pass a w in ter than the rain-drenched and 
unprotected tr en ch es. And d esp ite  i t s  m ilita r y  l im ita t io n s ,  Nuova 
Candia was a v i s ib le  and constant reminder th a t th e  a m ie s  o f  the Sul­
tan  were not about to  end th e s ie g e  o f  Candia in  th e  very near fu tu r e .1
Judging th e  con d ition  o f  Candia th e Venetian defenders a lso  seemed
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in te n t on r e s is t in g  th e  Turkish s ie g e .  The fo r tr e s s  was a la rg e  com­
p le x  measuring between th ree  and fou r m iles  in  circum ference. In  l in e  
w ith  th e  a r c h ite c tu r a l tr a d it io n  o f  th e  m ilita r y  in  th e  seventeenth  
century , th e  tow ers and bulwarks were arranged and designed in  th e  
shape o f  an arrow so  th a t th e  w a lls  would be b e tt e r  ab le t o  w ithstand  
th e  impact o f  th e  improved a r t i l l e r y  and so th a t each se c tio n  o f  th e  
fo r tr e s s  could be p rotected  by flan k in g  f i r e  from another. A fo r tr e s s  
o f  t h is  p attern  demanded constant a tte n tio n  and con tin ua l ou tlays o f  
money. Yet a f te r  more than f iv e  years o f  r e le n t le s s  Turkish a tta c k s , 
General Tomeo Pompeo could w r ite  co n fid en tly  in  1651 th a t th e  f o r t i f i ­
ca tio n s a t  Candia were in  a s ta t e  o f  " to ta l  p e r fe c t io n ."  Another ob­
ser v er , a c e r ta in  Father Roberto Solaro from M alta, confirmed t h is  
op in ion , n oting  how th e  f o r t i f ic a t io n s  o f  Candia were in  optimum con d i-
p
tio n  and how repa ir and con struction  continued apace. C onstruction  o f  
new bulwarks and escarpments and th e  re p a ir  o f  o ld  ones was a constant 
chore but one upon which th e s a lv a tio n  o f  th e  c i t y  u lt im a te ly  r e s te d .  
The race to  save Candia was freq u en tly  reduced to  a fr u str a tin g  co n te st  
aimed only at see in g  how quick ly  a breach made by th e  enemy could  be 
sea led  or how ra p id ly  money needed t o  purchase con struction  su p p lies  
could be ra ised . From the apparent con d ition  o f  Candia a t m id-century 
i t  would seem th e Venetians were a t  l e a s t  hold ing  th e ir  own.^
Entrenched behind t h is  array o f  s to n e , con crete , and earthenworks 
was th e  mongrel mercenary army o f th e  Venetian R epublic. The s iz e  o f  
t h is  mercenary garrison  o f  I t a l ia n ,  Greeks, and Germans varied  consid ­
erably w ith  each new season , but g en er a lly  th ere  were in  th e  1650's
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"between four and s ix  thousand men in  a l l .  By one est im a te , fo r  example,
there were in  1651 about 5,300 a c t iv e  in fa n try  s ta tio n ed  in  th e  c i ty ;
seven years la te r  another estim ate p laced  th e  number o f  e f fe c t iv e s  a t  
1*
k,k00. E xactly how many a d d itio n a l men should have been assigned to  
th e  fo r tr e s s  so as to  insu re i t s  d efense or to  enable th e  commanders to  
i n i t i a t e  a counterattack  i t  i s  im possib le to  sa y , but g en er a lly  th e  
consensus seems to  have been th a t th ere should have been a t  l e a s t  two 
or th ree  thousand more paid  in fa n try  a t a l l  tim es.  ^ Yet ju s t  maintain­
ing a minimal le v e l  must have been a d i f f i c u l t  ta sk . The is la n d 's  
harsh clim ate and th e  army's irr eg u la r  pay made d eser tio n s frequent.
With men o ften  forced  to  s le e p  in  the open in  co ld  and r a in , i t  was not 
su rp risin g  to  learn  o f  s e n t in e ls  f le e in g  t o  th e  countryside in  order to  
escape th e  rig o rs  o f  such a l i f e .  O ccasionally  fu g it iv e s  became so  
numerous th a t i t  was n ecessary  to  i n f l i c t  th e  sev e rest o f  p e n a lt ie s  in ­
cluding execution  on d eser ter s  so as to  stem th e  exodus.^
The se v e r ity  o f  duty a t Candia a lso  generated d isconten t w ith in  
th e  o f f ic e r  ranks as w e ll . Frequently a Venetian noble found serving  
h is  country a long-term  p rop osition . Years and years had to  be spent 
at sea  or entrenched behind th e  w a lls  o f  Candia, a l l  w ith few personal 
rewards fo r  th e  s a c r if ic e s  involved . Moreover, i t  was not unusual to  
fin d  a request fo r  lea v e  or tr a n sfer  denied or passed over in  s i le n c e .  
Luca Francesco Barbaro p e tit io n e d  th e S ign oria  in  th e  spring o f  1659 
for leave to  return to  Venice and look a fte r  th e  a f fa ir s  o f  h is  head­
l e s s  household; one year la te r  he s t i l l  had not received  an a ff irm a tiv e  
7
reply to  h is  not unreasonable request.
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The most exasperating com plaint o f  th e  men a t  Candia, e n l is t e d  men 
and o f f ic e r s  a l ik e ,  vas th e  ir r e g u la r ity  o f  th e  pay. Stranded as they  
were w ith in  th e  d eso la te  co n fin es  o f  a  b esieged  c i t y ,  th e  on ly  p leasures  
and am enities open to  th e men were th o se  which demanded money. Unless 
a s o ld ie r  were a l lo t te d  h is  pay a t  regu lar in te r v a ls  he more o ften  than 
not would fin d  h im self com pletely im poverished; in  such a s ta t e  he would 
e ith e r  fin d  h im se lf unable to  purchase th e  goods he wanted from the 
c i t y ’ s c iv i l ia n  population  or would be forced  to  r e ly  on th e  se r v ic e s  
o f  d isrep utab le cr ed it agen ts. By th e  tim e th e  s o ld ie r 's  pay arr ived , 
he had spent so much in  advance and for  in t e r e s t  charges th a t he was 
v ir tu a l ly  enslaved  in  a p erp etual c y c le  o f  indebtedness. Others who 
were fortu nate enough to  avoid th e  grasps o f  th e  loan  sharks freq uently  
found them selves on pay-day in  p o sse ss io n  o f  la rg e  q u a n tit ie s  o f  money 
and, l ik e  the p roverbia l drunken s a i lo r ,  wound up spending la v is h  sm s  
w ithout caution  or r e s tr a in t .^  So ch aotic  was th e  pay system th a t i t  
a ffe c te d  even th e o f f ic e r s .  In 1659 th e Prow ed itor-G eneral made r e f ­
erence to  th e b it te r n e ss  and d is s a t is f a c t io n  among th e  jun ior o f f ic e r s ;
many o f  th ese  were men w ith  fa m il ie s ,  he warned, and u n less  more money
9
was forwarded immediately th er e  would be troub le ahead.
Equally e s s e n t ia l  to  th e  su rv iv a l o f  Candia was th e  maintenance o f  
a continuous supply o f  grain  and fodder. Grain was needed fo r  the  
manufacture o f  th e army's b a s ic  s ta p le ,  b i s c u i t s ,  and fodder t o  su sta in  
th e  horses o f  th e  cavalry . One o f  th e  major l o g i s t i c a l  problems con­
frontin g  any p ro w e d ito r  o f  th e  is la n d  was to  m aintain or increase  th e  
supply o f  th ese  'b i s c u i t s ' ;  a t tim es th e  reserves o f  th is  H f e -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
su sta in in g  commodity "became dangerously low. In ad d ition  w ine, m eats, 
m unitions, and c lo th in g  had to  "be imported t o  Candia from Venice or 
various p arts o f  th e  archip elago. Even wood, v i t a l  fo r  th e  construc­
t io n  o f  cannon ca rria g es  and fo r  use in  repa ir  o f  th e  fo r tr e s s ,  had to  
he brought in  by sea . There was such sh ort supply o f  tim ber on certa in  
occasion s th a t th e  m asts o f  u s e le s s  g a lle y s  had to  s e r v e .1® Opinion 
varied  as to  th e  cheapest and most e f f i c i e n t  method by which th e  needs 
o f  Candia could be su p p lied , some o f f i c i a l s  arguing th a t i t  was more 
econom ical to  buy d ir e c t ly  from th e sources o f supply in  th e  archipelago  
w ith  others m aintaining th a t i t  would be w iser to  avoid  h ir in g  charges 
by trad in g  as much as p o ss ib le  a t V en ice .11 No m atter how th e  su pp lies  
were obtained , i t  was obvious th a t Candia was an extrem ely s t e r i l e  i s ­
land from which i t  was im possib le to  fu rn ish  even th e  sim p lest and most 
e s s e n t ia l  o f  an army’ s needs. With Turkish fo rces  firm ly  in  co n tro l 
o f th e  cou n trysid e, even th e  meager q u a n tit ie s  o f  forage and foods  
g en er a lly  a v a ila b le  a t Candia were denied t o  th e  Venetian d efen d ers.12
Compounding the d i f f ic u l ty  of sa tis fy in g  the  needs of the  Vene­
t ia n  army a t Candia was the  existence of a larg e  c iv i l ia n  population 
which inhabited the c ity .  In 1655 a f te r  ten  years of warfare there  
were estimated to  be about ten  to  eleven thousand c iv i l ia n  inhab itan ts 
w ith in  the walls of th e  c i ty ,  s ix  to  seven thousand o f which were 
women, ch ild ren , and aged. Besides consuming s izab le  q u an titie s  of 
food and c lo th ing , these c iv i l ia n s ,  a t le a s t  p o te n tia l ly , represented 
a possib le  th re a t  to  the  secu rity  of the  fo r tre s s .  One p row ed ito r 
in  th e  m id-l650' s  feared th a t  the  misery of th e i r  l iv e s  might drive 
them to  open reb e llio n  or to  conspiracy w ith the enemy. Furthermore,
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th ere were many o f  th e se  c iv i l ia n s  who had r e la t iv e s  in  th e  countryside  
through whoa inform ation might in ad verten tly  he lea k ed .1^ What wor­
sened m atters was th a t most o f  th e  productive c i t iz e n r y  who were pos­
sesse d  o f  a trade or ta le n t  had already f le d  th e  c i t y  in  order t o  seek  
a new l i f e  wcmewhere e l s e  in  th e  archipelago or in  th e  c i t i e s  o f  the  
Terraferma. The lo s s  o f  s k i l l e d  a r t isa n s  from Candia proved so  harmful 
in  th e  eyes o f  Prow ed itor-G eneral Barbaro th a t he is su e d  in  1658 a
decree forbidding departure from th e  c i t y  w ithout f i r s t  procuring an 
ll*
o f f i c i a l  l ic e n s e  to  do so .
F in a lly , to  appreciate com pletely  th e  l o g i s t i c a l  problems fac in g  
Venetian commanders, one must keep in  mind th a t th e  Turkish s ie g e  o f  
Candia was almost constant and one from which l i t t l e  r e s p ite  was en­
joyed. The constancy o f  th e  s ie g e  a l l  but precluded th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  
o f  recouping lo s s e s  or accum ulating a re sp e cta b le  re serv e  o f  v i t a l  
su p p lie s . The number o f  Turkish troops m aintained a t  Candia in  th e  
I6 5 C s varied  by as much as f i v e  or te n  thousand men, but u su a lly  th ere  
were somewhere between f i f t e e n  and twenty thousand enemy s o ld ie r s  at 
a l l  t im e s , excluding sev e ra l thousand more Turkish ser v a n ts , merchants, 
and general factotum s. Of th e s e ,  65-75 percent were custom arily  
sta tio n ed  at Candia w h ile the remainder were sc a tte r e d  throughout the  
kingdom at Rettimo and a t Canea.1  ^ Although a t t r i t io n  re su lt in g  from 
d ise a se  and combat c a su a lt ie s  was enormous, i t  was not uncommon fo r  s ix  
or seven thousand reinforcem ents t o  be sen t in  order to  re p le n ish  the  
Turkish army. Such seem ingly en d less su pp lies o f  manpower provided  
te r r ify in g  evidence o f  th e  enemy’ s cap acity  t o  absorb almost l im it le s s
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c a s u a lt ie s .  Not even the d isastrou s consequences o f  a plague seemed
ab le  to  r e s t r i c t  th e  manpower reserv es  a v a ila b le  t o  th e  Sultan . When
plague struck  th e  Ottoman empire in  l 6h7 , b a ilo  Soranzo warned th e
Senate not to  become l e s s  v ig i la n t  s in c e  th er e  was no one th ing  which
th e Turks could  ”more abundantly supply than t o  th e  providing o f  men 
„16
I I
As we have w itn esse d , once th e  i n i t i a l  shock o f  th e  f i r s t  few  
years o f  th e  war had subsided, th e s tr u g g le  fo r  Candia developed in to  
a t e s t  o f  l o g i s t i c a l  s k i l l  and perseverance ra th er  than a t e s t  o f  
momentary m ilita r y  genius or courage. The land  war on Candia and in  
Dalmatia r e f le c te d  th is  posture. Month a f t e r  month and year a f te r  year  
th e  s ie g e  continued. Operations o f  a m assive nature became a r a r ity  
as th e  psychology o f  lim ited  o b je c tiv e s  and l im ite d  warfare came to  
dominate more and more th e th inking o f  th e  m ilita r y  s t r a t e g is t s .  The 
1650's and th e  ea r ly  l6 6 0 ’ s are consequently b est represented  by the  
in d iv id u a l in c id e n t and not th e  crushing d e fe a t , by th e  f a l l  o f  is o la t e d  
outposts and c a s t e l l i  and not th e  capture o f  Candia or th e  t o t a l  an n i- 
h il ia t io n  o f  th e  enemy’s f l e e t .  Given th e  lim ite d  capacity  o f  both 
powers on land as w e ll  as at s e a , th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t e ith e r  opponent 
might score an overwhelming v ic to r y  was reduced to  a minimum.
The p o lic y  o f  d efensive a ctio n  forced  on th e  weaker Venetian armies
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a t Candia n ev er th eless  included  c e r ta in  o ffe n s iv e  t a c t i c s .  Any pro­
longed defense which proved su c c e ss fu l n e c e s sa r ily  demanded occasion a l 
o ffe n s iv e  th ru sts  in  order to  fo r ce  th e  b es ieg in g  enemy fo r c e s  o f f  
balance. By d ir e c tin g  tim e ly  a s sa u lt s  aga inst Canea and o th er Turkish 
p o s it io n s ,  th e  Venetians forced  th e  enemy to  d isp erse  i t s  troops over 
a much wider area and prevented a t o t a l  concentration  o f  Turkish troops 
aga inst Candia i t s e l f .
One such 'd iv e rs io n a r y 1 a ttack  came in  1650 when a Venetian task  
fo rce  was sen t aga in st the is la n d -fo r tr e s s  o f  San Todoro; th e  fo r tr e ss  
s itu a te d  on t h is  t in y  rock is la n d  was the spot where th e  f i r s t  Turkish 
a ssa u lt had begun in  161*5 • The Venetian ra id  came in  th e  dawn o f  July  
i t ,  1650. With th e  support o f  sev e ra l g a lle y s  th e  beachhead was secur­
ed, and, a f te r  two u n su cc essfu l attem pts, Albanian in fan try  fo r ced  th e  
enemy from th e  is la n d . The v ic to r y  was, however, purely  p sy c h o lo g ic a l. 
Since San Todoro la y  on ly a few m iles  o ffshore from th e  beaches adja­
cent to  Canea, th e  is la n d  should have been s tr a te g ic a l ly  inv a lu a b le  in  
harassing  Turkish sh ipping in  th e  area. In f a c t ,  the l im ite d  s iz e  and 
dilap id ated  con d ition  o f  th e  fo r tr e s s  on San Todoro made i t  m i l i t a r i ly  
unsu ited  for  such a r e s p o n s ib i l i ty .  L ikew ise, th e  lack  o f  fr esh  water 
at San Todoro p roh ib ited  th e  s ta t io n in g  o f  more than a handful o f  
Venetian g a lle y s  th e r e . Now th a t th e  Turkish commanders a t  Canea had 
been a ler ted  by th e  su rp rise  attack  on San Todoro, they  would undoubt­
ed ly  watch any a l l ie d  movements in  the area more c a r e fu lly . Under such 
circum stances, i t  was hardly su rp ris in g  th a t w ith in  a year th e  Venetians 
demolished th e  fo r tr e s s  and abandoned the is la n d  i t s e l f .  The abondon-
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ment o f  San Todoro and th e lo s s  in  1650 o f  S i t t i a  a t th e  eastern  end o f  
Candia were w ithout question  d isap p oin tin g  fa i lu r e s .  They d id tend to  
confirm , however, th e  "belief th a t V enice would only weaken her d efensive  
p o s it io n  i f  she continued t o  m aintain such d is ta n t and h igh ly  vulnerable
-* 1T s i t e s .
Ho major Venetian land o ffe n s iv e  was again  undertaken u n t i l  165U, 
when Lorenzo D e lf in o  le d  an a s sa u lt  a ga in st th e  Turkish-held fo r tr e s s  
o f Chnin in  Dalm atia. This was a daring operation  considering th e  d is ­
tance o f  Chnin from th e coast and i t s  r e la t iv e  proxim ity to  Turkish 
l in e s  o f communication in  th e  in t e r io r .  This ra id  f a i le d  when sev e ra l 
thousand Turkish reinforcem ents arr ived  to  rout th e  besiegers."*"^ Not 
fo r  another s ix  years would an operation  o f  even t h is  modest proportion  
be in i t ia t e d ;  whether in  Dalmatia or on Candia, th e  s o r t ie  against
Chnin remained th e  exception  to  a m ilita r y  philosophy now more than
19ever concerned w ith  th e maintenance o f  th e  s ta tu s  quo.
D espite th e  weakened s ta t e  o f  Turkish fo r ces  during th e  la t e  1650*s
nothing o f  importance occurred u n t il  th e  year 1660. At t h is  tim e
France, r e c e n tly  freed  from European war by th e  Peace o f  the Pyrenees
in  1659, sen t a French exped itionary fo rce  t o  Candia t o  help p a r tic ip a te  
20
in  a s ie g e  o f  Canea, There were only about2,500 Turkish s o ld ie r s  at 
Canea and i t  was hoped th a t the French, in  conjunction with Venetian 
naval support, might be ab le to  sweep th e Turks from Canea and th e  
surrounding fo r tr e s se s  on th e Bay o f  Suda and perhaps eventually  from 
Candia i t s e l f .  The combined task  fo rce  o f  four thousand in fa n try , two 
hundred cava lry , and f i f t e e n  sh ips sen t from France under th e command
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1o f  Prince Amerigo d 'E ste succeeded only in  capturing sev e ra l o f  th e  
Turkish p o s it io n s  e n c ir c lin g  th e  Bay o f  Suda, "but f a i le d  t o  force th e  
ca p itu la tio n  o f  Canea. As much had been expected  o f  P rince Amerigo's 
ex p ed itio n , th e  fa i lu r e s  o f  1660 appeared even more ignom inious and 
dem oralizing. 'When Turkish reinforcem ents arrived  t o  ensure th e con­
tin ued  defense o f  Canea, th e  a l l ie d  force  ra p id ly  d is in teg r a ted ; th e  
a u x il ia r ie s  departed Candia in  September, th e  Venetian Captain-General 
requested  perm ission  to  re lin q u ish  h is  command, and th e  d isco n so la te
P r i n c e  A m e r ig o  d i e d  m y s t e r i o u s l y  a  f e w  m o n th s  l a t e r  o n  t h e  i s l a n d  o f  
21Paros.
While th e armies o f  Venice continued t o  concentrate th e ir  e f fo r t s  
on m aintaining the m ilita r y  sta tu s  quo o f th e  l a t e  l 6U0 ' s ,  th e  Venetian  
navy w ith  i t s  marines waged a more vigorous campaign aga in st th e  enemy. 
But in  s p it e  o f  th e  re p u b lic 's  in ten tio n  to  p ress  th e  Turks at se a  and 
in  th e is la n d s  and co a sts  o f  th e Aegean and A d r ia tic , th e  ear ly  l 650's  
seemed a somewhat d isappoin ting  sequel to  th e  su cce sses  o f  men l ik e  
Giacomo da Riva. For one reason or another, from 16U9 u n t i l  1651 
attempts to  blockade th e  tr a n s it  o f  su p p lies  from Constantinople to  
Canea ended in  fa i lu r e .  N either R iva's r e c k le s s  daring at Fochies in  
16U9 nor th e V enetian v ic to r y  over th e  Turkish f l e e t  in  th e  Cyclades in  
1651 r e su lte d  in  a d e c is iv e  m ilita r y  triumph. No irr ep la c ea b le  p ortion  
o f the enemy's armada had been captured or destroyed , and no success  
had been reached in  severing  the l i f e l i n e  o f  Turkish su p p lies  flow ing
• . o 22i n t o  C a n e a .
T h e  n e x t  tw o  y e a r s  w e r e  e q u a l l y  f r u s t r a t i n g .  T h e  a r m a d a ,  now
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•under the  command of Leonardo Foscolo, the  hero of Dalmatia, p e rs is ted  
in  i t s  po licy  of search and destroy missions, but fa i le d  to  engage the  
enemy in  any major confrontations. Unable to  force the  enemy to  b a tt l e ,  
Foscolo concentrated h is  a tten tio n  on minor p o rts  and fo rtre sses  in  the 
hope th a t  gradually  the  Sultan would lo se  e ith e r  the  w il l  or th e  capac­
i ty  to  continue. Foscolo’s stra teg y  le d  to  occasional success, such as 
th e  capture of the  f o r t if ie d  island  of Schiro north of Negroponte.
A gainst v i t a l  Turkish ports and depots such as M alvasia, th e  Venetian  
g a lle y s  were seldom s u f f ic ie n t ;  Foscolo tr ie d  h im self in  1653 to  s e iz e
23M alvasia but Turkish r e s is ta n c e  was to o  g re a t. Even catastrophes 
u nrela ted  to  th e war, such as th e  r e v o lt  on Cyprus and th e  a cc id e n ta l 
burning o f  la rg e  se c tio n s  o f  Constantinople in  1653, f a i le d ' t o  weaken
Oil
th e  cap acity  o f  th e  enemy t o  continue th e  war.
Although th e  fa c t  th a t th e  p r in c ip a l naval strategem  o f  th e  Vene­
t ia n  armada had been to  blockade th e  entrance o f  th e  D ardanelles as 
t ig h t ly  as p o s s ib le ,  no major engagements took  p lace  in  t h is  area u n t il  
n early  a decade a fte r  th e war had begun. Then fo r  four con secutive  
y ears everyth ing seemed to  revolve about what happened th e r e . From 
1651+ u n t il  1657 th ere  occurred at th e  D ardanelles a s e r ie s  o f  fu riou s  
c la sh es which s u p e r f ic ia lly  appeared d estin ed  to  have some u n a ltera b le  
e f f e c t  on th e  m ilita r y  in e r t ia .  At no tim e throughout the e n tir e  war 
d id  V enetian commanders seem so in ten t on re ta in in g  th e blockade and 
Turkish commanders so in ten t on escaping i t s  grip  as they  did during 
t h is  in ten se  p eriod .
By th e  spring o f  165^ th ere were in  blockade at the Dardanelles
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eig h t s o t t i l e  g a l le y s ,  two g a l le a s s e s ,  and f i f t e e n  t o  s ix te e n  navi a l l  
under th e  command o f  Giuseppe D e lf in o . Between th e  26th -27th  o f  May, a 
h a s t i ly  assembled Turkish f l e e t  c o n s is t in g  o f  more than fo r ty  g a l le y s ,  
s ix  maone, and tw enty or so navi attem pted to  s k ir t  th e blockade and 
escape t o  th e  sa fe ty  o f  a port fu rther south and c lo se r  to  Candia. An 
error on th e  part o f  sev e ra l Venetian commanders caused e ig h t Venetian  
navi to  be carried  a c c id e n ta lly  by a sw ift  current beyond th e  immediate 
area o f  th e  b a t t le .  N e v erth e less , th e  remainder o f  the Venetian f l e e t  
jo in ed  th e  chase. The a ctio n  which ensued co s t  th e  Turkish commander 
th ree  or four v e s s e ls  and th e  Venetians two. Losses o f  such minimal 
proportions warranted no s p e c ia l  acclaim , but many viewed th e  engagement 
as an undeniable V enetian v ic to r y  because th e  Turkish f l e e t  had been  
sca ttered  and forced  to  f l e e .  In a d d itio n , th e  'v ic to r y ' had been won 
by a Venetian armada o f  v a s t ly  sm aller s i z e .  Perhaps an exp lanation  
fo r  t h is  exuberance can b est be found in  th e  enervating  and c o lo r le s s  
in a c t iv ity  o f  the p ast ten  years o f  naval w arfare. U n fortun ately , th e  
prem aturity o f  th e  V enetian s a t is fa c t io n  was b it t e r ly  revea led  when 
th e sca tter ed  Turkish f l e e t  managed to  regather a t th e  port o f  Trey and, 
a ft e r  about a month, proceed s a fe ly  t o  Canea. Heroic and dramatic as 
th e b a tt le  o f  I65H appeared to  b e , i t  s t i l l  had f a i le d  to  in terr u p t th e
25flow  o f  su p p lie s  and reinforcem ents to  th e  Turkish armies a t Candia.
Venetian and Turkish f l e e t s  met again a t th e  Dardanelles in  June 
o f 1655. S ince i t  was thought th a t th e  Turks were preparing a la rg e  
convoy at M alvasia, many o f  th e  g a lle y s  o rd in a r ily  assigned t o  the  
D ardanelles were away from th e ir  p o st. C onsequently, when th e  Turkish
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armada of sixty galleys moved to  break the  blockade, i t  was confronted 
w ith a Venetian force no more than one th ird  to  one h a lf  i t s  s iz e . The 
b a tt le  which followed witnessed th e  capture of th ree  Turkish su ltans 
and the d estruc tion  of perhaps a dozen other Turkish v esse ls ; th e  Vene­
tians lo s t  one sh ip , the  Golia, which had exploded during the  f ig h t.
As had happened so frequently  in  the  p a s t,  the  crippled  Turkish f le e t  
succeeded in  reassembling i t s  survivors in  the  sa fe ty  of one of the 
Turkish ports  to  the south, th is  time a t  Focchies. Here the  enemy a r­
mada made i t s  rep a irs  and waited u n t i l  th e  temporary Venetian blockade
had to  be l i f t e d  a month la te r  so th a t  a l l  Venetian forces could be 
27
concentrated in  an attack  on M alvasia. That same year tw elve Turkish 
g a lle y s  ev en tu a lly  did a rr ive  at Canea and th e other enemy sh ip s a t sea  
managed to  return  s a fe ly  to  C on stan tinop le.2® The campaigns o f  1655 
again revea led  th e  lack  o f  depth in  th e  Venetian navy. Had th er e  been 
s u f f ic ie n t  numbers o f  g a lle y s  to  m aintain both th e  blockade o f  Focchies 
and th e  D ardanelles and at th e  same tim e to  carry through th e a s sa u lt  
on M alvasia the enemy might have been se r io u s ly  weakened.
The only other naval actio n  by th e Venetian armada in  1655 which 
d eserves a tten tio n  came w ith the sweep o f  sev e ra l is la n d s in  th e  Aegean 
archipelago. During th e  summer p rio r  t o  th e  unsu ccessfu l s ie g e  o f  
M alvasia, one squadron o f the armada under Captain-General M orosini 
captured the Turkish fo r tr e s s  o f  Volo s itu a te d  in  th e Gulf o f  Volo ju s t  
north o f  Negroponte, and a lso  subjugated th e  Greek is la n d  o f  Aegina 
where Turkish agents had attempted to  subvert the lo y a lty  o f  th e  is la n d 's  
c it iz e n r y . This la te r  su ccess not only avoided th e  danger o f having a
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Turkish depot es ta b lish e d  in  the southern part o f  th e  arch ip elago , but 
i t  a lso  tended to  confirm and re in fo r ce  Venetian con tro l over th e  other 
is la n d s  in  th e  area. In t h is  p a rticu la r  c a se , th e  p u n itiv e  a ctio n  
taken on Aegina le d  th e  neighboring is la n d s to  pay obedience and tr ib ­
u te  to  V enice w ithout q u e stio n . The actio n  taken a t Aegina was, l ik e  
sim ila r  a c tio n  taken at Samos in  1651, designed p rim arily  to  remind th e  
inh ab itants o f  th e  archipelago o f th e continued m ilita r y  might o f  th e  
Republic and to  insure th a t in  no way would th e  is la n d e r ’s lo y a lty  to
29Venetian ru le  be undermined or challenged.
By fa r  th e  most dramatic o f  a l l  th e  engagements at th e  Dardanelles 
came in  1656 and 1657. In th ese  two con fronta tions th e  Venetian f l e e t  
disp layed  th e  seamanship and daring which had g iven  i t  dominion in  the  
eastern  M editerranean. Gathered a t th e  D ardanelles in  th e  summer of 
1656 were over th ir t y  a l l ie d  galleys,^®  seven g a le a sse s  and tw en ty -fiv e  
v e sse ls  under th e  command o f  Lorenzo M arcello , Captain-General o f  the  
Sea. Amassed w ith in  the sec u r ity  o f  th e  s t r a it s  was a Turkish armada 
larger than th e  a l l i e d  f l e e t  by some th ir t y  a d d itio n a l g a l le y s .  To 
a s s i s t  th e  Turkish f l e e t  in  i t s  escape from th e  b lockade, between ten  
and twenty thousand men were p osition ed  w ith  a r t i l l e r y  along th e  shores 
o f  the Sea o f Marmara w ith  orders to  impede th e  movement o f  th e  Vene­
tia n  g a lle y s . R ecently erected  fo r tr e s se s  a t c r i t i c a l  junctures pro­
vided a d d itio n a l land support for  th e Turkish v e s s e ls .  The conformation  
which th e  Venetian blockade had to  assume was consequently half-moon in  
shape w ith the in t e r io r  o f  th e half-moon arc moving arrow -like toward 
th e middle o f th e s t r a i t .  Besides the main element comprising the
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h a l f - m o o n ,  a  s e c o n d a r y  s q u a d r o n  o f  V e n e t i a n  g a l l e y s  h u g g e d  t h e  T u r k i s h  
c o a s t s  t o w a r d  A n a t o l i a ;  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w as  t o  p r e v e n t  T u r k i s h  
v e s s e l s  f r o m  e s c a p i n g  s o u th w a r d  b y  s k i r t i n g  t h e  b a t t e r y - p r o t e c t e d  s h o r e .
The w eather, o f  cou rse , remained u np red ictab le , and Turkish com­
manders had th e advantage o f  merely w a itin g  fo r  favorable winds which 
would d rive th e  Venetian g a lle y s  southwestwardly away from th e narrow 
entrance to  th e  s t r a i t s .  The Turks had one other 'n a tu ra l' advantage 
in  th e treacherous sea  currents o f  th e  D ardanelles. E levation  d if fe r ­
e n t ia ls  between th e  l e v e l  o f  th e  Black Sea and th a t o f  th e  Aegean 
created  a rush o f  water through th e  narrow s t r a it s  and made d e lic a te  
naval maneuvers a m ariner's nightm are.
At noon on th e  26th  o f June th e  Turkish adm iral, Captain Pasha 
Sinau, ordered h is  f l e e t  to  move w ith  great caution  along th e  A s ia tic  
coast p ast Ponta de Barbieri and h o p e fu lly  beyond th e  blockade in to  the  
open sea ; a favorable wind and current combined w ith  th e  a r t i l l e r y  o f  
th e  shore b a tte r ie s  were intended to  h inder any Venetian attempt to  
block  th e  route to  the south. As th e  Turkish v e s s e ls  s lip p ed  along the  
eastern  c o a s t lin e  under p rotection  o f  th e  co a sta l in s t a l la t io n s , th e  
furtherm ost Venetian g a lle y s  veered eastward in  an e f fo r t  t o  c lo se  in  
on th e  flan k  and rearguard o f  th e enemy. A fo r tu ito u s s h if t  in  th e  
wind aided  th is  advance u n it to  execute th e  maneuver w ith p e r fe c t io n . 
This maneuvers in  conjunction w ith  th e  o r ig in a l configuration  o f  the  
Venetian arm ada ,e ffective ly  entrapped th e  enemy f l e e t  between th e ir  own 
coast and th e a l l ie d  p o s it io n s . A ll  attem pts by Turkish a r t i l l e r y  f i r e  
from th e shore to  sh a tter  the Venetian encirclem ent fa i le d . Slowly th e
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trap  tigh tened . The b a tt l e  which followed la s te d  fourteen hours. Ca­
davers and burned h u lls  l i t t e r e d  the w ater; of those entrapped only a 
fo rtunate  few escaped the  pincer and f a t a l  grasp.
Venetian losses during the  fourteen hours were su b s ta n tia l;  th ree  
warships were burned beyond salvage and over th ree  hundred were among 
the dead and wounded, including the  armada’s Captain-General, Lorenzo 
Marcello. But even these sa c r if ic e s  were in sig n ific an t in  re la tio n  to  
the v icto ry  won. Approximately th ir te e n  g a lley s , s ix  n av i, and five  
maone f e l l  in to  Venetian hands; hundreds of prisoners were taken and 
thousands of C hristian  slaves compelled to  serve on Turkish galleys 
gained th e i r  freedom. Dozens of Turkish vesse ls  were e ith e r  damaged or 
destroyed and o thers found th e i r  only escape in  abandoning th e i r  ships 
on the beaches and ree fs  of the  easte rn  shore. Disagreement between 
the Maltese and the  Venetian u n its  concerning d iv is io n  of the  sp o ils  of 
war generated a touch of b itte rn e ss  among th e  v ic to rs ,  bu t l i t t l e  could 
d ispel the a ir  of ex u lta tion  which came in  the  wake of th is  unquestion­
ed triumph a t the  D ardanelles.^1
The Sultan was furious upon learning of the  catastrophic  destruc­
t io n  of h is  f le e t ,  and consternation spread throughout Constantinople 
for fear th a t th e  v icto rio u s  C hristians would soon be a t the gates of 
the  c ity  i t s e l f .  The death of Marcello had, however, l e f t  command of
the a ll ie d  armada in  question, and the booty-ladden Maltese s tra in ed
32to  retu rn  home with th e i r  p rizes . Furthermore, i t  was argued by some 
th a t the w isest s tra teg y  now was to  proceed d ire c tly  to  Candia and 
expel the Turkish in th is  moment of th e i r  weakness. Even though t.hio
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course of action  had been the plan of Captain-General M arcello, i t  was 
decided in  council to  t e s t  f i r s t  the  Turkish defenses on the  islands 
of Lemnos and Tenedos near th e  entrance to  th e  Dardanelles. The psy­
chological advantage of seizing two islan d s  so th rea ten ing ly  close to  
the very entrance of th e  Dardanelles was obvious to  a l l .  But re ten tio n  
of two islands hundreds of miles d is ta n t from the nearest major Vene­
tia n  base and almost w ith in  cannon shot of Constantinople was another 
m atter, one perhaps too tax ing  fo r the  sparse resources of the  Republic.
A lb e it, the decision was made, and the  v icto rious a l l ie d  armada sa iled  
33toward Tenedos.
Tenedos was the sm aller of the  two islands and lay  a  l i t t l e  more 
than ten  miles from the mouth o f th e  Dardanelles. A Venetian force 
under the  command of the  P row ed ito r dell'Armada Barbaro Badoer, estab­
lish ed  a foothold on the  island  and a f te r  s ix  days o f in tense combat 
forced the  surrender of the  fo r t re s s .  S im ilar success accompanied the 
assau lt on Lemnos, a much larg er islan d  tw enty-five to  t h i r ty  m iles 
d ire c tly  west of Tenedos and about f i f ty  m iles from the  entrance of 
the Dardanelles. This f e r t i l e  and ce n tra lly  located island  f e l l  before 
the  indefatigable  offensive of the  ju b ila n t Venetians. Haunting the 
successes which followed these recent endeavors was, however, th e  un­
deniable s tra in  which these fresh  campaigns had placed on the depleted 
reserves of men and supplies. Badoer was s t i l l  able to  forward to  
Candia several shiploads of b isc u its  and reinforcem ents, but much
a tten tio n  had to  be devoted to  the rep a ir  and reprovisioning of h is 
3L.own f le e t.
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The Venetian armada assembled in  1657 was under th e  command o f  
Lazzaro Mocenigo, a man whose heroism and temperament would seem to  
have in d ica ted  th a t th e  Senate was in ten t on pushing th e  war a outrance. 
Mocenigo reconnoitered  th e  general area around th e  is la n d  o f  Scio  
(C hios) ju s t  south  o f  Lesbos in  th e  hope th a t he might su rp rise a 
Turkish armada hugging th e  coast on i t s  way to  or from Constantinople; 
b esides th e  n in eteen  g a lle y s  and seven g a lea sses  w ith  th e  Captain- 
G eneral, another tw elve navi were ordered to  en force a blockade o f  th e  
D ardanelles. M ocenigo's hopes were r e a liz e d  on th e  3rd o f  May when th e  
Venetian squadron sp otted  a convoy o f  f i f t e e n  A lgerian  v e s s e ls .  In the  
ensuing chase and b a t t le  seven o f  th e  A lgerians were e ith e r  burnt or 
captured. This was a r e la t iv e ly  unimportant encounter. The importance 
o f  th is  p a rticu la r  engagement la y  not w ith i t s  momentary m ilita r y  s ig ­
n if ic a n c e  but w ith  i t s  rather unique h is t o r ic a l  d is t in c t io n . This 
b a t t le  at Scio  represented  one o f  th e  few tim es in  naval h is to r y  when 
a squadron comprised s o le ly  o f  g a lle y s  and g a le a sse s  singlehandedly  
defeated  an enemy fo r ce  c o n s is t in g  only o f  square-rigged  navi."^ I t  
was th e  conquest o f  mass and fire-pow er by superior seamanship and ma­
n eu v era b ility  .
Several months more were passed harassing the enemy before Mocenigo 
joined the Venetian, papal, and Maltese galleys already sta tioned  a t 
the D ard an e lles .^  When Mocenigo1s galleys had to  leave the blockade 
a few weeks la te r  in  order to  rep len ish  th e i r  supply of fresh  water, 
the Turkish armada t r i e d  to  s lip  by the remaining a ll ie d  ships. On the 
morning of the  17th of Ju ly , while adverse winds prevented the retu rn
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o f Mocenigo1s con tin gen t, th e  Turkish armada o f  t h ir ty  g a l le y s ,  eigh teen  
n a v i, ten  g a le a sse s  and numerous sa ich es  s e t  s a i l .  A ttacking without 
th e  support o f  Mocenigo*s g a l le y s ,  th e  a l l ie d  f l e e t  surrounded th e  enemy 
and in f l i c t e d  such severe lo s s e s  th a t th e  d isordered  Turkish armada was 
forced  to  r e t ir e  w ith in  th e sa fe ty  o f  th e  s t r a i t s .
The wind blew so fu r io u s ly  on th e  l8 th  th a t n eith er  f l e e t  was able  
to  conduct maneuvers or m aintain i t s  form ations w ith  any ex a ctitu d e .
On th e  19th  the winds subsided and sev e ra l Turkish g a lle y s  t r ie d  to  es­
cape th e  blockade. Having in a d v erten tly  m issed  th e  a c tio n  o f  th e  17th ,  
Mocenigo was understandably anxious to  engage th e  enemy a t th is  moment. 
Consequently he forced  h is  g a lle y  c lo se  t o  th e  Turkish shore in  an 
e f fo r t  to  c lo se  th e  path o f escape to  th e  en c ir c led  enemy sh ip s. This 
hazardous maneuver succeeded in  com pleting th e  investm ent o f  th e  enemy 
and r e su lte d  in  th e  lo s s  o f sev e ra l other Turkish g a lle y s  and n a v i.
The audacity o f  Mocenigo a lso  exposed h is  f la g sh ip  to  th e  dangers o f  
Turkish shore f i r e ,  and, subsequently c o s t  him h is  own l i f e .  Mocenigo*s 
body was recovered but th e  lo s s  l e f t  the a l l i e d  armada le a d e r le s s . 
Barbaro Badoer tem porarily  assumed th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  o f  Captain- 
G eneral, but Badoer had considerab le d if f i c u l t y  in  winning th e  unquali­
f ie d  support o f  th e  a u x ilia ry  u n its . Count Giovanni B ic h i, commander 
o f th e papal g a lle y s , o ffered  only minimal cooperation  and th e  M altese, 
under Gregorio Carafa, s a ile d  fo r  home w ith in  f iv e  days o f  th e  Captain- 
G eneral's death. Badoer ordered the remnants o f  the f l e e t  to  withdraw 
to  Tenedcsfor repa irs and refurbishm ent. I t  was at Tenedos where Badoer 
h im self d ied  on th e  16th o f August, l e s s  than one month a fte r  having
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a s s u m e d  M o c e n i g o 's  p o s t .  W i th  B a d o e r 's  d e a t h  t h e  com m and p a s s e d  t o  t h e  
i n e x p e r i e n c e d  L o r e n z o  R e n i e r .
Hoping to  p r o f it  from th e apparent d is in te g r a tio n  and d iso r ie n ta ­
t io n  o f  th e  Venetian f l e e t ,  th e Turks amassed an attack  fo rce  and moved 
aga inst Tenedos. As we have noted , Tenedos and Lemnos were a t th e  very  
doorstep o f  C onstantinop le, and due to  th e ir  proxim ity to  th e  Darda­
n e l le s  i t  was a b so lu te ly  im perative th a t th e  Turkish m ilita r y  recapture  
them. Not only was Venetian con tro l o f  them a ch allen ge to  th e  S u lta n 's  
hegemony o f  th e  northern Aegean, hut th e ir  lo s s  had a lso  forced  a re­
routing o f  Turkish commercial t r a f f i c  by way o f  Smyrna and camel cara­
vans. A la rg e  Turkish fo rce  was sen t a g a in st th e  fo r tr e s s  o f  Tenedos 
and captured i t  w ithout a f i g h t ; in  November a ft e r  two months o f  s ie g e
37L em nos l i k e w i s e  w as  s u r r e n d e r e d  b y  t h e  V e n e t i a n  u n i t  s t a t i o n e d  t h e r e .
The g lo r io u s aura o f  th e v ic to r ie s  o f  J u ly  17- 19thw ere thus some­
what overshadowed by th e  ignominious seq u el which had fo llow ed . Tenedos 
and Lemnos were l o s t ,  th e  blockade a t th e  D ardanelles had d is in teg r a ted  
in  th e  wake o f  a l l ie d  d isu n ity , and no su b s ta n tia l improvement in  th e  
s itu a tio n  at Candia had been e f fe c te d . The two encounters a t the  
D ardanelles o f  1656 and 1657 were unquestionably th e  most dramatic 
naval v ic to r ie s  o f  th e en tire  war. Yet in  a l l  o f  t h is  hero ic  destruc­
t iv e n e ss  n e ith er  th e w i l l  nor the cap acity  o f  th e enemy t o  continue th e  
war had been in  any way permanently or irrep arab ly  dim inished. The 
tim ely  recovery o f Tenedos and Lemnos and th e  seemingly en d less flow  o f  
reinforcem ents to  Candia were ample evidence o f  th e  depth and r e s il ie n c e  
o f the Turkish m ilita r y . Had Mocenigo l iv e d  to  carry th e b a tt le  to  th e
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g a t e s  o f  C o n s t a n t i n o p l e  i t s e l f ,  p e r h a p s  t h e  v i c t o r i e s  w o n  w o u ld  h a v e  
h a d  g r e a t e r  i m p o r t .  O r h a d  t h e  " b lo c k a d e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  t h e  D a r d a n e l l e s  
b e e n  e n f o r c e d  y e a r  r o u n d  i n s t e a d  o f  s e a s o n a l l y ,  p e r h a p s  t h e  T u r k i s h  
w i l l  t o  r e s i s t  c o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  s l o w l y  u n d e r m i n e d  b y  e c o n o m ic  s t r a n g u ­
l a t i o n .  B u t  a s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  s t o o d ,  t h e  s t r a t e g y  o f  b l o c k a d e  w a s ,  e v e n  
a t  i t s  m o s t  e f f e c t i v e ,  s t i l l  o n l y  a  p a r t i a l  a n s w e r .
I r o n i c a l l y ,  t h e  D a r d a n e l l e s  e n c o u n t e r s  o f  1656 a n d  1657 r e p r e s e n t  
t h e  m i l i t a r y  a p e x  o f  t h e  w a r  a t  s e a .  A f t e r  tw o  g l o r i o u s  v i c t o r i e s ,  t h e  
k i n d  o f  w h ic h  V e n e t i a n  c o m m a n d e rs  h a d  f o r  s o  l o n g  b e e n  h o p i n g ,  t h e  
n a v a l  w a r  e n t e r e d  a  q u i e s c e n t  a n d  a l m o s t  p a r a l y t i c  p h a s e .  M o s t  o f  t h e  
o p e r a t i o n s  u n d e r t a k e n  a t  s e a  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  s t r e t c h i n g  f r o m  1657 
u n t i l  1667 w e r e  l i m i t e d  i n  p u r p o s e ,  c o n c e r n e d  p r i m a r i l y  w i t h ,  h a r a s  s i n g  
e n em y  s h i p p i n g  o r  m a i n t a i n i n g  a t  s a t i s f a c t o r y  l e v e l s  t h e  r e i n f o r c e m e n t s  
a n d  s u p p l i e s  r e s e r v e d  a t  C a n d ia .  On o c c a s i o n  h e l p  a r r i v e d  f r o m  u n e x ­
p e c t e d  q u a r t e r s  s u c h  a s  t h e  f o u r  g a l l e y s  l o a n e d  b y  t h e  D u k e  o f  T u s c a n y  
i n  1658. B u t  g e n e r a l l y  a n  a i r  o f  i n d i f f e r e n c e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  E u r o p e 's  
a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d  t h e  w a r ;  e v e n  t h e  P o p e  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  w a r  i n  t h e  E a s t  
o f  l e s s  c o n c e r n  t h a n  h i s  ow n i n t e r n a l  p r o b le m s  a n d  t h u s  o r d e r e d  h i s  
p a p a l  s q u a d r o n  t o  r e m a in  i n  hom e w a t e r s  f r o m  1662 u n t i l  1 6 6 7 .^  T h i s  
a t t i t u d e  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  d i s i n t e r e s t  d e e p e n e d  a f t e r  1660 w h e n  t h e  a t t e n ­
t i o n  o f  E u r o p e  a n d  C h r i s t e n d o m  t u r n e d  t o w a r d  t h e  A u s t r o - T u r k i s h  w a r  o n  
39
t h e  b o r d e r s  o f  H u n g a r y .
B e s i d e s  t h i s  s h i f t  i n  E u r o p e a n  i n t e r e s t ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  n a v a l  s t r a t ­
e g i e s  o f  b o t h  a d v e r s a r i e s  w e r e  m o d i f i e d .  Z o r z i  M o r o s i n i  o b s e r v e d  how  
t h e  T u r k s ,  p r e v i o u s l y  l i t t l e  i n c l i n e d  t o w a r d  m a r i t i m e  m a t t e r s ,  h a d  b e ­
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come r e c e n tly  q u ite  s k il l e d  in  "avoiding th e  hazardous c o n te s t , and in  
d ir ec tin g  them selves in  n a v ig a tio n a l m atters w ith  very  exact caution ."
B y r e s t r i c t i n g  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  g a l l e y s  i n  a n y  o n e  f l o t i l l a  a n d  b y  r e l y i n g  
m o re  a n d  m o r e  o n  t h e  s e r v i c e s  o f  v a r i o u s  b e y s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  O tto m a n  
e m p i r e ,  t h e  T u r k i s h  c o m m a n d e rs  h o p e d  t o  m i n i m i z e  t h e i r  l o s s e s ;  a n y  o p ­
e r a t i o n s  t h e y  u n d e r t o o k  a t  s e a  w e r e  g e n e r a l l y  " w i t h i n  v e r y  n a r r o w  l i m i t s ,
1|0
and o ften  under th e  p ro te c tio n  o f  th e ir  own fo r tr e s s e s .  In a d d itio n , 
th e  str a teg y  o f  th e  Venetian armada sh if te d  away from a m assive b lock­
ade o f  th e  D ardanelles to  a p o lic y  orien ted  toward th e  more lim ited  
'search  and destroy' m ission . The Venetian str a te g y  which became char­
a c t e r i s t ic  o f th e  la t e r  years o f  th e  war c a lle d  fo r  a d iv is io n  o f  th e  
f l e e t  in to  separate squadrons whose prime o b je c tiv e  was to  scour th e  
archipelago and th e  Mediterranean in  search  o f  r e la t iv e ly  sm all enemy 
convoys o f  navi and sa ic h e s . Consequently, a f t e r  1657 no major encounter
b e tw e e n  l a r g e  f l e e t s  o f  V e n e t i a n  a n d  T u r k i s h  w a r s h i p s  o c c u r r e d  a t  t h e
In
D a r d a n e l l e s .
The 1658-59 campaigns under Francesco M orosini were energetic  but 
u n fr u it fu l. Most o f  M orosin i's e f fo r t s  were concentrated  on p u n itiv e  
ra id s aga in st sev e ra l is la n d s in  th e  Aegean archipelago and a lso  aga inst  
s p e c if ic  ta r g e ts  in  the Morea. One am bitious p ro je c t involved  an attempt . 
to  s e iz e  Canea from the Turks. U nfortunately, d if fe r e n c e s  between 
French and papal o f f ic e r s  delayed the a s sa u lt  long enough fo r  th e  Turk­
ish  commander to  learn  o f  th e  plan  and to  b o ls t e r  h is  garrison  w ith
a d d i t i o n a l  r e i n f o r c e m e n t s .  T h e  e n t e r p r i s e  a g a i n s t  C a n e a  c o n s e q u e n t l y  
^2
cam e t o  n o t h i n g .  T o  c o m p o u n d  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h i s  a b o r t i v e  p l a n
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against Canea, reports  a rr iv ed  in  August th a t  the  Grand V izier had
reached the  port of Canea w ith th irty -tw o  w ell-provisioned and re in -
forced ga lleys. The subjugation of minor Aegean is la n d s , and Morean
fo rtre sses  was feeble compensation in  re tu rn  fo r  the enemy's having 
1*1*received such bountifu l supp lies.
The decade of th e  l6 6 0 's  opened on a note of optimism. Spain and
France had f in a l ly  agreed on peace, war seemed imminent between the
Emperor and the  S ultan, and rumors spread th a t  the  Ottoman empire i t -
1*5s e l f  was threatened  by c iv i l  war in  th e  Middle East. Yet desp ite  
these  propitious circumstances, the  Venetian offensive continued to  
lack  in i t ia t iv e  and v igor. One contemporary characterized  th e  action  
of the early  l 660's  as a "war of c o rsa ir  against c o r s a i r . . .which s a t i s ­
f ie d  the  lu s t  fo r booty and fed  the  s p i r i t  o f adventure, (but) d id  not
.,1*6advance one step the most important need. Several tim es during the 
f i r s t  years of the  decade s izab le  Turkish f le e ts  were massed a t  the 
Dardanelles, but fo r one reason or another no confrontation  w ith the 
Venetian armada resu lted . Occasionally Venetian p a tro ls  f e l l  upon Turk­
ish  convoys from Egypt, Rhodes, Constantinople, or some other Ottoman 
p o r t-o f-c a ll  and seized or destroyed them, but such attacks had l i t t l e  
long-term e ffe c t. Now th a t  th e  enemy no longer attempted to  tran sp o rt 
goods by way of large  f l o t i l l a s  but p referred  more and more to  re ly  on 
small convoys dispatched from many areas of the  empire, i t  proved near­
ly  impossible to  maintain any absolute embargo on goods shipped to  
1*7Candia.
Consequently, the naval warfare between 1657 and 1666 was tinged
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with lass itu d e  and m isdirection . The Turkish m in isters "became under­
standably preoccupied with events in  Hungary while Venetian leaders 
grew le s s  b e llico se  as chances improved th a t  th e  war might yet be re­
solved by diplomacy. Each side  sought to  preserve the s ta tu s  quo. The 
relaxed  atmosphere o f the early  l 660's  sometimes created an a i r  of in­
souciance. Such was the  case in  1666 when th e  Venetian navy made no 
serious e ffo r t  to  in te rcep t a  Turkish armada o f f i f ty  ships gathered in  
the  Morea; the  r e s u l t  of th is  fo lly  was l a t e r  confirmed when th is  armada 
sa fe ly  landed men and supplies a t Canea. In  th a t  same year Venice made 
no attempt to  e s tab lish  even the semblance of a blockade a t th e  Darda­
n e lle s ,  the  r e s u l t  being an almost unimpaired free  flow of supplies from
1+8Constantinople to  th e  Turkish armies a t  Candia. Retrenchment and 
caution had almost im perceptibly come to  rep lace the aggressive naval 
operations of th e  f i r s t  ten  years of th e  war. The furious Turkish offen­
sive against Candia between 1667 and 1669 leaves the  wisdom of such 
inaction  and neglect open to  question. i.
While m ilita ry  a ff a ir s  during th is  period  gradually receded in  im­
portance, m atters of in te rn a tio n a l diplomacy became more c ru c ia l than 
ever. Unlike the  f i r s t  years of th e  war, i t  was a period during which 
the  very r e a l  p o s s ib i li ty  ex isted  th a t  Venice might f in a lly  receive sub­
s ta n t ia l  support from the g reat powers of Europe. Venetian asp ira tio n s  
were to  be f u l f i l l e d ,  but only in  a lim ited  fashion.
In 16U8 the  main diplomatic concern of the  Venetian s ta te  lay in
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try in g  to  e ffe c t some kind of peaceful reso lu tio n  of the  T hirty  Years 
War. For th ree  long years Venetian diplomats endeavored to  rush through 
a peace settlem ent a t the  Congress of Munster; as long as th e  C hristian 
princes of Europe remained a t war w ith each o th er, th e  in f id e l  would he 
encouraged " to  continue with obstinacy and p ertinacious a p p e tite  against 
„1*9C h ristian ity . Such was the opinion of the  Venetian ambassador to  
Spain and undoubtedly an opinion shared by most p a tr io t ic  Venetians.
The war a t Candia was viewed by them as much a re lig io u s  crusade as a 
defense of Venetian commercial and p o l i t ic a l  in te r e s ts .  Many looked 
o p tim is tica lly  forward to  the  day when a united Europe might come to  
the  support o f Venice.
For th ree  years rumors c ircu la ted  concerning th e  p o s s ib i l i t ie s  for 
peace, but i t  was not u n t i l  161+8 th a t  any concrete agreement was reached. 
That year witnessed the  signing of the  Peace of W estphalia and the with­
drawal of the  German s ta te s  from the war in  Europe. But th e  Treaty of 
Westphalia brought peace only to  p a rt of Europe. The war between France 
and Spain, the  two powers from whom Venice had expected th e  most in  
fin an c ia l and m ilita ry  support, continued unabated. From a Venetian 
viewpoint, th e  Treaty of Westphalia was a disheartening fa i lu re .
Venetian diplomatic e f fo r ts  suffered  fu rth er disappointment in  
l 6U8 , the year of the Fronde in  France. Many had suspected th a t  Maza- 
r i n ’s primary concern with peace in  Europe was h is desire  to  be f ree  to
50prosecute more fo rce fu lly  the  war against Spain. But the  eruption of 
the Fronde, a destruc tive  c iv i l  war complicated by co n sp ira to ria l nego­
t ia t io n s  between French frondeurs and Spanish agents, made any Immediate
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assis tan ce  from France a d is ta n t p o s s ib ili ty .
Furthermore, the  Fronde tended to  impose add itio n al demands on an
already d i f f ic u l t  diplom atic s itu a tio n . As fac tio n s  developed within
France supporting or denouncing f i r s t  the  Mazarin government and then
the  Spanish, i t  became increasingly  d i f f ic u l t  fo r Venetian diplomats to
tread  a d e lica te  and unoffensive path. In no way could Venice hazard
public support fo r  any one fac tio n  w ithout risk in g  th e  a lien a tio n  of a
clique which one day might hold the re in s  of power in  France.
The re ten tio n  of one as sympathetic to  the  Venetian p lig h t as
Mazarin was n a tu ra lly  a lin e  of action  favored by Venice. I t  was with
th is  in  mind th a t  the  Venetians negotiated d ire c tly  w ith Mazarin even
in  1650-51 when h is  p o sitio n  seemed tenuous. Rumors claiming th a t  Spain
was negotia ting  d ire c tly  w ith Constantinople, rumors fo rtu n a te ly  la te r
proved to  be untrue, made the  preservation  of Mazarin’s power in  France
even more necessary. Nevertheless, g rea t caution was employed fo r fea r
th a t  the  Republic might f in d  i t s e l f  completely estranged from those who
might eventually gain pow er.^
Mazarin subsequently regained h is  p o s itio n  in  France, and the
fu ro r of the Fronde quieted; but no immediate assistance flowed toward
Venice. This was p a r t ia l ly  because many th ings s t i l l  remained un se ttled  
52in  France, but French indifference could a lso  be traced  to  the b i t t e r
r e a l i ty  th a t Venice fa i le d  to  f i t  well in to  the  schemes of Cardinal
Mazarin. Mazarin’s primary in te re s t in  I ta ly  centered about reviving
French influence there , and for th is  ro le  he considered Venice, in her
53present dilemma, too weak to  be of r e a l  importance. Many in  France
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•were convinced th a t  the  Sultan would never nego tia te  a peace without 
5hthe  cession of Candia; under such circumstances one could thus expect 
Venetian influence in  I ta ly  per se to  remain minimal. As fo r  re lig io u s  
or humanitarian a ltru ism  "bringing France in to  the  war, th ere  seemed 
l i t t l e  hope. "In the  end," the  Venetian ambassador wrote in  1653, "the 
nature of the  French Cis) th a t  they have more concern fo r  th e  sm allest 
of th e i r  in te re s ts  than  of a l l  th e  world.
Venetian e ffo r ts  to  win support a t  the  court of Spain had sim ila r 
r e s u lts .  Tortured by the  war w ith France and the  c iv i l  up risings in  
Catalonia and Portugal, and exhausted by the  f is c a l  and m ilita ry  d isas­
te r s  of h a lf  a century, Spain lay  p ro stra te  and near th e  poin t of 
co llapse. The Spanish had d i f f ic u l ty  m aintaining th e i r  own equilibrium  
without having to  become embroiled in  the  troub les of the  E ast. The 
Venetian ambassador a t  Madrid was nevertheless noticeably  dismayed a t 
the v a c il la t io n  and inac tion  -which f ru s tra te d  h is  e ffo r ts  a t  th e  Spanish 
court. The m inisters he met were f i l l e d  w ith sympathy and f in e  words,
ti 56words which had, however, "a  fa ls e  so u n d .... An anonymous l e t t e r  of 
December 1652, a l e t t e r  the  ambassador p a r t ia l ly  discounted and one 
many would personally  lik ed  to  have d isbelieved , probably touched close 
to  the tru th . The l e t t e r ,  shown se c re tly  to  ambassador Querini by a 
member of the  Spanish court, claimed Spain had no in ten tio n  of rup tu r­
ing re la tio n s  with th e  Ottcman empire and th a t  any assistance len t 
Venice would come only in  q u a n titie s  su ff ic ie n t to  keep th e  Republic 
preoccupied with the war. The motive behind such ac tio n s , the l e t t e r  
claimed, was to  keep Venice paralyzed by the war thus freeing  Spain to
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57act as she would in  I ta l ia n  a f f a i r s ,  e sp ec ia lly  in  Mantua and Milan. 
Querini t r i e d  to  disregard  th e  l e t t e r  and i t s  judgments h u t, in  the 
l ig h t  of Spanish in te re s ts  in  the  I ta l ia n  pen insu la , i t  nevertheless 
contained arguments no serious Venetian m in iste r could l ig h t ly  dism iss.
Compounding th e  disappointment in  Europe was th e  continued in ab il­
i ty  to  improve diplom atic re la tio n s  between Constantinople and Venice.
In 16U9 th e  Grand V iz ie r expelled the Venetian b a ilo ,  Soranzo, and had 
Soranzo's f a i th fu l  dragoman, G rillo , s tran g led ; fo r  the  subsequent 
th ree  years the  only o f f ic ia l  representing  Venetian in te re s ts  in  Con­
stan tin o p le  was the French ambassador, M. de l a  Haye. The Porte re le n t­
ed in  1652 and perm itted residence to  a new b a ilo ,  Giovanni Cappello, 
who was him self in stru c ted  by the  Senate to  o ffe r  the  d estruc tion  of 
Canea and Rettimo, re s to ra tio n  of a l l  Turkish domains lo s t  in  Dalmatia, 
a war indemnity and t r ib u te  in  re tu rn  fo r  Venetian contro l of Candia. 
When the  Grand V izier learned th a t  Cappello had came without permission 
to  cede Candia, the  new ba ilo  him self was forced to  withdraw to  the 
r e la tiv e  sa fe ty  of Adrianople. Two years l a t e r  the  Turkish represen­
ta t iv e s  made i t  q u ite  c lea r  th a t they were not in te res ted  in  other i s ­
lands in  exchange fo r Candia or in  t r ib u te  or an indemnity, "only the  
„59cession of th e  kingdom. And a vast m ajority  of Venetian senators 
held firm ly to  th e i r  b e lie f  th a t  Candia had to  be defended a t  a l l  co sts . 
Even the proposal to  divide Candia in to  two p a rts  was vehemently re ­
jec ted  because i t  was f e l t  th a t such a  s itu a tio n  would merely perpetuate 
b itte rn e s s  between C hristians and Moslems and would also leave the  c ity  
of Candia extremely vulnerable to  fu tu re  aa aa u lts .^0
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In  1655 Cappello's former secre ta ry , Giovanni B a ttis ta  B alla rino ,
w as  e n t r u s t e d  w i t h  t h e  d u t i e s  o f  b a i l o .  A l th o u g h  B a l l a r i n o  f o u n d  l i f e
i n  t h e  T u r k i s h  c a p i t a l  a n  a l m o s t  c o n s t a n t  d a n g e r ,  t h e  f i r s t  f e w  y e a r s
of h is  tenure seemed to  o ffe r  more hope th a t  diplomatic e ffo r ts  might 
6l
y e t  " b r in g  p e a c e  t o  t h e  E a s t .  T h e  im p r o v e d  d i p l o m a t i c  r a p p o r t  d u r i n g
the l a te r  l6 5 0 's  came as a re s u lt  o f a combination of events. Not only
had th e  g rea te st m ilita ry  triumphs of the  Venetian armada come in  the
m id-l650 's, but re la tio n s  between France and the  Ottoman empire a lso
seemed to  worsen a t th is  tim e. One incident involving the  imprisonment
of the  French ambassador, M. de l a  Haye, fo r refusing  to  decipher an
in tercep ted  Venetian l e t t e r ,  ra ised  considerable c ritic ism  in  France.
The a rre s t of ambassador de l a  Haye in  May of 1658 placed Mazarin in  a
d e lica te  p o s itio n , fo r France a t th a t moment was c ru c ia lly  involved in
the Spanish war and could i l l  affo rd  a lien a tin g  the Sultan. Attempts
to  resolve the  d ispute through a specia l emissary f a i le d , and by 1660
Franco-Turkish friendship  had seemingly vanished. In  f a c t ,  M. de la
Haye, who tem porarily had been re leased , was rea rres te d  in  1660 and a l l
62French ships in  Turkish ports were confiscated . The growing tensions 
between Paris  and Constantinople and the  advent of t o ta l  peace in  Europe 
with the signing of the  Peace of the Pyrenees in  1659 offered encourage­
ment th a t France might y e t sever completely her re la tio n s  with the 
Turks.
During the la te  1650's  several incidents a lso  occurred which in­
dicated an increased warmth in  Mazarin*s a tt i tu d e  toward Venice. Part 
of th is  increased co rd ia lity  resu lted  from M azarin's desire to  use the
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diplomatic services and goodwill o f Venice in  "bringing Savoy and the  
Republic of Genoa fu rth e r in to  the French sphere o f influence in  I ta ly .  
Moreover, Mazarin hoped th a t Venetian pressure might help prevent the 
Duke of Mantua from supporting the Spanish fac tio n . Undoubtedly, 
the  v ic to rie s  won a t  the  Dardanelles had increased the  p restig e  of 
Venice and her importance as an I ta l ia n  power. And as long as Venetian 
influence might be of significance in  the chess game of I ta l ia n  p o li­
t i c s ,  Mazarin would remain sympathetic and concerned. Mazarin showed 
more than verbal sympathy in 1658, when he granted the  Republic several 
ships and 100,000 scudi. U nfortunately, th e  money was in d ire c tly  en­
tru s ted  to  a French banker by the name of Bertrand Arson, who bankrupted 
sho rtly  th e re a fte r;  Mazarin len t what support he could in  forcing Arsen
to  pay the  money to  Venice, but co llec tio n  was complicated in  the  courts
6 kand became a try in g  and d i f f ic u l t  m atter.
F in a lly , Venice stood to  p ro fi t  from the  in te rn a l disorders which 
plagued the Ottoman empire during the l a s t  years of the l6 5 0 's . The 
d isa s te rs  suffered  at the  Dardanelles and the  threatened war in  Hungary 
kept Constantinople in  turm oil. Disturbances between Greeks and Moslems 
in the Morea increased, and Constantinople was stricken  with pestilen ce  
in  the  summer of 1659- In addition, the  empire was touched by the 
ravages of c iv i l  war in  the w inter of 1658- 59. A rebe llion  of serious 
proportions was in s tig a te d  by the pashas o f Aleppo, Damascus, and Safed, 
who succeeded in  gathering an army of 80,000 men, an army which a t one
65time during the  reb e llio n  threatened to  seize  Constantinople i t s e l f .
I t  is  l i t t l e  wonder th a t under such circumstances the m inistry ut
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Constantinople proved more co ncilia to ry  and receptive  to  diplom atic 
66p arlay s .
Without question the  most pressing concern on the  mind of the
Grand V izier re la te d  to  the  tensions which had developed in  Hungary.
Along the  Hungarian lands which bordered the  Ottoman empire p o l i t ic a l
m atters remained in  a s ta te  of almost constant flux . Although Ottoman
influence in  th is  area was of considerable importance, th e  power of the
v iz ie r  in  lo ca l m atters was frequently  challenged by the  important and
often  meddlesome Racokzy fam ily. To the Ottoman m in istry , the  Racokzy
had become a d isru p tiv e  element acting against the  preservation  of
Turkish influence in  these  Hungarian borderlands. As a r e s u l t , i t  had
become extremely uncerta in  whether or not the v iz ie r  would attempt to
have the Racokzy elim inated from Transylvanian a f f a ir s  and replaced
with nobles more receptive to  the  d ic ta te s  of Constantinople. At f i r s t
i t  appeared as i f  the  Racokzy might escape the wrath of th e  v iz ie r ,  but
by the f a l l  of 1657 a l l  had changed and the Transylvanian lands of the
67Racokzy family seemed very much in  danger from a Turkish a ttack .
Giovanni B a ttis ta  Nani, the  Venetian ambassador to  the  Emperor, noted
the  imprisonment o f Racokzy's rep resen tative to  Constantinople and the
massing of Turkish troops along the Turco-Transylvanian border. As
Racokzy hastened to  re tu rn  from Poland, fea rs  increased th a t  even the
68independence of Hungary i t s e l f  might be threatened. Nani a lso  re ­
ported th a t while the  Emperor would be unable to  support openly the
Racokzysthe importance of the Transylvania borderlands precluded com- 
69p le te  noninvolvement by the Empire.
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Turkish, th re a ts  continued throughout 1658, and th ere  was much con­
je c tu re  as to  whether th e  a tta ck  would come f i r s t  in  Transylvania or in  
70Dalmatia. Even th e  fa in t e s t  p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t Turkish troops might be 
passin g  through German lands and perhaps then in to  F r iu li  was enough to  
create grave concern in  V enice. Nani co n sta n tly  importuned th e  Emperor 
to  defend w ith  a l l  e f fo r t  the mountain p asses o f  th e  Duchy o f  Carniola. 
According to  N ani's r e p o r ts , th e  Snperor w as, in  f a c t ,  in te n t on pre­
ven tin g  Turkish passage through Carniola and had ordered a r e in fo r c e -  
71ment o f  th e  fo r tr e s s e s  o f  th a t reg ion .
D esp ite  h is  re ce iv in g  th e  sym pathetic support o f  th e  Emperor,
Racokzy was o f f i c i a l l y  deposed by th e  Grand V iz ie r  in  1659 in  favor o f  
72someone more w il l in g  to  pay tr ib u te .  Although th e  Porte attempted to  
minimize th e  antipathy caused by i t s  a c tio n s  and to  reassure th e Emperor 
th a t th e  Sultan wished only peace w ith  th e  B npire, th e  fe a r  o f  war 
lin g e red . That fe a r  had in t e n s if ie d  by 1660 not merely because o f  th e  
f r ic t io n  in  Transylvania but a lso  because th e  d isorders in  A sia which 
had so fa r  d is tra cted  th e  v i z i e r  had by then  come t o  an end.
War between th e  Emperor and th e  Turks appeared in e v ita b le  but what 
d ir e c t  p r o f i t  Venice would d erive from such an event was uncerta in .
The desperate f in a n c ia l  and m ilita r y  p o s it io n  o f  th e  Empire in  1659-60 
seemed to  preclude th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t th e  Bnperor would be in c lin e d
73to  lend th e  Republic su b sta n tia l a s s is ta n c e  o f  any kind. Furthermore, 
Im perial re p r esen ta tiv e s  remained e lu s iv e  and spoke only in  vague term s, 
avoiding d e f in it e  m ilita ry  commitments as much as p o ss ib le . When Vene­
t ia n  n eg o tia to rs  broached th e su bject o f  a fu tu re Im perial-V enetian
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a l l ia n c e , m in isters  in  Vienna evaded th e  su bject and spoke only o f  the
need fo r  caution  and th e  dangers o f  in te r n a l r e b e llio n  w ith in  th e
s ta t e s  o f  the German Enqpire. Vienna would commit i t s e l f  on ly to  defend  
Jk
t h e  p a s s e s  o f  C a r n i o l a  a n d  S t y r i a .
Open warfare ev e n tu a lly  erupted in  Hungary between th e  Empire and 
th e  Turks. The war u nfortunately  la s te d  only a y e a r , from 1663 u n t il  
1664, when i t  was ended by th e  b r i l l i a n t  v ic to r y  o f  M onteeucculi a t  
S t. G otthard's Pass and th e  subsequent Treaty o f  Vasvar. The war was 
consequently to o  b r ie f  and l im ite d  in  scope to  compel C onstantinople to  
reach some accord over th e  question  o f  Candia. By fo r c in g  th e  Sultan  
to  engage in  w arfare on two fr o n ts , th e  Hungarian in ter lu d e  o f  1663-64  
c e r ta in ly  provided some r e s p ite  a t Candia; th e  in e r t ia  o f  th e  war at 
Candia in  th e ear ly  l6 6 0 ’s was undeniable evidence o f  t h i s  f a c t .  But 
th e  war n ev er th e less  continued and i t  continued d e sp ite  S t . G otthards, 
and, one might sa y , in  s p it e  o f  th e  Treaty o f  Vasvar.
In I ta ly  th e  V enetians faced  th e  same grim disappointm ent which 
they had found in  the c a p ita ls  o f  Europe. Throughout th e  l6 5 0 's  and 
l6 6 0 's  Franco-Spanish p o l i t i c s  dominated th e  concern o f  th e  I ta l ia n  
s t a t e s .  O ccasionally  a  contingent o f  troops or a cash grant might fin d  
i t s  way to  Venice from one o f I t a ly ' s  numerous s t a t e s ,  but gen era lly  
everyone’s a tte n tio n  was inexorably s h if te d  to  th e  art o f  s e l f - in t e r e s t  
and se lf-p r e se r v a tio n . There was l i t t l e  to  spare for  th e  t r ia l s  o f  
an en d less war w ith  th e  Turks.
T o t h e  d e t r i m e n t  o f  V e n e t i a n  i n t e r e s t s  i n  C a n d i a ,  t h e  e n t i r e  I t a l ­
i a n  p e n i n s u l a  w a s  g r a d u a l l y  t u r n e d  i n t o  a  c o m p le x  d i p l o m a t i c  l a b y r i n t h
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
171
w i t h  S p a i n  a n d  P r a n c e  f e v e r i s h l y  v y i n g  f o r  t h e  l o y a l t y  o f  T u s c a n y ,  Mo­
d e n a ,  P a r m a ,  G e n o a ,  a n d  t h e  P a p a c y .  T h e  d i p l o m a t i c  m a d n e s s  w h ic h  c o n ­
s e q u e n t l y  e n s u e d  r e s e m b l e d  a  s t r a n g e  p a s t i c h e  o f  v a g u e n e s s  a n d  c o n f u ­
s i o n .  T h e  G e n o e s e ,  w ho f a v o r e d  t h e i r  F r e n c h  n e i g h b o r s ,  f o u n d  th e m ­
s e l v e s  a t  o d d s  w i t h  t h e  S p a n i s h  w h i l e  t h e  p r o - S p a n i s h  P o p e  f r e q u e n t l y  
e n c o u n t e r e d  t h e  a c e r b i c  c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e  F r e n c h .  S i n c e  t h e  V e n e t i a n s  
w e r e  e s p e c i a l l y  d e t e r m i n e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  a  n e u t r a l  p o s i t i o n  i n  I t a l y ,  t h e y  
w e r e  f r e q u e n t l y  c a l l e d  u p o n  t o  a c t  a s  m e d i a t o r s  f o r  o n e  c a u s e  o r  a n o t h e r .  
W hen t h e  D u k e  o f  M o d e n a  a n g e r e d  S p a i n  b y  l e a n i n g  t o o  e m p h a t i c a l l y  t o w a r d  
t h e  F r e n c h ,  h e  a s k e d  V e n i c e  t o  m o l l i f y  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  a t  M a d r i d .  G e n o a ,  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  e n d e a v o r e d  t o  b e n e f i t  f r o m  t h e  d i p l o m a t i c  i n f l u e n c e  a n d  
r e p u t a t i o n  o f  V e n i c e  b y  h a v i n g  V e n e t i a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a s s u a g e  t h e  i r e  
o f  t h e  S p a n i s h  a n d  t h e  M a l t e s e .  I t  w a s  q u i t e  o b v io u s  t h a t  i n  s u c h  s i t ­
u a t i o n  V e n i c e  h a d  l i t t l e  t o  g a i n  a n d ,  i n  m a n y  w a y s ,  r i s k e d  a l i e n a t i n g  
a n y  n u m b e r  o f  p o t e n t i a l  a l l i e s  i n  t h e  w a r  a g a i n s t  t h e  T u r k s .
T h e  G e n o e s e  R e p u b l i c ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,  r e p r e s e n t e d  a  p o t e n t i a l  a l l y  
o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  V e n i c e 's  s i s t e r  r e p u b l i c  i n  I t a l y  h a d  
i n v a l u a b l e  c o m m e r c i a l  a n d  b a n k i n g  w e a l t h  a s  w e l l  a s  a  p o w e r f u l  f l e e t  
w h ic h  c o u l d  e a s i l y  a u g m e n t b y  t e n  o r  t w e n t y  g a l l e y s  t h e  a l l i e d  a r m a d a  
p a t r o l i n g  i n  t h e  E a s t .  B u t  t h e  G e n o e s e  f o u n d  t h e m s e l v e s  t r a p p e d  b e tw e e n  
t h e  F r e n c h  ha m m er a n d  t h e  S p a n i s h  a n v i l .  T h e  t r u e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  l o n g ­
s t a n d i n g  V e n e t i a n - G e n o e s e  d i s p u t e  o v e r  h o n o r i f i c  t i t l e s  a n d  e n t r a n c e  
i n t o  t h e  p a p a l  S a l a  R e g io  c o u l d  b e  f o u n d  i n  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  G e n o a  t o  
p l y  a  d e l i c a t e  p a t h  b e tw e e n  s q u a b b l i n g  l e v i a t h a n s  o f  E u r o p e .  A s t h e  
V e n e t i a n  a m b a s s a d o r  Q u e r i n i  r u e f u l l y  n o t e d ,  " T h e  R e p u b l i c  o f  G e n o a  w i l l
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always l i v e  in  th e  honorable serv itud e o f  two crowns. Consequently, 
th e  exaggerated Genoese o f fe r s  o f  a ss is ta n c e  in  th e  Candian war had to  
he a ssessed  in  l ig h t  o f  th e  dangers which confronted Genoa. "All t h is  
mass o f  w ild  p r o m ise s ... ,"  Giacomo Querini c a u s t ic a l ly  noted , was not 
aimed at help ing  Venice hut was "for th e ir  own in t e r e s t s . . . ."
Papal support o f th e  Venetian war e f fo r t  was l ik e w ise  e lu s iv e  and 
an tiph on ic , th e  Pope and h is  rep r esen ta tiv e s  always sym pathetic to  the  
dilemma which faced  Venice hut determining th e ir  course o f  actio n  hy 
reason o f  I ta l ia n  or European p o l i t i c s .
The in t e r e s t s  o f  France and Spain had to  he weighed c a r e fu lly , hut 
th e  papacy had a lso  i t s  own wishes to  consider e s p e c ia lly  in  e c c le s i ­
a s t ic a l  m atters. The is su e  in  question  during th e  1^50's centered  ahout 
th e readm ittance o f  th e  J e su its  in to  Venetian te r r it o r y . As th e  most 
m ilita n t rep resen ta tiv es  o f papal supremacy, th e  J e s u its  had heen 
ex p elled  from Venice and i t s  t e r r i t o r ie s  during th e  Paolo Sarpi contro­
versy  o f  th e  beginning o f  th e century. Mindful o f  th e  support h is
g a lle y s  le n t in  th e  war aga inst th e  Turk, th e  Pope f e l t  i t  opportune to
77p ressure th e Senate to  consider th e return  o f  th e  J e su its  to  Venice.
A proposal to  t h is  e f fe c t  was presented  to  th e  Venetian Senate and,
w ith minor r e serv a t io n , was accepted . In a d d itio n , Venice was forced
to  recogn ize papal demands fo r  more independence in  e c c le s ia s t ic a l  
78
appointment. With papal p r e s t ig e  and m ilita r y  support in  q uestion , 
th ese  concessions became unpleasant hut absolu te n e c e s s it ie s .
Beyond France, Spain, and th e  I ta lia n  s ta te s  th ere remained a pan­
oply o f  assorted  European nations from whom p o te n tia l  aid might be
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d e r i v e d .  T h e s e  n a t i o n s  f o r  o n e  r e a s o n  o r  a n o t h e r  h a d  a  p e r i p h e r a l  
i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  a f f a i r s  o f  t h e  E a s t  a n d  t h e  p r o g r e s s  o f  t h e  w a r  a t  
C a n d ia .  P o l a n d  a n d  t h e  P o l i s h  d i v e r s i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  O tto m a n  e m p i r e  
r e m a i n e d  t h e  e l u s i v e  c h i m e r a  w h ic h  i t  h a d  a lw a y s  b e e n .  T h e  p r o j e c t  
s u f f e r e d  p e r h a p s  a  f a t a l  r e v e r s e  w h e n  B o g d a n  K h m i e l n i t s k i ,  t h e  c o s s a c k  
l e a d e r  d e s i g n a t e d  t o  l e a d  t h e  i n v a s i o n ,  q u a r r e l e d  w i th ,  t h e  P o l e s  a n d  
f o u n d  i n  r e t u r n  f r i e n d l y  s u p p o r t  a t  C o n s t a n t i n o p l e .  T h e  P o l i s h  k i n g  
w a s  i n  n o  p o s i t i o n  t o  m a k e  e n e m ie s  o f  b o t h  t h e  T u r k s  a n d  t h e  c o s s a c k s  
o f  K h m i e l n i t s k y  a s  w e l l .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  w h a t e v e r  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  F r e n c h  
e n j o y e d  i n  P o l a n d  w o u ld  n o t  b e  u s e d  t o  e n c o u r a g e  a  ‘ P o l i s h  d i v e r s i o n '  
a g a i n s t  t h e  O tto m a n  e m p i r e ;  M a z a r i n  h o p e d  t o  u s e  P o l a n d  n o t  i n  t h e  i n ­
t e r e s t  o f  V e n i c e  b u t  r a t h e r  a s  a  l e v e r  a g a i n s t  t h e  p o w e r  o f  t h e  H a b s -  
79
b u r g s  o f  A u s t r i a .
T o t h e  E n g l i s h  a n d  t h e  D u tc h  t h e  w a r  i n  t h e  E a s t  w a s  e v e n  m o r e  
p e r i p h e r a l .  T h e  D u tc h  h a d  e n o rm o u s  d i f f i c u l t y  m e e t i n g  t h e  c h a l l e n g e s  
o f  E n g l i s h  c o m m e r c i a l  e x p a n s i o n ,  t h e  T h i r t y  Y e a r s  W a r , a n d  f i n a l l y  t h e  
m e g a lo m a n ia  o f  F r a n c e ' s  L o u i s  XIV w i t h o u t  a s s u m in g  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  b u r ­
d e n  o f  a  w a r  a g a i n s t  t h e  T u r k s .  A s f o r  t h e  r o l e  t h a t  E n g la n d  m i g h t  
p l a y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  u n d e r  t h e  a c t i v e  m a r i t i m e  p o l i c i e s  o f  t h e  C r o m w e l l i a n  
g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e r e  w a s  r e a s o n  f o r  g r e a t e r  o p t i m i s m .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  
C r o m w e l l 's  new  a c t i v i s m  a t  s e a  w as  d i r e c t e d  n o t  a g a i n s t  t h e  M o sle m  T u r k  
b u t  a g a i n s t  C a t h o l i c  S p a i n .  O c c a s i o n a l l y  E n g l i s h  a m o u re  p r o p r e  w o u ld  
b e  i n f l a m e d  o v e r  m a r i t i m e  i n c i d e n t s  i n v o l v i n g  M o sle m  p i r a t e s  b u t  n e v e r  
t o  t h e  p o i n t  o f  w a r .  T h e  p a s s i n g  o f  C r o m w e ll  b r o u g h t  n o  n o t i c e a b l e  
s h i f t  i n  t h i s  p o s t u r e  d u r i n g  t h e  l6 6 0 's .  S i n c e  E n g l i s h  n a v a l  a n d
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commercial power la y  firm ly  rooted  in  northern Europe, England had
l i t t l e  in c e n tiv e  to  become involved  in  a war w ith  th e  ' in f id e l '  in  
80
o r d e r  t o  d e f e n d  C a t h o l i c  V e n i c e .
From a d ip lom atic view point th e l6 5 0 's  and th e  l6 6 0 's  represented  
two com pletely d if fe r e n t p eriod s. The decade o f  th e  1650's  offered  
l i t t l e  promise th a t Venice would r e ce iv e  a s s is ta n c e  from abroad in  
any su b sta n tia l quan tity . Spain and France, l ik e  England and the  
Dutch p rov inces, were in e x tr ic a b ly  bound up in  th e  problem o f  th e ir  own 
wars. Poland, th e co ssa ck s, and th e Ottoman empire had apparently  
reached an acceptab le modus v iven di along th e  borders o f  Hungary and 
Transylvania. And as long as France and Spain continued to  view  I ta ly  
and i t s  peop le as pawns in  a p r iv a te  chess game, Venice could expect 
only minimal a ss is ta n c e  from th e s ta te s  o f  th e  I ta l ia n  pen insu la .
But th e  decade o f  th e  l6 6 0 's  brought a r a d ic a l change in  th is  
s itu a tio n  and th e fu tu re , a fte r  so many years o f  w arfare , f in a l ly  seem­
ed bright w ith  promise. The Peace o f  th e  Pyrenees, signed  in  1659, 
ended nearly a h a lf  century o f  war between France and Spain. To Vene­
t ia n  ob servers, peace between France and Spain o ffere d  th ese  important 
Catholic powers th e ir  f i r s t  opportunity to  support without h e s ita tio n  
th e Candian war. D espite i t s  f a i lu r e ,  th e  exp ed ition  o f  Prince Amerigo 
d'E ste in  1660 from France was in d ic a tiv e  o f  th e  type o f th e  m ilita ry  
p o te n tia l Venice hoped to  see  turned aga inst th e  Turks a t Candia. In 
ad d ition , th e  ten sio n s which had developed along th e  Transylvanian 
borders provided a chance th a t Constantinople might in  th e near fu ture  
be confronted w ith a war on two fr o n ts . There was even encouraging
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news from I ta ly  fo r  th e  long-stan d in g d isp u te between V enice and Pied­
mont had been s a t i s f a c t o r i ly  re so lv e d  and m ilita r y  a s s is ta n c e  from th e  
Piedmontese had already been r e ce iv e d  fo r  th e  war a t Candia. As a 
r e s u lt  o f  t h is  fo r tu ito u s  s h if t  in  in tern a tio n a l a f f a ir s ,  a  sen se  o f  
euphoria tended to  dominate th e  f i r s t  few years o f  th e  l6 6 0 1s . As th e  
war subsided during th e  la t e  1650' s and th e  p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n  in  
Europe turned favorab le , many Venetians became hopeful th a t an agreeab le  
so lu t io n  might y e t  be found to  th e  war. Another decade o f  f ig h t in g ,  
some o f  th e most b it t e r  o f  th e  war, would sh a tte r  irrevocab ly  th o se  
p leasant dreams.
IV
D esp ite every dip lom atic e f fo r t  to  gain  f in a n c ia l  a s s is ta n c e  from 
th e  powers o f  Europe, th e  enormous burden o f  t h i s  fr u s tr a tin g  and c o s t­
ly  war f e l l  d ir e c t ly  upon V enice. How c o s t ly  th e war was in  f in a n c ia l  
8l
terms remains im possib le to  t e l l .  One mid-century observer was
amazed at how l i t t l e  l i f e  in  Venice r e f le c te d  a s ta t e  o f  war; opulence,
gambling, and f e s t s  were everywhere p resent in  th e  c i t y .  But, he noted.
few continued to  l i v e  such l i v e s  o f  p ub lic luxury without ev en tu a lly
82
b eing forced  to  make p r iv a te  s a c r if ic e s .  To fin ance th e  long Candian 
war pub lic as w e ll as p r iv a te  con cession s had ce r ta in ly  to  be made.
This was e s p e c ia lly  true s in c e  the war touched Venice at a tim e when 
th e Republic was in' a s ta t e  o f  inexorab le f in a n c ia l  and commerciul
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s t a g n a t i o n .  Y e t  a s  u n d e n i a b l e  a s  t h i s  e c o n o m ic  d e c a d e n c e  w a s ,  o n e  m u s t  
n e v e r t h e l e s s  r e m e m b e r  t h a t  t h e  v e r y  a b i l i t y  o f  V e n i c e  t o  c o n t i n u e  s u c h  
a  w a r  f o r  n e a r l y  a  q u a r t e r - c e n t u r y  a t t e s t s  t o  a  c e r t a i n  a m o u n t  o f  f i ­
n a n c i a l  i n g e n u i t y ,  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  a n d  v i t a l i t y .
T h e  w a r  w a s  f i n a n c e d  i n  a  v a r i e t y  o f  w a y s  r a n g i n g  f r o m  t a x e s  a n d  
m o re  r i g o r o u s  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  p u b l i c  d e b t s  t o  l o t t e r i e s  a n d  f o r c e d  l o a n s .  
T h e r e  e x i s t e d  n o  o n e  s y s t e m a t i c  m e th o d , b u t  r a t h e r  a  v a s t  p a n o p l y  o f  
f i n a n c i a l  d e v i c e s  a l l  d e s i g n e d  i n  o n e  w a y  o r  a n o t h e r  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
r e v e n u e s  o f  t h e  s t a t e .  M o s t o f  t h e  m e th o d s  h a d  b e e n  u s e d  b e f o r e  b u t  
now  w e r e  e m p lo y e d  w i t h  i n c r e a s e d  v i g o r  a n d  e x t e n s i v e n e s s .  C e r t a i n l y  t h e  
m o s t  n o v e l  a n d  s o c i a l l y  r e p e r c u s s i v e  o f  a l l  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  t e c h n i q u e s  w as  
t h e  s a l e  o f  h o n o r s  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t  o f f i c e s .  An e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h i s  
f i n a n c i a l  d e v i c e  w i l l  r e v e a l  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  p r e s s u r e s  w h ic h  w e r e  f e l t  
i n  V e n i c e  d u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  y e a r s  o f  t h e  w a r .
A s i s  w e l l  k n o w n , t h e  V e n e t i a n  p a t r i a r c h y  w a s  a  c l o s e d  c a s t e  o f  
n o b l e  f a m i l i e s  w h o s e  n o b i l i t y  h a d  b e e n  d u l y  r e g i s t e r e d  i n  t h e  f a m o u s  
L i b r e  d 'o r o  o r  G o ld e n  B o o k s .  O n ly  t h o s e  i n s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  G o ld e n  B o o k s  
c o u l d  c l a i m  n o b i l i t y ,  a n d  o n l y  t h o s e  o f  t h e  n o b i l i t y  w e r e  e n t i t l e d  t o  
h o l d  h i g h  o f f i c e  i n  t h e  s t a t e .  W i th  o n l y  r a r e  e x c e p t i o n  t h e  e n n o b l e d  
f a m i l i e s  h a d  r e m a i n e d  t h e  sam e  f o r  n e a r l y  tw o  a n d  o n e - h a l f  c e n t u r i e s , 
f i x e d  a t  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  1 ,1 0 0  t o  1 , 3 0 0  p e r s o n s .  F o r  m o re  t h a n  tw o  c e n ­
t u r i e s  o f  f o r m a t i v e  a n d  tu m u l t u o u s  h i s t o r y  t h e  V e n e t i a n  n o b i l i t y  
c o n t i n u e d  a s  a  f i x e d  c a s t e  i n t o  w h ic h  o n l y  a n  h o n o r e d  h a n d f u l  w e r e  a b l e  
t o  e n t e r .  Y e t  u n d e r  t h e  p r e s s u r e s  o f  t h e  C a n d ia  w a r  t h e  V e n e t i a n  
n o b i l i t y ,  i n  16k 6 ,  p r o p o s e d  t h e  v e r y  t h i n g  w h ic h  i t  h a d  s o  a s s i d u o u s l y
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avoided fo r  so lo n g , namely th e  expansion o f  i t s  ranks.
The proposal presented  in  lSk6 t o  expand th e  n o b ility  was designed  
p urely to  r a is e  su b sta n tia l sums fo r  th e  war. Although d efeated  in  the  
Great C ouncil, th e s p ir it  o f  th e  measure survived . Certain fa m ilie s  
were, in  f a c t ,  admitted t o  th e n o b i l i ty  in  161+6 upon payment o f  th e  re­
quired sum, and throughout the e n tir e  len gth  o f  th e war s t i l l  others  
were accepted on an in d iv id u a l b a s i s . ^  For example, variou s fa m ilie s  
were accepted in  th e  spring o f  VokS upon payment o f  60,000 ducats out­
r ig h t and 1+0,000 ducats p laced  in  d ep osit a t th e  treasu ry  fo r  7 percent 
annual in t e r e s t ;  th e fa m ilie s  were adm itted in  t h is  p a rticu la r  by an
8U
overwhelming m ajority o f v o te s . In t h is  fash ion  n early  e ig h ty  fami­
l i e s  were ennobled during the Candian war w h ile others were to  be ad-
85
m itted  during th e war in  Morea la te r  in  th e  century. Although s a le  
o f n o b i l i ty  was accepted as a wartime ex igency, th ere were n ev er th e less  
86many who opposed i t .  I t  was a p ra ct ic e  which was never considered
l ig h t ly ;  n early two decades a f t e r  th e  f i r s t  proposal had been presented
i t  s t i l l  required fo r  an a ff irm a tiv e  v o te  approval o f " fo u r - f i f th 's  o f
„87
th e Senate and tw o -th ird 's  o f  th e  Major Council."
I f  we accept P rofessor D avis' fig u r e  o f  e ig h ty  fa m ilie s  admitted 
sometime between 161+6 and 1669 and apply i t  to  th e  100,000 ducats r e ­
quired as payment, we arrive a t a sum o f 8 , 000,000 ducats ra ised  in
t h is  fash ion , an amount o f  money represen tin g  tw ice th e expenditures 
88
made during th e  in ten se  year o f  1668. But th e ennoblement o f  wealthy  
fa m ilie s  was not the only honor pandered by th e Republic in  i t s  des­
p erate quest for money. The Procuratorship o f  S t. Marks, once a h igh ly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
178
p r i z e d  t i t l e  r e s e r v e d  t o  a  s e l e c t  f e w  w h o  h a d  s e r v e d  t h e  s t a t e  i n  so m e  
e x t r a o r d i n a r y  c a p a c i t y ,  w a s  a l s o  o p e n e d  f o r  s a l e .  Sum s r a n g i n g  f ro m
2 1 ,0 0 0  t o  2 2 ,0 0 0  d u c a t s  o u t r i g h t  t o  2 , 0 0 0  d u c a t s  p e r  y e a r  f o r  t h e
89
d u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  w a r  w e r e  a c c e p t e d  f r o m  s e v e r a l  n o b l e s  f o r  t h i s  h o n o r .
M oney  p a y m e n ts  w e r e  l i k e w i s e  a c c e p t e d  f o r  e a r l y  a d m i t t a n c e  i n t o  t h e
M a jo r  C o u n c i l .  F o r  1 5 0  d u c a t s  a  y o u t h  o f  e i g h t e e n  c o u l d  b e  a d m i t t e d
w i t h  v o t i n g  p r i v i l e g e s  t o  t h e  M a jo r  C o u n c i l , a n d  f o r  2 0 0  d u c a t s  w o u ld  b e
e x t e n d e d  t h e s e  sa m e  p r i v i l e g e s  e v e n  f i v e  y e a r s  s o o n e r ;  f o r  o n l y  a  m o n e y
p a y m e n t  y o u t h s  c o u l d  now  e n t e r  t h e  C o u n c i l  w h e n  t h e y  h a d  " h a r d l y  l e f t  
„ 9 0
t u t e l a g e  a n d  s c h o o l . . . .
P a r a l l e l i n g  t h i s  s a l e  o f  h o n o r s  w a s  t h e  s a l e  o f  g o v e r n m e n ta l  
o f f i c e s ,  a  p r a c t i c e  common t o  a l l  E u r o p e a n  s t a t e s  o f  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  
c e n t u r y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  s o  i n  F r a n c e  a n d  S p a i n .  V e n a l i t y  w as  a  c u s to m a r y  
p r o c e d u r e  i n  V e n e t i a n  t e r r i t o r y ,  b u t  n o n e  o f  t h e  e x t r e m e  e x c e s s e s  l i n k e d  
t o  t h e  F r e n c h  m o d e l  w e r e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  i t .  I n  V e n i c e  o n l y  t h e  l e s s e r  
g o v e r n m e n t a l  o f f i c e s ,  t h e  m i n i s t e r o ,  c o u l d  b e  a c q u i r e d  t h r o u g h  s a l e ;  
t h e s e  m i n i s t e r o  w e r e ,  i n  t u r n ,  s u b o r d i n a t e  t o  t h e  c o n t r o l  a n d  d i r e c t i v e s  
o f  a p p o i n t e d  m a g i s t r a t e s .  T h e s e  l e s s e r  p o s i t i o n s  i n c l u d e d  p o s t s  a s  
s e c r e t a r y ,  c o n t r o l l e r ,  n o t a r y ,  a l l  o f  w h ic h  c a r r i e d  m o d e s t  s a l a r i e s  a n d  
l i m i t e d  p o w e r ;  m a g i s t r a c i e s  a n d  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  o f f i c e s  o f  s t a t e  w e r e ,  
h o w e v e r ,  g e n e r a l l y  r e s e r v e d  s o l e l y  f o r  V e n e t i a n  n o b l e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
t h e  l e s s e r  o f f i c e s  w h ic h  w e r e  s o l d  p u b l i c l y  c a r r i e d  w i t h  th e m  n o  p e r ­
p e t u a l  c l a i m  o f  o w n e r s h i p  a s  d i d  v e n a l  o f f i c e s  s o l d  i n  F r a n c e .  A l th o u g h  
t h e  R e p u b l i c  a t t e m p t e d  t o  r e t a i n  r e l a t i v e l y  s t r i c t  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h i s  
p r a c t i c e ,  v e n a l i t y  n a t u r a l l y  i n c r e a s e d  w h e n  t h e  d e m a n d s  o f  w a r  r e q u i r e d
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91a su b sta n tia l expansion o f  pub lic revenues.
The revenue derived from th e  s a le  o f  th ese  o f f ic e s ,  when c o l le c te d ,
represented  a respectab le  sum o f money. A note o f  June, 1651 re fer s  to
th e  s a le  o f  pub lic goods and o f f ic e s  which returned fo r  th e  o f f ic e s
alone 300,000 ducats; s t i l l  another report a llu d es to  th e  s a le  o f  11^
p u b lic  o f f ic e s  y ie ld in g  a s t i l l  u n c o lle cte d  52,92^ ducats or an average 
92o f  16U ducats per o f f ic e .  Numerous d if f i c u l t i e s  arose concerning the
s a le  o f  o f f ic e s ,  the most ser iou s r e su lt in g  from th e  fa ilu r e  t o  report
vacan cies. Frequently, when an o f f ic e  f e l l  vacant fo r  one reason or
another i t  was not immediately reported  to  government a u th o r it ie s , or
replacem ents f i l l e d  th e  o f f ic e  w ithout th e  knowledge o f  th e  appropriate
m agistracy. Other o f f ic e s  which had been voided  by th e  government at
Venice were fraudu lently  reopened by assign in g  th e  same in d iv id u a l but
w ith  a fa l s e  name. Such devious m achinations were almost a l l  designed
to  defraud th e government o f le g it im a te  revenues from th e s a le  o f  th ese
o f f ic e s .  As a r e s u l t ,  th e  government repeated ly  issu e d  decrees in  an
e f fo r t  to  minimize th e  lo s s  o f  revenue, decrees re q u ir in g , fo r  example,
o f f i c i a l  proof from o f f ic e  holders o f  th e ir  t i t l e s ,  s a la r ie s ,  o b lig a -  
93t io n s ,  and payments. Every abuse n a tu ra lly  re su lte d  in  some lo s s  o f  
revenue.
Ir o n ic a lly , as th e  Republic labored to  cover i t s  war expenses by 
an increase in  v e n a lity , th e s a le  o f  o f f ic e s  was conducted w ith  le s s  
scr u tin y , and cases o f  fraudulent behavior consequently grew more fr e ­
quent. Since o f f ic e  holders reimbursed them selves fo r  th e o r ig in a l  
purchase p rice by subtracting  a ce r ta in  percentage annually from the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
180
t o t a l  revenues o f  th e ir  o f f ic e ,  th er e  was considerab le tem ptation t o  
extract e x c e ss iv e  percentages and to  in crease  th e  remunerative value  
o f  th e o f f ic e .  Innumerable cases flood ed  th e  m agistracies  o f attem pts 
to  ex tra ct to o  great a return  from an o f f ic e ;  anything in  excess o f  20 
percent per annum o f th e o r ig in a l purchase p r ic e  was considered  exor­
b it a n t ,  and ce r ta in  o f f ic e s  were annulled  as a r e s u lt  o f  such p r a c t ic e s .
I t  was even suggested  th a t a return  o f  k-l/2 to  5 percent from ce rta in  
lu c r a tiv e  p o s ts  should be considered  s u f f ic ie n t  although on most l e s s
oh.
lu c r a tiv e  o f f ic e s  20 percent per annum seems to  have been accep tab le .
Besides th e extension  o f  v e n a l i ty ,  th e  m agistra tes a lso  t r ie d  to  
increase  revenues by more r ig o r o u sly  c o l le c t in g  debts owed to  th e  
government. There were e le c te d , in  January o f  l6k^, th re e  s p e c ia l  Avo- 
gadori F is c a l i  or f in a n c ia l  o f f ic e r s ,  whose ta sk  i t  was t o  a s s i s t  in  
th e  c o l le c t io n  o f  outstanding debts and,where n e c e ssa r y ,to  impose f i n e s . ^  
M agistrates were urged to  c o l le c t  a l l  th a t was p o ss ib le  and to  punish  
debtors who, "with various subterfuges" attem pted to  delay the p e n a lt ie s  
and exactions o f  th e law; a l l  were encouraged to  "cut th e  ways and 
c a v ils  o f  th e  l i t i g a n t s ,  and w ith  a l l  promptness prevent any ex ten sion s
,,96
o f  th e  d e la y s. There were even months o f  'amnesty' declared  during  
which tim e th o se  who came fo r th  and p aid  th e ir  debts would su ffe r  no 
97a d d itio n a l f in a n c ia l  p en a lty . For th ose  who proved e s p e c ia lly  r e c a l­
c i t r a n t ,  however, th ere was always th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t th e ir  goods 
might be auctioned p u b lic ly  or they them selves ca st in to  debtors p riso n . 
Indeed, th er e  were apparently a few nobles among those so indebted, fo r  
in  1656 i t  was proposed th a t a l i s t  o f  a l l  debtors be o f f ic ia l l y
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published  and th a t anyone on th a t l i s t  he form ally p roh ib ited  from 
98entering  th e Senate chambers.
How much was a c tu a lly  c o lle c te d  by such methods i t  i s  im possib le  
to  estim ate w ith  any accuracy. Undoubtedly th e  increased  r ig o r  produc­
ed some increase s in c e  th e p o te n tia l  o f  such a source was indeed g reat. 
There were debts on p rop erties  owned by the s t a t e ,  on r e n t a ls ,  on the  
s a le  o f  p ub lic lands and goods, and on th e  purchase o f  government 
o f f ic e s .  Even though ce r ta in  debts had to  be discounted  as lo s t  be­
cause o f  th e  death o f  th e  debtor or h is  incapac ity  to  pay, others were, 
in  f a c t ,  s u c c e s s fu lly  and p r o fita b ly  c o lle c te d . O ccasionally  we read 
o f s iz a b le  sums being added to  th e  s ta t e  treasu ry  as a r e s u lt  o f  the
government's e f fo r t s ;  such was th e  sum of hOO,000 ducats c o lle c te d  b e-  
99
tween 1650 and 1658.
Another lu c r a tiv e  fund-praising e f fo r t  la y  in  th e  s a le  o f  p ub lic
p rop erties such as la n d s, houses, b u ild in g s , and shops which were owned
by the s ta t e .  Throughout th e  war, perm ission was granted t o  various
m agistrates to  s e l l  or auction  s p e c if ic  p ro p e r t ie s , p ro p erties  not only
in  Venice per s e ,  but a lso  in  th e  c i t i e s  and t e r r i t o r ie s  o f  th e  Terra- 
100
ferma. The ze a l o f  th e  government at tim es generated much c r it ic ism
when o f f ic i a l s  attempted to  s e l l  lands purposely s e t  a sid e  fo r  communal
use as pasturage; some land o f  th is  nature was, in  f a c t ,  s o ld , but
101greater caution  was exerc ised  fo r  fe a r  of p ub lic  o u tc r ie s . The sums 
c o lle c te d  from th e sa le  o f  p ub lic p rop erties represented  a s iz a b le  
contribution  to  the s ta t e  treasu ry . One report o f  16^9 made reference  
to  576,000 ducats c o lle c te d  from p ub lic sa le s  and another o f  165]
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n o t e s  a  sum  o f  7 0 0 ,0 0 0  d u c a t s .  W h e th e r  t h e  r e c e i p t s  f r o m  t h e s e  
p u b l i c  s a l e s  w e r e  c o l l e c t e d  i n  f u l l  o r  o n l y  i n  p a r t  w a s ,  h o w e v e r ,  l e f t  
u n m e n t io n e d .
D o n a t i o n s  a n d  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  w e r e  s t i l l  a n o t h e r  s o u r c e  o f  r e v e n u e
a l t h o u g h  o n e  n o t  n e a r l y  a s  p r o d u c t i v e  a s  o t h e r  l e s s  v o l u n t a r y  o r  m o re
r e w a r d i n g  m e a n s .  T h e r e  w e r e ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  n u m e ro u s  i n s t a n c e s  w h e n  t h e
.p o p u l a c e  a n d  t h e  n o b i l i t y  r e s p o n d e d  t o  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  n e e d s  o f  t h e  s t a t e .
P r i e s t s  w o u ld  o n  o c c a s i o n  s o l i c i t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  f r o m  p a r i s h i o n e r s ,  a n d
i n d i v i d u a l  n o b l e s  a t  v a r i o u s  t i m e s  w o u ld  v o l u n t a r i l y  o f f e r  o n e  t h o u s a n d
d u c a t s  o r  s o .  I n  o n e  i n s t a n c e  t h e  h o u s e s  o f  V e n i c e  w e r e  s o l i c i t e d  f o r
d o n a t i o n s  a n d  a  sum  o f  s i x t y  t h o u s a n d  d u c a t s  w a s  r a i s e d .
P a r a l l e l i n g  t h e  d r i v e  t o  i n c r e a s e  s t a t e  r e v e n u e s  w a s  a  c o o r d i n a t e  •
e f f o r t  t o  r e d u c e  o r  e l i m i n a t e  u n n e c e s s a r y  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  T h e  e f f o r t s
r a n g e d  f r o m  t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o r o n a t i o n  o f  t h e  D o g a r e s s a ,  a  s t e p
d e s i g n e d  t o  s a v e  m o n e y ,  t o  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  s u p e r v i s o r y  m a g i s t r a t e
i n  1 6 5 1  w h o s e  t a s k  i t  w a s  t o  c a r e f u l l y  s c r u t i n i z e  a l l  g o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n -  
104
d i t u r e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  a n y o n e  p o s s e s s e d  o f  k n o w le d g e  c o n c e r n i n g  how  
r e v e n u e s  m i g h t  b e  i n c r e a s e d  o r  u s e l e s s  e x p e n s e s  e l i m i n a t e d  w as  r e w a r d e d  
b y  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h e  m o n e y  s u b s e q u e n t l y  c o l l e c t e d .  A l l  *d e n u n c i a t i o n s * ,  
m a n y  o f  w h ic h  w e r e  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  f r a u d s  o r  u n c o l l e c t e d  d e b t s ,  w e r e  
k e p t  s e c r e t  a n d  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  m a d e  i n t o  t h e  c h a r g e s .  A l t h o u g h  r e c e i v ­
i n g  t h e s e  'd e n u n c i a t i o n s ’ s o m e t im e s  p r o v e d  t e d i o u s ,  t h e  p r a c t i c e  w a s  n o t  
105
d i s c o u r a g e d  b y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .  M any o f  t h e  'd e n u n c i a t i o n s '  w e r e  
w i t h o u t  b a s i s  a n d  m a n y  o f  t h e  s c h e m e s  b y  w h ic h  m o n e y  w a s  t o  b e  r a i s e d  
w e r e  v a g u e  a n d  w i t h o u t  p r o m i s e .  B u t  o t h e r s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  p r o p o s a l  t o
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p l a c e  a  t a x  o n  t h e  s a l e  o f  a l l  s h o e s  a n d  b o o t s  s o l d  i n  t h e  t e r r i t o r i e s
o f  V e n i c e ,  m u s t  h a v e  b e e n  m o r e  s e r i o u s l y  c o n s i d e r e d  b y  t h e  m a g i s t r a t e s . ^ -®^
E v e n  i f  s u c h  m e th o d s  w e r e  c l a n d e s t i n e  a n d  i n q u i s i t o r i a l ,  t h e y  m ay v e i l
h a v e  s e r v e d  t o  h a v e  e n c o u r a g e d  som e  d e l i n q u e n t s  t o  h o n o r  t h e i r  o b l i g a -  
107
t i o n s  t o  t h e  s t a t e .  C e r t a i n l y  s u c h  c a r e f u l  s c r u t i n y  o f  t h e  w e a l t h  
o f  t h e  s t a t e  h e l p e d  t o  e l i m i n a t e  so m e  a b u s e s  a n d  a l s o  e n a b l e  t h e  m a g is ­
t r a t e s  t o  a s s e s s  m o r e  j u d i c i o u s l y  t a x e s  l e v i e d  o n  t h e  p e o p l e . " 1"®^
E x c l u s i v e  o f  t h e  b u d g e t a r y  d i f f i c u l t i e s  p o s e d  b y  t h e  w a r ,  t h e r e  
r e m a i n e d  t h e  s e r i o u s  p r o b l e m  o f  m o n e t a r y  r e l i a b i l i t y  a n d  i n f l a t i o n .  T h e  
e n o rm o u s  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  s i l v e r  a n d  g o l d  c o n s u m e d  b y  w a r  e x p e n s e s  t e n d e d  
t o  d e p l e t e  t h e  s p e c i e  r e s e r v e s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h r e a t e n i n g  V e n i c e  
w i t h  p o t e n t i a l l y  d a n g e r o u s  i n f l a t i o n .  F o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  a s  w e l l  a s  V e n e ­
t i a n  c o i n s  o f  g o l d  a n d  s i l v e r  c i r c u l a t e d  a t  p r i c e s  c o n s i d e r a b l y  h i g h e r  
t h a n  o f f i c i a l  v a l u e s .  T h e  s h o r t a g e  o f  s i l v e r  c o i n a g e  a t  V e n i c e  p l a c e d  
a n  a d d i t i o n a l  b u r d e n  o n  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  s u p p l y  o f  s m a l l e r  c u r r e n c y  m a d e  
o f  b a s e  m e t a l s .  T o  s a t i s f y  t h e  d e m a n d  f o r  s u c h  d a i l y  c u r r e n c y ,  V e n i c e  
w a s  f o r c e d  t o  a c c e l e r a t e  t h e  c o i n a g e  o f  e v e r  l a r g e r  n u m b e rs  o f  c o p p e r  
c o i n s  know n  a s  ' b e z z i ' ;  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  t w e n t y - f o u r  y e a r s  o f  t h e  w a r  
l i t e r a l l y  t h o u s a n d s  o f  d u c a t s  w o r t h  o f  t h e s e  ’b e z z i 1 w e r e  i n  f a c t  m i n t ­
e d .  O ne t a n g e n t i a l  p r o b l e m  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h e  c o i n a g e  o f  s o  m a n y  o f  t h e s e  
c o p p e r  c o i n s  w a s  t h e  e x o r b i t a n t  c o s t  o f  m i n t a g e  i n  t h e  s e v e n t e e n t h  c e n ­
t u r y .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  i t  c o s t  t h e  V e n e t i a n  R e p u b l i c  i n  16V7, 7,566 d u c a t s
t o  m i n t  2 U ,0 0 0  d u c a t s  w o r t h  o f  s m a l l  c o i n s  a n d ,  tw o  y e a r s  l a t e r ,  5 ,^ 1 2
109
d u c a t s  t o  c o i n  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  o f  1 0 ,0 0 0  d u c a t s .
So  a c u t e  w as  t h e  s h o r t a g e  o f  s i l v e r  a n d  g o l d  c u r r e n c y  t h a t  i t  b e ­
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cam e a l m o s t  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  p r e v e n t  a  f l o o d  o f  i n f e r i o r  f o r e i g n  c o i n s  
o n t o  t h e  V e n e t i a n  c o m m e r c i a l  m a r k e t .  C o u n t e r f e i t e r s  a n d  h o a r d e r s  
p r e s e n t e d  a  n e a r l y  c o n s t a n t  t h r e a t  d e s p i t e  s e v e r e  p e n a l t i e s  a g a i n s t  
th e m .  M on e y  f o r b i d d e n  f o r  p u b l i c  u s e  c o u l d  v o l u n t a r i l y  b e  t a k e n  t o  
t h e  m i n t  w h e r e  i t  w o u ld  b e  e x c h a n g e d ,  a t  n o  l o s s  t o  t h e  o w n e r ,  f o r  
a c c e p t a b l e  c o i n s ;  u n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  c o n t r o l l e d  t h e  f l o w  o f  
i l l e g i t i m a t e  s p e c i e  a t  s t i l l  a n o t h e r  c o s t  t o  t h e  s t a t e . 1 1 0
B y  1 6 5 5  t h e  s h o r t a g e  o f  u n m i n t e d  s i l v e r  s p e c i e  w a s  s o  s e v e r e  t h a t
s i l v e r  s c u d i  h a d  t o  b e  m e l t e d  dow n i n  o r d e r  t o  h a v e  c o m m e m o ra t iv e  c o i n s
w i t h  t h e  new  D o g e 's  b u s t  r e m i n t e d . 1 1 1  T o  a l l e v i a t e  s u c h  s h o r t a g e s  i t
w a s  a  com m on p r a c t i c e  f o r  t h e  m a g i s t r a t e s  t o  r e q u i s i t i o n  s i l v e r p l a t e ,
f i g u r i n e s ,  a n d  v a l u a b l e  o b j e c t s  d ' a r t  f r o m  s c h o o l s ,  r e l i g i o u s  o r d e r s ,
a n d  p r i v a t e  p e r s o n s ;  t h e  m e t a l  d e r i v e d  f r o m  t h e s e  c o n f i s c a t i o n s  w a s
m i n t e d  i n t o  c o i n s  a n d  c r e d i t e d  t o  t h e i r  f o r m e r  o w n e r 's  a c c o u n t  i n  t h e
f o rm  o f  a  l o a n  t o  t h e  s t a t e .  S o m e tim e s  c o e r c i v e  t h r e a t s  h a d  t o  b e  u s e d
t o  e n c o u r a g e  i n d i v i d u a l s  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  b r i n g  t h e i r  w e a l t h  t o  t h e
m i n t  b u t  g e n e r a l l y  t h e  a t t r a c t i v e  p r i c e s  o f f e r e d  f o r  t h e  m e t a l s  a n d  
112
t h e  e n t i c i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  f o r  t h e  m o n e y  s u b s e q u e n t l y  m i n t e d  w e r e  
s u f f i c i e n t  r e w a r d  f o r  m a n y . A l l  o f  t h e s e  m e a s u r e s  w e r e ,  h o w e v e r ,  o n l y  
t e m p o r a r y  r e m e d i e s  f o r  a n  e v i l  w h ic h  w a s  r o o t e d  i n  c o m m e r c i a l  s t a g n a ­
t i o n  a n d  t h e  t e r r i b l e  f i n a n c i a l  p r e s s u r e s  o f  t h e  w a r . 1 1 ^
T h e  p r i m a r y  c a u s e  f o r  t h e  s p e c i e  s h o r t a g e  w a s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  w a r .  
No s o o n e r  w e r e  n e w  c o i n s  m i n t e d  a t  V e n i c e  t h a n  t h e y  w e r e  s h i p p e d  a b r o a d  
t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  n e e d s  o f  C a n d ia  o r  D a l m a t i a .  T h i s  w a s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  
c a s e  a t  C a n d ia  w h e r e  l a r g e  n u m b e rs  o f  t r o o p s  h a d  t o  b e  p a i d  r e g u l a r l y ,
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a n d ,  f o r  t h e  m o s t  p a r t ,  i n  s m a l l  c o i n a g e .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  s i t -
n li
u a t i o n  o n  C a n d ia  w a s  d i s m a l  e v e n  a t  t h e  " b e g in n i n g  o f  t h e  c e n t u r y ,  
t h e  w a r  w i t h  t h e  T u r k s  g r e a t l y  a g g r a v a t e d  m a t t e r s .  T h e  m i l i t a r y  g o v e r n ­
m e n t  o n  t h e  i s l a n d  w a s  g e n e r a l l y  s o  f a r  i n  a r r e a r s  t h a t  a s  s o o n  a s  a  
s h i p m e n t  o f  d u c a t s  a r r i v e d  f r o m  V e n i c e  i t  w a s  a l m o s t  im m e d i a t e l y  d i s ­
p e n s e d ,  o f t e n  t o  r e p u r c h a s e  t h e  p a p e r  m o n e y  a n d  i n f e r i o r  c o i n s  w h ic h  
h a d  "been  i s s u e d  t o  t h e  s o l d i e r s  a s  t e m p o r a r y  s u b s t i t u t e s .  A v i c i o u s  
c y c l e  o f  s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g  i n d e b t e d n e s s  a n d  p o v e r t y  b e c a m e  t h e  n o r m a l  
c o u r s e  o f  a f f a i r s .  I n f l a t i o n  c a u s e d  b y  e x c e s s i v e  r e l i a n c e  o n  c o p p e r  
c o i n a g e  h a d  b e c o m e  s o  r a m p a n t  b y  1653 t h a t  J a c o p o  d a  R i v a  o r d e r e d  a n  
i m m e d ia t e  r e c a l l  o f  a l l  s u c h  c o i n s  a n d  h a d  th e m  r e t u r n e d  t o  V e n i c e .  
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  u n d e r  h i s  s u c c e s s o r s  w h e n  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  s i l v e r  c o i n s  w a s  
e x h a u s t e d ,  t h e  m i l i t a r y  a t  C a n d ia  h a d  a g a i n  t o  r e s o r t  t o  e x t e n s i v e  u s e  
o f  c o p p e r  c o i n s .
V
F i n a n c i n g  t h e  w a r  w a s  t h e  d i r e c t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t  
o f  V e n i c e ,  b u t  t h e  c o m m e r c i a l  a n d  e c o n o m ic  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  w a r  w e r e  f e l t  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  c i t i e s  a n d  t e r r i t o r i e s  o f  t h e  T e r r a f e r m a .  I t  i s  u n d e r ­
s t a n d a b l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a s s e s s  w h a t  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  w a r  a t  C a n d ia  h a d  o n  
t h e  T e r r a f e r m a .  C e r t a i n l y  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  s a c r i f i c e s  o f  a  f i n a n c i a l  
n a t u r e  h a d  t o  b e  m a d e  i n  o r d e r  t o  a s s i s t  i n  r a i s i n g  f u n d s  f o r  t h e  w a r .  
L i k e w i s e ,  t h e  v e r y  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  s t a t e  o f  w a r  i n t e r r u p t e d  t h e  sm o o th
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flow of commercial t r a f f i c  and goods to  and from th e  in d u s tr ia l  centers 
of the  Venetian mainland. The d i f f ic u l ty  a rise s  in  attempting to  de­
termine the  d ire c t  influence of the  war v is  a v is  the  s ta te  of general 
economic decadence which had "been witnessed in  the  Mediterranean long 
"before th e  beginning of the  c o n flic t a t  Candia.
In  terms of d ire c t tax  revenues, th e  pressures of th e  war undoubt­
edly had an e ffe c t f e l t  in  the Terraferma. During any normal year, i t  
must be remembered, a s ifn i f ic a n t  proportion of th e  to ta l  revenues of 
th e  Republic derived from the taxes lev ied  in  the  Terraferma; in  161*1,
fo r example, o ne-th ird  o f the e n tire  yearly  revenue o rig inated  in  the 
l l 6Terraferma. Taxes were lev ied  on th e  import and export o f goods of
a l l  kinds including s a l t ,  m eats, wine, and bread , as w ell as in d u s tr ia l
commodities as s i lk  and wool. A tax  was lev ied  on a l l  inns and h o s te l-
r ie s  and a c e rta in  percentage of a l l  lo c a l  f in e s  and p e n a ltie s  was a lso
co llec ted . Such taxes were lev ied  throughout the  possessions of Venice
although exemptions as a re s u l t  of lo ca l customs were more frequently
recognized in  Dalmatia emd the  islands of the  Levant than they were on 
117the Terraferma. On occasion sp ecia l lev ie s  would be imposed by
Venice in  order to  ra is e  revenue fo r  the  war. In  1650, fo r- in s ta n ce ,
several notable senators from Venice were e lected  to  tra v e l throughout
t h e  l a n d s  o f  t h e  T e r r a f e r m a  s o  t h a t  t h e y  c o u l d  a s s e s s  s p e c i f i c  sum s
from the various mainland c i t i e s .  Despite in te rm itten t complaints,
these add itio n al assessments were generally  greeted with a minimum of
h o s t i l i ty  and some communities were even known to  o ffe r v o lu n ta rily  a 
118special wartime contribution .
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Som e m a j o r  c i t i e s  o f  t h e  T e r r a f e r m a  se e m  t o  h a v e  s u f f e r e d  n o  d i r e c t
e f f e c t s  f r o m  t h e  •war a t  C a n d i a .  F r a u d ,  " b a n d i t s ,  a n d  p u b l i c  d e b t o r s  w e r e
d a i l y  c o m p l a i n t s  w h ic h  c o n t i n u e d  t o  p l a g u e  t h e  c i t y  o f  P a d u a ,  b u t  t h e r e
a r e  s e ld o m  a n y  s p e c i f i c  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  i l l s  c a u s e d  d i r e c t l y  b y  t h e  w a r .
T h e  m o s t  p e r m a n e n t  a n d  f r u s t r a t i n g  p r o b le m  f a c i n g  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  o f
P a d u a  w a s  t h a t  o f  g e n e r a l  e c o n o m ic  d e c a d e n c e ;  o n c e  P a d u a  w a s  " i n  a  s t a t e
o f  o p u l e n c e , "  t h e  C a p t a i n s  o f  t h e  c i t y  c o m p l a i n e d ,  b u t  n o w  p o v e r t y  w a s
c o m m o n p la c e  a n d  o n l y  t h e  w o o le n  i n d u s t r y  h a d  w i t n e s s e d  a n y  p r o s p e r i t y  
11 o
i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  ^  B u t  s u c h  c o m p l a i n t s  h a d  b e e n  c o m m o n ly  h e a r d  b e f o r e  
t h e  w a r  h a d  b e g u n  a n d  t h e  i l l s  o f  P a d u a ,  l i k e  m a n y  c i t i e s  o f  I t a l y ,  
w e r e  a s  m u c h  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  d e c a d e n c e  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  M e d i t e r r a ­
n e a n  a s  t h e y  w e r e  t o  s p e c i f i c  f a c t o r s  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  T u r k i s h  w a r .
V e r o n a  s u f f e r e d  f r o m  s i m i l a r  e c o n o m ic  d e c a d e n c e  a n d  d e p r e s s i o n .
A n d , l i k e  P a d u a ,  c o m p l a i n t s  a b o u t  V e r o n a ' s  e co n o m y  w e r e  n o t  r e s e r v e d  
s o l e l y  f o r  t h e  y e a r s  o f  t h e  w a r .  I n  l 6 h h  t h e  F c d e s t a  o f  t h e  c i t y  n o t e d  
t h a t  b y  t h e  t i m e  o f  h i s  t e n u r e  i n  o f f i c e  t h e  r i c h e s  o f  t h e  s i l k  a n d  
w o o le n  i n d u s t r i e s  w e r e  a  g l o r y  o f  t h e  p a s t ;  b y  h i s  t i m e  w o o le n  p r o d u c ­
t i o n  h a d  f a l l e n  f r o m  60,000  p i e c e s  o f  ' p a n i 1 t o  a b o u t  o n e  h u n d r e d ,  a n d
120
t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  s i l k  w as  n o t  v e r y  f a r  f r o m  i t s  t o t a l  r u i n .  T h e
d i s r u p t i o n  o f  t r a d i n g  r o u t e s  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  T h i r t y  Y e a r s  W ar h a d  
a l s o  d i s a s t r o u s l y  a f f e c t e d  t h e  s i l k  t r a d e  w i t h  G e r m a n y , d e c r e a s i n g  
V e r o n e s e  r e v e n u e s  i n  t h i s  i n d u s t r y  f ro m  a s  m u c h  a s  7 0 0 ,0 0 0  d u c a t s  t o  
5 0 - 6 0 ,0 0 0  d u c a t s  a n n u a l l y .
T h e r e  w e r e  s e v e r a l  e c o n o m i c a l l y  r e l a t e d  p r o b le m s  w h ic h  w e r e  i n  a n  
i n d i r e c t  w ay  t i e d  t o  t h e  p r e s s u r e s  o f  t h e  w a r .  P o p u l a t i o n  d e c r e a s e s  a t
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V e r o n a  w e r e  p r o b a b l y  f u r t h e r  a g g r a v a t e d  b y  t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  l e v y i n g  
g a l l e o t t i  o r  o a r s m e n  f o r  s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  a r m a d a s  o f  V e n i c e .  A n o th e r  
m o r e  b a s i c  p r o b l e m ,  a n d  o n e  -w h ich  m a y  p o s s i b l y  h a v e  b e e n  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
R e p u b l i c ' s  d e s p e r a t e  n e e d  f o r  w a r t i m e  r e v e n u e s ,  w a s  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  
V e n e t i a n  t a x  l e v i e d  o n  a l l  g o o d s  e n t e r i n g  a n d  l e a v i n g  V e r o n a .  T h i s  
' d a t i o  d e l l a  s t r a d e l l a 1 w a s  a  c u s to m s  d u t y  o f  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  k  p e r c e n t  
l e v i e d  e v e n  o n  g o o d s  m e r e l y  p a s s i n g  t h r o u g h  V e r o n a .  S u c h  a  t a x  w a s  
u n d o u b t e d l y  a  l u c r a t i v e  s o u r c e  o f  r e v e n u e  a n d  o n e  -w h ich  a  s t a t e  a t  w a r  
m i g h t  b e  m o r e  i n c l i n e d  t o  r e t a i n .  B u t  a  t a x  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e  g r e a t l y  
d i s c o u r a g e d  c o m m e rc e  a n d  m a n y  p e t i t i o n s  w e r e  s e n t  t o  V e n i c e  u r g i n g  i t s  
r e p e a l .  T h e  c o n t i n u e d  f l i g h t  o f  f o r e i g n  g o o d s  t o  o t h e r  c i t i e s  i n  o r d e r
t o  a v o i d  t h e  d a t i o  c o m p e l l e d  V e n i c e  t o  g r a n t  a  p a r t i a l  r e m o v a l  o f  t h e
t a x  o n  c e r t a i n  g o o d s ,  b u t  s i n c e  i t  w a s  r e t a i n e d  o n  o t h e r  g o o d s ,  t h e
121effec t of th is  concession was probably minimal.
How then did the war a t Candia e ffe c t the  economic s ta tu s  of
Verona? The evidence availab le  suggests th a t  the  pressures of th e  war
and the  in h ib itio n s  on the flow of maritime commercial t r a f f i c ,  which 
th a t  war must have had, d id , in  f a c t ,  fu rth e r depress the  economy of 
the  Terraferma, including Verona. Although we can not re la te  causally  
ce rta in  fac to rs  as population and revenues to  the Candian war, those 
so c ia l ind ica to rs which do ex is t suggest unquestionably th a t the war 
years were a time of continued economic decline. The population of 
Verona, fo r  example, seems to  have e ith e r  declined or remained unchanged 
during a ten-year period of the war; th ere  were w ithin the  c ity  in  161*5 
approximately 25,793 persons and ten  years l a te r  a population of 25,llt0.
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A l lo w in g  f o r  r e a s o n a b l e  e r r o r ,  s u c h  f i g u r e s  s u g g e s t  a t  b e s t  n o  d e m o -
122g r a p h i c  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  c i t y  o f  V e r o n a  f o r  a n  e n t i r e  d e c a d e .  M o re ­
o v e r ,  o n e  r e a d s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  w a r  y e a r s  f r e q u e n t  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  t h e  
' c u r r e n t  d i s t r e s s '  r e s u l t i n g  f ro m  t h e  w a r  a n d  t o  t h e  n e e d  t o  r e d u c e  e x ­
p e n d i t u r e s .  D u r i n g  t h e  f i r s t  t e n  y e a r s  o f  t h e  w a r ,  t o t a l  V e r o n e s e
r e v e n u e s  a l s o  d e c l i n e d ;  i n  16^5 t o t a l  r e v e n u e s  a m o u n te d  t o  2 1 1 ,6 6 9  d u c -
1 2 3
a t s  a n d  b y  t h e  m i d - l 6 5 0 ' s  t h e  c a m e r a  r e p o r t e d  o n l y  1 6 7 ,9 9 6  d u c a t s .
E c o n o m ic  i l l s  w e r e  r e p o r t e d  i n  som e  o f  t h e  o t h e r  s m a l l e r  c i t i e s  
o f  t h e  T e r r a f e r m a .  I n  1 6 ^ 5  V ic e n z a  g r a n t e d  a s  a  v o l u n t a r y  w a r  c o n t r i ­
b u t i o n  3 0 ,0 0 0  d u c a t s .  B u t  e l e v e n  y e a r s  l a t e r  T o m a so  P i s a n i ,  t h e  P o d e s t a  
o f  V i c e n z a ,  l a m e n t e d  t h e  ' c o n f u s i o n '  i n  t h e  c i t y ' s  c l o t h  t r a d e s  a n d  t h e  
i n e x o r a b l e  e n c r o a c h m e n t  o f  f o r e i g n  g o o d s  m a n u f a c t u r e d  i n  t h e  n o r t h .  A t  
T r e v i s o  c o m p l a i n t s  c e n t e r e d  a b o u t  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  t o  
c o l l e c t  d e b t s  a n d  t h e  e v e r  i n c r e a s i n g  d a n g e r  o f  b a n d i t r y .  C a p t a i n s  a n d
P o d e s t a s  o f  b o t h  c i t i e s  c o m p la i n e d  o f  e x c e s s i v e  t a x a t i o n  a n d  a  d e c l i n e
12 k
i n  t h e  r e v e n u e s  d e r i v e d  f ro m  t h e  c u s to m  d u t i e s .
P e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  d i r e c t  e f f e c t  t h e  T u r k i s h  w a r  h a d  o n  t h e  T e r r a ­
f e r m a  c o u l d  b e  s e e n  i n  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  m i l i t a r y  l i f e  o n  t h e  m a i n l a n d .  
C o n t i n g e n t s  o f  l o c a l  m i l i t i a  f ro m  t h e  T e r r a f e r m a  s e n t  t o  D a l m a t i a  a n d  
e l s e w h e r e  w e a k e n e d  V e n e t i a n  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  i n  I t a l y .  T h e r e  w e r e  r e ­
p o r t s  c l a i m i n g  a  d e c l i n e  i n  c a v a l r y  a n d  m i l i t i a  t r a i n i n g  a n d  a  l a c k  o f  
a d e q u a t e  a r t i l l e r y  a n d  m u n i t i o n s ,  a  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  p e r h a p s  a t t r i b u t ­
a b l e  t o  t h e  o b v i o u s  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  f u n d s  a n d  r e s o u r c e s  a t  C a n d ia .
N ew s h a d  e v e n  r e a c h e d  S p a i n ,  w h e r e  t h e  V e n e t i a n  a m b a s s a d o r  l e a r n e d  f ro m  
S p a n i s h  s o u r c e s  t h a t  t h e  f o r t r e s s e s  o f  B e rg a m o  a n d  B r e s c i a  w e r e  i n
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p a r t i c u l a r l y  w e a k e n e d  c o n d i t i o n  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  n e e d s  o f  t h e  w a r  i n  
t h e  E a s t . 1 2 5
I n t i m a t e l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  e c o n o m ic  l i f e  o f  V e n i c e  a n d  t h e  
T e r r a f e r m a  w a s  t h e  s t a t e  o f  V e n e t i a n  c o m m e rc e  a n d  s h i p b u i l d i n g ,  t h e  
v e r y  f o u n d a t i o n s  u p o n  w h ic h  V e n e t i a n  g r e a t n e s s  h a d  b e e n  e s t a b l i s h e d .
Y e t  o n e  w i t n e s s e s  a  s t a g n a t i o n  a n d  d e c a y  i n  t h e  m a r i t i m e  i n d u s t r i e s  o f  
t h e  R e p u b l i c  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  e c o n o m ic  d e c a d e n c e  w h ic h  w a s  f o u n d  i n  m o s t  
c i t i e s  o f  t h e  T e r r a f e r m a .  A r e p o r t  i s s u e d  a  y e a r  b e f o r e  t h e  o u t b r e a k  
o f  t h e  w a r  b y  t h e  C in q u e  S a v i i  a l i a  M e r c a n z a  c o u l d  n o t  h a v e  b e e n  m o re  
d i s c o u r a g i n g .  S k i l l e d  m a r i n e r s  a n d  V e n e t i a n - b u i l t  s h i p s  w e r e  i n  d e s ­
p e r a t e  s h o r t a g e ,  a n d  f o r e i g n e r s  a s s u m e d  m o r e  a n d  m o r e  o f  t h e  s h i p p i n g  
o f  t h e  c i t y ;  a t t e m p t s  a s  e a r l y  a s  1602 a n d  1627 t o  l e n d  m o n e y  t o  V e n e ­
t i a n  f i r m s  i n  o r d e r  t o  c o n s t r u c t  o r  p u r c h a s e  m o r e  c o m m e r c i a l  v e s s e l s  
h a d  h a d  n o  a p p r e c i a b l e  e f f e c t .  E q u a l l y  u n s u c c e s s f u l  i n  e n c o u r a g i n g  
c o m m e r c i a l  a c t i v i t y  w e r e  s u c h  t e m p o r a r y  m e a s u r e s  a s  p e r m i t t i n g  v e s s e l s  
o f  s m a l l e r  t o n n a g e  t o  t r a d e  i n  t h e  L e v a n t .  I f  s o  f e w  v e s s e l s  w e r e  
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  c o m m erc e  d u r i n g  t i m e s  o f  p e a c e ,  t h e  S a v i i  q u e s t i o n e d ,
t h e n  how  g r e a t  w i l l  t h e  s h o r t a g e  b e  d u r i n g  t i m e s  o f  t u r b u l e n c e  a n d
126
w a r ?
M any o f  t h e s e  sa m e  p r o b le m s  c i t e d  b y  t h e  m a g i s t r a t e s  i n  l6 h l r  w o u ld  
c o n t i n u e  t o  p l a g u e  V e n e t i a n  c o m m e r c i a l  a c t i v i t y  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  C a n d ia n  
w a r ,  a n d ,  i n  c e r t a i n  c a s e s ,  w e r e  a g g r a v a t e d  b y  t h e  d i s r u p t i o n s  b r o u g h t  
o n  b y  t h e  w a r  i t s e l f .  T e n  y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  w a r  t h e  
C in q u e  S a v i i  c o n t i n u e d  t o  l a m e n t  a  l a c k  o f  c o m m e r c i a l  v e s s e l s  d e s p i t e  
e v e r y  a t t e m p t  t o  h a v e  ne w  o n e s  c o n s t r u c t e d  o r  f o r e i g n  o n e s  p u r c h a s e d .
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T o f u l f i l l  t h e  d e m a n d  m o re  a n d  m o r e  F l e m i s h  a n d  D u tc h  v e s s e l s  h a d  t o  h e
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g r a n t e d  p e r m i s s i o n  t o  s a i l  u n d e r  t h e  f l a g  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c .
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h i s  s t a g n a t i o n  o f  t h e  s h i p - b u i l d i n g  i n d u s t r y ,  
V e n e t i a n  c o m m e rc e  w a s  f u r t h e r  h a m p e r e d  b y  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  t a x a t i o n  p o l ­
i c i e s  o f  t h e  R e p u b l i c .  V e n e t i a n  w e a l t h  d u r i n g  t h e  p a s t  tw o  c e n t u r i e s  
h a d  f i r m l y  r e s t e d  u p o n  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  m o n o p o ly  a n d  a  t a x  s y s t e m  w h ic h  
l e v i e d  a  t a x  o n  a l l  g o o d s  p a s s i n g  t h r o u g h  t h a t  m o n o p o ly .  R e g u l a t i o n s  
know n  a s  t h e  D c m in a n te  r e q u i r e d  t h a t  a l l  g o o d s  s e n t  t o  o r  f r o m  t h e  
c i t i e s  o f  t h e  T e r r a f e r m a  p a s s  t h r o u g h  t h e  c u s to m s  o f f i c e  a t  V e n i c e .  
N a v i g a t i o n  l a w s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  N a v i g a t i o n  A c t s  o f  E n g la n d  n e c e s s i t a t e d  
t h e  u s e  o f  V e n e t i a n  s e a m e n  a n d  V e n e t i a n - b u i l t  s h i p s .  T h e  c o m b i n a t i o n  
o f  t h e s e  v a r i o u s  c o m m e r c i a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  m a d e  V e n e t i a n  m a r i t i m e  a c t i v i t y  
e x t r e m e l y  m o n o p o l i s t i c  a n d  r e s t r i c t i v e . 1 2 ®
W hen V e n i c e ' s  c o m m e r c i a l  a n d  m a r i t i m e  h e g e m o n y  r e m a i n e d  u n c h a l ­
l e n g e d  a  c e n t u r y  o r  m o r e  e a r l i e r ,  s u c h  c u s to m  d u t i e s  r e p r e s e n t e d  a  
l u c r a t i v e  s o u r c e  o f  s t a t e  r e v e n u e s .  B u t  a s  t h e  n o r t h e r n  E u r o p e a n  n a ­
t i o n s  b e g a n  t o  d e v e l o p  t h e i r  c o m m e r c i a l  p o t e n t i a l s  a n d  a s  t h e  m a r i t i m e  
c e n t e r  o f  E u r o p e  s h i f t e d  a w a y  f r o m  t h e  M e d i t e r r a n e a n ,  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
c u s to m  d u t i e s  o f  V e n i c e  b e c a m e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  u n a c c e p t a b l e  a n d  a n n o y i n g .  
M o re  a n d  m o re  m e r c h a n t  v e s s e l s  c i r c u m v e n t e d  t h e  V e n e t i a n  d a t i i  b y  
f r e q u e n t i n g  o t h e r  p o r t s  w h e r e  d u t i e s  w e r e  e i t h e r  l o w e r  o r  n o n e x i s t e n t .  
T r a d e  w i t h  t h e  n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  n o r t h  a n d  w i t h  t h e  c i t i e s  o f  G erm a n y  d i ­
m i n i s h e d  n o t i c e a b l y ,  a n d  m a n y  c o n t e m p o r a r i e s  a t t r i b u t e d  t h i s  d e c l i n e  t o  
t h e  r e f u s a l  o f  V e n e t i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  t o  l o w e r  o r  d i s p e n s e  w i t h  t h e  c u s to m
v • 129b a rrie rs .
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Debate over these custom duties was not new. During c e rta in  emer­
gencies such as in  1571, th e  du ties had "been l i f t e d  so as to  encourage 
a g rea te r  flow of commercial t r a f f i c .  But since th e  d a t i i  were consid­
ered an indispensable source of revenue, they  were generally  r e in s t i ­
tu te d  once th e  emergency had passed.1^0 During the  Candian war those 
merchants who shipped by way of Venice or who h ired  Venetian v esse ls  
paid not only the i r r i t a t i n g  d a ti i  but a lso  bore the  add itio n al r is k  
of being attacked or seized by Turkish p a tro ls .  As commercial t r a f f i c  
was increasingly  routed through Livorno or Ancona and then on to  Ragusa 
in  order to  avoid such dangers, the amount of shipping a t  Venice
4 131decreased.
Some e ffo r t was made to  ad just the  custom du ties during the  d if­
f ic u l t  years of the  Candian stru g g le . Foreign merchants were granted 
permission to  trad e  d ire c tly  with the po rts  o f the Levant and were even
extended the p r iv ileg e  of purchasing and s e ll in g  in  th ese  ports without 
132having to  use Venetian f a c i l i t i e s .  Specific exceptions were made in  
ce rta in  cases lik e  the tran sp o rt of wool; s ince such a d ea rth .o f  Spanish 
wool ex isted  in  Venice, merchants were perm itted to  tran sp o rt wool by 
land from the western coasts of I ta ly ,  and even, i f  necessary, from 
Livorno and G e n o a . E v e n  though ce rta in  items such as tobacco were 
s t i l l  required  to  pass through customs a t  Venice and other goods were
Vallgranted exemptions fo r only a  few years a t  a tim e, a serious e ffo r t 
was made to  accommodate and f a c i l i t a t e  th e  flow of commercial t r a f f i c  
at Venice during the  war y e a r s . ^
In addition to  a p a r t i a l  re lax a tio n  o f the  custom d u tie s , Venice
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also devoted specia l a tte n tio n  to  m aintain, in  sp ite  o f th e  war, e x is t­
ing trad e  re la tio n s  with Moslem p o rts . P ersian , Armenian, Turkish, and 
other easte rn  merchants were generally  tre a te d  w ith considerable cour­
tesy . Turkish merchants liv in g  in  Venice a t f i r s t  met w ith considerable 
136h o s t i l i ty ,  but even they were eventually  to le ra te d  and allowed to  
continue a c t iv i t ie s  w ithin the  walls of th e i r  fondaco or warehouse.
M aintaining a firm  hold on Turkish markets proved exceptionally  
d i f f ic u l t  fo r Venetian merchants as a re s u l t  of several fac to rs  to ta l ly  
unrelated  to  the  Candian war. Extensive c iv i l  war, espec ia lly  the  long 
Persian wars of 1623-38, had disrupted th e  Turkish economy and had 
forced a devaluation of Turkish currency. Consequently, cheaper mate­
r ia l s  were now being used by Turkish m anufacturers, and to  reduce ex­
penses e ith e r  Turkish-made items or inexpensive su b s titu te s  were being 
used. For example, Venetian manufacturers who refused to  sh if t  to  the  
production o f the  cheaper 'new d raperies ' now found th e i r  high qu a lity  
woolen-goods too expensive to  compete in  Turkish markets with any 
success. During the war Turkish buyers increasingly  came to  re ly  on
D u tc h  a n d  E n g l i s h  m e r c h a n t s  w h o , a s  t h e  w a r  d r a g g e d  o n ,  b e c a m e  m o r e  a n d
137more entrenched in  the  markets of the  East. In th is  sense, the  war 
d id , in  f a c t ,  act as a ca ta ly st in  acce le ra ting  a tendency estab lished  
e a r l ie r  in  the  century.
Despite a l l  e ffo r ts  to  reconcile  commerce and w arfare, Venetian 
trad e  in  th e  East suffered  from the d isruptions of the  Candian war. 
Merchants continued to  trade  a t Venice and Venetian p o r ts , hut more and 
more commercial t r a f f i c  sh if ted  e ith e r  to  n eu tra l I ta l ia n  ports or to
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R a g u s a  i n  o r d e r  t o  a v o i d  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  h a z a r d s  0 f  w a r . E n g l i s h  
a n d  D u tc h  m e r c h a n tm e n  n o t  o n l y  t e n d e d  t o  r e p l a c e  V e n e t i a n s  a s  t h e  p r e ­
d o m in a n t  t r a d e r s  i n  t h e  E a s t ,  h u t  t h e y  a l s o  p r o f i t e d  h y  s u p p l y i n g  t h e
139T u r k i s h  a r m i e s  w i t h  t h e  s u p p l i e s  t h e y  n e e d e d .  ^  C o n f r o n t e d  h y  t h e  
p r e s s u r e s  a n d  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  o f  w a r ,  V e n e t i a n  t r a d e  i n  t h e  E a s t  c o n t i n ­
u e d  t o  d w i n d l e ;  n o t  l o n g  a f t e r  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  C a n d ia n  w a r  t h e  c o n s u l s  
a t  A le p p o  a n d  S m y rn a  w e r e  c l o s e d  f o r  l a c k  o f  c o m m e r c ia l  a c t i v i t y .
C o t t o n  a n d  s i l k  m a r k e t s  i n  S y r i a  a n d  A n a t o l i a  s i m i l a r l y  s u f f e r e d  a  d e -
, .  140c lin e .
N o t e v e r y t h i n g  w a s  q u i t e  s o  c a t a s t r o p h i c ,  f o r  som e  c o m m e r c i a l  r e ­
g e n e r a t i o n  d i d  o c c u r  d u r i n g  t h e  p o s t - w a r  y e a r s .  E f f o r t s  c o n t i n u e d  t o
l l i l
s i m p l i f y  a n d  r e g u l a r i z e  t h e  c u s to m  d u t i e s  a l t h o u g h  w i t h  l i m i t e d  s u c c e s s .
I n s t e a d  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  s p i c e s  a n d  c l o t h - g o o d s ,  new  p r o d u c t s  s u c h  a s
f l a x ,  c a r b o n a t e  o f  s o d a ,  a n d  s u g a r  w e r e  c a r r i e d  h y  V e n e t i a n  m e r c h a n t s .
M o r e o v e r ,  V e n e t i a n  l u x u r i e s  s u c h  a s  g l a s s ,  q u a l i t y  f a b r i c s ,  a n d  j e w e l r y
c o n t i n u e d  i n  d e m an d  t h r o u g h o u t  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  t h e  w o r l d .  E v e n  t h e
D a l m a t i a n  t r a d e ,  t h o u g h  s t i f f l e d  h y  t h e  w a r ,  r e c o v e r e d  a n d  r e t a i n e d  a
lh2d e f i n i t e  s p a r k  o f  v i t a l i t y  o n c e  p e a c e  h a d  r e t u r n e d .
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  t h e  r e c o v e r y  w a s  o n l y  p a r t i a l  a n d  t h e  e c o n o m ic  d e ­
c a d e n c e  w h ic h  h a d  b e e n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  b e f o r e  t h e  w a r  c o n t i n u e d  u n a b a t e d .  
V e n i c e  s u f f e r e d  i n c r e a s e d  u n e m p lo y m e n t a n d  d e p o p u l a t i o n  a s  t h e  i n e x o ­
r a b l e  s h i f t  t o w a r d  t h e  T e r r a f e r m a  o f  m en  a n d  c a p i t a l  p r o c e e d e d  a t  a  
1^3
d e a d l y  p a c e .  T h e  d e c l i n e  o f  V e n i c e  a s  a  w o r l d  e c o n o m ic  p o w e r  b e ­
l o n g s  t o  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  tw o  c e n t u r i e s .  T h e  w a r  o f  C a n d ia  a s  a  f a c t o r  
i n  t h a t  d e c l i n e  w as  i n  t h i s  s e n s e  n o t  u n i q u e .  B u t  i t  w a s  a  c a t a s t r o p h e  
o f  u n d e n i a b l e  m a g n i t u d e ,  o n e  w h ic h  w e i g h e d  h e a v i l y  rnnong t h e  m any 
b u r d e n s  o f  t h e  c e n t u r y .
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CHAPTER IV : FOOTNOTES
1 . "Correspondenza M alta, l6k5-69 ,"  A rch lvlo S to rico  I ta l ia n o ,
XLI ( 1908) ,  p . 111 . Fra Roberto Solaro noted  th a t th e  Turks named th e  
fo r tr e s s  o f  Nuova Candia, 'D isp e tto * , -which in  I t a l ia n  referred  to  an 
annoying or s p it e f u l  a c tio n .
2 . A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R e laz ione , Busta 8l ,  R elazione  
d i Tomeo Pompeo, G enerale, January 27 , l£ 5 1 , Candia. In  a report o f
1650 , Fra Roherto Solaro wrote th e  fo llo w in g  concerning the s ta t e  o f  the  
f o r t i f ic a t io n s  a t  Candia: "The c i t y  o f  Candia i s  e x c e l le n t ly  f o r t i f i e d  
(e  r id o ta  in  otim a f o r t i f i c a t io n e ) ,  w e ll  counter-m ined, in s id e  as w e ll  
as ou t; at the m ilita r y  complex known as 'M ocen igo '(l1opera Monseniga) 
they have made a tr u e  lu n e t te ,  faced  w ith  ston e; the c i t y  i s  furnished  
to  p er fe c t io n  w ith  powder, firew orks (fo c h i a r t i f i c i a t i ) ,  a r t i l l e r y ,  
arms, b is c u i t s ,  and grain ."  See "Correspondenza M alta, l6h5-69 ,"  XLI
( 1908) ,  p . 112 .
3 . A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R elaz ione , Busta 8 0 , Giacomo 
da Riva, P row ed itor-G enerale dell'A rm i n e l  Regno d i Candia, 1653- Biva 
noted in  t h is  report th a t he had ca r ried  out numerous rep a irs  inc lud ing  
some on th e  p ort attached  to  the fo r t r e s s .  Another observer, P row ed itor  
d a l Regno, G iu lio  C ab riel, wrote s im ila r ly  complimentary statem ents on 
the co n d ition  o f  Candia*s d efenses: "The w a lls  o f  the c i t y  are in  optimum 
co n d itio n , and th e defense i s  s e c u r e . . . ."  C ertain  weak se c tio n s  had ap­
p aren tly  been repaired  inc lud ing  numerous ’low  p la c e s ’ which were now
in  "very good co n d itio n ."  The a r t i l l e r y  and cannon w ere, according to  
C abriel, in  l e s s  than sa t is fa c to r y  c o n d it io n . See A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V 
(S e c r e ta ), R e lazione, Busta 80, P ro w ed ito r  d a l Regno, G iu lio  C ab riel. 
There were sev e ra l o ther is o la te d  Venetian fo r tr e s s e s  on th e is la n d .
Suda had so fa r  proved impgrenable to  Turkish a s s a u lt s .  Garabusa, 
lo ca te d  on a rocky c l i f f ,  was l ik e w ise  fr e e  from fe a r  o f  Turkish a tta ck . 
Spinalonga was lo ca te d  in  an advantageous s i t e ,  but th e  w a lls  o f  t h is  
fo r tr e s s  were in  need o f  renovation . The fo r tr e s s  on th e  is la n d  o f  C erigo, 
although in  need o f  some re p a ir , was fo r tu n a te ly  constructed  on a summit. 
See A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ), R elazione, Busta 80 , Andrea Corner, 
P row ed itor-G enerale d e l  Regno.
h . A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R elaz ione , Busta 8l ,  January 27,
1651, Tomeo Pompeo. Included in  one o f  C a b r ie l's  reports i s  a r o l l  c a l l  
o f  troops a t Candia. There were 5,3^7 troops in c lu d in g  th e cavalry u n its  
(222) ,  an a d d itio n a l 1 .2 0 0  ce m id e  or  l o c a l  r e se r v e s , and 215 bombardiers. 
Of th e se , apparently on ly  1+,HOO men had "passed th e  bank", th at i s ,  who 
were among th e  p aid  s o ld ie r s .  Moreover, o f  th a t 5,3^7 f ig u r e , klk men were 
fe u d a ti or l o c a l  n ob les re sid en t on Candia, b ut th ese  were o f  q uestionab le  
m ilita r y  v a lu e . Among a l l  the tr o o p s , there were approxim ately 1 ,602 Ger­
mans (O ltrem ontani), 1,1+95 I t a l ia n s ,  and 1 ,005  Greeks, a l l  o f  whom were 
judged worthy and brave s o ld ie r s .  See A .S .V .,  C o lleg io  V (S ec reta ), 
R elazione, Busta 8 0 , R elazione d i G iu lio  C ab rie l, P row ed itor  d a l Regno, 
1651. As fo r  the number o f  troops needed to  improve defenses or in i t i a t e
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o f f e n s i v e  a c t io n ,  n o  co n cen su s  e x i s t s .  Pompeo argued  t h a t  from  6 ,0 0 0  
t o  1 0 ,0 0 0  men i n  a l l  w ere n eed ed  t o  d e fe n d  C andia; C a b r ie l  c i t e d  th e  
n eed  f o r  a t  l e a s t  300 r e g u la r  c a v a lr y  (1 0 0  h e a v y , 200 l i g h t ) .  S ee  
A .S .V . ,  C o l le g io  V ( S e c r e t a ) ,  R e la z io n e ,  B u s ta  8 0 ,  Giacomo d a  R iv a , 
P r o w e d ito r -G e n e r a le  d e ll 'A r m i n e l  Regno d i  C andia , 1653 .  A cco rd in g  t o  
P r o w e d ito r -G e n e r a le  B arb aro , i n  1658,  t h e r e  w ere  1,633  G reek s , 557  
Germans (O ltr e m o n ta n i) , 1 ,0 1 9  I t a l i a n s ,  12k c a v a lr y ,  and 203 bombard­
i e r s ;  th e  t o t a l  f o r c e  amounted t o  U,M*0 men i n  a l l .  Those c e m id e  w h ich  
w ere  c o n s id e r e d  o f  p o s s ib l e  u s e  num bered 631  m en. I n  th e s e  f i g u r e s  i t  i s  
in t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o te  th e  s h i f t i n g  c o m p o s it io n  o f  th e  g a r r is o n  and th e  
much g r e a te r  number o f  G reeks i n  1658  th a n  i n  1651 .  There w ere s o  many 
G reeks (many o f  th o s e  l i s t e d  a s  , 0 1 tr e m a r in i , w e r e , i n  f a c t ,  Greek in  
o r ig in )  t h a t  Barbaro rem arked t h a t  " th e  f o r t r e s s  (C andia) i s  a l l  o r  i n  
a  mao o r  P&rt from  th e  same n a t io n  (G r e e c e ) . 11 I t  i s  p o s s ib l e  t o  c o n je c tu r e  
t h a t  th e  number o f  Germans (O ltr e m o n ta n i)  had p ro b a b ly  d im in ish e d  due t o  
th e  d e c l in in g  number o f  unem ployed German s o l d i e r s ;  e a r l i e r  i n  th e  1650 ' s ,  
t h e r e  w ere  u n d ou b ted ly  many m ore ’ d e m o b iliz e d ’ German s o l d i e r s  who had  
r e c e n t ly  becom e unem ployed when t h e  P ea ce  o f  W e stp h a lia  was s ig n e d .  I t  i s  
a l s o  p o s s ib l e  t h a t  th e  V e n e tia n s  came t o  f in d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c o n v in c e  Ger­
man s o l d i e r s  t o  f i g h t  a t  C andia  w here th e  c l im a te  was h a r sh  and th e  pay  
f r e q u e n t ly  p o o r . C o n seq u en tly , V e n e tia n  r e c r u i t e r s  had t o  r e l y  more and 
more on s o l d i e r s  from  th e  i s la n d s  o f  th e  a r c h ip e la g o  and from  G reece .
5 .  Giacomo d a  R iv a  e s t im a te d  t h a t  i n  p e a c e  tim e  U ,0 0 0  p a id  i n ­
fa n tr y  and 2 ,0 0 0  l o c a l  r e c r u i t s  w ou ld  b e  s a t i s f a c t o r y  t o  d e fen d  C an d ia .
He recommended a n o th er  1 ,5 0 0  in fa n try m en  b e  c o n t in u a l ly  m a in ta in e d  a t  
C o rfu , C ep h a lo n ia , and Z a n te , e a c h ;  i n  th e  e v e n t  o f  an a t t a c k ,  e a c h  i s ­
la n d  c o u ld  s e n t  1 ,0 0 0  tr o o p s  t o  r e in f o r c e  th e  c i t y .  A t th e  o th e r  f o r t r e s s ­
e s  o f  th e  k ingdom , R iv a  recommended t h a t  500 in f a n t r y  b e  s t a t io n e d  a t  
P o r to  d e l l a  Suda, 15 0  a t  G arabusa, and bOO a t  S p in a lo n g a . S ee A .S .V . ,  
C o l le g io  V ( S e c r e t a ) ,  R e la z io n e ,  B u s ta  8 0 ,  P r o w e d ito r -G e n e r a le  d e l l ’Armi 
n e l  Regno d i  C andia , Giacomo d a  R iv a , 1 6 5 3 .
6 .  A .S .V . ,  C o l le g io  V ( S e c r e t a ) ,  R e la z io n e ,  B u sta  8 l ,  Tomeo Pompeo, 
January 2 7 , 1651 .  Pompeo w ro te  how th e  men w ere o f t e n  fo r c e d  t o  s l e e p  " in  
th e  r a in ,  and i n  th e  w ind on th e  b a r e  grou n d , e s p e c i a l l y  i n  th e  c u r r e n t  
se a so n  ( w i n t e r ) . . .  and th e  men s ic k e n e d ,  p a s s in g  from h e a l t h  t o  in f i r m i t y ,  
from  v ig o r  t o  e x h a u s t io n ,  and from  an a t t i t u d e  o f  s e r v i c e  t o  one o f  d e s ­
p a i r . . . . "  S ee  a l s o ,  A .S .V . ,  C o l le g io  V ( S e c r e t a ) ,  R e la z io n e ,  B u sta  8 0 ,  
R e la z io n e  d i  G iu l io  C a b r ie l ,  P r o w e d it o r  d a l  Regno d i  C andia , 1651 ; A .S .V . ,  
C o l le g io  V ( S e c r e t a ) ,  R e la z io n e ,  B u s ta  8 0 ,  Giacomo d a R iv a , P r o w e d it o r -  
G en era le  d e l l ’Armi n e l  Regno d i  C an d ia , 1653 .
7 .  A .S .V . ,  P .T J 4 . ( 808 ) ,  Luca F ra n cesco  B arbaro , P r o w e d it o r -  
G en era le  d i  C andia , May 2 3 , 1659 , C an d ia .
8 . When pay a r r iv e d ,  th e  s o l d i e r s  w ere p a id  o n e - th ir d  o f  t h e i r  
m on th ly  s a la r y  e v e r y  te n  d a y s , p a r t  i n  s i l v e r  and p a r t  i n  cop p er  c o in .
The f e u d a t i  and se r v a n ts  w ere u s u a l ly  p a id  o n ly  in  cop p er  c u r r e n c y .
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Moreover, -when money was short a t  Candia, work on th e f o r t i f ic a t io n s  
sometimes had to  he n eg lec ted . Money was freq uently  spent fa r  in  advance 
and account hooks were o ften  ’juggled* in  order to  m aintain a t  l e a s t  th e  
im pression  o f  o r d e r lin e s s . See A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R e lazione, 
Busta 80, G iu lio  C ab rie l, P row ed itor-G enerale dell'A rm i n e l  Regno d i  
Candia, 1652 ,  passim . ; A .S .V ., P.T.M. (715)» Rubrica d e l le  l e t t e r e ,  
P row ed itor-G enerale d ell'A rm i, M orosin i, A p r il, 1650, Candia. Reporting 
on th e  con d ition s a t  Candia, Fra Roberto Solaro wrote th e fo llo w in g  in  
November o f  1650: "In the beginning o f  th e  campaign, the Venetians had 
approxim ately 6 ,0 0 0  in fa n try  and 500 ca v a lry , a l l  chosen men; a t p rese n t, 
th ere  are not if,000 , th e  remainder being  dead o f  su ffe r in g , and, in  p a rt­
ic u la r ,  from fam ine. The Venetians do not g iv e  more than a grimani a  day 
per so ld ie r ,  and at th e  end o f  th e  month, twenty grim ani, which does not 
make a scudo a month, th a t not b eing  enough fo r  them to  buy a sa la d , s in c e  
everyth ing in  th is  fo r tr e s s  i s  very  c o s t ly .  Those poor so ld ie r s  are so  
exhausted from hunger th a t they have n ot th e  fo rce  to  shoot a  musket, and 
I  have never seen  so many, w h ile sh o o tin g , f a l l  down from weakness; th is  
i s  the reason why more f l e e  to  th e  Turks than any oth er ."  "Correspondenza 
M alta," XLI ( l9 0 8 ) ,p .  112.
9 . A .S .V ., P.T.M. (8 0 8 ), Luca Francesco Barbaro, P ro w ed ito r -  
Generale d i  Candia, June 27, 1658 , Candia.
10 . A .S .V ., P.T.M. (7 1 5 ), Rubrica d i l e t t e r e  d e l le  P ro w ed ito r -  
Generale dell'A rm i in  Regno d i Candia, l6 k 7 -5 2 , L etter  26 ,  August 2 ,
1652,  Candia, and L etter  7 9 , March 19 , 1651, Candia; A .S .V ., P.T.M. (8 0 8 ), 
Luca Francesco Barbaro, P row ed itor-G enerale d i Candia, March (passim . ) ,  
Candia; A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ), R e lazione, Busta 80 , Giacomo da R iva, 
P row ed itor-G enerale dell'A rm i n e l  Regno d i Candia, p a ssim ., 1653, and 
R elazione de E cc. Marco Molin as Prow ed itor-G enerale dell'A rm i n e l  Regno 
d i Candia, A p r il 15 , 1655.
11 . A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R elazione, Busta 80 , Giacomo da
R iva, P row ed itor-G enerale dell'A rm i n e l  Regno d i Candia, 1653 ,  and R el­
azione o f  G iu lio  C ab riel, P ro w ed ito r  d a l Regno, 1651 .
12 . A .S .V ., C o lle g io  V (S e c re ta ) ,  R e laz io n e , B u sta  8 l ,  Tomeo Pompeo, 
G enera le d e l  A r t i g l i e r i a  e  G ovem ato re-G enera le  d e l  Armi i n  Regno; A .S .V ., 
P.T.M . (7 1 5 ), R u b rica  d i  l e t t e r e  d e l l e  P ro w e d ito r-G e n e ra le  d e ll 'A rm i in  
Regno d i  C andia, R u b rica  36,  Septem ber 21, 1652, C andia; A .S .V ., P.T.M . 
( 808) ,  Luca F rancesco  B arbaro , P ro w e d ito r-G e n e ra le  d i  C andia, June 27, 
1658.
13 . A .S .V ., C o lle g io  V ( S e c re ta ) ,  R e laz io n e , B u sta  8 0 , Giacomo da
R iva , P ro w e d ito r -G e n e ra le  d e ll 'A rm i n e l  Regno d i  C andia, 1653 .
I lf. A .S .V ., P.T.M. (8 0 8 ), Luca Francesco Barbaro, Prow editor-G en­
e r a le  d i Candia, June 27, 1658 .
15 . F ig u re s  g iven  in  1650 by a  renegade Turk on th e  e s tim a te d  number 
o f  T u rk ish  tro o p s  a t  C andia were as fo llo w s :
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Rettimo: 1 ,000  " 20 "
Other fo r tr e s s e s :  900 ” 150 "
lo t a l :  16 ,900  in fa n tr y  870 cavalry
Included in  t h is  cavalry  estim ate were a lso  a number o f  bom bardiers, 
guastadors (sa p p ers), e t c . ,  bu t th e  v a s t  m ajority were probably cav­
a lr y . See BJI.M ., VH (’2 1 1 ), pp. 15^-55. P row ed itor  d a l Regno, G iu lio  
C ab rie l, reported  th ere  w ere, in  1651 , approxim ately 27 ,000  to  28 ,000  
enemy troops includ ing  1 ,000  ca v a lr y . This fig u re  apparently included  
some 12,000  men sta tio n ed  a t  Nuova Candia and in  the mountains in  th e  
immediate v i c in it y  o f  Candia; o f  th ese  12 ,0 0 0 , perhaps o n ly  5 ,000  
were men-at-arms, th e  remained b eing  ser v a n ts , merchants, and other  
c i v i l i a n s .  See A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R elazione, Busta 80 , 
P ro w ed ito r  d a l Hsgno, G iu lio  C ab rie l, 1651 .  Tomeo Pompeo gave th e  
f ig u r e  o f  between 25,000 and 30,000 Turkish troops th a t same year  
(1651) ,  but t h is  fig u r e  had been reduced by d ise a se  and combat to  
about 12,000 to  15,000 e f f e c t iv e s .  This estim ate apparently included  
on ly  th o se  so ld ie r s  s ta tio n ed  in  or near Nuova Candia and not 
th e e n t ir e  is la n d . See A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ), Busta 8l ,
Tomeo Pompeo, January 27 , 1651 .
1 6 . A .S .V ., D ip . R e l. ,  C o stan tin op o li, F i lz a  130 , l e t t e r  265, 
Soranzo, January-March,~l61*7> Soranzo added th a t th ere  were many p res- , 
sures f e l t  as a  r e su lt  o f  th e  p lague which had swept th e  Ottoman em pire; 
some 50,000 estim ated  dead had made, Soranzo claim ed, th e  Sultan  "more 
e n th u sia stic  ( to  peace) than e v e r . . . ."
17 . See B.N.M., V U  (2 1 1 ), passim . :  V a liero , H is to r ia , p p . 2l*l- 
1*5, 257, 260-62; BJJJ4., VII (2 0 0 ), Mbssa d ell'A rm i, 1650 , P ortezza
d i San Todoro. B esides Candia and Porto d e l la  Suda, th e  on ly  oth er  major 
fo r tr e s s  on th e is la n d  s t i l l  in  V enetian hands was th a t o f  Garabusa. 
Gaxabusa was apparently s itu a te d  on such d i f f i c u l t  te r r a in  th a t th e  
enemy had never even made an attem pt to  capture i t ;  th e  Turks "not o n ly  
did  n ot tr y  an a s sa u lt , but d id  not even v i s i t  i t . . . f o r  th e  h e ig h t o f  
the eminence on which i t  was b u i l t ."  A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , Busta  
80 , G iu lio  C ab rie l, P ro w ed ito r  d a l Segno, 1651 .
1 8 . V a lier o , H is to r ia , pp. 333-35; BJT.M., VII (2 0 0 ), Mossa d e l l '  
Aimi, p .  123, map 58 .
19 . See Angelo d i Benvenuti, " II d iv e rsiv o  in  Dalm atia d e l la  
guerra d i Candia," La R iv is lt a  Dalm atica, Part I I ,  XXV (A p r il, 1951*), 
pp. 29—31*. There e x is t s  some in t e r e s t in g  f in a n c ia l  and m ilita r y  d ata  
on D alm atia re lev a n t to  the years a f t e r  F o sco lo ’ s ea r ly  trium phs. For 
example, see A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R elazione, B usta 67 , Dalm atia, 
1660, R elazione d i Antonio Bernardo, Prow ed itor-G enerale in  D alm atia e t  
Albania, May 20 , 1660 , and June 29 , l 660 .  Bernardo’s l e t t e r  to  th e  Senate  
was in  many ways h ighjy  c r i t i c a l  o f  the s ta te  o f  Dalmatian and Albanian  
fo r t i f ic a t io n s  in  1660 . Few o f  the fo r tr e s s e s  he had insp ected  had s a t i s ­
fa c to ry  numbers o f  men and su p p lie s , and the armaments o f  th e  g a lle y s  had 
been weakened by d ise a se  and in te r n a l b ic k e rin g . Cattaro needed 50,000 to
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60,000 d u c a ts  i n  o r d e r  t o  s t r e n g th e n  t h e  d e fe n s e s  o f  t h e  p r o v in c e ;
A lm issa  h ad  w eak e x t e r io r  f o r t i f i c a t i o n s  and a  p o o r  tr e n c h  s y s te m , and  
c e r t a in  a s p e c t s  o f  S eb en ico  n eed ed  c o n s id e r a b le  m o d if ic a t io n .  In  a l l  o f  
t h e  m ajor f o r t r e s s e s  o f  t h e  p r o v in c e ,  th e r e  w ere n o t  more th a n  3,^98  
in f a n t r y .  Bernardo com p la in ed  t h a t  in e x p e r ie n c e d  men w ere  o f t e n  s e n t  
t o  D a lm atia  w here t h e y  s ta y e d  f o r  a  few  m onths and th e n  r e q u e s te d  l i c e n s e  
t o  r e tu r n  t o  V e n ic e . The l o c a l  in h a b ita n t s  s u f f e r e d  g r e a t l y  from  p o v e r ty ,  
and t h e  M o r la cch i c a v a lr y  d e se r v e d  t o  b e  d isb a n d ed  s in c e  th e  R e p u b lic  had  
f a i l e d  t o  p a y  them  t h e i r  a l l o t t m e n t .  B ernardo a p p a r e n t ly  was a b le  t o  
m a in ta in  t h e s e  D a lm atian  f o r c e s  f o r  a s  l i t t l e  a s  1 2 ,0 0 0  d u c a ts  a  m onth, 
b u t  t h i s  f i g u r e  may n o t  h a v e  in c lu d e d  s e v e r a l  m i l i t a r y - r e l a t e d  e x p e n s e s .  
The d i f f e r e n c e  i n  p a y  betw een  t h e  European t r o o p s  and t h o s e  r e c r u i t e d  
i n  t h e  p r o v in c e  o r  i n  t h e  i s la n d s  o f  t h e  a r c h ip e la g o  m a y -a lso  h ave  
e n a b le d  him  t o  m in im ize  e x p e n s e s .  F or exam p le , an  O ltrem o n ta n i or  
E uropean m ercenary  h ir e d  a s  a  C ap ta in  r e c e iv e d  s i x t y  d u c a ts  a  m onth, 
b u t a  G reek i n  t h e  same rank  r e c e iv e d  o n ly  t e n  d u c a ts  a  m onth, t h i s  was 
t r u e  ev en  th ou gh  th e  G reek t r o o p s  f r e q u e n t ly  p roved  more r e l i a b l e  th a n  
t h e  E uropeans. B ernardo a l s o  l i s t e d  a l l  t h e  tr o o p s  s t a t io n e d  a t  v a r io u s  
f o r t r e s s e s  th ro u g h o u t t h e  p r o v in c e :
Zara 590 s o ld i e r s B om bardiers
S e b en ico 591 C avalry
S p a la to 877
T rau 298 "
C lis s a 320 "
A lm issa 148
C atta ro 559
Budua 115
D e s p it e  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  R e p u b lic  t o  s h i f t  t r o o p s  from  one a r e a  t o  
a n o th e r , th e  f i g u r e s  g iv e n  b y  B ernardo o b v io u s ly  f a l l  s h o r t  o f  th o s e  
e s t im a te d  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  a  s e c u r e  d e fe n s e  o f  th e  p r o v in c e .  B ernardo  
e s t im a te d  t h a t  3*500 tr o o p s  w ould  b e  n eed ed  f o r  Z ara , 6,000  fo r  
S e b e n ic o ,  1,500 f o r  T rau, 4,000 f o r  S p a la to ,  and 3,000 f o r  C a tta r o .
20. A .S .V . ,  P.T .M . (8 0 8 ), Luca F ra n cesco  B a rb a ro , P r o w e d it o r -  
G en era le  d i  C andia , Saptember 1 2 , 1658, C andia. B arbaro e s t im a te d  th e  
T u rk ish  f o r c e s  a t  t h i s  t im e  t o  b e  a b ou t 6,000 in f a n t r y  and 1,0 0 0  C ava lry ;  
th e r e  w ere many o th e r s  i n  ' r e s e r v e ' ,  b u t  s in c e  t h e s e  w ere  'r e n e g a d e s '  
t h e i r  l o y a l t y  t o  t h e  Turks c o u ld  b e  d o u b ted . V e n e tia n  f o r c e s  w ere  a l s o  
i n  a  w eakened s t a t e  a t  t h i s  t im e .
21. "Correspondenza M alta, 1645-69,"  XLVI (1 9 1 0 ), pp. 39-41.
See  a l s o ,  M ario N ani M ocenigo, La m arina  V en ezian a  da L epanto  a l i a  ca d u to  
d e l l a  R ep u b b lica  (Rome, 1930), p p . 210-212^ (H e r e in a f te r  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  
M arina V en e z ia n a . ) "C orrespondenza M a lta , 1645-69," XLV (1910), p .  329-
22. B.N.M ., VII (211), L etter  o f  Giovanni Carlo Serpentine, 
August 22, 1651 , pp. 165-174; Sanruele Romania, S to ria  docuaentata d i 
Venezia (V en ice, l8 5 3 - 6 l ) ,  V II, p . 418-420. (H ereinafter re ferred  t o  as  
S to r ia . ) Antonio G uglie lm otti, . S to r ia  d e l la  marina p o n t if ic la . La 
sduadra a u s ilia n a  d e l la  marina Rcmana a Candia e a l ia  Morea. S to ria  d e l
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1644 a l  1669  (Rone, 1883) ,  V IH , pp. 102-03 . (H erein after re ferred  to  as 
Marina P o n t i f l c ia . ) ;  Andrea V a lier o , H is to r ia  d e l la  guerra d i  Candia 
(V en ice, 1 6 7 9 ), p . 265- 67 .  (H erein after re ferred  to  as H is to r ia . ) ;
BJT.M., VH (2 0 0 ), Mossa deLL'Armi, p .  93 , map 1*3, p . 95, map 44 , P . 97, 
map 1*5.
2 3 . Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, p .  17**.
24 . "Correspondenza M alta, 1645-69,"  XLV ( 1910) ,  J u ly  17 , 1653,
p . 31*0.
25 . See B.N.M., VII (2 1 1 ), R elazione d e l su ccesso  a i  D ardanelli 
t r a  l ’Armata Veneta e l a  Turca, pp. 237-21*0 and May 27 , 165U, pp. 183-  
187; Romanin, S to r ia , pp. 424-426; B.N.M ., VII (2 0 0 ), Mossa dell'A rm i, 
p . 125 , map. 59 , p . 127 , map 60 , p . 133 and map 63 .
26 . B.N.M ., VII (2 1 1 ), L e tte r  o f  June 26 , 1655,  pp. 191-194; 
B.N.M ., VII (2 0 0 ), Mossa d ell'A rm i, p . 145, map. 6 9 ; Nani-Mocenigo,
Marina Veneziana, pp. l 8 0 - l8 l .
27 . I t  was thought th a t a  la r g e  Turkish convoy was being  
assem bled a t  M aivasia in  order t o  transp ort reinforcem ents and su p p lie s  
t o  Canea. As a r e s u l t ,  Morosini in i t i a t e d  a gen eral p o s it io n  to  a s s a i l  
because i t  was s itu a te d  on a rock is la n d  connected t o  th e  mainland by a 
bridge two hundred meters lo n g . M orosini cut th e  b ridge t o  th e  mainland 
and then  t r ie d  t o  fo r ce  th e  subm ission o f  th e  f o r tr e s s .  An unfortunate  
shot during th e  f i r s t  few days o f  th e  a s sa u lt  struck  th e  fla g sh ip  o f  
th e  M altese r e s u lt in g  in  a withdrawal o f  th e  M altese sh ip s from th e  
b a t t le .  D esp ite  four months o f  s ie g e  th e  Turks were a b le  t o  bring in  
rein forcem en ts, and M orosini was fo rced  to'abandon th e  s ie g e .  See 
G u g lie lm o tti, Marina F o n t if ic ia , p . 138; V a lier o , H is to r ia , pp. 358-364; 
B.N.M ., VII (2 0 0 ), Mossa d e ll'a r m i, p . 147, map 70, p . 1^9, map. 71.
28. Nani-Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, pp. 181-182.
29 . "Correspondenza M alta, 1645-69,"  XIV (1 910), June 26 , 1655, 
p . 3h8. We read o f th e  sack  o f  th e  is la n d  and fo r tr e s s  o f  V olo, and o f  
th e  capture o f  m ill io n s  o f  b is c u it s  and sev e ra l p ie ce s  o f  a r t i l l e r y ;  
tw enty-seven  a r t i l la r y  p ie ce s  were taken a t  A egina. See a l s o ,  V a lier o , 
H isto r ia , pp. 346-349; B.N.M ., VII (2 0 0 ), Mossa d e l l ’Armi, p . 144, map 67; 
G u g lie lm o tti, Marina P o n t if lc ia ,  pp. 103-104.
3 0 .Included in  th e  a l l i e d  f l e e t  were seven g a lle y s  from M alta. 
Although i t  seems probably th a t th e  papal g a lle y s  d id  not jo in  th e  
a l l ie d  f l e e t  in  1656 because o f  Venetian-Papal squabbles concerning th e  
readm ittance o f  th e  J e su its  in to  th e  t e r r i t o r ie s  o f  th e R epublic, 
G uglielm otti suggests th a t th e  papal g a lle y s  were unable t o  s a i l  t o  th e  
D ardanelles because o f  an outbreak o f  p lague a t  C iv itavecch ia  and th e  
need to  quarantine than. See G u g lie lm o tti, Marina P o n t i f lc ia , pp. 142-11*9.
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31. The b e st s in g le  account o f  th e  1656 b a t t le  a t  th e  Darda­
n e l le s  can be found in  th a t o f  Col. Frederico  F er ra r i, "Le b a tta g lie  
d ei D ardanelli n e l  1656-57 ,"  Memorie Storicfae M i l i ta r i ,  IX (1913)3 
pp. 27-5lj-. See a l s o ,  Nani-Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, pp. 183-187;
V a lier o , H is to r ia , pp. 380-381; B.N.M., VII (2 0 0 ), Mossa d ell-A rm i, 
p . 153, map 73; Enrico C elan i, "Di una carta  a penna ra ffig u r a n te  l a  
b a tta g lia  navale d e i D ardanelli,"  Huovo A rchivio Veneto, Part I I ,
IX ( l8 9 5 )j  pp. 453-1*67; Celani p rovides a  com plete l i s t  o f  a l l  th ose  
n obles who p a r tic ip a te d  in  th e b a t t le  on pp. 1*60 - 1*62 o f  h is  a r t ic l e .
32. Die M altese took  w ith  them as p r iz e s  o f  b a t t le  e ig h t g a lle y s  
and th ree  g a l le a s s e s .
33. Nani-Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, pp. 187- 189,  p . 187 , n . l .
A sm all naval fo r c e  was l e f t  a t  th e  D a r d in e lle s .
3l*. F er ra r i, "Le b a tta g lie  d e i D ardanelli n e l  1656- 57 ,"  pp. 56- 
57; B.N.M., VII ( 2 0 0 ) ,  Mossa d e l l ’Armi, p . l 6l ,  map 77 , P- 159, 76 .
35. Nani-Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, pp. 191-192.
36 . There were f iv e  g a lle y s  belonging t o  th e  papal squadron, 
and seven t o  th e  M altese f l e e t .
37. Once th e  Venetians had been ex p e lled  from Lemnos and Tenedos, 
the Turkish commanders apparently ordered con siderab le re in fo r c in g  o f  
th ese  two is la n d s  and th e ir  fo r tr e s s e s .  See Querini Stam palia, M .S .,
Cod. LXXVIH, H4, L ettere  da C onstantinopoli d i  Sebastiano Molin  
( 16I48- I 673) ;  see  a ls o  F er ra r i, "Le b a t ta g l ie  d e i  Dardane l l i  n e l  
1656-57 ," , pp. 94-129; Nani-Mocenigo, Marina Veneziana, pp. 189-205; 
G uglie lm otti, Marina P o n t if ic ia , pp. 176-193; B.N.M ., VII 9 2 1 1 ), D iv ersi  
L e tte r e , pp. 204-206; B.N.M ., VII (9158) ,  S uccessi n e l l ’a tta cco  e re sa
de Lemno, 1657, pp. 262- 263; V a liero , H is to r ia , p . 409-
38 . "Correspondenza M alta, 1645-69,"  Part m ,  XLIX, p . 40.
39 . H einrich  Kretschmayr has w r itten  th a t  th er e  was "from
l 66l  u n t i l  1666 no important war year fo r  V enice " H einrich
Kretschmayr, G eschichte Von Venedig ( S tu ttg a r t , 1 9 3 4 ), I I I ,  p . 334.
40 . The Turkish p o lic y  o f  l im ite d  maneuvers was perhaps a 
product o f  n e c e s s it y .  M orosini reported  th a t th e  Turkish f l e e t  had 
by t h is  tim e d im inished to  about fo r ty  g a l le y s ,  a f ig u r e  alm ost equal 
to  th a t o f  th e  V enetians. According to  M orosin i, th e  V enetians then
had about s ix  g a l le a s s e s  and tw enty-four g a l le a s s e s  and tw enty-four g a l le y s .  
See A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S ec reta ), R elazione, Busta 75 , R elazione o f  Z orzi 
M orosini, Capitano-Generale de Mar, 1664.
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In . Many i l l s  continued t o  p lague th e  operations o f  th e  armada. 
There was a  chronic need fo r  s k i l l e d  o f f ic e r s  and a need t o  extend and 
in c re a se  th e  tr a in in g  o f  nobles fo r  p o sts  on th e  g a l le y s .  Moreover, 
th er e  was a lso  a shortage o f  oarsmen or g a l l e o t t i .  Many o f  th ese  
g a l l e o t t i  were Greek and thus retu rn ed , in  th e  w in ter , to  t h e ir  homes; 
t h i s  l e f t  th e  armada w ithout s u f f ic ie n t  manpower. So much in  demand 
were oarsmen th a t cr im inals who had a lready served  out th e ir  sen tences  
a t th e  oars were n ot granted perm ission  t o  le a v e  t h e ir  p o sts  a s th ey  
should have been. See A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R elazione, Busta 
75 , Capitano-Generale da Mar, Z orzi M orosini, 1664.
42 . G uglie lm otti, Marina P o n t if ic ia ,  pp. 231-236.
4 3 . A .S .V ., P.T.M. (8 0 8 ) , Luca Francesco Barbaro, P ro w ed ito r -  
Generale, L etter  o f  August 27 , 1658 ,  Candia.
4 4 . For th e  various a tta c k s , s ee  B.N.M ., VII (2 0 0 ), Mossa 
d ell'A rm i, p . 183 , map 88 , p . 1 87 , map 9 ° , P* 191» nap 92 ,  p . 195-
4 5 . "Correspondenza M alta, 1645- 69 ,"  XLVI (I9 1 0 ) ,p . 24 .
46 . "Correspondenza M alta, 1645-69,"  XLV (1 910), pp. 326-327.
47 . One fa v o r ite  p lo y  o f  th e  enemy was to  sh ip  goods by way 
o f  Egypt in  sm all convoys which th en  landed on th e  l e s s  p a tr o lle d  
southern shores o f  Candia.
48 . Nani-Mocenigo, Marina V eneziana, pp. 219-221.
49 . A .S .V ., Am basciatori B isp a cc i, Spagna, Busta 8l ,  L etter  
322, Ju ly  29, 1648, G u istin ia n , Madrid.
50. Giovanni Zulian, "Le prime r e la z io n i tr a  i l  card in a le  
G iu lio  M azzarini e  Venezia,"  Huovo A rchivio Veneto, Part I ,  XXII,
New S er ie s  (1911), PP- 307-309-
51. Ib id . ,  pp. 357-359.
52. Ambassador Giovanni Sagredo wrote from P aris  in  ea r ly  1653 
th a t m atters were so  u n se tt le d  in  France th a t he s t i l l  had n ot "found
a m in is t e r . . .a t  t h i s  court who was contented and s a t is f ie d " . A .S .V .,  
Am basciatori D isp a cci, Francia, F i lz a  115 , L etter  78, February 18,
1653 , Sagredo, P a ris .
53. Z ulian , "Le prime r e la z io n e ,"  pp. 323-324.
54. In  a  French g a z z e tte  dated December 30, 1652, we read  news 
s ta t in g  th a t th e  Frnech had no lo n g er  need t o  a s s i s t  th e  V enetians in  
th e  Candian stru g g le  s in c e  th e  Turks were determined not t o  accept
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anything l e s s  than th e  surrender o f  th e  is la n d . B .S .V ., Am basciatori 
D isp a cci, F rancia , F i lz a  115, a«d.
55. A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cci, F rancia , F ilz a  115, January 
21 , 1653 (Coded), Sagredo, P a ris .
56. A .S .V ., D ip . B e l . ,  Spagna, F i l z a  85 , L etter  1*6, November
27, 1652, Giacomo G u e r in i ,  Madrid.
57. A .S .V ., Dip. B e l . ,  Spagna, F i lz a  85 , L etter  1+9, December 
11 , 1652 (coded), Giacomo G uerin i, Madrid.
58 . Z ulian , "Le prime r e la z io n e ,"  pp. 335-337; Bcmanin, S to r ia ,
p . 1*22 .
59- V a lier o , H is to r ia , p . 326.
60 . Ib id . ,  pp. 360-361.
61 . Z ulian , "Le prime r e la z io n e ,"  pp. 3I+L-350 . The th r e a ts  
ag a in st th e  b a ilo  continued d esp ite  seme c o n c il ia to r y  g estures on th e  
part o f  th e  Grand V iz ie r . In  February o f  1657  th e  v iz ie r  s e iz e d  th e  
house o f  B a ile r in o , and murdered th e  b a ilo * s  ser v a n ts . In  a d d itio n ,  
messages sen t t o  th e  b a ilo  were fr eq u e n tly  in terc ep te d  and thus had to  
be sen t s e c r e t ly .
62. Z u lian , "Le prime r e la z io n e ,"  pp. 351-352.
6 3 . Z u lian , "Le prime r e la z io n e ,"  pp. 325-338.
61*. A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp a cc i, F ran cia , F ilz a  121, January
28, 1659, Francesco G uistin ian , P aris; Z ulian , "Le prime r e la z io n e ,"  
pp. 332-331*. The ambassadorial l e t t e r s  from P a ris  in  1658 and 1659 are
l i t e r a l l y  f i l l e d  w ith  referen ces t o  t h is  M. Arson who owed a s iz e a b le  
loan  to  Venice which Mazarin had g iven  th e  B epub lic. Apparently Arson 
was ab le  t o  r e c e iv e  re p r iev es  o f  payment from th e  Parlement o f  P aris  
granting  him more tim e to  c o l le c t  th e  money fo r  V enice.
65 . "Correspondenza M alta, 161*5- 69 ,"  XLVT (1910), January 20 , 
1659 and May 2 0-21 , 1659, PP* 9 -1 0 , 15 , 17; Z ulian , "Le prime r e la z io n e ,"  
pp. 3b6-3k7.
6 6 . Peace terms were again o ffe r e d  in  1658 , but were not accep­
ta b le  t o  th e  V enetians because again  th ey  includ ed  th e  surrender o f  
Candia. Rcmanin, S to r ia , pp. 1*37-M*0.
6 7 . As l a t e  as th e  summer o f  1657 i t  seemed to  many observers  
th a t no Turkish a tta ck  a ga in st th e  lands o f  th e  Bacokzy would be fo r th ­
coming. W ithin months, however, m atters had changed com pletely. A lfred
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F r a n c is  Pribram , Y e n e t ia n is c h e  D epeschen  vom K a ise r h o fe  (V ien n a , 1 901),
I ,  pp. 33-34 , U9 - 50T (H ereinafter r e fer re d  t o  as Y enetianische  
Depeschen. )
6 8 . Ib id . ,  pp. 61- 6 3 .
6 9 . Ib id . ,  pp. 67 .
70 . The Turks apparently even threatened  th a t th ey  cou ld , w ith  
o n ly  "three words", bring an immediate accord w ith  V enice over th e
Candian s tr u g g le , a  covert th re a t th a t th ey  then  would have a  fr e e  hand
t o  move a g a in st Transylvania and D alm atia. "On t h i s  same p o in t . . . in  
order t o  fr ig h te n  th e  Racokzy even more, th e  Turks made i t  known th a t  
th ey  (Turks) have peace w ith  th e  Republic in  th e ir  h a n d s .. . ."  I b id . , 
p p . 103-104, l 4 l .
71 . I b id . ,  PP- 3 -4 , 105-106.
72 . Romanin, S to r ia , p . 442.
73. Pribram , Y e n e t ia n is c h e  D ep esch en , p p . 265- 266 .
74. I b id . ,  pp. 4D2-403, 468, 470, 492-493. Spanish pressure
may have had something t o  do w ith  encouraging th e  Emperor to  be "cautious"; 
th e  Spanish ambassador, Molin reasoned, hoped t o  ga in  f in a n c ia l  and m il­
i ta r y  l e v i e s  from th e  Empire and thus had no d e s ir e  t o  see  such poten ­
t i a l  resources t i e d  up in  a war w ith  th e  Turks. I b id . ,  p . 479.
75. Quoted in  Eugenio Bacchione, "Venezia e  Genova durante l a  
guerra d i Candia," Deputazione d i S to r ia  P a tr ia  per l e  V enezia, VI 
(19^3), P . 6 7 .
76 . Several in c id e n ts  generated  considerab le b it te r n e s s  between 
th e  Genoese and th e  Spanish. There were c la sh es over maritime in c id e n ts  
and a lso  over th e  Spanish in te n tio n s  t o  s e l l  Pontremoli to  Tuscany in ­
s tea d  o f  th e  Republic o f  Genoa. Wien France recovered  from th e  Fronde, 
th e  Genoese were b e tte r  a b le  t o  r e ta in  a tenuous n e u tr a lity  between 
Spain and France. Bacchion, "Venezia e Genova," pp. 42-43 , 51-61.
The Spanish lik e w ise  frowned upon any Genoese involvem ent in  th e  Candian 
war because o f  th e  drain i t  would have had on resources which Spain 
hoped to  employ. Moreover, a  keystone o f  th e Spanish diplomacy in  I t a ly  
was to  m aintain among th e  r e sp e c tiv e  I t a l ia n  s ta t e s  a  d e l ic a te ly  balanced  
equilibrium ; any union o f  th e  Genoese and Venetian repu b lics would have 
threatened  th a t balance and dim inished th e  power o f  Spain in  northern  
I t a ly .  Ib id . , p . 94-95 . I t  i s  in te r e s t in g  to  note th a t Bacchion d is ­
counts Amy Bernardy's contention  th a t th e  Genoese were more in te r e s te d  
in  p r o f it in g  from V enice's commercial d ec lin e  as a  r e s u lt  o f th e  war, 
and thus refu sed  to  a s s i s t  in  th e  defense o f  Candia. He a lso  r e je c t s  
Qnoratio P a stin e 's  in terp re ta tio n  which p laced  heavy emphasis on th e  
p ride and arrogance o f  Venice in  r e la t io n  to  th e  h o n o r if ic  t i t l e  demanded 
by Genoa. Ib id . , pp. 91-92.
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77* The absence o f  th e  p o n t if ic a l  f l e e t  a t  th e  Dardanelles 
in  1656 may have been connected w ith  an attem pt by th e  Pope t o  coerce  
V enice in to  readm itting  th e  J e s u its .
78. Rcmanin, S to r ia , p . 429; V a lier o , H is to r ia , pp. 370-371; 
F er ra r i, "Le b a t ta g l ie  d e i Dardane l l i , 1' p . 70.
7 9 . Z ulian , "Le prime r e la z io n e ," , p . 314; V a lier o , H isto r ia , 
pp. 301, 250, 256-58 , 270.
80 . G u glie lm o  B e r c h e t ,  Crom well e  l a  R ep u b b lica  d i  V e n e z ia  
(V e n ic e ,  1 8 6 4 ), p p . 1-31 .
81 . The t o t a l  co st o f  th e  war i s  n ea rly  im possib le t o  estim ate  
w ith  any degree o f  accuracy. M ilita ry  c o s t s  ob v iou sly  increased  over 
normal o u tla y s , and ce r ta in  d ecreases in  customary revenues derived  
from commerce l ik e w ise  occurred. C onsequently, any attempt t o  estim ate  
th e  tim e c o sts  o f  th e  war would e n t a i l  sep aratin g  th ese  two fa c to r s . 
Contemporaries f e l t  th a t th e war expenditures were con siderab le . In 
1649, a ce r ta in  V inceszo Gussoni spoke in  th e  C o lleg io  n oting  th a t th e  
war c o st a s much in  one year as th e  Cyprus c o n f l ic t  o f  th e  1570* s had 
c o s t  in  th re e  y ea r s; t h i s  may have been more a r e f le c t io n  o f  Gussoni*s 
a tt itu d e  toward th e  war, but i t  may have been a good in d ica to r  o f  in ­
f la t io n .  See H einrich  Kretschmayr, G esehichte von Venedig (S tu ttg a r t , 
1931*), p . 326. A modem student o f  Venetian h is to r y  n o te s  th a t th e  war 
in  1668 a lone co s t  an estim ated  4 ,32 2 ,0 0 0  d ucats. Even allow ing fo r  th e  
sp e c ia l m ilita r y  a c t iv i t ie s  o f  l 668 ,en e  can e a s i ly  s e e  th a t th e  co s ts  were 
o ften  in  th e  m il l io n s .  See Roberto C e ssi, S to r ia  d e l la  Repubblica d i 
Venezia (M ilan, r e v .e d . ,  1968) ,  I I ,  p . 188 .
8 2 . Pompeo Molmenti, "Venezia a l i a  meta se c o lo  XVII. R elazione  
in e d ita  d i mons. F. Pannocchiesche," R endiconti d e l la  Reale Accademia d ei  
L in cei (Rome, 1916) ,  5th s e r ie s ,  XXV, pp. 202-20
8 3 . See James C. D avis, "The D ecline o f  th e  Venetian N o b ility  
as a R uling C la s s ," The Johns Hopkins U n iv ers ity  S tu d ies in  H is to r ic a l  
and P o l i t i c a l  S cien ce , EXXX (1962), No. 2 , v , p . 110.
84 . B.N.M ., VII (9158), pp. 298-301. Numerous fam ily  names 
are l i s t e d  here such as Tasca, Labia, Zaguri, M a r tin e lli ,  Coraggi, e t c . ,  
a l l  o f  whom r e ce iv e d  a ff ir m a tiv e  n otes fo r  acceptance in to  th e  n o b i l i ty .  
Most o f  th e  v o te s  ’fo r ' were in  ex c ess  o f  seven  or e ig h t hundred, w ith  
u su a lly  l e s s  than one hundred opposed.
85 . D av is, "Decline Of th e  Venetian N o b ility ,"  p . 110, Davis 
n otes th a t th e  payment was some 1 00,000  d u cats , a sum in  excess  o f  even 
th e  incomes o f  th e  r ic h e s t  merchants, and n early  double th a t o f  the  
r ic h e s t  noble fa m il ie s .  As he n o te s , th e  o r ig in a lly  proposed fig u re
o f  60 ,000  ducats was r a ise d  to  100 , 000 ,  a fa c t  which may have encouraged 
some o f  th e  n o b i l i ty  t o  agree t o  th e  measure. However, i t  should be 
noted as w e ll  th a t  th e  100,000  ducats includ ed  *+0 ,0 0 0  ducats which 
were to  be p laced  in  th e  treasu ry and were t o  r e c e iv e  annual in t e r e s t .
In t h is  sen se , th e  a d d itio n a l 40,000 was perhaps not so burdensom as
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as o r ig in a lly  would seem s in c e  i t  may have been viewed as an investm ent.
(The 60 3000 ducats was a sum which was expected  t o  pay fo r  1 ,000  in ­
fa n tr y  fo r  one y e a r .)  B.N.M ., VU (9158)* P- 287 .
86 . D a v is ,  " D e c lin e  o f  t h e  V en e tia n  N o b i l i t y , " ,  p p . 107-109.
8 7 . Quoted in  Rcmanin, S to r ia , pp. 372, n . 2 .
88 . For t h e  fo u r  m i l l i o n  f ig u r e  f o r  1668 s e e  Roman i n ,  S t o r i a ,
PP. 369-370.
89 . B.N.M ., VII (9158) ,  pp. 282 , 287.
90. V a lier o , H is to r ia , p . 17^.
91. See Roland M ousnier, "Le t r a f i c  des o f f ic e s  a V enise,"
Revue H istorique de D ro it Francais e t  S tranger, Uth S e r ie s , No. 1 ,
XXX (1952), p p . 552- 565. Mousnier notes how in  tim es o f  emergency 
o f f ic e s  were so ld  more fr eq u e n tly . Of th e  t o t a l  number o f  o f f ic e s  so ld  
between 1660- 1680 ,  th ey  were s t i l l  on ly  about 2  percent o f  th e  t o t a l  
population  (th ere  were 2 ,5 0 0  o f f ic e s  fo r  a popu la tion  o f  125 , 000 ; when 
th e  popu lation  o f  th e  Terraferma i s  includ ed , an a d d itio n a l 1 ,800 ,000  
person s, then  th e  percentage o f  so ld  o f f ic e s  drops t o  between .1 3  and 
.11+ p ersen t. Ib id . , p . 555.
92. A .S .V ., D e p u ta t i-A g g iu n t i  R e g is t r o  1 , D e c r e t i - M in is t r i  (160I+-
1669) ,  L e t t e r s  o f  June 10 , 1651 and June 1653-
93. A .S .V ., D e p u ta t i-A g g iu n t i  R e g is t r o  1 , D e c r e t i - M in i s t r i ,
L etter  o f  January 11 , 1658 and passim ; A .S .V ., D eputati-A ggiunti R eg istro  
3 , Rubrica D e creti (I60I+-I667) , L etter  o f  August ll+, 1655 and passim .
9^. See A .S .V ., D eputati-A ggiunti R eg istro  1 ,  D e cre ti-M in istr i 
(160I+-I669) ,  passim , l i e  charges o f  ' le s io n e '  which meant l i t e r a l l y  
damage or in ju r y  t o  property r ig h t ,  seems t o  in c re a se  in  th e  l a t e  1650 ' s 
and th e  l6 6 0 ’s  over th e  e a r l ie r  part o f  th e  century. In th e  e a r lie r  
cases th ere  seems to  be more cases o f  delayed  payment ra ther than ’le s io n e ’ . 
Of th ose  found g u il t y  o f  e x tra ct in g  an e x c e ss iv e  amount from th e ir  o f f ic e  
(over 20 percen t) th ere  were some who were fo r ced  t o  reimburse th e  
p u b lic . One case found a man who had purchased an o f f ic e  fo r  250 ducats 
and who had d erived  from th a t o f f ic e  an annual sa la ry  o f  72 ducats;  
th e  s a le  o f t h i s  o f f ic e  was thus duly annulled. Ib id . , L etter  o f  June,
1663.
95. B.N.M ., VII (9158), pp. 281-282. In  1658 th e  Senate e le c te d  
a body o f  th re e  d ep u tie s , fo r  a p eriod  o f  one y ea r , t o  examine th e  in ­
comes and expenses o f  various m a g istr a tes , and t o  f in d  means to  cut 
expenses or in c re a se  revenues;on  November 29 , 166I+, four more magis­
tr a te s  were added t o  th e  board. See B ila n c i Generali d e l la  Repubblica 
d i  Venezia (V en ice, 1903-1902), I I I ,  p .117 . (H ereinafter re fer re d  to  
as B ila n c i G en era li. )
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9 6 . A .S .V ., D eputati-A ggiunti R eg istro  1 , D ecret-M in istr i
(160U-I669 ) ,  L etter  o f  December 13 , l 6U6 . Apparently sane o f f ic e  h o ld ers  
were in c lin e d  t o  do favors fo r  s p e c ia l  ' c l i e n t s '  such as suspending 
Judgments a g a in st them or a llow ing th e  c l ie n t  t o  avoid  paying h is  debt; 
anyone found oing so  was to  be deprived o f  h is  o f f ic e  or punished in  
same other fa sh io n . A .S .V ., Gov. d e l le  Pub. E ntrate , Busta 17, June,
21 , 1659.
97. A .S .V ., Gov. d e l le  Pub. E ntrate , Busta 17 , V aria, 1651-1700.
August 12 , 1656 and September 1 , 1655 .
98 . A .S .V ., Gov. d e l le  Pub. E ntrate , Busta 17, V aria, 1651-  
1700, L etters  o f  December 12 , 165U, January 1 0 , 1656 , and October 2 9 , ,
1658 . One case in  th e  le t t e r  o f  October 29 ,  1658 , r e la te s  th e  m isfortunes  
o f  a  c e r ta in  Lorenzo F a n e ll i  who had been c a st in to  debtors p rison  fo r  
th ree  years and had been r e lea sed  on h is  own recogn izance; he agreed
t o  pay 80 ducats o f  a  2 ,6 2 0  ducat debt Immediately and an ad d itio n a l 
1*0 ducats per year u n t i l  i t  was liq u id a te d . F a n e ll i  had apparently  
contracted  th e  debt w h ile  in  p o sse ss io n  o f  th e  D atio d e l le  nova im posts 
d e l le  marina d i Chioggia, and th e  m agistra tes  recommended th a t he be 
so  r e le a se d . That he would be re lea sed  a f t e r  paying o n ly  1*0 ducats a  
year (a f te r  f i f t y  years h is  debt s t i l l  would n ot have been com pletely  
l iq u id a te d ) was an in d ic a tio n  o f  th e  m a g istra tes  hum anitarian sentim ent 
or a re co g n itio n  o f  a  b it t e r  r e a l i t y  and a w ill in g n e ss  t o  accept whatever 
th e  debtor could pay.
99- A .S .V ., Gov. d e l le  Pub. E ntrate , Busta 1 7 , L eg .-V aria , 
1651-1700, L e tte r  o f  March 2k, 1662. See a l s o ,  Ib id . ,  L etter  o f  January 
19 ,  1655; A .S .V ., D eputati-A ggiunti, F i lz a  335, L ettere  d i r e p o st i a l  
M a g istr a ti, 1657- 168O, passim . In th e se  l e t t e r s  one can read numerous 
examples o f  sums c o lle c te d  fran  various debts on r e n ta ls  o f  p ro p erties  and 
goods.
100. A .S .V ., D eputati-A ggiunti, R eg istro  1 , D e ere ti-M in is tr i( l60h- 
1669) ,  August 7» 1655; A .S .V ., D eputati-A ggiunti R eg istro  3j Rubrica- 
D ecreti (l6ol+-l667), March 2 3 , 16^7 and June 1 5 , 161+8; A .S .V ., Busta 1(0 
(1619-1690) ,  D e cre ti, March 1 ,  1658 .
101. V a lier o , H is to r ia , pp. 60-61 .
102. A .S .V ., D eputati-A ggiunti, R eg istro  1 ,  D ecre ti-M in istr i
(160I+-I667 ) ,  November 2 0 , 161+9 and June 10 , 1651 .
1 05 . V a liero  n otes th a t in  t h is  h ouse-to-h ou se s o l ic i t in g  th ere
were c o l le c te d , in  t h is  p a rticu la r  ca se , "hardly s ix t y  thousand d u c a t s . . . . '  
V a lier o , H is to r ia , p . 6l .  In  th e  records o f  th e  m agistra tes in  charge 
o f  f in a n c ia l  problems one can read numerous requ ests  fo r  'voluntary  
co n tr ib u tio n s' fo r  th e  war e f fo r t  from sch oo ls and r e l ig io u s  foundations, 
(" to induce them t o  a copious voluntary c o n t r ib u t io n . . . .1') Some o f  the
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requ ests were ignored , others answered w ith  'con trib u tion s*; freq u en tly , 
such requ ests were fo llow ed  by more 'r e q u e s ts ' . See A .S .V ., D eputati- 
A ggiu nti, H lz a  332, L ettere  d i r ip o s t i  a l  m a g is tr a te  (1646-49), L etter  
o f  December 16, 1649, August 25 , 1649, and passim .
10^. Branftwiw, s t o r ia ,  p . 368; V a lier o , H is to r ia , p . 279*
105. A .S .V ., D epu tati-A gg iun ti,R eg istro  1 , D e cre ti-M in istr i 
(1604-1667), January 24 , 1646 and February 2 2 , 1658 .
106. A .S .V ., D eputati-A ggiunti,  F ilz a  35 , S cr ittu r e  R isp o sti
a l  Senato, J u ly  21, 1660 , February 20 , 1659, A p r il , 1660, March 1 9 , 1659 , 
and May 23, 1659-
107. A .S .V ., Gov. d e l le  Pub. E ntrate , Busta 17 , L eg .-V aria , 
1651-1700, October 9 , 1658 , Orders fr eq u e n tly  were issu e d  requ ir in g 
a l l  persons w ith  any property or goods o f  va lue t o  report than t o  the  
government o f f i c i a l s  so th a t ta b u la tio n s  could be k ep t, presumably fo r  
ta x a t io n  purposes.
108. O ccasion ally  new ta x e s  were le v ie d  so as t o  in c re a se  
government revenues. One such ta x  was recorded in  1658 when th er e  
was decreed a le v y  on a l l  ty p es o f  land  in  Venice and th e  Terraferma. 
R ealiz in g  th a t t h i s  was p r e ju d ic ia l  t o  landowners, an a d d itio n a l tax  
was p laced  on a l l  o ther typ es o f  income inc lud ing  commercial and 
manufacturing. A s im ila r  ta x  o f  t h i s  nature was again  le v ie d  in  1662.
A .S .V ., Gov. d e l le  Pub. E ntrate , Busta 1 7 , L eg .-V aria , 1651-1700,
A p ril 16 , 1658 and December 2 8 , 1662 .
109. See N ico lo  IhpaaqpoU. A ldobrandini, Le monete d i  Venezia 
(V enice, 19 1 9 ), PP* 269-273-
110. Ib id . ,  pp. 324-325, 362-363, 380-381.
111. Ib id . ,  pp .299-300.
112. The in t e r e s t  r a t e s  o ffere d  fo r  such conversions o f  p la te  
and va luab les in to  sp ec ie  fo r  coinage o ften  was as h igh  as 7 percent 
annually.
U 3 .  A ldobrandini, Le monete d i V enezia, pp. 358-359, 270;
B.N.M ., VII (9158), January 31 , 1646, p . 2S £
114. Aldobrandini n o tes  th a t th e  f in a n c ia l  s itu a t io n  on 
th e  is la n d  was always somewhat ch aotic,an d  th a t th ere  was, in  1608 , 
a desperate shortage o f  sound coinage; p r ic e s  soared as a  r e s u l t ,  and 
th e  p ro w e d ito r  warned th a t th e  s itu a t io n  would not be n o ticea b ly  a lter ed  
w ithout some in crea se  in  new money. See th e  report o f  General Gerolamo 
C apello, October 18 , 1608 ,  form Candia, p arts o f  which were quoted by
Aldobrandini, Le monete di  V enezia,pp. 945-946.
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115- A ld o b ra n d in i n o te s  how t h e  i n f l a t i o n  o f  th e  e a r ly  1650* s  
was s o  ram pant t h a t  good  s i l v e r  c u rren cy  w as g r e a t ly  i n  demand and  
i n f l a t e d  i n  v a lu e ;  a  s i l v e r  s c u d i ,  f o r  exam ple w as w o r th , i n  1649, o f f ­
i c i a l l y  a b o u t 1 2 .5  l i r e  b u t ,  i n  f a c t ,  b ro u g h t 27  l i r e  and b y  1650 b ro u g h t  
45 l i r e  p e r  s c u d i .  S ee  A ld o b r a n d in i, L e m onete d i  V e n e z ia ,  p p . 955-956.
116. B i la n c i  G e n e r a l i , I ,  p . 150. L is t e d  f o r  l 6 4 l  w ere 1 ,14 5 ,9 4 9  
d u c a ts  from  t h e  T erra fen n a  and from  V en ice  1 ,814 ,132  d u c a ts .
117. I b i d . ,  p . 183
118. V a lier o , H isto r ia , pp. 246-247.
119. A .S .V ., C olleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R e laz ion e , Busta 4 3 , Padova, 
Girolamo D i l f in ,  Capitano, June 23, 1644 and November 28, 1645; A lv ise  
F o sca r in i, P odesta , February 20, 1646; A lv is e  Mocenigo, Podesta, November 
1 7 , 1648; M ich iele M orosini, Podesta, A p r il 1 ,  1664.
120. A .S .V . ,  C o l le g io  V ( S e c r e t a ) ,  B u s ta  50, V erona, A lv i s e  
V a l ie r ,  C a p ita n o , Septem ber 16 , 1639, I*. M ic h ie l ,  P o d e s ta , O ctober 18 ,
1644.
121. A .S .V . ,  Cinque S a v i i ,  B u sta  31 , C a p itu la r ,  1625-1685,
October 20 , 1656 ; A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , Busta 50, A lv ise  
F o sca r in i, Capitano d i Verona, 1658- 59 . Apparently even th e  D atio  
d e lla  S tr a d e lla  as a source o f  p u b lic  revenue was in  q uestion . One can 
read a re fer en ce  made t o  th e  *D a t ii  d e l la  S tr a d e lla ’ which had once 
rented  fo r  75 ,000  ducats in  l 6l 8 , but which now brought on ly  34,110  
ducats; l ik e w ise  th e  d a tio  on s i lk  once ren ted  fo r  46,000  ducats in  1619 
but now, in  th e  m id -l650 ' s  i t  brought o n ly  9 ,5 0 0  d ucats.
122. A .S .V . ,  C o lle g io  V ( S e c r e t a ) ,  B u s ta  50, R e la z io n e  d i  
Giacomo C o m e r , C ap itan o  d i  V erona, Septem ber 20, 1645. C om er n o te s  
t h a t  i n  V erona p ro p er  t h a t  w ere ab ou t 25 ,793  p e r so n s  and 58,635 in  
th e  su rro u n d in g  t e r r i t o r i e s .  In  1654  t h e  p o p u la t io n  was a p p a r e n t ly  
some 25,340 i n  V erona p e r  s e .  As f o r  e x p e n se s  i n  1645, Corner n o te d  
t h a t  e x p e n se s  ex c e e d e d  r e v en u es  b y  173 d u c a ts  t h a t  y e a r  a lth o u g h  much 
money m ust h a v e  b een  s e n t  d i r e c t l y  t o  V e n ic e  f o r  war c o s t s .
1 2 3 . A .S .V . ,  C o l le g io  V ( S e c r e t a ) ,  B u sta  5 0 , V erona, 1656 .
124. A .S .V . ,  C o lle g io  V ( S e c r e t a ) ,  R e la z io n e ,  B u sta  51, V ic e n z a ,
1658; A .S .V . ,  C o l le g io  V ( S e c r e t a ) ,  R e la z io n e ,  B u sta  48, T r e v is o ,  1655 .
125. A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R e lazione, Busta 43 , Padova, 
1655-1660, passim . A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R elazione, Busta 50, 
Verona, 1645; A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R elazione, Busta 51, V icenza,
1658 ; A .S .V ., Am basciatori D isp acci, Spegna, Busta 8l ,  G u istin ia n , 1647
(coded l e t t e r ) .
126. A .S .V . ,  Cinque S a v i i ,  B u sta  153j R i s p o s t i ,  1641-44, R ep ort o f  
JUly 4 , 1644.
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127. A .S .V ., Cinque S a v ii ,  Busta 155, Ri s p o r t i ,  1652-62,
A p ril 2k, 165*+ and February 2 , 165^. I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a s se s s  th e  
in f lu en ce  o f  th e  war on th e  amount o f  sh ipp ing and sh ip s in  se r v ic e .  
Domenico S e l la  n otes th a t  in  1637 th er e  were about 39 u n its  belonging  
t o  V enetians and 27 o th ers in  s e r v ic e , and in  1671  th er e  were 112 
a lto g eth e r; even w ith  adjustm ents fo r  tonnage, th e  u n it  count would 
have been 32 u n its  fo r  1637, and 77 fo r  1671 . T his in c re a se  S e lla  
a ttr ib u te s  t o  th e  r e g u la r iz a tio n  o f  r e la t io n s  between V enice and th e  
Porte, th e  resum ption o f  p r o te c tiv e  le g i s la t io n  a f t e r  th e  war, and th e  
a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  la rg e  numbers o f  sh ip s in  th e  years im m ediately a f te r  
th e  war. S e l la  a lso  remarks th a t although l i t t l e  data  has been found 
fo r  th e  p eriod  o f  th e  war y e a r s , "various elem ents in d ic a te  th a t th e  
lo n g  p eriod  o f  h o s t i l i t y  was unfavorable to  th e  Venetian ind u stry  and 
maritime tr a n sp o rta tio n ."  See Domenico S e l la ,  Commerci e  In d u str ie  a 
Venezia n e l  se c o lo  XVII (Venice-Rcme, 1961) ,  pp. 107-1097 (H erein- 
a ft e r  re fer re d  to  as Ccnmerci e  in d u s tr ie . )
128. See H oratio Brown, S tudies in  Venetian H istory  (London, 
1907), I I ,  v i i ,  pp. 339-365.
129 . A .S .V ., Cinque S a v ii ,  Busta 31 , C ap itu lar , 1625- 8 5 , 
September 1 1 , 1655 . In  t h i s  p a r tic u la r  re feren ce th e  s a v i i  argue 
th a t i t  i s  n ecessary  t o  "dim inish in  some p a rts  th e  D a t io . . . in  order 
t o  make th e  b u sin ess  tr a n sa c tio n s , which have fo r  many years been  
in terrup ted , f lo u r is h  a g a in .. . . "
130. A .S .V ., Cinque S a v ii ,  Busta 57, D atio d 'u s c ita ,  L etter
o f November 1 2 , 1636 . The s a v i i  wrote th a t th e  d a tio  on goods lea v in g  
V enice would be re ta in e d  because o f  th e  "considerable incomes" de­
r iv e d  from i t .  Note a ls o  th a t fo r e ig n  merchants were o ften  granted th e  
same d atio  r a t e s  as th o se  fo r  Venetians during th e  war. At Alexandria  
we read in  161+6 o f  fo r e ig n  merchants being granted equal r a te s  as th o se  
o f  Venetians fo r  a l l  th e  p o rts  o f  th e  Levant; re fer en ce  was made to  th e  
same a ctio n  having been taken in  1571 during another c r i s i s  p eriod .
See A .S .V ., Cinque S a v ii ,  Cottimo d e l la  A lexandria, Busta 9k6, May
l l+ ,  1 6 V 7 .
131. A .S .V ., Cinque S a v ii , Busta 15!+, 161+5-52, February 23 ,
161+5.
132. A .S .V ., Cinque S a v ii , Busta 153 , R is p o s t i , 161+1-W+. There
i s  one in t e r e s t in g  case o f  two merchants whoe com plaints were heard
by th e  s a v i i  in  161+7. These two merchants, according t o  th e  report  
o f  th e  s a v i i ,  "for th e  m isfortunes o f  th e  current d isturbances have 
been ab le  in  th e  p a st two years to  make o n ly  two voyages (presumably to  
th e  Levant) where in  p ea ce fu l tim es th ey  used  t o  make seven  or e ig h t  
voyages in  th e  same amount o f  tim e w ith  great p r o f i t . . . . "  See A .S .V .,  
Cinque S a v ii , Busta 15k, R isp o st i , 161+5-52, March 29 , 161+7.
133. A .S .V ., Cinque S a v ii , Busta I 5I+, R isp o st i , 161+5-52, May 
27, 1651. S e l la  l i s t s  th e  number o f  p ie c e s  o f  woolen c lo th  which passed
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through Venetian customs and th er e  seems t o  be a n o tic e a b le  d e c lin e  in  
th e  number during th e  war y ea r s . Moreover, th e  number a f t e r  th e  war 
remained low , in d ica tin g  th a t th e  war may have not on ly  d isrupted  th e  
market on a temporary b a s is  but may. have re su lte d  in  th e  permanent lo s s  
o f  va lu ab le  markets. S e l la ,  Commerci e  In d u str ie , p . 110.
YEAR MO. OF PIECES__________________________YEAR NO. OF PIECES
I61i0 11,719 1659 8,81*7
l 6l*l 12 , 91*5 1660 7 ,8 6 1
161*2 1^,519 1661 6 ,2 5 1
161*3 1^,550 1662 6,51*3
161* 12,1*92 1663 7,71*8
161*5 9,31*6 1661* 9 ,325
161*6 9,1*36 1665 9,975
16U7 9 ,789 1666 8 ,6 3 0
161*8 10,853 1667 7 ,522
161*9 8 ,890 1668 6 , 121*
1650 10,082 1669 1*,778
1651 11,1*59 1670 5,226
1652 10,086 1671 6 ,8 9 6
1653 11,1*59 1672 7 , 691*
165^ 10,933 1673 5,302
1655 10,111 167U 5,709
1656 9 ,330 1675 6 ,8 6 5
1657 7 ,716
1658 9 ,262
13b. A .S .V ., Cinque S a v ii , Busta 31 , C apitu lar, 1625-1685,
August 13 , 1657 and September 26, 1657- One reads th a t in  I 63I* th e  d a tio  
on raw m ateria ls used in  th e  manufacturing o f  soap was removed (the  
d a tio  d ’en tra ta  or im portation) but th a t f i f t e e n  years l a t e r ,  in  th e  
m idst o f  th e  Candia war, the d a tio  was r e in s ta te d . This was a ser io u s  
blow to  th e  production o f  soap a t  Venice, th e  production o f  which 
throughout th e  seventeenth  century continued to  drop re g u la r ly . See 
S e l la ,  Commerci e  In d u str ie , p . 13I*.
135. A .S .V ., Cinque S a v ii , Busta 31 , C ap itu lar, 1625-1685,
March 8 , 161*6 and January, 1648. R ecognizing th a t much trade was being  
d iv erted  to  th e p o rts  o f  Ancona and Ragusa, th e  S a v ii recommended th a t  
Moslem or 'Turkish1 merchants be tr e a te d  " s t i l l  as merchants' so as not 
t o  damage and fu rth e r  Venetian commerce. When 'Turkish* merchants 
were o c c a s io n a lly  arr este d , the s a v i i  sometimes urged r e s t i t u t io n  o f  
t h e ir  goods so as not "to p rejud ice th e  commerce o f  V e n ic e . . . ."  See 
A .S .V ., Cinques S a v ii , Busta 155, R isp o st i , 1652- 62 , August 3 , 1655 and 
February 18 , 1655 .
136. A .S .V ., Cinque S a v ii , Busta 31 , C apitu lar, 1625-85,161*5, 
passim . In 161*5 th e  fo n tic o  or Turkish warehouse was searched fo r  
war m a ter ie l, and th e  community o f  Jews was forbidden t o  trade in  
arms w ith  the Turks.
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137* S e l la ,  C om erci e  In d u str ie , pp. 61-6U; se e  a ls o  Carlo 
C ip o lla ," B ie  D ecline  o f  I t a ly : ”  th e  case o f  a f u l ly  matured economy,” 
Economic H istory  Review, S er ie s  I I ,  V; No. 2 (1 9 5 2 ), passim .
138. The Republic o f  Ragusa, s itu a te d  as i t  was on th e  A d r ia tic  
and near th e  M editerranean, continued t o  p r o f i t  from th e  Candian war
a t  th e  expense o f  Venice; The Ragusians t r ie d  t o  tread  a  m iddle course  
between lo y a lty  t o  Venice and lo y a lty  t o  th e  Turks; th ey  p a id  tr ib u te  
t o  the Sultan  o f  12 ,000  z e c c h in i and re sp e ct to  th e  Doge. D espite  
Ragusa's seeming d u p lic ity  in  th e  eyes o f  V enice, V enetian trade w ith  
Ragusa in  meat and le a th e r  su p p lie s  was so  valuab le th a t every e f f o r t  
was made to  continue fr ie n d ly  r e la t io n s .  See A .S .V ., Cinque S a v ii ,
Busta 141, R agusi, L etter  o f  September 2 8 , 1647; N ico lo  Barozzi and 
Guglielmo Berchet ( e d s .) ,  Le r e la z io n l  d e g li  s t a t i  Europei l e t t e  al  
Senato am basciatori Veneziani n e l  sec o lo  d ecisettim o  Tvhnice,
i 856-78T T i 7  S er ie s  I ,  p . 39^"
139. A .S .V ., Senato Corta, 1648, R egistro  2 2 , March 6 , 1.61*8.
ll*0. S e l la ,  Commerci e  In d u str ie , pp. 50-51-
141. A .S .V ., Cinque S a v ii , Busta 57, Dazio d 'U sc ita , November 
2 0 , 1670 . To compensate fo r  th e  lo s s  o f  seme m arkets, th er e  was trade  
a ft e r  th e  war and in  th e  l 8th  century in  new commodities such as f la x  
carbonate o f  soda, and Egyptian sugar ( t h is  la t e r  was u n fortu n ately  soon  
replaced  by American su gar). See S e l la ,  Commerci e In d u s tr ie , p . 7 8 .
142. S e l la ,  Commerci e  In d u str ie , p p .55-56 , 66- 6 8 . The d ec lin e  
o f  Luccan and F lo ren tin e  s i l k  manufacturing brought some in c re a se  t o  
th e  V enetian s i lk  ind u stry .
ll*3- See D a n ie li B eltram i, Forze d i lavoro  e  p ro p rieta  fo n d ia r ia  
d ei s e c o li  XVH e X V III (Venice-Rome, 196lT7 pp. 25- 28 .
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CHAPTER V 
THE FUTAL FURY, 1667-1669
The la s t  th re e  v io le n t  years o f  th e  Candian war came a fte r  nearly
a decade o f  r e la t iv e  m ilita r y  and p o l i t i c a l  calm. Like th e  earthquake
which devastated  Ragusa in  1667 , th e  v io le n t  erruption  o f  th e  war was
sudden, in te n se , and v a s t ly  d estr u c tiv e ; i t  ended w ith  a tr u e  sense o f
f in a l i t y  any hope th a t th e  war might he reso lv ed  am icably. D espite
c i v i l  d isorders in  Egypt, Mecca, and Basra,^ th e  Grand V iz ie r  s t i l l
ordered to  Candia in  1667 te n s o f  thousands o f  men to  r e in fo r c e  and r e -
in v ig o r a te  th e  s ie g e .  The fo r ces  gathered  by th e  v i z i e r  th a t year at
Candia were in  a l l  p ro b a b ility  greater than any Turkish army p rev io u sly  
2
assembled on th e  is la n d .
This ch a llen ge was p a r t ia l ly  n eu tra lize d  by an in c re a se  in  th e  
Venetian fo r ces  s ta tio n ed  a t Candia. In  ad d ition  to  th e  numerous in ­
fan try  contingents contributed  by various European s ta t e s  during th e  
ear ly  and m id -l660 ' s ,  th ere  continued t o  a rr iv e  throughout th e  summer 
hundreds o f  Venetian m ercenaries drawn from Dalm atia, th e  archipelago  
is la n d s  and Europe. By f a l l  o f  1667 th e  garrison  numbered n early  eleven  
thousand men o f  v a r ie d  ta le n ts  and m ilita r y  tr a in in g . These so ld ie r s  
were not a l l  o f p ro fe ss io n a l ca p a c ity , but they  d id represent one o f  th e  
la r g e st  garrison s ever c o lle c te d  w ith in  th e  w a lls  o f  th e  fo r tr e s s .^
In conjunction w ith  th is  expansion o f  th e  ga rr iso n , th e  fo r tr e s s  
i t s e l f  was in  a s t a t e  o f  nearly  constant rep a ir  and m od ifica tion . Aid­
ed by the crews o f  th e  armada as w e ll  as th e  c i t y ' s  vagrant hordes o f
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women, c h i ld r e n ,  and a g e d , t h e  la b o r io u s  t a s k  o f  r e c o n s tr u c t io n  c o n t in ­
ued  a p a ce . E veryw here c o u ld  b e  w itn e s s e d  c o n s tr u c t io n  on w a l l s ,  
t r e n c h e s ,  h o u s in g ,  and p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s .  A r t i l l e r y ,  m u n it io n s ,  and  
s k i l l e d  t e c h n ic ia n s  who c o u ld  d i r e c t  th e  m i l i t a r y  and m in in g  o p e r a tio n s  
w ere a lw ays in  demand. As f a r  a s  th e  a c t u a l  p h y s ic a l  c o n d it io n  o f  th e  
f o r t r e s s  was co n c e r n e d , w ith  e x c e p t io n  o f  t h o s e  b a s t io n s  c l o s e s t  t o  th e
s e a ,  t h e  c i t y  o f  C andia rem ained  in  r e l a t i v e l y  sound c o n d it io n  a t  th e  
1;
s t a r t  o f  th e  enem y's new o f f e n s iv e .
The T u rk ish  a s s a u l t  fo r  w hich  th e  Grand V iz i e r  had am assed su ch  a  
fo rm id a b le  arra y  came d u rin g  th e  summer m onths o f  l66j . So d eterm in ed  
was th e  v i z i e r  t o  f o r c e  th e  c a p i t u la t io n  o f  C andia t h a t  a t  th e  T urk ish  
f o r t r e s s e s  o f  R ettim e  and Canea "even  th e  ch u rch es w ere f u l l . . . "  o f  
s u p p l ie s ;  t o  com pensate f o r  th e  la c k  o f  a r t i l l e r y  a  T u rk ish  fou n d ry  had  
b een  n ew ly  e s t a b l i s h e d  a t  Nuova Candia w here canon  and sh o t  w ere c a s t  
d a i ly .   ^ D e term in a tio n  o f  t h i s  n a tu r e  was u n d o u b ted ly  a  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  
t h e  f r u s t r a t io n  f e l t  a t  C o n s ta n tin o p le  w ith  t h e  p r o lo n g ed  s i e g e  o f  
Candia. Now th a t  th e  T rea ty  o f  V asvar had  b ro u g h t p e a c e  w ith  th e  Aus­
t r ia n  Emperor and p e a c e  n e g o t ia t io n s  had f a l t e r e d  w ith  th e  V e n e t ia n s ,  
Grand V iz ie r  Ahmed K iu p r i l i  p la c e d  h im s e lf  a t  t h e  head  o f  h i s  arm ies  
and i n i t i a t e d  th e  cam paign o f  166? . ^
In  May th e  f i r s t  T u rk ish  a s s a u l t  w aves s tr u c k  t h e  b a s t io n s  o f  
P an egra , B e tlem , and t h e  so u th w estern  p o r t io n s  o f  M artin en go . So many 
s o ld i e r s  had a p p a r e n tly  b een  m o b il iz e d  f o r  t h i s  new o f f e n s iv e  th a t  
o n ly  a  h a n d fu l o f  d e fe n d e r s  w ere l e f t  t o  g a r r is o n  t h e  f o r t r e s s e s  o f  
R ettim o and Canea. T u rk ish  commanders c h o se  th e  so u th w estern  flunkB
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b e c a u se  th e  c i t y ' s  o th e r  b a s t io n s  bad t o  b e  approached  w ith o u t camou­
f l a g e  p r o t e c t io n  or w ere  c o n s id e r e d  t o o  d angerous f o r  a  f r o n t a l  a s s a u l t .  
Even t h e  tw o m ost v u ln e r a b le  p o s i t i o n s  a lo n g  t h e  w e s te r n  and e a s te r n
c o a s t l i n e s ,  th e  b a s t io n s  o f  San t'A n d rea  and S a b io n e r a , w ere c o n s id e r e d
7
a t  t h e  t im e  to o  fo r m id a b le  f o r  d i r e c t  a t t a c k .
Day a f t e r  day and n ig h t  a f t e r  n ig h t  th e  a s s a u l t s  c o n tin u e d  a lo n g
w ith  c o n s ta n t  d iv e r s io n a r y  m aneuvers a t  o th e r  p o s i t i o n s .  Much o f  th e
c o n t e s t  c e n te r e d  about t h e  u se  o f  m in e s ,  a  d e l i c a t e  b u t  d e v a s ta t in g
m ethod b y  w h ich  one c o u ld  b reach  th e  w a l l s  o f  t h e  f o r t r e s s  o r  throw  th e
d e fe n d in g  g a r r is o n  in t o  co m p le te  c o n fu s io n .  M ines w ere u sed  by th e
V e n e tia n s  e i t h e r  d i r e c t l y  t o  r e p e l  an enemy a s s a u l t  o r  a s  co u n term in es
d e s ig n e d  t o  d e s t r o y  T u rk ish  tu n n e ls  o r  i g n i t e  p r em a tu re ly  t h e  enemy’ s
pow der. On t h i s  m a tte r  a  c h r o n ic le  o f  th e  s i e g e  d u r in g  th e  m onth o f
J u ly  p ro v es  f r ig h t e n in g ly  r e p e t i t i o u s :  "Wednesday t h e  1 3 th  p a sse d  v e r y
q u ie t ly  d u rin g  th e  d a y . . .b u t  in  th e  e v e n in g  tow ard  t h e  hour o f  e ig h t
(2 0 :0 0 )  th e  enemy ex p lo d ed  a  m i n e . . . .  On th e  l 6 t h  one hour b e fo r e  dawn
a  T u rk ish  m ine on th e  r ig h t  o f  M oceniga c a u sed  some damage t o  f i v e  o f
our s o l d i e r s . . .  (.and) tow ard  th e  hour o f  e ig h t  ( in  th e  e v e n in g )  th e
T urks. . .  a t ta c k e d  from P anegra  e x p lo d in g  a  m in e . . .a n d  a lm o st a t  th e  same
8
t im e  th e r e  ap peared  t o  e x p lo d e  a n o t h e r . . . .  M ines w ere d e to n a te d  a t
a l l  h ou rs o f  t h e  day and n ig h t ,  d e s ig n e d  a s  much t o  ca u se  con ifu sion  and
f e a r  as th e y  w ere t o  i n f l i c t  c a s u a l t i e s  on th e  enemy. M ines w ere o f t e n
e x p lo d ed  in  th e  d a rk n ess  o f  th e  n ig h t  s o  a s  t o  t e r r o r i z e  th e  d e fe n d e r s
g
and erod e  by f a t ig u e  th e  m orale  o f  th e  g a r r is o n .
The c o n s tr u c t io n  o f  t h e s e  m in es was a lw ays a  d e l i c a t e  and tirduous
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t a s k .  Some w ere r e l a t i v e l y  s m a ll w h i le  o th e r s  w ou ld  c o n s i s t  o f  d ozen s  
o f  "barrels o f  pow der, t h e  i g n i t i o n  o f  w hich  m ig h t weaken o r  d e s t r o y  a  
d e f e n s iv e  p o s i t i o n ;  s to n e s  and o th e r  d e h r is  s c a t t e r e d  "by th e  e x p lo s io n  
f r e q u e n t ly  i n f l i c t e d  e x t e n s iv e  c a s u a l t i e s  on any d e fe n d e r s  in  th e  a r e a .  
L ik e w is e ,  g u a s ta d o r i  or sa p p ers  w hose r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i t  was t o  con­
s t r u c t  th e  tu n n e ls  u se d  i n  th e  m in es worked u nder t h e  m ost hazardous  
o f  c o n d i t io n s ;  n o t  in fr e q u e n t ly  th e y  s u f f e r e d  d ea th  o r  in ju r y  from  
s u f f o c a t io n  and a c c id e n t a l  e x p l o s i o n s . ^  W ith  t h e  c o n s ta n t  m in in g  and 
c o u n te r -m in in g  w hich  to o k  p la c e  b e n e a th  and n ea r  t h e  w a l l s  o f  C andia , 
t h e  war m ust h ave  seem ed t o  many a  f e v e r i s h  c o n t e s t  o f  g ia n t  m o le s . 
Beyond t h e  d o zen s o f  a s s a u l t s  and s o r t i e s  e x e c u te d  b y  b o th  s i d e s ,  l i t ­
e r a l l y  hundreds o f  m in es w ere c o n s tr u c te d  and d e to n a te d  d u rin g  t h e  f i v e  
months o f  a c t i v e  w a r fa re  in  1667. In  th e  m onth o f  J u ly  a lo n e  th e r e  
w ere e s t im a te d  a t  l e a s t  e ig h t y  su ch  m ine e x p l o s i o n s . ^
D e s p it e  a l l  t h i s  e f f o r t ,  th e  Grand V iz i e r  was f o r c e d  t o  l i m i t  th e  
s i e g e  due t o  th e  autum nal r a in s  w hich  r e g u la r ly  f lo o d e d  th e  t r e n c h e s  
and m ine t u n n e ls .  The ad ven t o f  p la g u e  in  t h e  T u rk ish  camp in  1667 
n e c e s s i t a t e d  an a lm o st co m p lete  r e t r e a t  o f  t h e  v i z i r ' s  f o r c e s  t o  th e  
s a f e t y  o f  Nuova C andia; o n ly  a  s k e l e t a l  army was l e f t  t o  m a in ta in  th e  
s i e g e  a t  C andia. D e s p it e  a  v a l ia n t  e f f o r t  t o  d is lo d g e  t h i s  s k e le to n  
army from some o f  th e  t r e n c h e s  c lo s e  t o  t h e  so u th e r n  b a s t io n s  o f  C andia , 
th e  enemy managed t o  r e t a in  th e  forw ard  p o s i t i o n s  i t  had won in  th e
/- r  12campaign o f  1667. With th e  exception  o f  th e se  few advanced p o s it io n s ,  
however, nearly  a h a lf  year o f  b it t e r ly  in te n se  warfare had done l i t t l e  
to  change th e  r e la t iv e  p o s it io n  o f th e  two opposing arm ies. The Vene­
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t ia n  defenders had witnessed extensive devastation  and destru c tio n  hut 
had s t i l l  managed to  survive one of the  most determined campaigns o f 
the  e n tire  v a r .1^
Venice was fo rtu n a te  in  th is  moment of c r i s is  to  enjoy the  bene­
f i t  of re la tiv e ly  generous a l l ie d  con tribu tions. The m ilita ry  and 
f in a n c ia l assistance  from which Venice p ro fite d  came a t a more regu lar 
pace and in  g rea te r q u a n titie s  than a t  any time during the  previous 
years of the  stru g g le . Without question, the  s p i r i t  which 
infused th is  fresh  concern for the f a te  of Candia and C hristian  p res­
t ig e  in  th e  M editerranean came from Home and Christendom's new p o n tif f ,  
Clement IX. Moreover, with France and Spain no longer competing fo r 
the  domination of I ta ly  and m atters in  th e  German empire in  a s ta te  of 
r e la tiv e  quiescence, Europe could more e a sily  spare so ld ie rs  fo r  se rv ice  
against th e  Turkish in f id e l.  But i t  was in  the f in a l  analysis  Clement 
and the  re lig io u s  fervor he generated which created the  aura of a 
crusade about the  Candian war. As a re s u l t  m ateria l assis tan ce  poured 
fo rth  from the Catholic princes of Germany, such as the  E lectors of 
Mainz and Cologne and the Bishops of Strasbourg and Paderborn. Other 
princes in  Germany and I ta ly  were somewhat less  generous but neverthe-
1^le s s  a lso  promised troop lev ie s  and money gran ts.
Giulio R o sp ig lio s i's  ascension in  1667 to  the  p o n tif ic a te  as Clem­
ent IX was a boon to  Venice of inestim able value. His predecessor, 
Alexander V II, had been forced to  contend almost continuously with the  
megalomania of France and Spain; in  add ition , he had suffered from 
poor health  and had shown "occasional slowness and lack of decision.
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Alexander had contributed  tc  the  defense o f Candia, hut in  comparison 
to  th a t  o f h is  successor h is  p o n tif ic a te  seemed marred by lethargy  and 
near ind iffe rence . Clement, on the  other hand, assumed as h is  own
personal sanbenito th e  burden of the  war and sought w ith every power.
16at h is  command to  bring  v ic to r y  to  Christendom in  th e  E ast.
17Although Papal finances were usually  in  a rre a rs  Clement labored 
assiduously to  bring su b stan tia l assis tan ce  to  the  C hristian  forces a t 
Candia. Throughout 1667 h is  generosity  continued unabated, from money 
g rants and perm ission to  levy troops w ithin papal t e r r i t o r i e s  to  a paid 
regiment of 500 men and 100,000 pounds of powder.'*'® Although there  
were some minor disagreements between Venice and the  papacy, Clement's 
p o n tif ic a te  represents unquestionably one o f th e  most harmonious periods 
in  the  h isto ry  of Venetian-Roman r e la t io n s .1^
The Pope a lso  endeavored to  use h is  influence as the  leader of 
Christendom in  order to  generate g rea te r support in  Europe fo r the 
struggle  a t Candia. To Louis XIV of France and Maria Anna, the  Queen- 
Regent of Spain, Clement addressed l e t t e r s  supplicating  them fo r a 
peaceful conclusion to  th e ir  war in  the N etherlands. 20 This War of 
Devolution was eventually  ended in  May of 1668 although in  a c tu a lity  
i t s  conclusion had l i t t l e  to  do with the  in te rv en tio n  of Clement; when 
confronted w ith the T rip le  A lliance formed by Holland, Sweden, and Eng-
21land , Louis quick ly  found peace a w iser course than t o t a l  war. Un­
fo r tu n a te ly , th e  Treaty o f A ix-la-C hap elle  which ended th is  Franco- 
Spanish war brought no subsequent b e n e fit  t o  th e  V enetian stru g g le  in  
th e East. The French in  p a rticu la r  proved c le a r ly  h o s t i le  to  any
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im plication or demand th a t  they become involved in  the  Venetian war
with th e  Turks and made every e ffo r t to  delay sending assistance  to
„  . 22 V enice.
Clement had hoped to  encourage more Spanish in te r e s t  in  the  war 
but th ere  too he met w ith sim ilar fa i lu re .  A ll of Spain seemed para­
lyzed by disorder and confusion; th e  government of Spain had two bodies, 
the Venetian ambassador noted, "one weak with an infirm  head, th a t  be­
ing the queen, the  o ther strong without a head, th a t  being th e  coun- 
..23c i l o r s . . . .  So d istressed  was th e  Spanish regency of feeble  Charles
I I  th a t  the  Queen-Regent n o tif ied  th e  Venetian Senate in  1667 th a t
Spain would be unable to  lend i t s  Neapolitan g alleys fo r  serv ice  in  the 
2h
East.
When the cold and ra in  of the w inter passed, the  war resumed in  
f u l l  fury . Some Turkish a r t i l l e ry  b a tte r ie s  had continued to  harass 
th e  fo rtre s s  throughout th e  winter but the  main enemy th ru s t  of 1668
25did not come u n t i l  the summer of th a t  year. Yet in  s p ite  of such 
fev erish  e ffo r ts  on the  p a rt of Grand V izier Amhet K iu p rili th e  fo rtre s s  
of Candia seemed in  about the  same condition in  which i t  was found in 
1667. Repair work and m odification was constantly  in  p rogress, and, 
with specia l a tten tion ,even  the r e la tiv e ly  vulnerable eastern  flank  a t 
Sabionera had been su itab ly  strengthened. As usual th ere  were short­
ages of powder and food but the  number o f small ca lib er a r t i l l e r y  was 
apparently adequate. Somewhat diminished by normal a t t r i t io n  and the
departure of a l l ie d  troops for the w inter, the  garrison  numbered be-
26tween f iv e  and s ix  thousand a v a ila b le  men. The defenders a lso  neemed
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favored "by th e fa c t  th a t fev er  Turkish s o ld ie r s  were assembled a t Candia 
than had "been in  th e  previous year; th e  v i z i e r ' s  army contained  in  1668 
between f iv e  and s ix  thousand J a n issa r ie s  to g e th er  w ith perhaps another 
27ten  thousand sappers. Although some observers were e x c e s s iv e ly  o p ti­
m is tic  about th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  ex p e llin g  th e  Turkish fo r ces  from th e
is la n d , th e  year o f  1668 was l e s s  enshrouded w ith  th e  foreboding gloom 
28
o f past years.
D esp ite th e  dim inished Turkish fo r ces  a t  Candia th e  c i ty  enjoyed 
l i t t l e  r e s p ite  from i t s  s ie g e . Monsignor B ich i wrote from Malta in  
1668 th a t "the enemy pressed  so vehem ently .. .th a t  every day th ere  r e -
29mained dead f i f t y  or s ix ty  C h r is t ia n s ...  Candia soon gained th e  
reputation  as a fo r tr e s s  from which few ever returned; consequently re­
cruitment became in c re a sin g ly  d i f f i c u l t .  In s p it e  o f  foreign  a s s i s ­
ta n ce ,th e  Republic was more and more forced  to  r e ly  on th e  se r v ic e s  o f  
e x -p r iso n er s , b a n d its , and reprieved  cr im ina ls in  order t o  m aintain  
sa t is fa c to r y  troop le v e ls ;  most o f  th o se  forced  t o  serve a t  Candia de­
parted once th e ir  term o f  o b lig a tio n  had e x p ir e d .^
U n til almost th e  end o f  th e  summer, m ilita r y  a c t iv i t y  a t Candia 
was in  a s ta t e  o f r e la t iv e  q uiescence. In August, however, th e  new 
P row ed itor-G eneral Francesco Morosini was greeted  by a fu riou s p incer  
a ssau lt concentrating on th e  two c o a s ta l b a stio n s o f  Sant'Andrea and 
Sabionera. M ilita ry  maneuvers as w e ll  as mine and trench construction  
were somewhat r e s tr ic te d  in  the area o f  Sant'Andrea because o f  the  
d if f i c u l t  te rra in  between the b astion  and th e  G io ffiro  River to  the  
w est. S ection s o f  t h is  area were l i t t l e  more than b o g -lik e  marshes
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■which sev e re ly  in h ib ite d  the con struction  o f  sound tren ch es; in  addi­
t io n ,  th e  s o i l  in  th e  immediate v i c in it y  o f  th e  b a stio n  i t s e l f  was 
gen er a lly  rocky thus in creasin g  th e  d if f i c u l t y  o f  mining th e  founda­
t io n s  o f  th e  fo r tr e s s .  The Turks w ith  th e ir  myriad o f  sappers and 
gen eral laborers n ev erth eless  p e r s is te d  in  th e ir  e f fo r t s  a t Sant'Andrea, 
and by August had managed to  th reaten  th e  se c u r ity  o f  th e  e n t ir e  
western b a stio n . P row ed itor-G eneral M orosini ordered m od ifica tion s  
in  th e  defenses o f Sant'Andrea and eventua lly  succeeded in  d riv ing  th e  
enemy from advanced p o s it io n s  by means o f  a c o s t ly  cavalry s o r t ie .  The 
a ttack  on Sant*Andrea continued in to  September but eventua lly  fa i le d  
la r g e ly  as a r e s u lt  o f  th e  a r t i l l e r y  and musket support from th e flank­
ing  b astions o f  San S p ir ito  and Panegra.
At th e  b astion  o f  Sabionera on th e  eastern  c o a s t , a sim ultaneous  
enemy a ssa u lt was in i t ia t e d .  Sabionera, as i t s  name su g g e sts , was 
constructed  e s s e n t ia l ly  on foundations o f  sand and was thus h ig h ly  v u l­
n erable to  underground mine ex p lo sio n s. Turkish a ssa u lt  waves in  con­
ju n ction  w ith th e  work o f  t h e ir  engineers and sappers were consequently  
more su cce ss fu l at Sabionera. The arsena l b attery  along th e  coast was 
s ile n c e d  by Turkish cannon and a breach o f  s ix ty  paces (p a ss i)  was 
opened in  th e b a s tio n 's  main w a ll; major d isa s te r  was avoided on ly  by 
th e ex is te n c e  o f  a newly constructed  inner bulwark. The d efenses o f
Sabionera stood  firm  d esp ite  th e  e f fo r t s  o f  over te n  thousand Turkish
31s o ld ie r s  who attempted to  fo r ce  i t s  c o lla p se .
The cost of the  war in 1668 in  terms of men and m ateria l was stag­
gering. Ey the end of the  year few companies numbered more than th ir ty
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or fo rty  men, o ffic e rs  and men a lik e  su ffe rin g  enormous ca su a ltie s .
Over nine hundred o ffic e rs  of ju n io r rank and above perished th a t  year 
together w ith nearly  s ix  thousand men in  th e  in fan try  and cavalry; 
over th ree  thousand were l is te d  among the  wounded, most of these  being 
sappers and laborers who constructed the  trenches and mine tunnels. 
Turkish losses were estimated to  be f iv e  tim es as many f a t a l i t i e s  and 
twice as many wounded, figures perhaps somewhat exaggerated lu t  never­
th e le ss  re f le c t in g  the  d e fin ite  in te n s if ic a t io n  of the  war. Of in te r ­
e st is  the  d isproportionate  number of f a t a l i t i e s  among both th e  Vene­
t ia n  and Turkish arm ies, a fac t undoubtedly re su ltin g  from the  poor 
medical conditions and the consequent danger of in fec tio n . As one ob­
server noted, any "who were wounded even l ig h t ly  in  any p a rt whatever
of th e  body and even only on a f in g er lo s t  h is  l i f e  as a re s u l t  of 
3 0th a t  in s ig n if ic an t wound.. . . "  In  terms o f m ateria l th ere  were con­
sumed m illions of pounds (lib b re) of powder, hundreds of thousands of 
bushels of g ra in , and thousands of pounds o f lead , wood, m etal, and 
o ther goods necessary fo r  war. To m aintain Candia fo r  ju s t  one year 
Venice spent in  l 668 nearly  It,392,000 d u c a ts .^  Such was the  magnitude 
of the  war in  i t s  l a s t  but most v io len t phase.
Since both Venice and Constantinople remained adamant concerning 
possession of Candia, no r e a l is t ic  hope ex isted  th a t the  war would be 
ended by diplom atic nego tia tions. Luigi Molini had sp e c if ic a lly  been 
sent to  discuss peace terms and to  o ffe r  not only t r ib u te  and compen­
sation  but a lso  complete re s to ra tio n  of a l l  formerly Turkish lands in 
Dalmatia. The Turkish response was u n a lte red , the  v iz ie r  demanding
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above a l1 the surrender of the e n tire  islan d ; Molini was advised th a t 
without cession of the  kingdom and i t s  c a p ita l c i ty ,  peace negotiations 
would be a f ru i t le s s  waste of tim e. The Turkish m in iste rs informed 
Molini th a t  the  war was a mere d iversion  fo r the  Sultan and th a t  the 
Ottoman empire had endless resources of men and money should the siege 
of Candia so requ ire.
Venetian diplomats in  Rome could be more sanguine, fo r  Clement's 
desire  to  preserve Candia seemed in  no way to  waiver. The Pope's 
contribu tions in  1668 equalled those of the  previous year including 
loan of the  p o n tif ic a l squadron, perm ission to  levy tro o p s , a paid reg­
iment of 250 men for serv ice  in  Dalmatia, 500 in fan try  sent to  Candia,
100,000 pounds of powder, and a g i f t  of 50,000 scudi. Clement a lso  
perm itted the suppression of th ree  regu lar orders w ith in  Venetian t e r ­
r i to ry  the proceeds of which were to  be applied to  the  costs  of the 
war; in  th is  fashion approximately one m illion  ducats were ra ise d . 
Moreover, the Pope contributed money from his own p riv a te  fam ily fo r­
tune and endeavored to  persuade o ther European princes and s ta te s  to  
be as generous in  the defense of Christendom.^^ To th is  end, the  
p o n tiff  had a t le a s t  been able to  win from Louis of France a promise 
th a t  for the  duration of one year French forces would re f ra in  from in 
any way attacking Spain. ^  Whether Venice stood to  p ro f i t  from Clem­
e n t 's  diplomatic e ffo r ts  no one could ye t t e l l .
France's in te rn a tio n a l p o sitio n  in  1668 was in  many ways extremely 
d e lica te . The French government n a tu ra lly  wished to  remain on friend ly  
terms with His Holiness, even i f  he seemed as committed to  the  defense
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of Candia as Venice h e rse lf , but a t the  same time feared any rupture 
in  commercial re la tio n s  with the  Moslem nations of th e  Levant. Caught 
as i t  was in  th is  dilemma, French diplomacy consequently floundered. 
There was increasing  alarm in  Constantinople over th e  growing numbers 
of French m ercenaries and French troops finding  service a t  Candia. As 
a r e s u l t  French custom charges in  th e  Levant had been ra ised  to  5 per­
cent as compared to  the  p re fe ren tia l r a te  of 3 percent lev ied  on Eng­
l is h  and Dutch merchandise. The French were a lso  importuned to  lend 
commercial v esse ls  in  order to  tran sp o rt goods to  Candia, a request 
which was not always evaded with success. Franco-Turkish re la tio n s  had 
reached a nadir by th e  summer of 1668. As a  r e s u l t ,  the French ambas­
sador Denis de l a  Haye was reca lled  to  P a r is ; th is  action  was not taken , 
however, as a prelude to  a complete diplom atic break between Paris  and 
Constantinople—as Venice had hoped—but was trig g ered  by th e  French 
m in is try 's  anger over de l a  Eaye's apparent in a b i l ity  to  e ffe c t a rap­
prochement a t the  Porte. In every sense, the  French government remain­
ed extremely se n sitiv e  toward any action  which might endanger French 
37power and p restig e  in  the Levant.
On th e  other hand, Louis and h is  m in iste rs  were keenly aware of 
France 's p o sitio n  in  Europe and labored in  every way to  preserve a t 
le a s t  the  appearance of in te re s t  in  the  a f f a ir s  of Christendom in the 
East. Some of the  in te re s t  which the French king began to  express in  
the  fa te  o f Candia was undoubtedly, in  p a r t ,  re la te d  to  Louis' d esire  
to  'accommodate' the  Pope; i t  was hoped th a t  in  retu rn  the p o n tif f  
might help heal the widening schism in  th e  French church over the
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q uestion  o f Jansenism . Consequently, 1668 -witnessed a flo o d  o f  French
38
prom ises to  "bring a s s is ta n c e  t o  th e  beleagured defenders o f  Candia.
Clement grew in c re a sin g ly  o p tim istic  when, in  May o f  th a t yea r ,
word was rece iv ed  th a t Louis seemed ready to  send from s ix  to  e ig h t
thousand men t o  Candia a t  h is  own expense. By w in ter  no French so ld ie r s
had y e t  been sen t even though Louis and h is  fo r e ig n  m in ister  Lione
continued to  encourage optimism whenever th ey  cou ld . With th e  exception
o f one hundred thousand scudi and perm ission  to  r a is e  r e c r u its  on
French s o i l  nothing m a ter ia lized  th a t year in  th e  way o f  su b sta n tia l
m ilita r y  a s s is ta n c e . Popular r e lig io u s  enthusiasm fo r  th e  defense o f
Candia was unquestionably widespread among th e  c i t iz e n r y  o f  France, but
fo r  th ose  in  whose hands the power o f  th e  n ation  r e s te d , ra ison  d 'e ta t  
39was th e  forem ost concern.
Pope Clement's e f fo r t  to  win French support fo r  th e  Candian stru g­
g le  was p a r t ia l ly  fr u stra te d  by th e  lack  o f  fr ie n d ly  r e la t io n s  between 
Venice and France. For a period  o f  th ree  y e a r s , frcrn 1665 u n t il  1668, 
France had had no o f f i c i a l  ambassador at V enice. In 1667 Louis had' 
become involved  in  th e  War o f  D evolution in  th e  Netherlands and, hoping 
to  p r o f it  from th e resumption o f  formal r e la t io n s  w ith  V enice,had ap­
pointed  a c e r ta in  M. de Saint-Andre as h is  ambassador to  th e  B epublic.
I t  was M. de Saint-Andre' s ta sk  to  express to  th e  Venetian Senate King 
Louis' overwhelming d es ire  to  a s s i s t  in  th e  d efense o f  Candia. But i t  
was a lso  M. de Saint-A ndre' s r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  to  exp la in  th a t France and 
Venice would have to  accept th e  con d ition s imposed on them by " n e cessity ,"  
presumably meaning th e  n e c e s s ity  o f  f i r s t  pursuing King Louis' m ilita r y
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and p o l i t i c a l  in  Europe.
Even a fte r  co r d ia l dip lom atic r e la t io n s  had once again been re­
e s ta b lish e d  between France and V en ice , th er e  e x is te d  sev e ra l p r a c t ic a l  
problems as fa r  as French m ilita r y  a s s is ta n c e  was concerned. The 
d if f i c u l t y  confronting  Venetian m ilita r y  commanders a t Candia la y  in  
th e  somewhat questionab le va lue  o f  th e  French in fa n try  and French cav­
a l ie r s  who volunteered  th e ir  s e r v ic e s . Many French knights sen t to  
Candia were f i l l e d  w ith  you th fu l z e a l and am bition, c h a r a c te r is t ic s  
which th e se  sometimes in tr a c ta b le  c a v a lie r s  expressed  in  a c ts  o f  reck ­
l e s s  daring. The h is to r y  o f  French involvem ent in  th e  Candian s ie g e  
stands as ir r e fu ta b le  evidence o f  t h is  G allican  madness, a type o f  
m ysterious and incurable m ilita r y  fe v er  which combined in  i t s  essence  
perverse obstinancy w ith  a m asoch istic  d e s ir e  fo r  g lo r y . Venetian com­
manders, accustomed to  th e  l e s s  h ero ic  ta sk s  o f  a year-round s ie g e , 
understandably looked askance a t th e se  r e c k le s s  c a v a lie r s  who sought to
1^ 1
sweep away the  in f id e l  in  one grandiose Wagnerian charge. Despite 
th e i r  apparent p o te n tia l ,  French expeditionary forces, such as the  one 
sent in  1660 under the  Duke d 'E ste , seemed in ev itab ly  to  end in  disap­
pointment and to  lack  the  perseverance so v i ta l  to  a prolonged siege.
In 1668 a ssistance  from a v a rie ty  of European s ta te s  o ther than 
France and the papacy arrived  a t  Candia in  re la tiv e  abundance. The 
I ta l ia n  s ta te s  of Tuscany, Modena, Genoa, and Lucca a l l  contributed  in  
one form or another, some b a rre ls  of invaluable gunpowder and o thers 
contingents of in fan try . The Emperor sent th ree  thousand so ld ie rs  
while th e  princes of the  Empire, such as the  E lector of Cologne, the
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Archbishop of Salzburg, th e  Duke of Brunswick, and th e  Bishop of S tras­
bourg, together contributed  an add itio n al thousand men. Even the  re lu c ­
ta n t Spanish agreed to  apply funds co llec ted  from a dime (o rig in a lly  
intended fo r th e  Hungarian strugg le  e a r l ie r  in  th e  decade) to  the  costs 
o f the  Candian war and to  send the  g a lleys o f Naples to  jo in  the  a ll ie d
k2f le e t .  C o llec tiv e ly , th is  European support represented  a s ig n ific a n t 
addition  to  th e  Candian g arrison  and one w ithout which the  Republic 
would have found the siege incomparably more d i f f ic u l t .  With Europe in  
a s ta te  of r e la tiv e  calm and th e  papacy lending i t s  unreserved support 
and encouragement to  the  Venetian war, the  prospects fo r  a successful 
defense of Candia seemed to  become a  re a l  p o s s ib i li ty .
I l l
A fter so many years of b ru ta l  and exhausting w arfare, the  Venetian 
Senate had become increasingly  inclined  toward seeking some kind of 
compromise settlem ent w ith respect to  Candia. In 1668 th e  Senate had 
sent a rep resen ta tive  to  Constantinople to  nego tia te  a settlem ent based 
on a d iv ision  of the  islan d ; i f  Venice could re ta in  the  c ity  o f Candia 
and i t s  immediate environs in  a six ty-m ile  rad iu s , the remainder of the  
kingdom would belong to  th e  Sultan. The Signoria seemed on the verge 
of concluding such an agreement when suddenly negotiations were sus­
pended. This abrupt suspension was probably due to  the  lack of s in cer­
i ty  on the p a rt of the  Grand V izier and also  to  the Pope's request th a t
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Venice not conclude a separate peace w ith Constantinople. In  a sense 
the  Pope's request had fu rth e r 'in te rn a tio n a liz e d ' the  war and had, 
from a moral vie-wpoint, increasingly  committed th e  Republic to  po sitio n  
which precluded the  p o ss ib i li ty  o f  a separate  peace w ith the Turks.
The Venetian decision to  suspend peace nego tia tion  in  the  spring 
of 1669 was a t le a s t  in  p a rt re la te d  to  th e  w illingness of the  French 
to  agree not to  wage war on Spain fo r th e  duration  o f th e  Candian war. 
Although Louis had only re lu c ta n tly  agreed to  th is  jo in t  Franco-Spanish 
pact o f non-aggression, the  Pope was e sp ec ia lly  o p tim istic  th a t i t  would 
have a b e n e fic ia l e ffec t on the  defense of Candia. Not only would 
French m il ita ry  might be brought to  bear on th e  war, but the  Spanish 
had a lso  promised th a t  w ith peace in  Europe th e  e l i t e  troops of Flanders 
would be ordered to  help defend th e  c ity . For Clement th e  agreement 
represented a major diplomatic triumph in  h is  passionate  quest to  bring 
the  un ited  s tren g th  of Christendom in to  th e  w a r .^
In June of 1669 an a l l ie d  expeditionary force comprised of papal, 
M altese, and French vessels sa iled  frcm Toulon and headed toward the  
waters of Candia. The French squadron consisted  of th ir te e n  galleys 
under the  Count de Vivonne and eighteen galleys and seventeen troop
toships under the command of th e  Duke de Beaufort. This was one of the 
la rg e s t armadas ever assembled to  bring a id  to  Candia and one which, in  
terms of sheer magnitude, had not been matched since the m id-l650 's and 
the  days of Marcello and Mocenigo.
Ju st the  s ize  of the  armada of 1669 was su ff ic ie n t to  make i t  of 
singular importance. Although between 1667 and 1669 the land war had
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increased considerably in  in te n s ity  and fe ro c ity , the  ro le  o f th e  navy 
had diminished to  th e  poin t where i t s  ch ie f re sp o n s ib ility  was lim ited  
e s se n tia lly  to  sc a tte re d  p a tro ls  and la rg e ly  in e ffec tu a l maneuvers.
The a u x il ia r ie s  had only in te rm itte n tly  jo ined th e  Venetians, and from 
166U u n t i l  1667 even the  p o n tif ic a l  g alleys had remained r e s t r ic te d  to  
I ta l ia n  waters.
Moreover, a general lethargy  seemed to  dampen th e  s p i r i t  of the  
Venetian navy during th e  second ha lf  of th e  decade. At most, the  Vene­
t ia n  f le e t  attempted to  impose in te rm itten t blockades on th e  port of 
Canea and to  p a tro l ,  in  a somewhat desultory  fash ion , the  waters near
k6Malvasia and Cerigo. Even when th e  armada represented  a sizable 
f l o t i l l a  of w arships, the  number of encounters w ith  th e  enemy remained 
few. Turkish commanders continued to  avoid open confrontation  with the 
superior Venetians, and the  l ig h te r  and sw ifte r Turkish v esse ls  proved 
d i f f ic u l t  to  chase w ith any success. "Experience th ere fo re  persuades 
me to  s ta te ,"  wrote Corner in  1667, " th a t i t  is  very d i f f ic u l t  to  chase 
f ru i tf u l ly  the  g alleys of the  Bey, as long as these  same p refe r  not to
11U7want in  any fashion to  o ffe r nor to  receive in v ita tio n  to  combat. . . .
Nor was Venetian naval stra teg y  the same as i t  had been in  the  early  
years of the  c o n fl ic t .  No longer was th ere  a po licy  o f a c tiv e ly  and 
system atically  blockading the  Dardanelles o r , indeed, any of the other 
major p o rts . The e a r l ie r  stra tegy  had now been replaced by one concen­
t ra t in g  on a sca tte red  and sporatic  p a tro ls  la rg e ly  r e s t r ic te d  to  the 
waters in  the  immediate v ic in i ty  of Candia i t s e l f .  Such a stra tegy  was 
too desultory to  have resu lted  in  any serious long-term m ilita ry  e f f e c t ,
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and when i t  was combined with d is in te re s t  on the p a rt of the a u x ilia ­
r ie s  and in e r t ia  w ithin the Venetian adm iralty i t  marked what Prov- 
veditor-G eneral Barbaro called  "a beginning o f the  abandonment of the  
s e a . . .
In  addition  to  th is  lack of s p ir i te d  leadersh ip  and enthusiasm, 
the  armada continued to  su ffe r from customary i l l s .  Shortages of mar­
in e rs ,  oarsmen, prov isions, and money were d a ily  concerns. Healthy and 
experienced g a le o tti  or oarsmen were in  constant demand; many who were 
infirm  or whose sentences a t the oars had-expired were obliged to  
continue a t t h e i r  posts fo r lack  of adequate replacements. The g rea t 
length  of th e  war had, moreover, depleted the  resources of the  a rch i­
pelago is la n d s , the  tra d itio n a l  reserve where the armada found supplies 
and tax  money by which to  nourish and pay the crews. By the l a s t  years 
o f the  war, l i t t l e  more than b arley , wine, and lim ited  amounts of money 
were to  be found in  these re la tiv e ly  r ic h  and prosperous Venetian do- 
50mams.
The ro le  of the  navy consequently de te rio ra ted  during the  la s t  
years of the war u n t i l  i t  became, in  f a c t ,  a f a i r ly  in s ig n if ic an t fac to r 
in  the  to ta l  defense of Candia. There occurred only one major encounter 
between 1667 and 1669- In March of 1668 a  Turkish f le e t  attempted to  
in te rcep t a Venetian convoy under the  command of Lorenzo Cornaro; ap­
p rised  of the Turkish designs, the Venetian convoy was secre tly  re in ­
forced and subsequently managed to  tu rn  the  su rp rise  a ttack  in to  a com­
p le te  triumph. Successful as th is  engagement was, i t  nevertheless 
proved to  be the la s t  major naval encounter of the  w a r .^  There were
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several minor land-and-sea operations such as th e  successfu l Venetian 
assau lt on the  fo r tre s s  a t  San Todoro, and, on severa l occasions, 
galleys were used to  harass Turkish shore b a t te r ie s .  But generally  
during these l a s t  few desperate years the  armada became almost to ta l ly  
subordinate to  th e  demands o f the garrison  a t  Candia. In  numerous 
instances mariners were disembarked and d ire c tly  employed in  the  de­
fense of Candia i t s e l f ,  an ac t which c le a r ly  underscored the  s h if t  in 
52the  war from th e  sea  to  th e  land.
Although th is  was th e  tw en ty -fif th  summer of th e  c o n f l ic t ,  the
campaign of 1669 o ffered  more r e a l is t ic  hope fo r a successfu l defense
than had any in  recen t y ears. Not only were th ere  rumors th a t  the  Otto-
53man empire was i t s e l f  in  a s ta te  of considerable in te rn a l  d iso rder, 
but the  re la tiv e ly  abundant assistance which flowed in to  Candia th a t 
year seemed to  promise some r e l i e f  fo r the  tormented c ity . The a rr iv a l  
o f a ll ie d  reinforcements in  May led  the P row ed ito r dell'Armada, Lorenzo 
Corner, to  estim ate th a t  Candia was no longer in  a desperate s itu a tio n , 
e spec ia lly  since no Turkish troops had yet a rriv ed  to  b o ls te r  the  winter
Cli
fo rces. Some tw enty-four hundred German troops from Brunswick-Lune- 
burg under Count Jo sia s  d i Waldeck and six teen  hundred from the Elector 
of Bavaria arriv ed  in  May and June resp ec tiv e ly ; in  addition there  was 
the  customary support of men and m ateria l contribu ted  by the pope, the 
Emperor, the  M altese, and the  I ta l ia n  p r in c e s .^
The newest addition  to  the garrison  was the  French expeditionary 
force consisting  o f over six  thousand in fan try  and cavalry with months 
of supplies and m unitions. These troops were under the  command of three
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French o f f ic e r s , the most notable of vhom were the Due de B eaufort, 
commander of th e  troops sta tio n ed  on the  f l e e t ,  and th e  Duke de 
Navailles who assumed command of a l l  land forces once th e  so ld ie rs  had 
disembarked. A ttired  in  varied  dress w ith only the  scarves o f th e i r  
u n its  to  d istin g u ish  then , these s ix  thousand French so ld ie rs landed 
under cover of n ight on th e  19th of June. Only the Musketeers o f the 
King refused such an 'ig n o b le ’ entrance and requested perm ission to  
disembark in  f u l l  view of th e  enemy during the  following day; the  re ­
s u lt  o f th is  i n i t i a l  touch of French 'c h iv a lry ' was the lo ss  o f several
56musketeers to  Turkish a r t i l l e r y  and r i f l e  f i r e .
No sooner had the  French troops disembarked when th e i r  commander, 
de N availles, demanded an immediate s o r t ie  against the  Turkish posi­
t io n s . Despite P row editor-G eneral M orosini's advice th a t  th e  so rt ie  
should a t le a s t  await the  a rr iv a l  of th e  a l l ie d  g a lley s , de N availles 
in s is te d  th a t immediate action  be taken. French troops were thus 
assembled on the  night of June 2kth along the easte rn  defenses of San 
Demetri. The subsequent charge, which came in  the dark of th e  follow­
ing morning, i n i t i a l ly  routed th e  enemy from th e i r  p o s itio n ; th e  posi­
tio n s  were, however, quickly recovered by the  Turks when th e  e la ted  
French troops f e l l  in to  disorder and were dispersed in  panic a f te r  a 
b a rre l of gunpowder acciden ta lly  exploded in  th e i r  m idst. The l iv e s  
lo s t  in  th is  senseless and f u t i le  s o r t ie  were in  the  hundreds, includ­
ing the  Due de Beaufort, who had become separated from h is  u n it  during 
the b a t t l e  and was never heard from again. The trag ic  re s u l ts  o f de 
N availles' so rt ie  were the lo g ic a l outcome of a se ries  of serious
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s tra te g ic  mistakes on p a rt of the  French command. Not only were the 
French commanders unfam iliar w ith th e  te r r a in  and the enemy's ta c t ic s ,  
hut the  s ize  o f th e i r  s o r t ie  was in  i t s e l f  too small to  have even ac­
complished the task  they had decided upon. Moreover, French hauteur in 
regard to  the  Venetian and German troops s ta tio n ed  a t Candia tended to  
generate an atmosphere of mutual d isa ffe c tio n , a fac t which may, in 
p a r t ,  have accounted fo r M orosini's unwillingness to  commit more of the 
troops under h is  command to  support the  French a ttack . As one contem­
porary complained, th e  French wanted "for themselves only the  honor of
57l ib e r a t in g  from  t h e  enemy t h a t  c i t y  C C an d ia ).. ;  what th e y  accom­
p l i s h e d  i n  t h e i r  s h o r t  s t a y  on t h e  i s la n d  was som eth in g  c o n s id e r a b ly  
l e s s .
The a l l ie d  armada consisting  of seven p o n t if ic a l ,  seven M altese, 
fiv e  Venetian and th ir te e n  French galleys f in a l ly  a rrived  a t  Candia on 
the 3rd of Ju ly . A week la te r  a consulta of a l l  the  a l l ie d  commanders 
decided, against the  warning of P row editor-G eneral M orosini, th a t  the  
galleys and land forces would undertake a Jo in t assau lt in  the  v ic in i ty  
of Sant1Andrea. ^  Two more weeks passed while favorable weather condi­
tio n s  were awaited; on the 2Uth of Ju ly  a t  7:00 A.M. the galleys began 
the bombardment o f the  Turkish b a tte r ie s .  The barrages continued fo r 
nearly  th ree  hours a t  which time a French v esse l by the name of Theresa 
suffered an enemy shot in  the  magazine; th e  ship exploded and a l l  but 
seven of her 293 man crew perished. The panic spread by the  explosion 
and loss of the  Theresa disrupted  the  e n tire  a ll ie d  operation, and the 
galleys were forced to  withdraw a f te r  having suffered extensive easual-
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t i e s .  The sim ultaneously launched land s o r t ie s  likew ise ended in  
fa i lu re  p rim arily  due to  a  lack of cooperation among the  a ll ie d  so l­
d ie rs  and to  th e  a rr iv a l  of Ja n issa rie s  who rein fo rced  the  enemy 
59p o sitio n s .
The b itte rn e ss  and dejection  which swept th e  garrison  in  th e  wake 
of th is  grandiose fa i lu re  caused many of th e  French to  c r i t ic iz e  and 
slander Prow editor-G eneral Morosini and th e  e n tire  defensive system 
a t Candia. They complained u n fa ir ly  th a t  Morosini had misled them in to  
thinking  th a t  Candia was defendable. As a r e s u l t ,  the  French openly 
refused to  a s s is t  in  th e  construction of new f o r t if i c a t io n s ,  and 
Admiral Vivonne dispersed h is galleys in  d iffe re n t po rts  throughout the  
kingdom because, he claimed, the a i r  about the  c ity  was foul. As a 
s t i f f l in g  heat wave struck  the c ity ,  French troops were clandestinely  
removed to  th e i r  galleys on the  p re tex t o f illness.^®
Vicenzo R osp ig liosi, papal commander and th eo re tic  commander-in- 
ch ie f fo r a l l  the  C hristian  fo rces , was f in a l ly  compelled to  convene a 
general consulta of a l l  the  a l l ie d  lead e rs. The consults  produced, 
however, no tang ib le  r e s u lts  and tended ra th e r  to  exacerbate the  d if ­
ferences among the a l l i e s .  The Due de N availles was e spec ia lly  o b s ti­
na te , claiming th a t losses w ithin h is  ranks had been so numerous th a t  
he would be unable to  lend French so ld ie rs  fo r any fu rth e r duty than 
th e i r  o rig in a l assignments. The only concensus among the commanders 
was to  delay any fu tu re  action  u n til  an expected two thousand ad d itional 
mercenaries under the Duke d e lla  Mirandola had arrived  safely in  C an d ia .^
Weeks of continued rancor and b itte rn e ss  followed th is  consulta
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
235
u n t il  f in a l ly  the  Due de N availles announced h is  in ten tio n  to  withdraw 
the vast m ajority  of h is  French troops by the  21st of August. On the 
n ight of the  2 1 st, another consulta met a t the  house of de N availles, 
but the  only point agreed upon by a l l  was the  in e v i ta b i li ty  of the  f a l l  
o f Candia once French support had been withdrawn. Unaffected by the 
pleas and supplications of the  Maltese and Venetian commanders as well 
as those of numerous Candian p r ie s ts  and no tab les, th e  French duke with 
a l l  but f iv e  hundred of h is  so ld ie rs  withdrew from th e  c ity  th a t  n ight. 
A ll had t r i e d  to  i n s t i l l  in  de Navailles a sense of duty to  "the ser­
v ice of God, the  honor of re l ig io n , th e  repu ta tion  o f C h ris tia n ity , and 
in  p a rt ic u la r  o f th e i r  king (Louis XIV) , . . .  (but) th ere  was no way to  
force him to  condescend to  a sing le  t h in g . . . ." ^ 2
Although th e  h is to r ic a l  evidence i s  confusing, i t  seems th a t  the  
resp o n s ib ility  fo r  th is  p recip itous French withdrawal must l i e  larg e ly  
w ith the Duke. Despite the  f le x ib i l i ty  of h is  in s tru c tio n s , de Navailles 
unquestionably exceeded the  in te n t ,  i f  not the  express wording, of h is  
orders from Louis. Moreover, in  terms of Louis' foreign  po licy , de 
N availles' action  would have made l i t t l e  sense. The French re t r e a t  
from Candia l e f t  French influence and p res tig e  in  Rome abysmally weak­
ened ju s t  a t  a time when Louis was try in g  to  gain more support fo r  a 
French candidate as the  next Pope. In add ition , de Navailles could in  
no way excuse h is  decision by arguing th a t  h is  troops were decimated or 
weakened, since the  vast m ajority  of them returned  safely  to  the shores 
of France. The f u l l  sto ry  w ill  never be known, but from existing  evi­
dence the  Duke stands indicted  for exceeding h is in stru ctio n s  and
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consequently for hastening the  surrender of Candia.
In  th e  wake of th e  French departure came a general co llapse of 
morale w ithin the  garrison . Knowledge of the  French exodus caused the 
Turkish commander to  i n i t i a t e  a massive a ssau lt on th e  23rd of August, 
an a ttack  which Morosini and h is  men courageously and successfu lly  
repulsed. But even th e  v igor and "bravery displayed th a t  day "by the  
Venetian contingents proved useless in  encouraging th e  o ther foreign  
commanders to  remain a t  Candia. The Duke d e lla  Mirandola had no sooner 
arriv ed  w ith h is  reinforcements on th e  25th  of th a t  month when he in ­
formed Morosini he had no in ten tio n  of p a rtic ip a tin g  in  th e  surrender 
o f the  c ity  and would soon depart without ever having landed h is  troops. 
Quickly following s u it  were th e  Maltese and Savoyards who requested 
immediate withdrawal from what they had come to  view as a doomed c ity ;  
only the  German tro o p s, already severly decimated "by d isease and "battle, 
6bagreed to  remain a t  th e i r  po sts .
Now faced w ith the imminent departure of the  M altese, Savoyard,
and papal u n its ,  Morosini ca lled  a general consulta on the  27th of the
month during which he made one la s t  p lea  th a t  R ospigliosi and the other
a l l i e s  remain a t the  defense of Candia. M orosini’s p lea  had l i t t l e
e ff e c t,  and under cover of darkness on th e  n ight of August 31st the
65papal, M altese and remaining French u n its  s a iled  from Candia. Even
with an ad d itional six  hundred reinforcements "brought from Standia the
departure of R o sp ig lio s i's  troops l e f t  Candia with fewer than four
thousand men. In such a s ta te  fu rth e r defense beyond the  immediate 
66fu tu re  seemed a l l  but impossible.
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Confronted w ith impending d isa s te r ,  Morosini had se lec ted , even 
before the a u x ilia ry  squadrons and u n its  had departed , a peace dele­
gation  in  order to  nego tia te  the  surrender of Candia to  the  enemy.
But the  Turkish nego tia to rs remained adamant, demanding th a t  before
67peace could be discussed Candia would f i r s t  have to  be ceded. With 
the  departure of th e  a u x il ia r ie s  a t th e  end of August, Turkish demands 
in creased ,th e  v iz ie r 's  rep resen ta tiv es  now refu sin g  to  discuss the  
re ten tio n  or exchange of various Candian and Dalmatian fo r t re s s e s ; 
they questioned how the  Venetians could in  any way make demands in  ex­
change fo r Candia when the Grand V iz ie r 's  forces could successfu lly  
storm the c ity  w ith in  a m atter o f days. So confident had the  Turks be­
come by th is  date th a t  they had the  tem erity  to  suggest th a t  Venice pay 
a repara tion  fo r th e  cost of the  war and t r ib u te  fo r  any Turkish fo r­
tre s s e s  taken in  D a lm a tia .^  A fter the  Venetians bravely and success­
fu lly  repulsed a major Turkish assau lt in  ea rly  September, however,
Turkish n ego tia to rs seemed le s s  in so len t and more amenable to  sensib le  
69peace n ego tia tions.
At th e  time o f i t s  surrender Candia "seemed l ik e  a p i le  of stone,"
espec ia lly  a t Sant'Andrea and Sabionera with only the  innermost po r-
70tio n s  of th e  c ity  s t i l l  in  recognizable condition. Considering i t s  
s ta te ,  Morosini gained re la tiv e ly  advantageous term s, perhaps because 
he negotia ted  the surrender as p a rt of a general peace settlem ent be­
tween Venice and Constantinople. Moreover, the  P row editor-G eneral had 
taken considerable care in concealing from the enemy the tru e  condition 
of the fo r tre s s ;  th e  Grand V iz ie r , anxious him self to  conclude the  war
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and faced w ith what seemed to  he a s t i l l  reso lu te  garrison , undoubtedly 
found compromise an increasingly  sensib le  course of action .
In th e  peace terms no mention was made of an indemnity nor even of 
Zante's customary annual ' t r i b u t e . '  Venice re ta in ed  a l l  of the a r t i l ­
le ry  contained within Candia,and a l l  the  c i ty 's  inhab itan ts and m ili­
ta ry  personnel were guaranteed safe conduct from th e  islan d . The fo r­
t re s se s  of Suda, Garabusa, and Spinalonga were a lso  to  remain in  Vene­
t ia n  contro l although without adequate harbor f a c i l i t i e s  these  secondary
71fo rtre s se s  were of lim ited  value. There was some d ispute over the 
boundaries to  be estab lished  in  Dalmatia, a dispute which lingered  well 
beyond the cessation  of h o s t i l i t i e s .  The old and cantankerous pasha of 
Bosnia even threatened a resumption of the  war in  Dalmatia, but with 
h is  death an agreement was eventually  concluded; Venetian dominion over 
Zara, Sebenico, Spalato, Cattaro as w ell as the  t e r r i t o r i e s  in the  im­
mediate v ic in i ty  of C lissa  and Spalato was assured. I t  was not u n t i l
October of 1671, however, th a t th is  t re a ty  agreement was o f f ic ia l ly
72r a t i f i e d  fo r the  Dalmatian coast.
A fter more than twenty-four years of continuous warfare on land 
and a t sea, the  great s tragg le  fo r possession of the Kingdom of Candia 
had come to  an end. Countless a s sa u lts ,  s o r t ie s ,  and mine explosions 
marked the long course of the war. The combined f a t a l i t i e s  fo r the  war 
stagger the  imagination, one author estim ating nearly 30,000 C hristians 
and over 100,000 Turks had lo s t  th e i r  l iv e s  in  the s trugg le . At the 
time of the  evacuation th ere  were counted 3,75^ so ld iers and approxi­
mately i+,000 c iv ilia n s  of which only a handful chose to  remain under
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th e is la n d s  o f  th e  arch ip elago , in  th e  I s tr ia n  p en in su la , or on th e  
73mainland o f  V enice.
News o f  th e surrender was re ce iv e d  w ith  mixed fe e l in g s  "by some 
in  V enice. One sen a to r , Antonio C orrer, demanded th a t th ere he a f u l l  
in v e s tig a tio n  and inq u iry  in to  M orosini*s a c t io n , hut others rushed  
to  defend th e  P row ed itor-G enera l’ s conduct and the honorable peace he 
had gained in  th e  fa c e  o f such a d v ersity . Deeply shocked and stunned 
hy th e  ca p itu la t io n  o f  Candia was th e  p o n t if f ,  Clement IX, a man whose 
en ergies and resources had so s e l f l e s s l y  been consumed in  defense o f  
th e  is la n d ; i t  seems probable th a t h is  death in  December o f  1669 was 
immeasurably hastened by t h is  v ic to r y  o f  th e  Moslems in  th e  East."^
Even Louis XIV, France’ s great Sun King, must have f e l t  a sense o f  
chagrin over th e  lo s s  o f Candia and th e  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  French a ctio n  
had to  share in  i t s  surrender. But c e r ta in ly  throughout Europe, 
among even th e  most r e l ig io u s  o f  Christendom's p r in c es , th er e  must have 
been mixed w ith  the remorse a sense o f  genuine r e l i e f .  V ictory would 
have been sw eeter but in  a stru g g le  which seemed en d less and one from 
which no s in c ere  C atholic could w ith  ease escape involvem ent, much o f  
Europe must c e r ta in ly  have savored w ith  joy th e  coming o f  peace . For a 
w h ile , a t l e a s t ,  th e  troublesome a f f a ir s  o f  th e  East could once again  
be la id  to  r e s t .
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CHAPTER V: FOOTNOTES
1 . Johannes von Hammer -  P u r g s ta ll, H isto ire  de 1 ' empire Ottoman, 
tr a n s . by J . J . H e lle r t  (P a r is, 1835-^1), I I I ,  p . 10^ 107- (H ereinafter  
re fer re d  to  as H is to ir e . )
2 . Estim ates fo r  th e  number o f  Turkish troops s ta t io n e d  a t  
Candia vary considerab ly . Both Hammer and T erlinden c i t y  th e  f ig u re  
o f  70,000 men fo r  th e  year 1667 . Hammer, H is to ir e , p . 122 and Charles
H. T erlinden, Le Pape Clement IX e t  l a  guerre d i Candle, 1667-69  (Lou- 
v a in -P a r is , 190?), p . 3 ^  (H ereinafter re fer re d  to  as Clement IX e t  
Candle. ) According to  sev e ra l contem poraries, however, th er e  were 
fewer enemy s o ld ie r s . Prow ed itor-G enerale d e l l ’Armi in  Candia, Antonio 
P r iu l i ,  estim ated , in  1667,  th er e  were about 30,000  enemy s o ld ie r s .  
According t o  P row ed itor-G enerale d e l l ’Armi in  Regno d i Candia, Barbaro, 
th er e  were only 20 ,000 , but reports re ce iv e d  from Constantinople noted  
another 35,000 were on th e ir  way. The number o f  reinforcem ents found
a t Candia a t  any one tim e consequently in c re a se s  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  
estim ating  th e  troop stren gth  o f  th e  enemy. Both th e  Turks and th e  
V enetians g en er a lly  increased  th e  number o f  reinforcem ents considerab ly  
during th e  summer and f a l l  months when th e  f ig h t in g  was a t  i t s  w orst.
Both men agreed , however, th a t th e  Turkish army was lack ing  in  ce r ta in  
v i t a l  su p p lies  and s k il l e d  en g ineers, d e f ic ie n c ie s  not uncommon in  th e  
Venetian camp a ls o . See A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S ec reta ), R elaz ione , Busta 
80, R elazione d e l P row ed itor-G enerale dell'A rm i in  Candia, Antonio P r iu l i ,  
March 30, 1667 and P row ed itor-G enerale dell'A rm i in  Regno d i Candia,
Luca Francesco Barbaro, 1667.
3 . For Barbaro's f ig u r e s  on troop str en g th s, and fo r  an analy­
s i s  o f  th e various contingents and th e ir  cap acity , see  A .S .V .,  C o lleg io  
V (S e c r e ta ), R elazione, Busta 80 , Luca Francesco Barbaro, P ro w ed ito r -  
Generale dell'A rm i in  Regno d i Candia, 1667 . In t h is  p a rticu la r  re p o r t, 
Barbaro, who assumed command some tim e in  th e  la t e  spring or summer,
remarked th a t  ”1 have assembled under my eye 8 ,310  s o ld ie r s  " See a lso
B.N.M., VII (2182), S iege o f  Candia; Andrea V a lier o , H isto r ia  d e l la  
guerra d i Candia (V enice, 1679)s PP- 627- 651 , 673*675 . (H ereinafter r e ­
fe rre d  to  as H is to r ia . )
4 . A report drawn Tip by Cavalier F ilip p o  Verneda, Superintendent 
o f F o r t if ic a t io n s  and A r t i l le r y , g iv es  us a f a i r ly  clear  p ic tu re  o f
the enormous amount o f  a c t iv i t y  and labor which was requ ired  to  m aintain  
th e se c u r ity  o f  Candia. For exantple, Verneda's report mentions th e  r e ­
su rfacin g  and h eighten ing o f  th e  r a v e lin  o f  San S p ir ito , th e  enlargement 
o f th e r a v e lin  at Panigra, adjustment o f  numerous counter-escarpm ents, 
re sto r a t io n  o f  much o f  Sabionera, com pletion o f  various p arap ets, 
con struction  o f  numerous countermines fo r  fu ture defense , and th e  er ec tio n  
o f  a hew 'fr e c c ia '  or arrow and 'mezzaluna' or lu n e tte . The report men­
t io n s  in  p assin g  th a t th ere was a continued shortage o f sappers fo r  work
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2kl
on th e f o r t i f i c a t io n s ,  and a su ggestion  th a t  more could  be procured from 
th e is la n d s  o f  th e  archipelago; in  desperate c a se s , th e  men from the  
armada (the report su g g ests) might a ls o  be so  employed. See A .S .V ., 
C olleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R elazione, Busta 80 , R elazione d i P ro w ed ito r-  
Generale dell'A rm i in  Candia, Antonio P r iu l i ,  March 30 , 1667; See a lso  
B.N.M., VII (2182), 1667-68, p . 13.
5. A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S ec reta ), R elaz ione , Busta 8 0 , Luca 
Francesco Barbaro, Prow ed itor-G enerale d e l l ’Armi in  Regno d i Candia,
1667 ,  and R ela tion e d i P row ed itor-G enerale dell'A rm i in  Candia,
Antonio P r iu l i ,  March 30, 1667.
6 . See Hammer, H is to ir e , I I I ,  pp. 106-107; Andrea V a liero , 
H isto r ia  d e l la  guerra d i Candia (V enice, 1679) , BP* 627, 651 , 673,
675 . (H ereinafter re fer re d  to  as H is to r ia . ) The Senate proposed to  th e  
Turks through th e  V enetian re p r esen ta t iv e , Giovanni B a t t is ta  Padavino. 
th a t th ere  could  be a  " d iv is io n  o f  th e  islan d "  ;l ik e w ise  th e  fo r tr e s s  
a t Suda would be destroyed  i f  Huova Candia were razed  and Venice would 
pay a ' g i f t '  o f  300,000  r e a l is  and as w e ll  annual tr ib u te  o f  25,000 
r e a l i s .  This su ggestion  had no ta n g ib le  r e s u l t .  According to  Hammer, 
K iu p rili made an o ffe r  o f  peace — .......... .
7 . Turkish fo r c e s  in  fr o n t o f  Panigra and th e  w estern b astions  
were le d  by th e  Grand V iz ie r  h im se lf , and were accompanied by a  "m ulti­
tude o f  workers, w izened mercenary s o ld ie r s  and p e a s a n ts , . . .and en g ineers, 
th e  great p art o f  whom were C h r is t ia n s . . . ." ;  most o f  th e se  l a t t e r  were 
put to  work on th e  tranches and th e  con struction  o f  underground m ines.
See A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S ec reta ), R e laz ione , Busta 8 0 , Luca Francesco 
Barbaro, Prow ed itor-G enerale dell'A rm i in  Regno d i Candia, 1667; Hamme r , 
H isto ir e , I I I ,  p . 123.
8 . B.H.M ., VH (2182) ,  pp. 19- 2 1 .
9 . B i d . ,  p . 2 .
10. I b id . , passim .
11 . B ie exact number o f  mines exploded v a r ie s  considerab ly , 
although th er e  i s  a  concensus th a t t h is  year saw th e  ex p lo sio n  o f a t  
l e a s t  sev e ra l hundred. One source n otes th a t from J u ly  1 , 1667 u n t i l  
Ju ly  29 , 1667  th er e  were exploded a t  l e a s t  e ig h ty  m ines. B.N.M., VII 
(2182), pp. 15-29 . R elying p rim arily  on Nani, B igge and others p lace  
th e  number o f  s o r t ie s  a t about seventeen  fo r  th e  y ea r , th e  number o f  
Turkish a s sa u lt s  a t  th irty -tw o ,an d  th e  t o t a l  number o f  Turkish and 
Venetian mines exploded a t  between s ix  and seven hundred. Wilhelm  
B igge, La guerra d i Candia n e g li  anni 1667-69  (Turin, 1901), p . 15 
(H ereinafter re fer re d  to  as Guerra. ) See a lso  Romanin, S to r ia , pp. 
1+51- 1*52.
12. B igge, Guerra, pp. 11+-15; A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S ec reta ), 
R elazione, Busta 80 , Relazione d i Prow ed itor-G enerale dell'A rm i 
in  Regno d i Candia, Luca Francesco Barbaro, 1667 .
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13. "The c i t y  o f  Candia p r e se n t ly  has been b attered  day and 
n ig h t by th e  Turks -with e ig h t b a tte r ie s  o f  fo r ty  p ie c e s  so g re a t th a t  
fo r  th e  most p a rt th ey  are o f  120 pound ( lib b r e )  c a l ib e r . There have 
been d estroyed , however, in  many p a rts  b u ild in g s very  worthy o f  r e sp e c t , 
as th e  church o f  San Francesco, San S a lvatore , San P aolo, and o f  th e  
Capucchines, and th ere  have remained u n inhab itab le a l l  th e  houses o f  th e  
quarter o f  Sant'Andrea and o f  Sabionera; whence most o f  th e  fa m il ie s  o f  
th e  inh ab itants have withdrawn them selves in  c e r ta in  huts under th e  w a ll ,  
where th e  enemy cannon does n ot reach . The Grand V iz ie r  has ordered  
demolished a l l  th e  houses o f  th e  co u n try -s id e , lea v in g  standing * on ly  
th e  one he occup ies. He has opened th e  tr e n c h e s ...a n d  th er e  does n ot 
p ass a s in g le  day when th ey  (Turks) do n ot explode some m in e....O u r  
cannon can no longer damage them because o f  th e  h eigh t and th ick n e ss  
o f t h e ir  earthen ram parts." "Correspondenza M alta, 1645-69,"  A rchivio  
S to r ico  I ta lia n o , Part I I I ,  XLIX (1912), p . 77 . There were estim ated  
to  be in  Candia in  1667 about seven  thousand c iv i l i a n  in h a b ita n ts , 
many o f  whom were s t i l l  dependent upon th e  c i t y  fo r  su b s is te n c e s .
A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ) , R elazione, Busta 8 0 , Luca Francesco  
Barbaro, P row ed itor-G enerale dell'A rm i in  Regno d i  Candia, 1667 .
lU . B igge, Guerra, pp. 15 -1 6 . For example, in  1667 ,  th e  E lecto rs  
o f  Mainz and Cologne and th e  Bishops o f  Paderbom and Strassbourg sen t  
fou r hundred in fa n try  each; th e  E le cto r  o f  Bavaria promised two thousand 
men who never arr ived  although Bavarian troops had served  in  Candia s in c e  
1665 . Bnperor Leopold I  allow ed  r e c r u it in g  in  h is  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  sen t  
500,000 l ir a ,a n d  promised s e v e r a l thousand tr o o p s. In  1667 th e  Duke o f  
Savoy sen t money fo r  a b a tta lio n  o f  f i v e  hundred men and la t e r  re in fo r ce d  
i t .  Moreover, th e  s k i l l e d  Savoyard g en er a l, th e  Marquis de V i l la ,  was 
sen t t o  serve in  Candia in  th e  m id -l660’s  and stayed  u n t i l  h is  r e c a l l  
in  1667 . See L uig i Dalmazzo, "I Piem ontesi n e l la  guerra d i Candia 
(1644-69),"  M iscellanea  d i S to r ia  I t a l ia n s , X III (1909), pp. 35-52.
15. Ludwig von P astor , H istory  o f  th e  Popes, tr a n s . by Dorn 
E rnest G raff (London, 1 9 4 0 ), XXXI, pp. 121-122.
16 . Venice made every e f f o r t  t o  c u lt iv a te  th e  fren dsh ip  and 
support o f  th e  p o n t if f ;  in  accord w ith  t h i s  p o lic y ,  th e  fa m ily  o f  th e  
Pope, th e  R o s p ig lio s i , was in sc r ib e d  in  th e  Golden Books o f  Venetian  
n o b il i ty .  To add t o  t h i s  new warmth between Rome and Venice were th e  
many years o f  fr ie n d ly  r e la t io n s  th e  Republic had had w ith  Clement when 
he was Alexander V II’ s Secretary  o f  S ta te . See T erlinden, Clement IX 
e t  Candle, p . 65 .
17. The Venetian ambassador t o  Rone, Sagredo, wrote in  l 66l  
th a t  th e  Papal S ta tes  were indebted  by sane 39 ,000 ,000  scud i owed to  
about te n  d if fe r e n t banks. D esp ite t h is  deb t, however, papal cr ed it  
remained sound fo r  th e  shares in  th ese  banks were o ften  so ld  a t  premium 
p r ic e s .N ic o lo  Barozzi and Guglielmo Berchet ( e d s .) ,  Le r e la z lo n i d e g li
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s t a t i  Europei l e t t e  a l  Senato Am basciatori V eneziani n e l  sec o lo  
d ecisettim o  (V enice, 1856- 7 8 ) ,  I I ,  S er ie s  I I I ,  pp. 21*5^21*7.
(H ereinafter re fer re d  to  as R e la z io n i. )
18 . T e r lin d e n , Clement IX  e t  C andle, p . 76 .
19. Apparently th er e  arose some disagreem ent over th e  borders 
o f  Ferrara over which th e  Republic proved, in  P a sto r 's  op in ion , l e s s  
than agreeable t o  th e  new Pope. Die 'in g r a titu d e ' w ith  which Pastor  
charges Venice apparently d id  not s e r io u s ly  im pair Venetian r e la t io n s  
w ith  Clement. P a ste r , H istory  o f  th e  Popes, XXXI, pp. 1*18-1*19.
20. The Pope a lso  t r ie d  to  u se  h is  in flu en ce  t o  urge other  
C hristian  p rin ces  in  w estern  and ea stern  Europe to  support th e  war, 
e s p e c ia l ly  Poland in  th e  E ast. P astor , H istory  o f  th e  Popes, XXXI, 
pp. 1+13-Ulh, 1*18- 1*2 0 .
21. T erlinden, Clement IX e t  Candle, p . 63 .
22. The French even re fu sed  t o  a s s i s t  th e  desperate Ragusians 
who su ffe red  th e  d evasta tin g  earthquake o f  1667 b ecause, Terlinden  
su g g e sts , th e  French learned  th a t  th e  Ragusian p ort o f  Sain t-C roix  
would be o f  no p a r tic u la r  m aritime or m ilita r y  u se  t o  them aga inst  
Spanish N aples. T erlinden, Clement IX e t  Candle, pp. 38-1*0, 67- 6 8 .
23. B erchet, R e la z io n i, n ,  S er ie s  I I I ,  p . 335-
2k. T erlinden, Clement IX e t  Candle, p . 7k.
25. Several Turkish b a tte r ie s  harassed  th e  fo r tr e s s  a t  Sabion­
era as ea r ly  as February o f  1668 . B.N.M ., VII (200) Mossa Arma, p . 229, 
map 11. In March I f  1668, th e  Turks a ls o  attem pted a su rp rise  a tta ck  
on S tandia, but th e  Venetians learned  o f  th e  maneuver and managed to  
thwart i t .  A .S .V ., P ro w ed ito r  d i Armada (1221+), Lunar do Moro, Prow ed- 
i t o r  d ell'A rm i, March 16 ,  1668 .
26. B.N.M., VII (2183) ,  R elazione d e l S tato  n e l  quale s 'a t t r o -  
vavano l a  Piazza d i C a n d ia ...21 A p rile  1668. According t o  t h is  report  
th ere  were about U,7 0 0 'combatants inc lud ing  o f f ic e r s  but exclud ing th e  
s ic k  and wounded (a lso  exclud ing 1*00 so ld ie r s  o f  th e  Pope, 300 from 
Savoy, and 350 in  th e  cava lry ); w ith  th e  la b o r e r s , g a le o t t i ,  and guas- 
tadors or sappers counted th er e  may w e ll  have been about 11 ,000  persons  
in  a l l .  This number was la t e r  increased  by th e  ad d ition  o f  dozens o f  
companies brought in to  th e c i t y ,  ev e n tu a lly  bringing th e  number t o  
15,792 o f  which 11,131* were considered  ' e f f e c t iv e s ' .  See a ls o  B.N.M., 
VII (2 1 1 ) , R elazione d i Antonio Barbaro in  retorno d i P ro w ed ito r -  
Generale dell'A rm i in  Candia.
27. B.N.M., VII (2 1 1 ), R elazione d i Antonio Barbaro r ito r n o
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d i P row ed itor-G enerale dell'A rm i in  Candia. Mons. B ic h i -wrote to  
Cardinal R o sp ig lio s i in  September o f  1668 saying th a t  th e  Turkish  
army was very weak and numbered no more than about 15 ,000 men. See 
"Correspondenza M alta, 1645-69,"  XL3X (1912), p . 323-
28 . Antonio Barbaro, Prow ed itor-G enerale o f  th e  fo r tr e s s ,  
estim ated  th a t s ev e ra l T urkish-held  fo r tr e s s e s  could have been captured 
w ith  th e  a ss is ta n c e  o f  sev e ra l thousand more men and cava lry  and w ith  
th e  a id  o f  severa l more g a l le y s .  He noted  th e  weakness o f  th e  enemy 
p o s it io n  a t  Canea and Rettimo as w e ll  as at l e s s e r  fo r tr e s s e s  on th e  
is la n d . A su rp rise a tta ck  on Canea, he estim ated , would requ ire about 
four thousand in fa n try  and, in  th e  open, about e ig h t thousand in fa n try
and one thousand cavalry . See B.N.M. VII (211), R elazione d i Antonio
Barbaro r ito r n o  d i P row ed itor-G enerale dell'A rm i in  Candia, 1668,
pp. 322-323.
29. "Correspondenza M alta, 1645-69," XLIX (1 9 1 2 ), p .79- In  
appraising th e  s ta t e  o f  Candia's d e fe n se s , th e  Marquis da V il la  noted  
th a t th e  fo r t i f ic a t io n s  were g en er a lly  " in good cond ition"  w ith  ramparts, 
p a lisa d e s , cannon, and underground f o r t i f ic a t io n s  a l l  in  reputab le  
con d ition . See B.N.M. (657 ) ,  R elazione d el Marchese (Francesco V illa )  
d el s ta t e  d e lla  p iazza  d i Candia a tta c a ta  da Turchi come s i  trovana a l  
tempo d i sua partenza , 1668 .
30. B igge, Guerra, p . 44
31. Ib id . ,  pp. h7-50.
32. Quoted in  B igge , Guerra, pp. 55-56-
33- Romanin, S to r ia , pp. 1*56-57.
3l*. Hammer, H is to ir e ,  I I I ,p .  117.
35- B arozzi and B erchet, R e la z io n i, I I ,  S er ie s  I I I ,  pp. 85- 86 ,
339-3liO . See a lso  T erlinden, Clement IX e t  Candle, pp. 76-77 . Terlinden
n otes th a t Clement granted anyone volun teerin g  fo r  se r v ic e  in  Candia 
a p lenary indulgence and a ls o  agreed to  maintain two hundred p a id -  
in fa n try  throughout th e  w in ter a t  Candia. See a ls o  B igge , Guerra, p . 18 
B igge accepts th e  tr a d it io n a l f ig u r e  o f  one m ill io n  scudi and 800,000
scu d i as th e  proceeds derived  from th e suppression o f  th e  th re e  orders
and th e  s a le  o f  th e  Church o f  San Marco.
36 . T erlinden, Clement IV e t  Candle,  p . 140; P astor , H istory  
o f  th e  Popes, XXXI, pp. 423-421*.
37. T erlinden, Clement IX e t  Candie, pp. 103-107.
38. Ib id . ,  pp. 106-107.
39- I b id . , pp. 89 -91 , 110-111, 136-137.
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1*0. P ierre  Duparc, R ecu eil des in str u c tio n s  aux ambassadeurs 
e t  m in lstres  de France (P a r is, 1658), XXVI, p . 62; Terlinden, Clement 
IX e t  Candie, p . 96 , 109, 114. Diplom atic rapport between France and 
Venice was a ls o  improved when th e  V enetian ambassador, G iustin ian , 
was replaced  by  Jean M orosini. M orosini jo in ed  w ith  th e  new papal 
nuncio, B a r g e l l in i ,  t o  produce an atmosphere which was more conducive 
to  encouraging open French support fo r  th e  war a t  Candia.
4 l .  Romanin, S to r ia , pp. 455-1+56; T erlinden, Clement IX et 
Candie, pp. 93 -95 , 99 . The French con tig en t p rese n t a t  Candia in  
Candia in  1668 was under th e command o f  th e  Duke de l a  F eu illa d e; l ik e  
th o se  French who were to  fo llo w , th ey  demanded to  be p laced  a t th e  
most dangerous p o s it io n  and a lso  t o  make dangerous and o fte n  fo o lis h  
s o r t ie s ,  th e  r e s u lt s  o f  which were o fte n  tr a g ic .
k2. T erlinden, Clement IV e t  Candie, pp. 84 , 86-87; V a liero , 
H isto r ia , p . 698 .
43. Hammer, H is to ir e , p . 127. Hammer n o tes  th a t upon hearing  
th e  Venetian o f f e r  th e  Grand V iz ie r  answered saying: "We are not
merchants; we have enough money, and we w i l l  not renounce Candia a t  
any p r ic e !” See a lso  T erlinden, Clement IX e t  Candie, pp. 183-184.
44. The French continued to  remain extrem ely ca u tio u s, making 
every e f fo r t  to  p reserve co r d ia l r e la t io n s  w ith C onstantinop le. French  
troops and sh ip s sen t to  Candia were to  s a i l  tinder th e  p o n t if ic a l  
f la g ,  and French commanders were ordered not to  attem pt t o  prevent th e  
passage o f  any Turkish sh ip s through the D ardanelles. As f o r  the Pope, 
Louis needed h is  a s s is ta n c e  in  h elp in g  to  q u e ll d isse n s io n  w ith in  the  
c le r g y . Moreover, Louis hoped to  gain  support fo r  a French nominee to  
th e p o n t if ic a te .  A s ig n  o f  improving r e la t io n s  was th e  appointment
o f  Duke Frederic Maurice de B o u illio n  to  th e  C ardinalate in  August o f  
1669 . Terlinden, Clement IX e t  Candie, pp. 143-144, 152, 156, 169,
200- 201 .
45. P astor , H istory  o f  th e  Popes, XXXI, p . 425.
46. A .S .V ., P row ed itor  d i Armada (1224), 1665-1673, 1665-1666,
passim .
47. A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ), R elazione, Busta 75, R elazione  
d i Andrea Corner, Capitano-Generale da Ifer, 1667 .
i+8 . A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ), R e lazione, Busta 80, Luca 
Francesco Barbaro, P row ed itor-G enerale d ell'A rm i, 1667 .
49. A .S .V ., P row ed itor a l ia  Armar, F i lz a  21, n .n . ,  A p ril 13,
1669 .
50 . A .S .V ., C o lleg io  V (S e c r e ta ), R elazione, Busta 75 , Andrea 
Corner, Capitano-Generale da Mar, 1667 .
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51. v n  (2 1 1 ), pp. 3 4 l-3 1t4; RomaniB, S to r ia , p . 453-454; 
B igge , Guerra, pp. 30-31 . In t h is  b a t t le ,  th e  B a tt le  o f  F o d ella , over  
four hundred Turkish p risoners  were taken and one thousand C h ristian  
s la v e s  freed .
52. B igge, Guerra, pp. 38-40 .
53- "Correspondenza M alta, 1645-69," XL3X (1912), pp. 338-339- 
A pparently the J a n issa r ie s  rose in  r e v o lt  over the order to  execute  
th e  Su ltan ’s two o ther b ro th ers . Moreover, th e  J a n issa r ie s  demanded 
th a t the Sultan  reach a peace agreement w ith th e  V enetians w ith in  
fo r ty  days or be replaced  by h is  second b rother, Sulieman. As a r e ­
s u lt ,  Turkish fo r ces  a t  Candia in  th e  spring o f  1669 were in  something 
l e s s  than optimum co n d itio n , a f a c t  about which th e  weakened Venetians 
could do l i t t l e .
54. A .S .V ., P ro w ed ito r  a l ia  Armar (122k), Lorenzo C om er, 
P row ed itor  dall'Arm ar, May 18, 1669 , Candia.
55- B i g g e ,  G u e r r a ,  p p .  57-58 .
56. Hone o f  th e  French commanders, according to  T erlinden, 
were w ithout flaw ; th e  Due de N a v a ille , h im se lf, was ch aracter ized  by 
Terlinden as a man w ith  ’ in t r a c t ib le  p r id e '. T erlinden, Clement IX
e t C a n d i e ,  pp. 198-199- T h e  e x a c t  n u m b e r  of F r e n c h  t r o o p s  w e r e  a s  f o l l o w s :
5 ,2 9 0  .......................................... in fantry
535 .......................................... roya l guard
232 .......................................... o f f ic e r s
223 ...........................................musketeers o f  th e  k ing (horse)
328 .......................................... cavalry
6 ,8 0 8  TOTAL 
B igge, Guerra, p . 6l .
57. Quoted in  B igge, Guerra, pp. 70-71, n .2 . For a com plete 
d escr ip tio n  o f  th a t unfortunate French charge o f  June 2 4 -25 , s e e  B igge, 
Guerra, pp. 64-71 . See a ls o  a l e t t e r  o f  Card. R o s p ig lio s i  to  Nuncio 
B a r g e ll in i  in  Rome w r itten  on August 27, 1669 , c i te d  in  T erlinden,
Clement IX e t  Candie, pp. 344-345-
58. M orosini urged an a tta ck  on Sabionera, not Sant'Andrea 
where the p o s it io n  o f  th e a l l i e s  on land and sea would be l e s s  secure.
See T erlinden, Clement IX e t  Candie, p . 229- 230 .
59- B igge, Clement IX e t  Candie, pp. 74-80.
60. A .S .V ., P ro w ed ito r  a l ia  Armada (1224), Lorenzo Corner, 
P row ed itor  a l ia  Armar, August 10 , 1669 , Candia. Corner reports how 
the French in s is te d  on departing d esp ite  the su p p lic a tio n s o f  R o sp ig lio s i .
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He a ls o  n otes how French troops were c la n d e stin e ly  removed a t  n igh t 
t o  th e ir  sh ip s: "Every n ig h t, a few a t  a  tim e , th ey  tak e them (t h e ir
men) aboard th e ir  sh ip s , producing w ith enormous e f f e c t  a great lo s s  
to  t h i s  d efense and inducing in  th e  remaining men a great lo s s  o f  s p i r i t . ,  
s p i r i t . . . . "  Corner g iv es  R o sp ig lio s i  c r e d it  fo r  tr y in g  to  persuade 
th e  French to  remain; R o sp ig lio s i , "with tremendous z e a l ap p lied  h im self  
to  t h i s  urgent em ergency ...."  See a lso  B igge , Guerra, p . 80; and 
T erlinden, Clement IX e t  Candie, pp. 233-234.
61 . B igge, G uerra, pp. 52-85 .
62 . A .S .V ., P ro w ed ito r  a l ia  Armada (1224), Lorenzo Corner, 
P ro w ed ito r  dell'Armada, Candia, August 2 5 , 1669 ; B igge, Guerra, pp. 89-90 .
63 . Charles H. Gerin, "L'expeditione des Francais a Candie en 
1669,"  Revue des Q uestions H istoriq ue , XXV (Jaunary, 1879) ,  pp. 105-107, 
111-112. See a ls o ,  T erlinden, Clement IX e t  Candie, pp. 267-275; B igge, 
Guerra, pp. 85- 88 , 120.
64 . B.N.M., VII (1566), R elazione (anonymous), pp. 201-202;
A .S .V ., P ro w ed ito r  a l ia  Armada (1224), Lorenzo Corner, P ro w ed ito r  
dell'Armada, August 25, 1669 , Candia; B igge, Guerra, pp. 90-91-
65- B igge, Guerra, pp. 92-94 .
6 6 . B.H.M., V II (1556), R elazione (anonymous), pp. 204-205.
There were su ggestion s th a t th e  fo r tr e s s  be mined and destroyed  in  
one great ex p lo sio n , but t h is  was considered  to o  dangerous fo r  the  
evacuation  o f  th e  su rv ivors . Others suggested  th a t th e  crews o f  the  
g a lle y s  be employed in  th e  con struction  o f  new b a ttlem en ts , but th is  
a lso  was r e je c te d  because i t  would have exposed th e  armada to  capture, 
an event which would have condemned fo r  c e r ta in  th e  fo r tr e s s .  See 
Romanin, S to r ia , pp. *<62.
67 . Peace n eg o tia tio n s had been underway alm ost continuously  
even though i t  proved in c re a sin g ly  d i f f i c u l t  to  fin d  a prominent 
Venetian w il l in g  to  su ffe r  th e hum ilia tion s and harassments encountered  
in  Constantinople. In August, 1669 ,  A lv ise  Molin, th e V enetian repre­
s e n ta t iv e , rece iv ed  th e l a s t  p roposal concerning a d iv is io n  o f  th e  is la n d .  
He was perm itted to  cede even th e  fo r tr e s s  a t  Suda, an o f f e r  which th e  
Grand V iz ie r  r e jec te d .S ee  Romanin, S to r ia , pp. 461-462.
68 . B.N.M., V II (1566), R elazione (anonymous, pp. 208-211.
69 . Ib id . ,  pp. 212 .
70. D escrip tion  o f  the c i t y  by J . M. Sch eith er (a  contemporary 
m ilita r y  h is to r ia n ) as quoted in  B igge, Guerra, p . 97, n . l .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
248
71. A .S .V ., P ro w ed ito r  a l ia  Armada (1 224), Lorenzo Corner, 
P ro w ed ito r  d e l l ’Armada, September 10, 1669 , Candia. A copy o f  th e  
peace terms can be found in  V II (1566) ,  R elazione d e g l i  u lt im i
s u c c e s s i  d i Candia (Anonymous), 1669 , pp. 213-214.
72. Angelo de Benvenuti, "IL d iv e r s iv e  in  Dalmazia d e lla  
guerra d i Candia," La R iv is ta  Dalm atica, Part I I ,  XXV (A p r il, 1954),
PP. 33-34 . See a lso  Hammer, H is to ir e , H I ,  p . 134.
73 . B.N.M ., V II (1 566), R elazione d e g l i  u lt im i s u c c e s s i  d i  
Candia (Anonymous), pp. 217-218; B igge, Guerra, p . 97 .
74 . See B.N.M ., V II (1566) ,  A rringa f a t t a  n e l  Serenissim o  
Maggior C on sig lio  d a l l ’E cceH en tissim o Signor Giovanni Sagredo, Pro- 
curatore e C avaliere a favore d e ll 'E c c e lle n tis s im o  Signor Capitano- 
G enerale, Francesco M orosini, p . 225, and Arringa fa t ta  n e l  Serenissim o  
Maggior C on sig lio  d a l "noble uomo Antonio Correr contro i l  Capitano- 
Generale Francesco M orosini, 20 Decembre 1670, p . 221. See a ls o  Romanin, 
S to r ia , pp. 467-470.
75. T erlinden, Clement IX e t  Candie, p . 307; P a s to r ,' H istory  
o f  the Popes, XXXI, pp. *£9-430.
76. T erlinden s ta t e s  th a t -while L ou is’ in t e r e s t  in  th e  war 
was not t o t a l ly  d is in te r e s te d , h is  z e a l "was none th e  l e s s  tr u ly  s in ­
ce re ."  Terlinden, Clement IX e t  Candie, p . 244. Moreover, th e  Duke de 
N a v a ille s  was e x ile d  from court upon h is  return  to  France fo r  a  period  
o f  th ree  y ea r s , and th e  count d i Vivonne su ffe red  th e  anger o f  th e k ing . 
B igge, Guerra, p . 94.
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CONCLUSION
In view  o f  th e general d ec lin e  o f  Venice during th e  seventeenth  
century, i t  would appear r e la t iv e ly  sim ple to  d ism iss th e  c o lla p se  o f  
Candia as th e  product o f in e v ita b le  fo r c e s . In doing s o ,  however, we 
would commit a ser iou s h is t o r ic a l  error . The more c lo s e ly  we examine 
th e  ’d ec lin e  o f  Venice' in  the seventeenth  century, th e  more we are  
made to  r e a l iz e  th e  importance o f  tak ing  in to  con sideration  th e  many 
exceptions which an h is t o r ic a l  g en er a liz a tio n  frequently  ign ores . The 
same caution  must he applied  t o  any study o f  th e  Candian war. By ig ­
noring th e  many m ilita r y , p o l i t i c a l ,  and economic p a r tic u la r s  o f  th is  
fr u s tr a tin g  and dramatic ep isode , we run th e  r is k  o f  s a c r if ic in g  the  
w ar's h is t o r ic a l  importance to  th e  v a n ity  o f  g lib n e ss .
As tem pting as i t  may he to  reduce a l l  m ilita r y  fa c to r s  in  th e  
Candian war to  a m atter o f a t t r i t i o n ,  we should keep in  mind th a t the  
war was very much a stru g g le  o f  human courage and re so u r cefu ln ess .
Without q u e stio n , th e armies o f  th e  Sultan  remained superior on land  
w h ile th e Venetian armadas u su a lly  went unchallenged a t sea . But in  
order to  understand why th is  g e n e r a lity  was e s s e n t ia l ly  tr u e , one must 
f i r s t  d ir ec t c lo se r  a tten tio n  to  th e  many s u b t le t ie s  o f  m ilita r y  h is to r y .
F ir s t ,  one must appreciate th e  q u a lity  o f  the Turkish fo e  w ith  
which th e V enetian defenders were confronted . Friar Roberto Solaro  
wrote in  1650 th a t th e  Turkish army a t Candia was "the flow er o f  Turkey, 
not b eing , as many b e l ie v e ,  th a t 100 C hristians can subdue 2 ,000 Turks; 
here i t  i s  th e  contrary, th a t 1 ,000  Turks have more and more tim es
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subdued 2 ,000  o f  o u rs ."  T urk ish  s o ld ie r s  in  g e n e ra l  d isp la y e d  con­
s id e ra b le  courage and p e r s is te n c e ;  a t ta c k in g  a  T u rk ish  p o s i t io n  by
s o r t i e  o f te n  proved c o s t ly  and as w e ll f u t i l e ,  f o r  t h e i r  s o ld ie r s  and
2
la b o re rs  u s u a lly  q u ic k ly  re p a ire d  th e  damage. The T u rk ish  as w e ll as 
th e  V enetian  army f re q u e n tly  had men •whose courage , d i s c ip l in e ,  and
3
a g g ress iv en ess  was u n q u estio n ed .
F urtherm ore , th e  Turks a t  Candia seemed adep t a t  le a rn in g  from 
ex p erien ce  and from th e  t a c t i c s  o f  t h e i r  a d v e rsa ry . Renegade V enetians 
and o th e r  w este rn  Europeans f r e q u e n tly  in s t r u c te d  th e  T urk ish  tro o p s  
i n  th e  a r t s  o f  w a rfa re , from th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f  m ines and th e  hand ling  
o f  a r t i l l e r y  t o  th e  d e fe n s iv e  weaknesses o f  th e  f o r t r e s s  o f  Candia i t ­
s e l f .  As th e  war dragged on , T u rk ish  o f f ic e r s  became e s p e c ia l ly  ex­
p erie n ce d  in  th e  use  o f  p a r a l l e l  t r e n c h e s ,  a  tec h n iq u e  l a t e r  made famous 
in  Europe by Vauban. The most p r o f i t a b le  ex p e rien c e  g a in e d  by th e  Turk­
i s h  en g in e ers  was in  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f  m ines and m ine t u n n e l s , a
4
m i li t a r y  dev ice  so e x te n s iv e ly  and u s e f u lly  employed a t  C andia.
In  a d d it io n  t o  th e  m i l i t a r y  q u a l i t i e s  o f  th e  T u rk ish  army, th e  
V enetians them selves committed s e v e ra l  s t r a t e g ic  e r r o r s  d u rin g  th e  
course  o f  th e  war which f a c i l i t a t e d  th e  ca p tu re  o f  Candia. One o f  th e  
b a s ic  w eaknesses o f  th e  V enetian  m i l i t a r y  command was th e  ch ro n ic  la c k  
o f  u n i ty .  This n o t on ly  a f fe c te d  th e  imm edia te  ch a in  o f  command, bu t 
i t  a ls o  ten d ed  to  l im i t  th e  v alu e  o f  j o i n t  la n d -a n d -se a  o p e r a t io n s ,  so 
much so t h a t  th e  armada and th e  lan d  fo r c e s  o f te n  seemed to  fu n c tio n  
as s e p a ra te  u n i t s .  One a n a ly s t  o f th e  war has gone as  f a r  as t o  con­
c lude th a t  "w ithou t doubt one must c o n s id e r a s  th e  p r in c ip l e  cause o f
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th e  f a l l  o f  C an d ia .. . th e  la c k  o f  a  s tro n g  u n i ty  o f  command on th e  sea  
and la n d .11 ^
A nother f a t a l  e r r o r  o f s t r a te g y  was th e  f a i l u r e  t o  embark on a  
sy s te m a tic  p o lic y  o f  b lockad ing  th e  enem y's p o r t s .  A f te r  t h e  g re a t  
trium phs o f  th e  m id -l6 5 0 's  and th e  i n a c t i v i t y  o f  th e  w ar d u rin g  th e  
y e a rs  t h a t  fo llo w ed , th e  p o lic y  o f  m a in ta in in g  y e a r ly  b lockades a t  th e  
main T u rk ish  p o r t s  f e l l  in to  d e su e tu d e .^  More and more th e  armada be­
came a  mere appendage o f  th e  army s ta t io n e d  a t  C andia, lo s in g  th e  
i n i t i a t i v e  and ag g re ss iv e n e ss  which had c h a ra c te r iz e d  i t s  days under 
Giacomo da R iv a , Lorenzo M arce llo , and Lazzaro Mocenigo. U nderstandab ly  
th e  n a v a l re so u rc e s  o f  th e  R epub lic  were l im i te d  and th e  t a s k  c o n fro n t­
ing  i t  enormous. As Andrea C orner n o ted  in  1667, w ith  a  " s e a  so  v a s t
i t  would no t be p o s s ib le  to  p re v e n t t h e  a r r i v a l  o f  a l l  a id  t o  t h e
,.7
T u rk ish  arm ies a t  Candia. M oreover, th e  number o f  sh ip s  upon which 
th e  Grand V iz ie r  was a b le  to  draw seemed n e a r ly  in e x h a u s t ib le ,  w hether
th ey  came from F ren ch , D utch, o r E n g lish  m erchan ts o r  from th e  squad-
8rons o f  h is  beys and p ash a s . Yet a l l  th e s e  f a c to r s  can in  no way ex­
cuse o r  e x p la in  th e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  th e  once renowned V enetian  navy to  
m ain ta in  a  dete rm ined  and s p e c if ic  s t r a t e g ic  p o lic y  a t  s ea  d u rin g  th e
l a s t  y e a rs  o f  th e  c o n f l i c t .  No p o l ic y  i n  t h i s  case was in  many ways
0
worse th a n  one which m ight have been in  some ways u n s a t i s f a c to r y .  Be­
yond th e  e v e r-p re s e n t q u es tio n  o f  re s o u rc e s  and manpower, th e r e  a ls o  
la y  a t  i s s u e  v e ry  'human' f a c to r s  r e la t in g  to  m i l i t a r y  t a c t i c s  and 
q u e s tio n s  o f  s t r a te g y .
S o c ia lly  and f i n a n c ia l ly  as w e l l ,  th e  Candian war has i t s  own
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h i s to r y ,  one -which, in v o lv e s  th e  d i r e c t  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  war on changing 
V enetian  s o c ie ty .  The war cannot be s in g le d  o u t a s  th e  c a ta s t ro p h ic  
event which in su re d  th e  d e c lin e  o f  V enice in  t h e  sev e n te en th  c e n tu ry , 
b u t i t  c e r ta in ly  was a  m ajor burden and f r u s t r a t i o n  f o r  a  R epublic  a l ­
read y  in  a  s t a t e  o f  decay. U nquestionably  th e  war a c c e le ra te d  a  com­
m e rc ia l  e ro s io n  w hich  had a lre a d y  been  underway and removed even fu r ­
th e r  any chance t h a t  V enice m ight r e v e r s e  w hat seemed t o  be an in e x o r­
a b le  d e c l in e .  The w artim e co n d itio n s  d im in ish ed  and in  c e r ta in  ca ses
com plete ly  ru in e d  many o f  th e  L evan tine m arkets which V enetian  m er- 
10chan ts had t r i e d  t o  p re s e rv e .
In  a  p u re ly  f in a n c i a l  sen se  th e  V enetian  s t a t e  was a b le  t o  w ith ­
s tan d  th e  a d d i t io n a l  p re s s u re s  o f th e  Candian w ar w ith  r e l a t i v e  e a s e , 
f o r  w ith in  a  s h o r t  tim e  o f  i t s  c o n c lu sio n  th e  p u b lic  d eb t c o n tra c te d  
as a  r e s u l t  o f  war had been  reduced  t o  a  m anageable s u m .^  Even in  
c e r ta in  a re a s  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  economic s t r e n g th ,  th e  V e n e tian  economy 
rem ained la r g e ly  u n a f fe c te d  by th e  w ar; lu x u ry  i te m s , f i s h ,  and such 
in v i s ib l e  ex p o rts  as banking  s e rv ic e s  c o n tin u ed  t o  be v i t a l  elem ents 
12in  th e  p o st-w ar economic s t r u c tu r e .  The r e a l  damage wrought by th e  
war was in  th e  d i s lo c a t io n  o f  t r a d e  brough t on by n e a r ly  tw e n ty -f iv e  
y e a rs  o f c o n f l i c t .  I t  was t h i s  g e n e ra l d is ru p t io n  o f t r a d e  w hich 
fo rc e d  V enetian  m erchants from a  co m p e titiv e  m arket and a ls o  enab led  
th e  a g g re ss iv e  m erchants o f  th e  n o rth e rn  European c o u n tr ie s  to  became 
more s o l id ly  en trenched  in  th e  commercial l i f e  o f  th e  E ast th an  th ey  
had ever been. When coupled  w ith  th e  a n tiq u a te d  commercial p r a c t ic e s  
and custom d u tie s  so f r e q u e n tly  encoun tered  a t  Venice and w ith  th e
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ev e r in c re a s in g  co m p e titio n  o f  th e  c i t i e s  o f  th e  T erraferm a , th e  ad d i­
t i o n a l  burdens brough t on by th e  war p la c e d  V enetian  commerce in  a 
d e l i c a t e  and tenuous p o s i t i o n . V e n i c e  rem ained th roughou t th e  cen­
tu r y  a  p o p u la r c le a r in g  house f o r  th e  commerce o f  D alm atia and c e r ta in  
p o r t s  o f  th e  A d r ia tic ,  b u t ,  l i k e  P o r tu g a l o f  th e  s ix te e n th  c e n tu ry , 
she more and more assumed th e  r o l e  o f  t h e  p a s s iv e  m erchant who handled
and t r a n s p o r te d  m erchandise b u t i n  whose hands th e  com m ercial and
ill-m an u factu rin g  i n i t i a t i v e  no lo n g e r rem ained .
The d i r e c t  e f f e c t  o f th e  war on th e  s o c ia l  l i f e  o f  V enice i s  d i f ­
f i c u l t  t o  d e te rm in e . Monsignor P an n o cc h iesch i, a  contem porary o b se rv er, 
saw few obvious p u b lic  e f f e c t s  on th e  c i t y ’s populace b rough t on by th e  
w a r ^  and a  n o ted  modern h i s to r i a n  o f  V enice has argued t h a t  th e  m oral 
and p o l i t i c a l  c lim a te  p re se n t a t  th e  end o f  th e  ce n tu ry  was s u b s ta n t i ­
a l l y  no worse th a n  i t  had been a t  th e  b e g in n in g .1^ A lthough g e n e ra lly  
i t  seems t h a t  most o f  Venice was on ly  p e r ip h e r a lly  touched  by  th e  p re s ­
su re s  o f  th e  w ar, th e  r e la t iv e l y  few in d ic e s  o f  s o c ia l  b eh a v io r a v a i l ­
a b le  t o  th e  h i s to r i a n  p re se n t som ething o f  a  mixed p ic tu r e .
For example, i f  one examines th e  number o f opera l i b r e t t i  w r itten  
and published  between 1637 and 1699, one w i l l  fin d  none fo r  16h6 and 
on ly  one fo r  161*7- Since l 6h-6 i s  th e  only year fo r  which a t le a s t  one 
l ib r e t t o  has not y e t  been found, i t  may be th a t in  t h is  p a r tic u la r ly  
d if f i c u l t  war year th ere  was very  l i t t l e  money fo r  such "cultural"  and 
"non-m ilitary" ventures as opera. A fter  th e  l a t e  l61*0's, however, the  
number o f  published  l i b r e t t i  remains f a i r ly  constant throughout th e  
century , a fa c t  perhaps r e f le c t in g  th e  in c id e n ta l e f fe c t s  o f  the sub­
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sequent years o f  th e  war. I t  i s  a lso  in te r e s t in g  to  note th at there  
was apparently money a v a ila b le , a lb e it  from p r iv a te  so u rces , fo r  the  
remodeling or recon stru ction  o f  Venetian th e a te r s;  such renovation  
occurred at th re e  d if fe r e n t th ea ters  during th e  course o f  th e  war in  
165k , 1655 and again in  l 6 6 l . 1^
There e x is t  a lso  some demographic f ig u r e s  fo r  seventeenth-century  
Venice which, though ap p licab le  to  th e  century at la r g e , a lso  o ffe r  
some c lu es  as to  th e  s o c ia l  e f f e c t s  o f  th e  Candian s tr u g g le . The num­
ber o f  marriages recorded in  V enice , fo r  in s ta n c e , drops s l ig h t ly  during 
th e  f i r s t  few years o f  th e  Candian war; frum l6k6 t o  1650 in c lu s iv e
th ere  was a d ec lin e  o f  about 8 percent in  th e  number l i s t e d  fo r  th e
previous f iv e  y ea r s , from 5>831 to  5,356 in  a l l .  In  th e  ten -y ea r period  
from l6 k l to  1651 th ere  were an average o f 1 ,119  marriages a y ea r , but
fo r  th e  th ree-y ea r period  between l6k5 and 16U7 th er e  were a t o t a l  o f  
19306 fewer marriages than th e  average. These f ig u r e s  would seem to  
imply th a t th e  pessimism generated during th e  f i r s t  years o f  th e  war 
may have had a d ep ressive e f fe c t  on th e  t o t a l  number o f  m arriages.
L ikew ise, th ere was an o v e r a ll population  decrease in  V enice w hich, 
in  p a r t , may r e f le c t  th e  arduous warfare w ith  th e  Turks during th e  la s t  
h a lf  o f  th e  century. In l62k th ere were lk l ,6 2 5  persons in  V enice , and 
a fte r  the plague o f  1630 about 102,1^3 in  1633. For th e  next n ine
years th e  population  recovered rap id ly  u n t i l  in  l6h2 th ere  were recorded
some 120,307 p erson s, an in crease  o f  1 7 -1 /2  percen t. A fter 16U2, how­
ever , th e r a te  o f  growth subsided considerab ly so th a t in  1696 there  
were only 138,067 persons l iv in g  in  V enice, a ra te  o f  increase o f only
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lU—1/2 percent and an absolute increase sm aller than th a t gained in
20only the  nine years from 1633 u n t i l  l6h2. Undoubtedly, much of th is  
demographic decline can be re la te d  to  the  economic decay of Venice and 
the  general s h if t  to  the mainland; nev erth e less , these s ta t i s t i c s  may 
p a r t ia l ly  r e f le c t  the  e ffe c ts  th a t  tw enty-five years of warfare had on 
Venetian society  a t  la rg e .
Such then are a few o f  th e  r e la t iv e ly  l im ite d  in d ic e s  o ffere d  the  
s o c ia l  and economic h is to r ia n  o f  th e Candian war. C erta in ly  no war i s  
lack ing  in  complex is su e s  and the net r e s u lt  o f  a c o n f l ic t  a s prolonged  
as th a t fought a t Candia cannot be e a s i ly  reduced to  sim ple term s.
Bryon re fer re d  to  Candia as V enice's Troy, and in  seme ways th e war was 
ju s t  such a burden. In r e tr o sp e c t , th e  war must be viewed l e s s  p o e ti­
c a l ly .  I t  was a c o n f l ic t  which in  many ways was dramatic and tr y in g  
but one w hich, in  th e  context o f  seventeenth -century  V enice , was n e ith er  
t o t a l ly  unique nor com pletely ca tastrop h ic .
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